We agree with Helmuth and colleagues that a return to the theoretical foundations of authenticity is warranted. The roots of authenticity are in existential humanist philosophy, despite the argument (in Walumbwa et al., 2008 and elsewhere) that it lies in social psychology or in positive psychology (Luthans and Avolio, 2003). These arguments are somewhat misleading because the development of authenticity in social psychology (e.g., Kernis and Goldman, 2006) explicitly drew from existential philosophical roots. Thus, we agree with Helmuth et al.'s contention that the roots of AL are in existential philosophy. Helmuth et al. draw on those roots to lay out a distinction between authentic actions and authenticity, and they use data to explore whether the former has unique value over the latter both empirically and conceptually. We commend Helmuth et al. for exploring this question and providing evidence for their ideas. We are also hopeful that this separation will inspire future work that might map the nomological network of AL. For instance, research might explore authenticity as social cognition of the leader (self-referential), authentic actions as their actual behavior (self-referential), and perceived authentic action of a leader as a judgment or evaluation of observers (relational view of authentic action). With these points of agreement and convergence, we believe that a strong foundation for a conversation is in place, and we now turn to points where our views diverge or extend in new directions from Helmuth et al