With technology advancements and becoming prevalent in everyday lives, the need for robust and comprehensive security measures is growing. To defend against brute force type of attacks, encryption algorithms have been used to keep user information on hardware safe from outside influences. However, such counter measures are vulnerable to non-invasive side-channel attacks. The direct attacks are used to go after vulnerabilities in algorithm while a side channel attack focuses on analyzing certain physical characteristics of the hardware and using statistical calculations to gain access to private information. In this work, we explore a type of side channel attacks that uses the systems Direct Memory Access (DMA) protocol to compromise the system and later propose a lightweight authentication scheme that identifies the compromised chips and mitigate such attach and makes the system resilient to corrupted hardware without modifications to either the physical hardware or the protocols of the system. The scheme provides protection by generating a unique identifier for trusted hardware and storing the identifiers in a database on the system, allowing only hardware that matches the identifiers to have access to the system and the system's memories.