CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PEASANT RESISTANCE IN THE UKRAINE, 1927-1933

by

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ABSTRACT

LARRY NEVIL SLAWSON. Crime and Punishment: Peasant Resistance in the Ukraine, 1927-1933. (Under the direction of DR. STEVEN SABOL)

Between 1927 and 1933, the Soviet Union underwent numerous social, political, and economic changes under collectivization and the "First Five-Year Plan." In their struggle to industrialize, the Soviet regime often resorted to excessive grain-procurement policies that aimed to extract maximum amounts of grain from the peasantry. These policies, in turn, sparked great social unrest across the Soviet countryside, as peasants rebelled against these "excesses" to protect themselves and their families amidst Soviet encroachment. This thesis provides an analysis of peasant resistance on a regional level through an analysis of the Ukraine between 1927 and 1933. It argues that peasant resistance varied dramatically across the country's interior, with particular regions engaging in more-violent forms of resistance than others. By identifying high-resistance zones in the Ukraine, this thesis situates peasant rebellions in the context of the Holodomor as these regions appear to have suffered higher fatality rates than less-violent areas of the Ukraine.

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> *"Where is it I've read that someone condemned to death says or thinks, an hour before his death, that if he had to live on some high rock, on such a narrow ledge that he'd only room to stand, and the ocean, everlasting darkness, everlasting solitude, everlasting tempest around him, if he had to remain standing on a square yard of space all his life, a thousand years, eternity, it were better to live so than to die at once! Only to live, to live and live! Life, whatever it may be!...How true it is!"*
>
> --Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*[1]

Between the years 1927 and 1933, food shortages and famine devastated the Soviet landscape and culminated in a period of great social and political unrest as peasants across the Soviet Union increasingly chose to rebel against collectivized agriculture. In response to growing hunger and abuse from the Soviet regime, peasants actively pursued methods to resist Stalin's collectivization drives in order to escape complete government control over both their lives and prosperity. This thesis provides a regional analysis of the resistance strategies employed by peasants and examines the patterns of rebellion that emanated from the Ukraine between 1927 (the beginning of collectivization) and 1933 (the end of the Great Famine). It argues that resistance to collectivization in the Ukraine followed many different forms of aggression, and varied in intensity across the numerous cities, districts, and *oblasts*[2] (regions) of the country's interior. Through an exploration of resistance patterns, this thesis argues that geography, history, culture, and local customs all played a substantial role in the development of peasant attitudes toward the Soviet state. The result was that Ukrainian peasants,

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[1] Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment,* trans. Constance Garnett (Ontario: Harper Perennial Classics, 2013), 173-174.

[2] The term *oblast* refers to a large administrative district composed of several, smaller *raions.*

particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev, rebelled more openly and violently than other, less-violent regions such as Odessa and the Crimea due to cultural differences and variations that existed in peasant-State relations across the Ukraine.

To understand the scope and magnitude of the variations that existed, this thesis examines four separate oblasts of the Ukraine, which include Odessa, Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kiev. While data on resistance strategies exist in other localities of the Ukraine, evidence of rebellious actions are both abundant and highly documented in these areas. Given the strong geographical, historical, and cultural particularities represented by each of these oblasts, an analysis of these four areas allows for both a clearer and deeper understanding of resistance patterns to emerge.

The implications of this approach are profound. By suggesting that peasant resistance to collectivization varied significantly in the Ukraine, this study alludes to a possible trend that existed during the 1932 Great Famine. Although an in-depth analysis of the famine and its causes remains outside the scope (and focus) of this study, resistance patterns in the Ukraine may provide critical insight into the genocidal aspects of this disaster. If we are to follow the logic of this study, the evidence suggests that more rebellious regions of the Ukraine suffered higher starvation (and fatality) rates than less-violent regions. Higher fatality rates, in part, derived from Soviet attempts to neutralize pockets of Ukrainian nationalism before it spread further – an aspect discussed more in depth by historian, Timothy Snyder.[3] Thus, the selection of Odessa, Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kiev serve a dual purpose in this study. Not only did these *oblasts*

[3] Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

exhibit various degrees of resistance to collectivization, but they also experienced large differences in fatality rates following the 1932 famine, as seen in Figure 1.1:



FIGURE 1: FATALITY RATES OF THE 1932 GREAT FAMINE IN UKRAINE[4]

Both Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev (high-resistance zones) suffered fatality rates that resulted in a 25 percent (or more) decline in population.[5] Odessa and the Crimea (passive zones), in contrast, suffered fatality rates of 10 to 15 percent, respectively.[6] Although the focus of this study remains too limited (geographically) to determine whether the Soviets intentionally tried to starve high-resistance areas of the Ukraine between 1932-1933, an analysis of resistance patterns (against collectivization) helps to confirm the work of prior

[4] "Political Map of the 'Holodomor' Ukrainian Famine-Genocide of 1932-33." Holodomorct.org. Accessed October 26, 2016. http://www.holodomorct.org/Holodomor-1932-1933-political-map.html.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.

historians, such as Robert Conquest[7] and Timothy Snyder,[8] who stressed the genocidal aspects of the Ukraine Famine.

SOURCES

To substantiate each of my claims, the following chapters rely on a wide array of primary documents drawn from American, Ukrainian, Canadian, Russian, and Polish sources. In particular, government records from the "Security Service of the Ukraine" (SBU), memoirs from the 1988 "U.S. Commission on the Great Famine," as well as archival sources from government offices in Odessa, Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev all contribute significantly to the pool of resources incorporated in this work. These sources include (but are not limited to) diplomatic reports, statistics from the "Unified State Political Administration" (OGPU), letters, correspondences between Soviet officials, memoirs, telegrams, minutiae of meetings, data from the Central Intelligence Agency, and government data collected about local communities. Finally, this thesis also relies heavily on published (and unpublished) sources from Eastern Europe, the United States, Canada, and the Russian Federation. The diverse nature of these sources, in turn, provides a wide assortment of views and perspectives that allow for a more balanced and objective view of peasant resistance strategies to emerge when examined in their historical context.

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[7] Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
[8] Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin,* 41.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

In order to understand the regional variations of peasant resistance that occurred in the Ukraine, it is important to examine the historiographic foundations that inform this thesis. Historical interpretations regarding peasant resistance against the Soviet regime are abundant. Scholars, however, remain sharply divided over questions regarding the strategies, efforts, and regional differences of peasant resistance in the Soviet Union. Such contentious questions include, what made peasant revolts possible across Soviet territory? Did resistance efforts vary depending on region and locality in the Soviet Union? What role did gender play in revolts? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, did peasant resistance tactics represent a universal endeavor, or did revolts stem predominantly from local and regional disputes? More specifically, did particular regions of the Soviet Union resist more than others? If so, why?

PRE-1991 SCHOLARSHIP (COLD WAR ERA)

In the late 1960s, historian Moshe Lewin published the landmark book, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization*,[9] which painstakingly detailed Stalin's plan to implement collectivized agriculture throughout the Soviet countryside, as well as the negative reaction it generated amongst the peasantry. Lewin argued that peasants viewed the arrival of collective farming as an unwelcome event across the Soviet interior, and often chose to resist its implementation "in every way that was open to them."[10] While Lewin posits that peasants initially resisted the invasion of Stalin's

[9] Moshe Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968).
[10] Ibid., 419.

cadres in a more passive manner (i.e., through protests and a refusal to join the *kolkhoz* farms), he argued that "opposition grew more violent and more vociferous" once peasants realized that Soviet officials possessed no intention to abandon the countryside.[11] Lewin's interpretation viewed fighting, unrest, and disorder as a particular characteristic of "better-off peasants, for whom the *kolkhoz* represented a threat" to both their economic and social interests.[12]

For the broader "mass of the peasantry," Lewin argued that poorer peasants often "remained hesitant and non-committal, suspicious, and above all afraid" during the early years of collectivization.[13] Despite this hesitancy, Lewin concluded that the ability of *kulaks*[14] (wealthy peasants) to successfully rebel against Soviet authorities stemmed from the incorporation of lower-class peasants into their ranks. *Kulaks* accomplished this, he argued, by spreading rumors that reflected the moral misconduct of Soviet officials.[15] According to Lewin, convincing lower-class peasants to join the *kulak*-led rebellion was made easy because of the peasantry's innate "mistrust of the regime and its intentions" that stemmed directly from years of mistreatment under Tsarist rule.[16]

The politics of the Cold War forced Lewin to base his assertions on a limited number of primary sources because the Soviet government often denied foreign scholars access to archival holdings. Despite these shortcomings, Lewin's contribution to the field of Soviet history suggested that peasant resistance flowed from a universal effort to

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[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., 419-420.
[14] In Russian culture, "kulak" is a general term that refers to the wealthy, affluent members of the peasantry class.
[15] Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet*, 424.
[16] Ibid., 423-424.

dislodge Stalin's grip over the countryside. Moreover, his work revealed the importance of lower-class peasants among the *kulaks*, and the need for social-class cooperation to coordinate attacks against collectivization.

Historian Eric Wolf expanded on these points in his work, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (1968).[17] Although the focus of Wolf's book revolved around worldwide peasant revolts, and not on the Soviet Union, specifically, his study revealed that peasant rebellions often developed through the cooperation of social-classes against higher echelons of authority. Similar to Lewin, Wolf argued that lower-class peasants "are often merely passive spectators of political struggles" and "are unlikely to pursue the course of rebellion, unless they are able to rely on some external power to challenge the power which constrains them."[18] His study argued that "the decisive factor in making a peasant rebellion possible lies in the relation of the peasantry to the field of power which surrounds it."[19] For Soviet peasants, Wolf's scholarship underscored Lewin's argument and suggested that this "external power" was fulfilled by the abilities of the *kulaks* to recruit lower-class elements to their cause.[20]

In the mid-1980s scholars gained tremendous access to Soviet archives due to the policies of *Glasnost*[21] and *Perestroika*[22] that advocated a newfound openness to the

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[17] Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).
[18] Ibid., 290.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] The term "Glasnost" refers to a 1986 governmental policy instituted by former Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. The policy promoted "openness" between the Soviet government and its people, and permitted greater criticism of the regime from both its citizens and the media.
[22] Often seen in conjunction with the term, "Glasnost," the term "Perestroika" was a 1986 policy implemented by Mikhail Gorbachev. The term, which translates to "restructuring" in English, refers to Gorbachev's efforts to reform the economic, political, and social systems of the Soviet regime in order to promote greater economic and political efficiency.

global community. With the proliferation of new source materials came additional interpretations regarding peasant resistance in the Soviet Union. One such interpretation is historian Robert Conquest's book, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine.*[23] Although Conquest's book focused on the genocidal aspects of the 1932 Ukraine Famine (in particular, Stalin's deliberate attempt to starve Ukrainian nationalists into submission), his work also shed light on the resistance strategies of Russian and Ukrainian peasants toward collectivized agriculture in the late 1920s. Echoing the arguments first espoused by Lewin in the 1960s, Conquest argued that peasant resistance strategies derived from the leadership of *kulak* farmers who took to "looting, civil disorder, resistance, [and] riots" in the latter half of the 1920s.[24] In this *kulak*-led campaign of resistance, Conquest argued that "the number of 'registered *kulak* terrorist acts' in the Ukraine quadrupled between 1927 and 1929," as nearly one thousand acts of terrorism were carried out in the year 1929, alone.[25] For these acts of terrorism to succeed, Conquest asserted that the *kulaks* relied heavily on the incorporation and participation of lower-class peasants in their struggle – just as Lewin and Wolf argued in the late 1960s.[26] Conquest posited that cooperative forms of resistance remained a universal theme for *kulaks* in the Soviet Union, as government reports about resistance from 1928 to 1929 demonstrated that these strategies were undertaken "all over the country."[27] In contrast to Lewin, who stressed the violent nature of these cooperative efforts, Conquest argued that "armed resistance" was sporadic at best, and that "large

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[23] Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
[24] Ibid., 102.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., 102-103.
[27] Ibid., 102.

scale resistance of a more passive type was…[far] more significant" in the Soviet Union.[28]

For scholars writing in the 1980s, understanding the divide between passive and active forms of resistance often proved difficult. More importantly for historians, it remained unclear as to what motivated peasants to choose between active and passive forms of aggression against the Stalinist regime. If Conquest's theory was correct, why did peasant resistance often take on a more passive role in the Soviet Union as he proclaimed? In 1989, historian James C. Scott attempted to address some of these questions in his essay, "Everyday Forms of Resistance."[29] Similar to Wolf's earlier study, Scott examined the causative factors behind resistance through a cross-comparison of peasant revolts worldwide. Scott's findings suggested that peasants rarely participated in violent (active) rebellions because they understood the "mortal risks involved in…open confrontation" with government forces.[30] According to his work, peasants often resorted to more passive forms of insubordination because they "rarely seek to call attention to themselves."[31] As a result, Scott argued that peasants tend to favor "everyday forms of resistance" (stealing, pilfering, bribery, etc.) when dealing with "a party of greater formal power."[32] As he proclaimed, "such resistance is virtually always a stratagem deployed by a weaker party in thwarting the claims of an institutional or class opponent who dominates the public exercise of power."[33] For historians, Scott's analysis

[28] Ibid., 103.
[29] James C. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," in *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance,* ed. by Forrest D. Colburn (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989).
[30] Ibid., 22.
[31] Ibid., 20.
[32] Ibid., 23.
[33] Ibid.

provided tremendous insight into both the local and global strategies of peasant resistance and dominated historiographical research of the 1990s, particularly in the field of Soviet history. Historians who subscribed to Scott's argument included Sheila Fitzpatrick, Lynne Viola, Mark Tauger,[34] and Natalia Starostina.[35]

POST-1991 SCHOLARSHIP (COLLAPSE OF THE USSR)

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, scholars gained unprecedented access to new materials as former Soviet archives opened their doors to Western historians. These new materials afforded historians a unique opportunity to view collectivization, and Soviet policies from both a Russian and Ukrainian perspective. Consequently, the years that followed the demise of the Soviet Union were one of renewed scholarly interest about the Soviet peasantry and its struggle against collectivized agriculture. In 1992, historian Lynne Viola capitalized on this newfound opportunity through an analysis of peasant women in both the Ukraine and Russia during collectivization. In her article, "*Bab'I Bunty* and Peasant Women's Protest During Collectivization,"[36] Viola focused her attention on the resistance strategies of women, and the direct role they played in slowing the advance of collectivized agriculture. Building on the interpretations of both Conquest and Scott, which highlighted the passivity of most peasant revolts, Viola argued that peasant women also resorted to passive forms of aggression in their protests and demonstrations against the Soviet

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[34] Mark Tauger,"Commune to Kolkhoz: Soviet Collectivization and the Transformation of Communal Peasant Farming, 1930-1941," ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. January, 1991.
[35] Natalia Starostina, "Power, Identities and Language in Collectivization of the Soviet Countryside: Local Officials in the 1920s-1930s," ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, January 1999.
[36] Lynne Viola, "*Bab'I Bunty* and Peasant Women's Protest During Collectivization," in *Russian Peasant Women,* ed. Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

regime. According to Viola, "women were seldom held responsible for their actions" because Soviet officials viewed them as "illiterate…and representative of the 'most backward part of the peasantry.'"[37] Due to their status as females in a patriarchal society, Viola argued that this afforded women a unique opportunity to express their discontent and grief in a manner that differed significantly from the resistance strategies of men.[38] Unlike their male counterparts, Viola argued that "women's protest seems to have served as a comparatively safe outlet for peasant opposition…and as a screen to protect the more politically vulnerable male peasants who could not oppose policy as actively or openly without serious consequence."[39]

Offering a gender-based expansion to both Conquest and Lewin's work, Viola's findings stressed that unique patterns of resistance existed within the Soviet Union. As she argued, female-led revolts provided peasants with a means to express discontent, and "consumed many Russian and Ukrainian villages during the First Five-Year Plan."[40] Viola's study, however, cautioned that "the general scale of peasant resistance to the state during collectivization should not be exaggerated" as it would be an overstatement to assume that all peasant women were united in their views.[41]

In 1994, historian Sheila Fitzpatrick continued to explore the intricacies of peasant resistance with her book, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the*

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[37] James C. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," 196-197.
[38] Lynne Viola, "*Bab'I Bunty* and Peasant Women's Protest During Collectivization," 192.
[39] Ibid., 200.
[40] The "First Five-Year Plan" refers to the mass-collectivization drive (1927) that aimed to extract maximum amounts of grain from the Soviet countryside for the general purpose of funding (and developing) industrialization.
[41] Lynne Viola, "*Bab'I Bunty* and Peasant Women's Protest During Collectivization," 201.

Russian Village After Collectivization.[42] In her study, Fitzpatrick's analysis echoed the argument of Scott and his focus on the passive nature of peasant revolts. Fitzpatrick found that, "among the strategies Russian peasants used to cope with collectivization were those forms of 'everyday resistance' (in James C. Scott's phrase) that are standard for unfree and coerced labor all over the world."[43] According to Fitzpatrick, passivity formed the backbone of peasant resistance strategies, and "was a behavioral repertoire" learned from their years under serfdom and tsarist rule.[44] Fitzpatrick's study concluded that "violent uprisings against collectivization were comparatively rare in the Russian heartland" due to the strength and repressive power of the Soviet state.[45] To survive the harsh realities of collectivized agriculture, Fitzpatrick's work argued that peasants relied on a universal set of strategies that helped to alleviate the vast suffering that surrounded them. Her study argued that peasants manipulated policies and structures of the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) in a manner that "served their [own] purposes as well as the state's" [sic].[46]

Fitzpatrick's work differed significantly from that of earlier historians, such as Lewin, in that it challenged the implication that *kulaks* served an important role as leaders in peasant revolts. According to Fitzpatrick, the term "*kulak*" possessed no real meaning because government officials often applied it to "any [so called] troublemaker" in the Soviet Union.[47] In contrast to Wolf's argument, Fitzpatrick's work highlighted the high-

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[42] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance & Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994),
[43] Ibid., 5.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid., 4.
[47] Ibid., 5.

level of coordination and cohesion that existed between peasants, in general, and their ability to function without the "external" influence of the *kulaks*.[48]

Historical interpretations once again shifted in the mid-1990s as mounting evidence suggested new ways to interpret the strategies of peasant resistance toward collectivization. In 1996, Lynne Viola published a monumental work entitled, *Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance*,[49] that served as a counterpoint to the studies of both Scott and Fitzpatrick. In her assessment of Soviet records, Viola's findings suggested that resistance strategies were not limited to passive forms of aggression. Instead, Viola asserted that peasant revolts often incorporated both active and violent forms of resistance that openly challenged the Soviet regime, and that "universal strategies of peasant resistance [in the USSR]" emerged which "amounted to a virtual civil war between state and peasantry."[50] According to Viola,

> For them [peasants], collectivization was apocalypse, a war between the forces of evil and the forces of good. Soviet power, incarnate in the state, the town, and the urban cadres of collectivization, was Antichrist, with the collective farm as his lair. To peasants, collectivization was vastly more than a struggle for grain or the construction of that amorphous abstraction, socialism. They understood it as a battle over their culture and way of life, as pillage, injustice, and wrong. It was a struggle for power and control…collectivization was a clash of cultures, a civil war.[51]

Although Viola's argument challenged Fitzpatrick's analysis, both their interpretations accepted the basic premise that peasant resistance reflected a unified and universal struggle against collectivized agriculture. Moreover, Viola also supported Fitzpatrick's

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[48] Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century,* 290.
[49] Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
[50] Ibid., viii.
[51] Ibid., 14.

position about *kulaks*, as she argued that wealthier peasants played no significant role in the radicalization of poorer peasants to action. As she stated, "all peasants could be enemies of the people [*kulaks*] if they acted contrary to the policies of the party."[52] Viola's work also drew attention to the role of nationalism in regard to resistance against the state. She argued that peasants demonstrated a clear sense of "national awareness, calling at times for a 'free Ukraine,' an 'independent Ukraine,' or simply a battle with Communist" Jews.[53]

In 1996, historian Andrea Graziosi's work, *The Great Soviet Peasant War,*[54] also argued that conflict between the Stalinist regime and the Soviet peasantry took on the form of a war effort in the 1920s.[55] Through an examination of hostilities between the state and peasantry, Graziosi argued that the conflict represented quite "possibly the greatest peasant war in European history," as nearly fifteen million individuals lost their lives as a result of state-sponsored attacks on their culture and way of life.[56] In contrast to Viola's interpretation, however, Graziosi's work attempted to showcase the causative factors that propelled active forms of rebellion in the Soviet Union. According to Graziosi, peasant resistance to the state emanated from the peasantry's sense of disfranchisement, as they "felt to be second-class citizens and deeply resented the way they were treated by local bosses."[57] In addition to feelings of inferiority, Graziosi added that "nationalist" sentiment served to fuel animosity between the peasantry and state as

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[52] Ibid., 16.
[53] Ibid., 120-121.
[54] Andrea Graziosi, *The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917-1933* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996).
[55] Ibid., 2.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid., 42.

well, particularly in the Ukraine "and in other non-Russian areas" of the Soviet Union.[58] Consequently, Graziosi argued that nationalist aspirations served to broaden repressive measures against the peasantry because Stalin viewed the countryside as a "natural reservoir and breeding ground of nationalism," and a direct challenge to his authority and power.[59] Although Graziosi rejected Viola's assertion that peasant resistance represented a unified and cohesive effort against Soviet officials, he argued that active resistance, nevertheless, did showcase "a surprising homogeneity" amongst the peasantry; albeit, one with "strong regional and national variations."[60]

While Graziosi stressed the importance of nationalism in regard to peasant resistance against the state, historian William Husband in 1998 challenged this notion with his article, "Soviet Atheism and Russian Orthodox Strategies of Resistance, 1917-1932."[61] Although Husband agreed with Graziosi's assessment that national identity served as an important component to peasant solidarity and aggression, Husband posited that the role of religion should not be overlooked when examining resistance patterns because the customs and norms of peasants often dictated their overall behavior.[62]

As the Soviet leadership consolidated its power in the 1920s, Husband argued that the Bolsheviks sought to impose vast political, social, and economic changes into the countryside in an attempt to build socialism from the ground up.[63] According to Husband, the Bolshevik leadership hoped to implement a fundamental replacement of

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[58] Ibid., 54.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid., 24.
[61] William Husband, "Soviet Atheism and Russian Orthodox Strategies of Resistance, 1917-1932," *The Journal of Modern History*, 70:1 (1998):
[62] Ibid., 76.
[63] Ibid., 75.

"religious views with secular values," because atheism served as a critical component to the dream of a communist utopia.[64] Such pronouncements, however, proved problematic for the Soviets because Husband argued that nearly all peasants adhered strongly to Orthodox religious beliefs and doctrines. As a result of this attack on peasant culture, Husband argued that "Russian workers and peasants [often] employed resistance and circumvention to protect [their] traditional beliefs and practices," switching between both violent and passive forms of resistance to safeguard their customs.[65] According to Husband, peasants acquired these forms of resistance over a period of several centuries, as the repressive nature of tsarist rule led many peasants to devise "elaborate methods of resisting unwanted outside intrusions and pressures."[66] Whereas Husband agreed with prior historians (such as Viola and Fitzpatrick) that these efforts reflected a universal peasant response, his interpretation chose to ignore the dichotomy established between both active and passive forms of rebellion. Instead, Husband chose to focus on the causative factors that drove peasant revolts rather than the strategies of resistance, and signified a need for change in the traditional focus of historiographical accounts.

CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP (2000-PRESENT)

The early 2000s represented a dramatic shift in historiographical trends. Whereas research in the 1990s analyzed peasant resistance from a generalized approach (ignoring regional discrepancies that occurred across the Soviet Union), greater access to Soviet archives provided historians with a newfound opportunity to explore resistance on a localized level. Through an analysis of peasant memoirs, interviews, and local histories,

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[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid., 77.
[66] Ibid., 76.

scholars gained tremendous insight into regional variations of peasant resistance in the Soviet Union. In 2001, Tracy McDonald, a social and cultural historian of Russian and Soviet history, incorporated this new approach in her study, "A Peasant Rebellion in Stalin's Russia: The Pitelinskii Uprisising, Riazan 1930."[67] In this local case-study, McDonald rejected the broad generalizations proposed by historians such as Viola and Fitzpatrick, and argued that peasant resistance should be understood in the context of its localized and regional efforts, not as a universal, cohesive, and nationally-organized movement against collectivization.

In her analysis of the Pitelinskii district of Riazan, McDonald argued that peasant resistance served as a reaction to individuals and groups that threatened the safety of peasant villages.[68] In the case of Pitelinskii, McDonald posited that peasants often avoided resistance altogether, unless the "moral economy" of their village was violated by Soviet officials (i.e., when "excesses" such as murder, starvation tactics, extreme violence, and the degradation of women took place).[69] When these actions occurred against their villages, McDonald argued that peasants actively engaged Soviet officials with a "high degree of solidarity," as they "worked together, uniting against the outsiders over and above any rivalries that may have existed prior to the rebellion."[70]

McDonald's research helped to demonstrate the sporadic nature of peasant revolts in the Soviet Union and the role that external stimuli played to motivate collective resistance toward authority. Moreover, her work also mirrored the arguments presented

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[67] Tracy McDonald, "A Peasant Rebellion in Stalin's Russia: The Pitelinskii Uprising, Riazan 1930," *Journal of Social History,* 35:1 (2001).
[68] Ibid., 135.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.

by Husband, because McDonald stressed that resistance often revolved around the peasantry's desire to return to "the 'old ways,' of tradition, the church, and the priest," as they sought to "explicitly" reject "the new Soviet order."[71]

In 2004 the revisionist historian, Mark Tauger, published a landmark study entitled "Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-39"[72] that challenged the notion that resistance played a significant role in the peasantry's reaction to collectivized agriculture. Through his use of newly acquired documents from the former Soviet archives, Tauger's study argued that the "resistance interpretation," put forth by historians such as Viola, Fitzpatrick, and Graziosi, was not supported with evidence, and that peasants "more often…adapted to the new system" instead of fighting it.[73] Although Tauger admitted that some peasants, particularly in the early 1930s, resorted to using "weapons of the weak," he argued that peasants viewed resistance as both a vain and useless strategy that offered little chance for success against the powerful Soviet regime.[74] According to Tauger, adaptation to collectivization allowed the peasants to feed "the growing population of the USSR" and to "produce harvests that ended famines."[75] For Tauger, "the resistance interpretation" developed by leading historians of the 1990s simply expressed "their hostility to the Soviet regime," and ignored factual evidence.[76]

In 2008, historian Benjamin Loring returned the historiographical focus back to the contributions made by Tracy McDonald in 2001. In his article, "Rural Dynamics and

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[71] Ibid.
[72] Mark Tauger, "Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-39: Resistance and Adaptation," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 31 (2004).
[73] Ibid., 427.
[74] Ibid., 450.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.

Peasant Resistance in Southern Kyrgyzstan,"[77] Loring examined peasant resistance toward collectivization in a regional context, just as McDonald did with the Riazan countryside in years prior. In his analysis of peasant revolts in Kyrgyzstan, Loring argued that "resistance varied and bore the imprint of local economic and social dynamics."[78] Loring explained this variation through the fact that "policy [often] reflected lower-level officials' interpretations of state priorities and their capacity for implementing them."[79] Consequently, Loring suggested that the peasantry's adoption of resistance strategies, whether active or passive, stemmed directly from the actions of cadres that ignored regional interests, or "antagonized" local needs.[80] Similar to McDonald, Loring argued that active peasant rebellions in Kyrgyzstan resulted from external actors that sought to impose their will on local populations. In the case of Kyrgyzstan's peasantry, Loring argued that the "onerous policies" of Stalin and his regime led "large segments of the agrarian population to open rebellion" by 1930 in a region once heralded as peaceful in years past.[81]

More recently, scholarship about peasant reactions toward collectivization once again shifted with the publication of Anne Applebaum's 2017 monograph, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine.*[82] In her work, Applebaum, a Pulitzer Prize winning author, journalist, and professor of economics, reinvigorated the debate over peasant resistance in the 1920s and 1930s with her regional analysis of the Ukraine. Using Viola and

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[77] Benjamin Loring, "Rural Dynamics and Peasant Resistance in Southern Kyrgyzstan, 1929-1930," *Cahiers du Monde russe,* 49:1 (2008).
[78] Ibid., 184.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid., 209-210.
[81] Ibid., 185.
[82] Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2017).

Graziosi's arguments as a basis for her research, Applebaum argued that peasant resistance towards collectivization was particularly bitter and strong in the Ukraine when compared to other localities across the Soviet Union.[83] Her work shed light on the strong connection between peasant resistance and nationalism in the early years of the Bolshevik Revolution, which continued to develop unabated throughout the 1920s and beyond.[84] According to Applebaum's study, peasants across the country undertook extreme measures to subvert Stalin and his cadres and resorted to violence (murder, arson, assassinations, etc.) in order to preserve their culture in the wake of collectivization.[85] Similar to Viola and Fitzpatrick, Applebaum's work stressed the "universal" nature of rebellion in the Ukraine and made little distinction between the resistance strategies of countless villages, cities, and *oblasts* of the region as she argued that resistance served as an "organized reaction to a much-hated policy" in the Ukraine.[86]

FAMINE AND THE CASE FOR GENOCIDE: 1932-1933

Scholars also remain divided over questions regarding the connection between collectivization, peasant resistance, and the 1932 famine in Ukraine. Did the famine result from natural causes? Was it part of a genocidal plot by the Soviet regime to starve recalcitrant peasants into submission? Did particular regions of the Soviet Union suffer more than others during the famine? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what role did collectivization and peasant resistance play in the development of famine conditions, particularly in the Ukraine?

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[83] Ibid., 107.
[84] Ibid., 191.
[85] Ibid., 140
[86] Ibid., 156.

GENOCIDE OR NATURAL CAUSES?

In 1986, historian Robert Conquest attempted to answer many of these questions in his book, *The Harvest of Sorrow*. Through an analysis of the Ukraine and the western half of the Soviet Union, Conquest argued that mass-starvation from the famine resulted from genocidal policies carried out by Stalin and the Soviet regime.[87] Conquest's work demonstrated how Soviet officials deliberately starved particular areas of the Soviet Union (most notably the Ukraine) as a means to quell nationalist uprisings.[88] As he argued, Soviet officials "inflicted [famine] on…collectivized peasants of the Ukraine and the largely Ukrainian Kuban…by the methods of setting…grain quotas far above the possible, removing every handful of food, and preventing help from the outside – even from other areas of the USSR – from reaching the starving."[89] Conquest's work served as one of the first in-depth studies about the Ukraine famine because of the limitation of primary documents available to scholars prior to *Glasnost* and *Perestroika.* Consequently, his work helped to set the stage for scholarly debate about the famine in the 1990s and beyond.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, historians gained access to numerous government documents and reports about the Ukraine. In 1991, revisionist historian Mark Tauger incorporated these new resources in his article, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933." In an attempt to nullify the findings of Conquest, Tauger stressed that mass-starvation from the famine resulted from poor harvests and bad weather

[87] Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow*, 4.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

conditions.[90] Although Tauger admitted that the "[Soviet] regime was still responsible for the deprivation and suffering of the Soviet population in the early 1930s," he argued that the famine resulted from failed economic policies, "rather than…a 'successful' nationality policy against Ukrainians or other ethnic groups."[91] According to Tauger, Conquest's interpretation relied too heavily on "'post-Stalinist' statistics" that overlooked "inconsistencies between official grain harvest statistics for the early 1930s."[92] Consequently, Tauger's findings stressed that the famine derived from more natural causes, rather than genocidal intentions.

Although the historical community accepted Tauger's argument that the 1932 famine began from a severe drought affecting Eastern Europe, several historical works from the 1990s continued to support Conquest's interpretation that food-shortages resulted from genocidal intent. In 1998, for example, historian D'Ann Penner's article, "Stalin and the Ital'ianka of 1932-1933 in the Don Region," built upon Conquest's earlier theory on genocide, but expanded the historical focus away from the Ukraine to include the North Caucasus. Penner's article addressed both the economic and political causes of the famine, and argued that "villager-Party relations" remained "closely intertwined" throughout the development of famine conditions between 1932 and 1933.[93] According to her findings, the Don region experienced tremendous political turmoil (similar to the Ukraine) because the Soviets decided to "undertake total collectivization…with or without…the villagers' consent."[94] Penner argued that peasants responded to

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[90] Mark Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933," *Slavic Review Vol. 50 No. 1* (1991): 84.
[91] Ibid., 89
[92] Ibid., 70.
[93] D'Ann Penner, "Stalin and the Ital'ianka of 1932-1933 in the Don Region," *Cahiers du Monde russe,* Vol. 39, No. ½ (1998): 28.
[94] Ibid., 31.

collectivization "with a variety of covert and direct actions" against Soviet officials.[95] She found that peasant resistance in the North Caucasus "compelled the Party to make a choice: either compromise on the terms of collectivization or employ a weapon more effective than…weapons of exile and execution."[96] Although Penner found that "the Communist Party did not have the power to create a famine" on its own, she posited that Soviet officials effectively made "famine its partner in the subjugation of villagers."[97] Through this local-case study about the famine, Penner demonstrated that a strong connection between peasant resistance and starvation existed in the Don region of the North Caucasus, and substantiated Conquest's earlier claim for genocide.

For many scholars, the denial of food relief indicated a plot by the Soviet regime to deliberately starve the Ukrainian population into submission because of their nationalist aspirations and rebelliousness to Stalinist policies – in particular, collectivization.[98] In 2009, historian David Marples argued in his article, "Ethnic Issues in the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine" that Stalin feared Ukrainian nationalism and the threat it posed to unity across the newly formed Soviet Union.[99] As Marples demonstrated, any sort of nationalist spirit had the potential to undo Stalin's strong grip over Soviet society. Likewise, Norman Naimark's study, *Stalin's Genocides,* also argued that Stalin withheld food from the Ukraine to destroy deep-rooted national pride and spirit.[100] Timothy Snyder (2010) also provided direct support to the genocide

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[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid., 53.
[97] Ibid., 51.
[98] David Marples, "Ethnic Issues in the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 61 No. 3* (May 2009): 514.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Norman Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 5.

interpretation in his work, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin.* According to Snyder's interpretation of the famine,

> Stalin might have saved millions of lives without drawing any outside attention to the Soviet Union. He could have suspended food exports for a few months, released grain reserves (three million tons), or just given peasants access to local grain storage areas. Such simple measures, pursued as late as November 1932, could have kept the death toll to the hundreds of thousands rather than the millions. Stalin pursued none of them.[101]

Anne Applebaum's 2017 work, *Red Famine,* also explored the issue of genocide in the Ukraine. According to her findings, peasant resistance, which stemmed from nationalist movements of the 1920s, encouraged widespread attacks against Soviet officials who operated in the Ukraine. To counter these uprisings, Applebaum argued that the Soviet regime used the ensuing Great Famine of 1932 as a tool to eradicate elements of the Ukrainian peasantry and prevented food supplies and outside aid from reaching Ukrainian peasants. According to her findings, the Bolsheviks launched "a famine within the famine" that "specifically targeted…Ukraine and Ukrainians."[102] Applebaum argued that it was a "political famine, created for the express purpose of weakening peasant resistance, and thus national identity."[103]

COLLECTIVIZATION AND FAMINE

Not all scholars agreed with the genocide interpretation first espoused by Conquest. In 1992, historian Daniel Stone's article, "The Economic Origins of the Soviet Famine of 1932-1933" used primary sources from Polish archives to understand the famine's causes. Stone's assessment shifted the historiographical focus away from the

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[101] Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, 41-42.
[102] Ibid., 190.
[103] Ibid., 283.

event's political causes to encompass its economic origins. For Stone, one of the primary causes of the Great Famine derived from the Soviet government's need to maintain international trade.[104] According to Stone's argument, "The Soviets' enactment of the Five Year Plan in 1928 stirred hopes of a vigorous trade relationship [with the international community] that never materialized."[105] As poor harvests (and acts of peasant resistance) decreased the available amount of grain for trade, Stone argued that Soviet officials were forced to enact extreme forms of grain-procurement in 1932 due to a "need to find foreign capital to pay off loans."[106] Such measures resulted in an "export of grain [that went] beyond village capacity" and led inexorably to starvation and famine between 1932-1933.[107] Thus, Stone's argument stressed "that the Soviet government did not intend to create the famine."[108] He argued, instead, that "economic mismanagement," led to food-shortages and hunger during the 1930s.[109]

Historians Gijs Kessler and Niccolo Pianciola also argued that the famine resulted from Stalin's collectivization efforts across the Western half of the Soviet Union. Both of their works suggested that famine did not result from a pre-meditated desire to kill millions. Using the Ukraine and the Urals as focal points for his research, Gijs Kessler's article, "The 1932-1933 Crisis and Its Aftermath Beyond the Epicenters of Famine" argued that starvation "arose from the general problems created by the Soviet regime's

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[104] Daniel Stone, "The Economic Origins of the Soviet Famine of 1932-1933: Some Views From Poland," *The Polish Review*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1992): 170.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid., 178.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid., 183.
[109] Ibid.

agricultural policies of the preceding years."[110] With poor agricultural policies already in place across the Soviet Union, Kessler argued that the rigorous collection of grain only exacerbated existing problems. As he stated, "the Famine was the logical outcome…of the agricultural policies adopted by the Stalinist leadership at the end of the 1920s, which aimed at extracting maximum amounts of grain and other produce from the agricultural sector without investment to increase productivity."[111]

Likewise, historian Niccolo Pianciola also built upon this argument through his analysis of Kazakhstan during the early 1930s. Similar to Kessler's approach, Pianciola's article, "The Collectivization Famine in Kazakhstan, 1931-1933" argued that the Great Famine spread well beyond the borders of the Ukraine and, in turn, disrupted many regions across the Western half of the Soviet Union. Pianciola posited that famine conditions arose from collectivization efforts of the Soviet regime. In contrast to interpretations that favored the issue of genocide, however, Pianciola argued that "mass death…was not an objective the policy makers set out to achieve, but rather the price they were prepared to pay as long as they could achieve the goal of gaining political and economic control over the region."[112]

In 2004, R.W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft supported the positions taken by Kessler and Pianciola in their work, *The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933.*[113] According to their findings, famine conditions developed from overzealous

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[110] Gijs Kessler, "The 1932-1933 Crisis and Its Aftermath beyond the Epicenters of Famine: The Urals Region," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies Vol. 25 No. 3/4* (2001): 253.
[111] Ibid., 263.
[112] Niccolo Pianciola, "The Collectivization Famine in Kazakhstan, 1931-1933," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies Vol. 25 No. 3/4* (2001): 246.
[113] R.W. Davies and S.G. Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

collectivization efforts undertaken by the Soviet regime.[114] By setting quotas and figures that remained unattainable for the majority of peasant workers, Davies and Wheatcroft argued that starvation occurred because of mismanagement from Soviet leaders, not from genocidal intent.[115] In 2007, Economist Michael Ellman agreed with this interpretation, and suggested that because the famine was unintentional, the term "genocide" remained inappropriate for describing the famine due to legal definitions set forth by the United Nations.[116] According to his findings, Ellman argued that Stalin's actions were incapable of being confirmed as genocide because "ignorance" implied an involuntary action on behalf of the Soviet regime.[117]

In 2008, historian Hiroaki Kuromiya's article, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-1933 Reconsidered,"[118] provided similar findings. Although Kuromiya agreed with historians, such as Conquest and Snyder, that the famine was "man-made," he argued that Stalin did not anticipate the "deaths of millions" in the Ukraine[119] As Kuromiya stated, "at the present state of knowledge, one cannot conclude that Stalin intended to kill millions of people through famine."[120] Thus, Kuromiya's work rejected the notion that the 1932 famine represented an act of genocide by the Soviet regime due to the lack of evidence against Stalin, and because individuals from Kazakhstan and Russia also suffered high

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[114] Ibid., 441.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Michael Ellman, "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-1933 Revisited," *Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 59 No. 4* (2007): 665.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Hiroaki Kuromiya, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-1933 Reconsidered," *Europe-Asia Studies,* Vol. 60, No. 4 (2008): 663-675.
[119] Ibid., 666.
[120] Ibid., 667.

fatality rates from starvation as well.[121] As Kuromiya stated, "it is difficult to argue" that starvation policies "were specifically directed against ethnic Ukrainians."[122]

EAST-EUROPEAN SCHOLARSHIP

Western scholars from the 1980s to the present continue to remain divided over the issue of genocide. Although recent scholarship, such as Applebaum's 2017 analysis of the famine, demonstrated that signs of genocide existed within the Ukraine between 1932 and 1933, other scholars, such as Ellman, Tauger, Davies and Wheatcroft, argued that starvation resulted from overzealous efforts, collectivization policies, and unrealistic grain-procurements. This scholarly divide, however, remains less prominent in Eastern Europe (particularly in the Ukraine). Eastern European scholars, for example, often uphold the case for genocide due to the contentious history that existed (and continues to exist) between Russia and the Ukraine. These interpretations also derived, in part, from Ukrainian laws that prohibit any denouncement of the "Holodomor" ("Death by Starvation").[123] As a result, Eastern European interpretations regarding the 1932 famine often remain narrowly focused and biased.

In 2008, Ukrainian scholar Stanislav Kul'Chyts'kyi's article, "The Holodomor and Its Consequences in the Ukrainian Countryside," argued that "the horrific scale of the [Ukraine] famine was caused by the deliberate actions of the Soviet government."[124] Kul'Chyts'kyi's assessment of the Ukrainian countryside revealed that Soviet authorities

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[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid. 668.
[123] Myroslav Shkandrij, "Breaking Taboos: The Holodomor and the Holocaust in Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," in *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry, Jews and Ukrainians Vol. 26,* edited by Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern and Antony Polonsky (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2014).
[124] Stanislav Kul'Chyts'kyi, "The Holodomor and Its Consequences in the Ukrainian Countryside," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* Vol. 30, No. ¼ (2008): 3.

implemented widespread punitive measures against the Ukraine, such as blacklists, that resulted in a widespread blockade of the region.[125] Kul'Chyts'kyi argued that the Soviet state incorporated "forcible methods," such as "selective dekulakization" and burdensome taxes as a means to "integrate the peasantry into the command economy."[126] When policies, such as these, failed, Kul'Chyts'kyi stated that the Soviet state resorted to "the weapon of famine" as a means to subdue Ukrainian peasants.[127] Unlike Conquest and other western historians that stressed a connection between famine and Ukrainian nationalism, Kul'Chyts'ky asserted that starvation-policies derived from Stalin's desire to transform the "agrarian socioeconomic" order of the Soviet Union.[128] According to Kul'Chyts'kyi, this desire stemmed from a need to suppress individualism within the peasant class, and to "bind the peasantry tightly to the economy."[129]

Ukrainian historians, Oleg Khlevniuk and Marta Olynyk also supported the genocide interpretation in their article, "Comments on the Short-Term Consequences of the Holodomor."[130] Similar to Kul'Chyts'kyi, both Khlevniuk and Olynyk argued that the famine resulted from a deliberate attack upon the Ukraine's social, political, and economic realms by the Soviet state. Khlevniuk and Olynyk, however, added that one of the main causes for this attack derived from Stalin's desire to transform the Ukrainian peasantry "into a new social group, [and] a collective farm-based peasantry…linked with the collective farming system."[131] According to their findings, Soviet officials viewed

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[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid., 3-4.
[129] Ibid., 4.
[130] Oleg Khlevniuk and Marta D. Olynyk, "Comments on the Short-Term Consequences of the Holodomor," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* Vol. 30, No. ¼ (2008): 149-161.
[131] Ibid., 150.

the peasantry's desire for "a more equitable distribution of agricultural products and an increase in the share of private property" as a direct threat to state security, which prompted repressive action on a mass-scale (i.e. famine and starvation).[132]

In 2009, Russian scholar, V.B. Zhiromskaya's article, "*Golod 1932-1933 Godov v Russi ii Sovremenniye Myezdoonarodniye"* ("Hunger 1932-1933 in Russia and Modern International Relations"), provided a counter-argument to Eastern European scholars focused on the link between famine and genocide. According to Zhiromskaya, "the famine of 1932-1933, was not a genocide of the Ukrainian people, but was a common tragedy for all the peoples of the USSR."[133] His findings suggested that "the famine was an unintended consequence of the forced industrialization and forced collectivization" across the western Soviet Union.[134] Zhiromskaya argued that "the Stalinist government did not want to reckon with the crop failure of 1932 and forced both collective farms and individual farmers to inflate the rates of grain procurement, which resulted in the Holodomor."[135] Zhiromskaya's interpretation stressed the "multiethnic" dimensions of the Great Famine, as he attempted to shift blame for the famine away from the Russian government.[136] Even in the Ukraine, Zhiromskaya argued that the regions most affected by famine possessed a plurality of minority groups.[137] As such, his article stressed the need for a dramatic shift in current historiographical trends, and encouraged Eastern

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[132] Ibid., 151.
[133] V.B. Zhiromskaya, "Golod 1932-1933 Godov v Russi ii Sovremenniye Mvezhdoonarodniye," https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/golod-1932-1933-godov-v-rossii-i-sovremennye-mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya-1, Accessed: 5 May 2018.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.

European scholars (particularly in the Ukraine) to abandon the genocide interpretation altogether.

Despite Zhiromskaya's efforts, Eastern European scholars continued to focus on the genocidal aspects of the Great Famine. In 2014, for example, Polish historian, Myroslav Shkandrij, addressed the Holodomor in his article, "Breaking Taboos: The Holodomor and the Holocaust in Ukrainian-Jewish relations."[138] Shkandrij expanded prior arguments about genocide through an analysis of Jewish populations that resided in the Ukraine. According to Shkandrij, many Ukrainians viewed Jews "as a potential ally of Ukrainianization" because they considered Judaism as "the most reactionary of religions' [sic].[139] Consequently, Shkandrij argued that Ukrainians hoped to form an alliance with Jews in order to "reverse the Russification that was tsarism's legacy."[140] Shkandrij posited that the Soviet leadership viewed potential alliances, such as this, as a tremendous threat to their power.[141] As he stated, Stalin "knew from earlier experience that a link-up between Jews and Ukrainians spelled trouble for Soviet rule: these communities had legitimate grievances and large diasporas, and could mobilize support."[142] Thus, Shkandrij argued that Soviet officials responded to this threat through the use of famine and starvation, and targeted specific ethnic groups for elimination (most notably Ukrainians and Jews).[143]

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[138] Myroslav Shkandrij, "Breaking Taboos: The Holodomor and the Holocaust in Ukrainian-Jewish relations," in *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry, Jews and Ukrainians Vol. 26,* edited by Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern and Antony Polonsky (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2014).
[139] Ibid., 267.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid., 264.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid., 261.

SUMMARY

The issue of peasant resistance in the Soviet Union encompasses a wide array of viewpoints and opinions. In addition, scholars remain heavily divided over the question of genocide and the Ukraine Famine of 1932. As such, it is doubtful that historians will ever reach a consensus on the causes, strategies, and nature of peasant revolts. Nor is it likely that historians will arrive at a definitive answer to the genocide debate that surrounds the Great Famine.

As later trends in the historiography suggest, it is evident that local case-studies of the Soviet Union offer the best prospect for researchers to test their theories regarding peasant resistance due to the large cultural and ethnic divisions that permeated Soviet society. As Loring and McDonald's studies on Kyrgyzstan and Riazan demonstrated, local uprisings often differed significantly from the generalized accounts of prior historians that stressed the uniformity and cohesive nature of peasant rebels. Thus, generalizations about the regional level (such as Applebaum's "popular history" account) remain inadequate, given the great diversity of the region. This was particularly true for the Ukraine, which encompassed a wide array of ethnic groups and social backgrounds across its numerous rural and urban locales.

In lieu of these lacunae, this thesis expands the historiographical debate from an aggregate to a localized level just as McDonald and Loring attempted in prior years. For this to occur, I focus my attention on the two forms of resistance (passive and active) that characterized peasant revolts, and argue that both provided a basis for peasant actions against the Soviet regime in the Ukraine. In contrast to prior historical works, this thesis argues that resistance did not follow a universal or singular pattern (as argued by Viola

and Fitzpatrick). Rather, it argues that resistance in the Ukraine followed strong regional variations that differed significantly from one area of the country to another. Although numerous studies exist about peasant resistance in the Ukraine, few (if any) of these works examine this topic from a localized perspective. Instead, historians often provide generalized explanations for the resistance structure that emerged, without accounting for local histories, customs, traditions, and geography. Because certain ethnic groups dominated particular regions of the Ukraine (such as Russians in the Crimea), and because geographical features differed significantly across the region, these local variations must be accounted for when examining peasant resistance. To ignore the dichotomies that exist provides a false understanding of Ukrainian resistance to the Soviet state.

An understanding of these regional differences also helps to situate peasant resistance within current scholarship on the Holodomor. Today the consensus amongst most historians (including both Eastern European and western scholars) is that the famine resulted from genocidal policies carried out by the Soviet regime to eliminate problematic ethnic groups. As historian D'Ann Penner argued (in 1998) about the North Caucasus, a clear link appears to exist between peasant resistance and the starvation policies pursued by Soviet officials in 1932-1933.[144] Although an analysis of the famine remains outside the focus of this study, the identification of high-resistance zones in the Ukraine helps to substantiate Penner's argument, as fatality rates for both Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev (active resistance areas) remained far higher than passive regions, such as Odessa and the

[144] D'Ann Penner, "Stalin and the Ital'ianka of 1932-1933 in the Don Region," *Cahiers du Monde russe,* Vol. 39, No. ½ (1998): 31.

Crimea. Not only does this suggest that particular areas of the Ukraine were targeted (and eliminated) by the Soviet regime, but it also helps to corroborate the interpretation of scholars, such as Conquest, Snyder, and Applebaum that the Great Famine constituted an act of genocide. Whereas prior historians interpreted the famine with broad and generalized accounts of the Ukraine, this thesis approaches the Great Famine from a localized perspective, just as Penner attempted with the North Caucasus. This approach allows for a more specific analysis of the Ukraine, and demonstrates why particular areas of the Ukraine suffered more than others during the years of starvation.

CHAPTER 2: THE SOVIET ECONOMY, 1917-1933

In order to understand the resistance strategies of different districts in the Ukraine, an analysis of the years leading up to both collectivization and Stalin's "First Five Year Plan" is crucial. To accomplish this, it is necessary to provide both a background and introduction to the conditions and factors that helped make collectivization and peasant resistance possible between 1927 and 1933. This chapter introduces the economic, political, and social circumstances that the USSR faced in the days, months, and years of the 1920s. An understanding of the Soviet economy during this period is important to consider as it helps to explain why conflict developed between the state and peasantry prior to the years of starvation and why the peasant class remained alienated and detached from the Soviet regime. This background to Soviet economic policies in the 1920s situates collectivization in the broader Soviet effort to implement social and political control, as well as peasant resistance and rebellion between 1927 and 1933 in the Ukraine.

WORLD WAR ONE AND "WAR COMMUNISM"

In the decade prior to collectivization and the Ukraine Famine of 1932, the Soviet Union faced great uncertainty as warfare, food shortages, and economic woes created an atmosphere of social and political chaos across the former Russian Empire. Moreover, the power vacuum that resulted from the collapse of tsarist authority provided a basis for intense conflict between Bolshevik forces (Reds) and Whites as they fought, with varying degrees of success, to implement new forms of government and authority over Russian

society.[145] In the months that followed the October Revolution and the Bolshevik seizure of power, the new Soviet government, under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, faced an even greater crisis, however, as war continued to rage across its western border during the final months of the First World War. As German troops and their allies continued to advance across Russian territory in the early months of 1918, the Bolsheviks, facing the prospect of military defeat, reluctantly brokered a peace deal with the Central Powers in order to prevent the German onslaught from spreading further, and to protect the fledgling Soviet regime from foreign interference and harm.[146] Yet, the terms of peace dictated in the ensuing Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) proved largely unfavorable to the Soviets as it forced Lenin "to renounce [nearly] 1.3 million square miles of territory" to the Central Powers in return for a cessation of hostilities.[147] This move resulted in a net loss of "a third of [Russian] industry, and more than a third of its grain fields" to Germany and its allies.[148] Regions of the former Russian Empire most affected from these changes included the Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.

The abrupt political and social changes inspired by the treaty were particularly strong in the Ukraine, as the German occupation and the retreat of Bolshevik forces in the area created an atmosphere conducive for both nationalist uprisings (most notably, Symon Petliura)[149] and anarchic movements (such as Nestor Makhno and his

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[145] Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History 4th Edition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 374.
[146] Stephen Kotkin, *Stalin: Paradoxes of Power Vol. I, 1878-1928* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 258.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid..
[149] Symon Vasylyovych Petliura was a Ukrainian politician that led the Ukraine's struggle for independence in the years that followed the Russian Revolution of 1917. He also served as leader of the Ukrainian National Republic between 1918-1921 during the Ukraine's brief period of autonomy from Russia and the Soviet Union.

followers)[150] to develop unabated. With little ability to police or maintain government oversight and stability across the Ukraine due to its military commitments elsewhere, the German occupation instead promoted self-governance in the Ukraine through the implementation of a "puppet-regime" under the leadership of General Pavel Skoropadsky, a highly decorated Imperial Russian Army officer of Ukrainian heritage.[151] According to historian Robert Conquest, this political maneuver allowed the Central Powers to exploit the Ukraine for its natural resources as they prepared for "the last phase of the war against France, Britain and the United States."[152] Simultaneously, their installation of a native Ukrainian leader in the Central Rada (Skorpoadsky) aimed to provide the Ukraine with a false sense of autonomy and independence from foreign control, even though "Germans…had ultimate power in Ukraine."[153]

Although Skoropadsky introduced numerous reforms in the Ukraine during his brief tenure as hetman of the so-called "Ukrainian National Republic" (such as the introduction of basic civil rights as well as significant advances in science and education), his dependence on German support and "collaboration with Russian and landlord elements" provoked hostility amongst the Ukrainian people.[154] In particular, Skoropadsky's decision to restore "lands to rich estate-owners" through a resurrection of "the prerevolutionary socoioeconomic order," especially in the countryside, provoked

[150] Nestor Ivanovych Makhno led an anarchist movement across Southern Ukraine between 1917 and 1922 known as the "Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine." Makhno and his followers denounced all external authority in the Ukraine and served as a major hindrance to both nationalist and Bolshevik forces during the years of civil war.
[151] Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History 4th Edition*, 362.
[152] Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow,* 35.
[153] Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History 4th Edition*, 356.
[154] Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow,* 35.

"fierce peasant revolts" across the Ukraine.[155] According to historian Orest Subtelny, "hordes of peasants [in response to these policies] fought pitched battles with German troops" and plunged the Ukraine into political chaos as nationalist, anarchist, and German-backed authorities struggled for control.[156]

Unsurprisingly, when Bolshevik forces returned to the Ukraine only eight months later to reestablish control (following the withdrawal of German troops and Skoropadsky during the waning months of World War One), Lenin and his cadres faced both a recalcitrant and rebellious Ukrainian nation plagued with violence.[157] The expansion of the Russian Civil War into Ukrainian territory only exacerbated this violence. In 1919 alone, the city of "Kiev changed hands five times in less than a year" as six different armies, including "the Ukrainians, the Bolsheviks, the Whites, the Entente, the Poles, and the anarchists" all vied for political control in the months that followed the removal of Skoropadsky and his puppet-regime from power.[158] As the Bolsheviks sought to regain power in the Ukraine, a particularly problematic group for the Soviets included the Ukrainian peasantry, whose massive acquisition of land (acquired through their seizure of property from the former nobility), and desire for self-sufficiency countered communist ideals that stressed the importance of "community" over "self" and which favored strong obedience to government authority. Subtelny captured this contrast of ideals in the following:

> As he [Ukrainian peasants] observed the collapse of one authority after another from his self-sufficient village, the peasant's attitude was one of wishing a pox on the city people and all their governments. His prime concern was to keep his land

[155] Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History 4th Edition*, 358-359.
[156] Ibid., 358.
[157] Ibid., 359.
[158] Ibid.

> and, if possible, to obtain more of it. The peasant was willing to support any government that seemed able to satisfy these desires. But the moment that government was unable to fulfill his expectations or placed demands on his land and harvest, the peasant turned against it and went over to a rival. The peasant knew that he did not want the return of the old order, yet he was uncertain of what he wanted to replace it. This made him a rather unpredictable element throughout the Civil War.[159]

In 1919, the Bolshevik seizure of private property, as well as their attempts to subdue nationalistic development, infuriated the Ukrainian peasantry who turned to violence and rebellion in order to protect their interests.[160] Nationalist uprisings, in particular, served as "an important force" in numerous districts of the Ukraine, and were "centered [primarily] in the western and central parts of the Ukraine."[161] Although "poorly organized," CIA documents revealed that "there was considerable sympathy within the Ukraine for its nationalist leaders," as the Civil War period was "glorified as a time in which the Ukrainian people struggled against numerous enemies in the face of overwhelming odds for their independence."[162] By the middle of 1919, "almost the entire Ukrainian countryside was in revolt against the Bolsheviks," whom the peasantry viewed as a threat to their social order.[163] Revolts often turned violent and included assassinations, murders, and mass pogroms against Jews who the peasantry (as well as other political groups operating in the Ukraine) viewed as "pro-Bolshevik" due to the fact that "Jews were…disproportionately prominent" amongst the communist regime.[164]

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[159] Ibid., 360.
[160] Ibid., 365.
[161] "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," A"Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," August 1957, Declassified CIA Document, Located in Central Intelligence Agency's Digital Archives, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r002300220007-1, 9.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History 4th Edition*, 365.
[164] Ibid., 363.

Peasants that resided in other regions of the Soviet Union, including Russia, responded in a similar manner against the Bolshevik regime. The Russian Civil War and its subsequent consequences exacerbated conditions in the countryside. As war continued to rage between the Reds and Whites for control over the former Russian Empire, peasants, with no sense of loyalty to either side of the conflict, often took to looting and rebellion in order to avoid forced enlistments into the ranks of communist or nationalist forces. As historian Nicholas Riasanovsky argued, many peasants "came to hate both sides" of the conflict because both the Whites and Reds "often brought mobilization, requisitions, and terror" anywhere they appeared.[165] As more and more peasants recognized that neither the Reds nor Whites sought to protect their future interests and well-being, rebellion offered the peasantry a means to preserve their own interests and pursuits. Thus, as early as 1918, the relationship between both the peasantry and Soviet government remained uncertain and hostile as both sides envisioned radically different views for the future of the Communist state and the countryside at large.

The Bolshevik government attempted to provide law and order, as well as bridge the social gaps that existed between itself and the vast Soviet peasantry through the implementation of radical changes under the title of "War Communism."[166] This new policy aimed to stabilize governmental control amidst the political and social chaos that emanated from the Civil War and widespread peasant revolts.[167] Through the implementation of War Communism, the Bolsheviks hoped to generate much-needed grain and food supplies for the fledgling Soviet state in order to remedy food shortages

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[165] Nicholas Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 487.
[166] Basil Dmytryshyn, *A History of Russia* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 500.
[167] Ibid., 500-501.

and to provide grain to the army and towns across the Soviet Union.[168] War Communism accomplished this through the requisition of grain and the imposition of food levies on peasants.[169]

The Bolsheviks sought to supply Soviet towns and cities with food due to the large number of working-class individuals that resided there.[170] Cities also served as important industrial centers for the Soviet state. As a result, urban localities often acquired priority over the countryside in regard to food supplies and support because Bolshevik and Marxist ideology viewed industrialization as an important step towards the advancement of communism.[171] According to historian Nicholas Riasanovsky, the Bolsheviks "thought of socialism entirely in terms of an advanced industrial society," with workers serving as the ideological vanguard of this socialist movement.[172] Lenin and his followers based this belief on the teachings of Karl Marx, who argued that only through industrialization could a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and an overthrow of the bourgeoisie occur. As Marx stated in his work, *The Communist Manifesto*, "with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more."[173] A major problem the Bolsheviks faced with this ideology, however, derived from the Soviet Union's lack of industry and workers. As a predominantly agrarian-based society, "workers numbered…[only] three million out of a population of about 170 million in

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[168] David Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century* (Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2011), 45.
[169] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition*, 479.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid., 495.
[173] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* edited by: Martin Malia (New York: Signet Classic, 1998),60-61.

1914."[174] Thus, according to Riasanovsky, "the dictatorship of the proletariat in a land of peasants remained an anomaly."[175] Peasants, alone, lacked the class-consciousness that, according to Marx, only developed in an advanced capitalist state.[176] Without this consciousness or a worker-led vanguard to lead them, the Bolsheviks argued that the peasant-dominated population would desire no change in their political and economic status.[177] This, in turn, rendered the expulsion of the bourgeois and capitalist elements an impossible task to achieve in the absence of an industrialized economy. According to Lenin, only through proper leadership "by the proletariat and the party, [could] poor peasants…be a revolutionary force."[178]

To remedy these problems through War Communism, Lenin implemented a widespread nationalization of "banks, foreign trade, and transport" in order to impose "government control over production and distribution."[179] This resulted in the elimination of private industry across Soviet territory and, in effect, removed the threat of capitalist enterprise to Lenin's plan for socialist expansion.[180] In their attempt "to deprive the propertied classes of their influence," however, the Bolsheviks only created "economic disorder" as War Communism fixed prices on grain and foodstuffs and implemented heavy regulations into the lives of the peasantry.[181] To assert greater control over the flow of food within the Soviet sphere, the Bolsheviks also dispatched "armed food detachments" in order to "requisition surplus grain supplies from the

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[174] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition*, 428.
[175] Ibid., 495.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid., 468.
[178] Ibid., 468.
[179] Dmytryshyn, *A History of Russia*, 500-501.
[180] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th edition*, 479.
[181] Dmytryshyn, *A History of Russia*, 501.

peasants" and to stabilize resources.[182] Bolshevik leaders specifically tasked these brigades to eliminate so-called "privileged" elements of Soviet society. Yet, distinctions between rich and poor members of the peasantry often mattered little as peasants from all social standings found themselves in the crosshairs of these overly-ambitious cadres. Consequently, both rich and poor peasants often suffered tremendous hardships as a result of War Communism's economic policies.[183]

As Soviet forces continued to pour into the countryside, the harsh reality of War Communism and forced grain requisitions led to resentment and instability for the Soviet state. According to Riasanovsky, as civil war drew to a close in 1921, "Soviet Russia was [both] exhausted and ruined" from the conflict.[184] Although War Communism "saved the Soviet government in the course of the Civil War," its policies greatly damaged the economy as it resulted in low production levels, the end of private industry, and the collapse of international and local trade due to the strong government regulations implemented.[185] Moreover, the aggressive grain requisitioning campaign sanctioned through War Communism served to fuel the flames of dissent and rebellion across the countryside as peasants started to question their loyalties to the Soviet state in response to abuses they experienced. By 1921, "the unbearable situation led to uprisings in the countryside and to strikes and violent unrest in the factories."[186] In the early months of 1921, nearly "200,000 peasants in the Ukraine, the Volga, Don, and Kuban valleys…took up arms against Bolshevik misrule."[187] The unrest reached a climax in March, with the

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[182] Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 105.
[183] Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century*, 45.
[184] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition*, 488.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Kotkin, *Stalin Volume I, Paradoxes of Power: 1878-1928*, 344.

Kronstadt uprising that involved "some 14,000 sailors" and local rebels who rose up against the Bolshevik regime.[188] Although these rebellions failed in their original goals and resulted in violent repression, these events highlighted the widespread discontent that both workers and peasants shared across the Soviet Union. Thus, in the span of only a few years, War Communism helped to establish a basis for strong hostility and conflict between the state and its citizens, in particular, the peasantry. Through the establishment of this hostile atmosphere, War Communism set the stage for intense, often times violent, social unrest for the remainder of the decade.

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP)

In response to the growing crisis between the state and its citizens, Vladimir Lenin issued a directive during the 10th Party Congress of 1921 that lessened the burden of grain requisitioning upon the rural and agrarian sectors of the Soviet Union and, effectively, terminated the policies of War Communism. In his 15 March 1921 report to the Congress, Lenin stated,

> I ask you to bear in mind this basic fact…the chief thing to bear in mind at the moment is that we must let the whole world know, by wireless this very night, of our decision; we must announce that this Congress of the government party is, in the main, replacing the grain requisitioning system…and…that by embarking on this course the Congress is correcting the system of relations between the proletariat and the peasantry and expresses its conviction that in this way these relations will be made durable.[189]

In the aftermath of the 1921 peasant uprisings and the Kronstadt rebellion, the Bolshevik leadership recognized that attacks upon its own population could not continue with such ferocity and intensity. As historian Basil Dmytryshyn stated, even Lenin himself, with all

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[188] Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century,* 53.
[189] Vladimir Lenin, "Report to Tenth Party Congress, March 15th 1921: Introducing the New Economic Policy," in *The Lenin Anthology ed. Robert C. Tucker* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975), 510.

his radicalized ideas for the future of Communism, "was astute enough to sense the growing dissatisfaction with his policy throughout the country" and realized "that his survival was at stake."[190]

In response to these social and political changes, the 10th Party Congress "resolved on a switch to the NEP [New Economic Policy], and the replacement of grain requisitions by a flat tax."[191] Under this new system, the Soviet government allowed peasants to sell their surplus grain after the collection of taxes for small profits.[192] This switch, under the guidance of Nikolay Bukharin, allowed Soviet agriculture to grow via "small-scale capitalism" under the auspices of socialism.[193]

The decision to switch to NEP reflected two aspects of Soviet society during this time. For one, it represented the lengths that Lenin and his regime were willing to go in order to maintain Bolshevik control over the Soviet Union, even if it meant endorsing capitalist, "bourgeois" practices in the short-term. Secondly, and critically, the decision to implement the NEP demonstrated the power of Soviet peasants, and highlighted the potential threat they posed to Soviet communism. Alone, peasants were weak and powerless against the Soviet regime. Yet, when united and acting together in unison, as with the 1921 uprising, the peasantry represented an entity capable of mass-revolt and destruction. For the Soviet state, which had just survived years of civil war and the invasion of foreign armies, largescale peasant resistance represented both a dangerous and hazardous risk to the Bolshevik regime. As a result, the economic policies of the

[190] Dmytryshyn, *A History of Russia*, 502.
[191] Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century*, 63.
[192] Kotkin, *Stalin Volume I*, 388.
[193] Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century*, 64.

NEP served as both a means to control and curtail the threat of the peasantry through a pacification of their strong sense of rebelliousness. Viewed in this light, the NEP "was a compromise, [and] a temporary retreat on the road to socialism, in order to give the country an opportunity to recover."[194]

Such a drastic change in policy proved difficult to accept for the majority of Bolshevik leaders. Historian, Stephen Kotkin, for example, argued that the motivations and desires of the peasant-class "acted as a severe constraint on Bolshevik ambitions," and that "accommodation to the peasant…proved extremely difficult to stomach for many party stalwarts."[195] As a result, concessions served to agitate the fragile relationship between Bolsheviks and the peasantry.

Although the NEP successfully stabilized the Soviet Union's social and political atmosphere, the new policy only delayed political and social conflict between the peasantry and state as rebellion and repression dominated much of the Soviet Union by the late 1920s. Stalin's rise to power, his decision to eliminate the NEP, and his collectivization drives of the late 1920s once again brought the tension of 1921 back to the forefront, as peasants and government officials clashed over the decision to reintroduce grain requisitioning through collectivized agriculture.

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[194] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition*, 489.
[195] Kotkin, *Stalin Volume I*, 420.

COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE "FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN"

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FIGURE 2: "Under the leadership of Great Stalin — Forward to Communism!"

In the months and years that followed Lenin's death in 1924, the Soviet Union underwent tremendous social, economic, and political changes as individuals fought for control over the state. Although Joseph Stalin assumed command of the Soviet government in 1924, his future remained uncertain due to interparty strife and the Soviet Union's political and economic vulnerabilities to both foreign and domestic threats.[197] Although the NEP served as "a time of revival," historian David Marples argued that it also created "acute social problems" in the mid-1920s, such as high-unemployment, low-wages, lack of housing, and crime across the Soviet Union.[198] This resulted in a "mass

[196] Phillip De Valcourt, "Collecting Soviet History," Collecting Soviet History, Accessed November 14, 2016, http://www.collectingsoviethistory.com/
[197] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition*, 495-496.
[198] David Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century*, 65.

exodus of the urban population to the countryside" and a retreat from Bolshevik ideology that stressed the importance of strengthening the working-class.[199]

To consolidate power and control, therefore, Stalin needed to accomplish three things: control over the countryside, a repeal of NEP, and, finally, rapid industrialization. As a result of its internal and external problems, the Soviet Union remained socially and politically divided and at an increasingly high-risk of invasion from both Eastern and Western powers.[200] Moreover, lack of industrial infrastructure placed the Soviet Union at a tremendous disadvantage to mechanized nations capable of mass-producing weaponry and supplies at a rapid rate. During the 15th Party Congress of 1927, Stalin echoed these sentiments in the statement: "Considering the possibility of a military attack against the proletarian state [Soviet Union] by capitalist states, it is necessary…to pay maximum attention to the rapid development of…industry, in particular, on which fall the primary role in securing the defense and economic stability of the country during the time of war."[201]

In addition to problems with industry, the adoption of NEP also equated to a toleration of capitalism. Viewed in this perspective, the NEP served to not only counter the work and original aims of the Russian Revolution, but it also served to prevent the establishment of a communist state. Thus, for these reasons, NEP required significant

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[199] Ibid., 64.
[200] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition*, 496.
[201] Joseph Stalin, "On the Directives On the Establishment of a Five Year Plan for the National Economy: 19 December 1927," in *Documents of Soviet History Vol. 4: Stalin Grasps Power 1926-1928*, Ed. Alex G. Cummins (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1998), 260.

alterations to fit Stalin's vision for a unified and "advanced industrial" Soviet state.[202] According to Marples,

> Stalin believed that the USSR was ten years behind the advanced nations of the West in industrial development. Not only did it have to bridge this gap, but it also had to achieve economic self-sufficiency. The atmosphere created in the country was one of a state of war – enemies were everywhere and being uncovered anew by the secret police. The new directions in economic policy would eradicate these enemies and strengthen the country.[203]

In 1927, Stalin sanctioned the development of the "First Five Year Plan" as a response to threats (either real or imaginary) working inside and outside of the Soviet Union.[204] The plan aimed to subordinate peasants through the development of collectivized farms designed to modernize Soviet industry.[205] Stalin planned to accomplish industrialization and modernization through overly-ambitious and excessive goals that mimicked a wartime economy.[206] Stalin used the potential threats posed by China, Japan, Germany, and the west as an excuse to launch collectivization throughout the Soviet Union and to extract the maximum amount of grain from the peasantry. Stalin also justified his collectivization program through the argument that state intervention served as the only means to eradicate capitalist-sabotage from taking place within the ranks of the peasantry.[207] Stalin falsely accused *kulaks* (wealthy peasants) for the poor grain supplies of 1927 and argued that wealthy peasants deliberately sabotaged harvests in order to damage the Communist state from within.[208] The absurdity of this claim,

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[202] Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century,* 94.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid., 95.
[205] Ibid., 94.
[206] David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond 6th Edition* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2002), 483.
[207] Lynne Viola, V.P. Danilov et. al, *The War Against the Peasantry, 1927-1930: The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 19-20.
[208] Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century,* 93.

however, lies in the fact that "*kulak* farms made up only 4 percent of the total" peasant population during this time; therefore, *kulak* sabotage (if it existed at all) played little role in the creation of a "grain crisis" as Stalin asserted.[209]

Grain procurement served as a crucial step for the advancement of Stalinism because it increased the amount of available goods to trade with foreign powers. Exports increased monetary capital for the Soviet regime and allowed for greater investments in both industry and security for the Soviet state. The official provisions of the first "Five Year Plan" reflected the overall intent of grain requisitioning. As it stated, "proceeding from the general course of foreign trade…it is necessary to construct a foreign trade plan with the purpose of an active balance."[210] According to the provisions, "an active trade balance together with the increase of gold extraction in the country…[was] the fundamental source for the formation of a currency revenue."[211] Stalin argued that "a sufficient increase in exports" inevitably led to "the growth of heavy and light industry."[212] Likewise, a newspaper article written in 1930 by Louis Fischer summarized the importance of heavy industry in the Soviet Union. In the article, which appeared in *The Nation*, Fischer stated,

> The heavy industries must not suffer. They are the solid foundation which bolshevism is laying for Russia's future development. Without them the country is dependent, incapable of defense in war, and doomed to a low standard of living. Moreover, if agricultural overproduction continues throughout the world, and if the Soviet Union were to remain a predominantly agrarian country, nobody would desire her exports, her foreign trade would shrink and her growth would be stunted. Industrialization is the historic function of bolshevism and answers the

[209] Ibid.
[210] Joseph Stalin, "On the Directives On the Establishment of a Five Year Plan for the National Economy: 19 December 1927," in *Documents of Soviet History, Volume 4, Stalin Grasps Power, 1926-1928,* ed. By Alex G. Cummins (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1998), 262.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid., 263.

> highest national interests. In the end the nation will be grateful to the Soviet regime for its persistence and courage in carrying out a difficult program despite the terrific costs to all inhabitants of the Union.[213]

Although clearly biased with his conclusions, Fischer, an "astute observer of Soviet politics," illustrated the importance that Soviet leaders placed on industrialization and equated both its growth and expansion to an agenda of pure necessity.[214]

The implementation of collectivization provoked widespread resentment and anger throughout the Soviet Union, as peasants (especially wealthier *kulaks*), and Soviet citizens clashed with government agents tasked with the enforcement of Stalin's new economic system.[215] To expedite the process of collectivization, the Soviet regime established brigades of armed "party activists," similar to War Communism, in order to confiscate grain and force farmers to join the collectives, often through force, if necessary.[216] These brigades included the infamous 25,000ers, who were comprised (primarily) of urban-workers, "demobilized Red army soldiers, internal security forces…and rural officials."[217] According to Lynne Viola, the Soviets tasked the 25,000ers "to serve in permanent positions on the collective farms in order to ensure the reliability of the collective farm movement."[218] Through this leadership role, the 25,000ers "were to serve as agents of revolution from above" and "were to inject [a sense of class] consciousness into the vast" peasantry to prepare them for socialism.[219] To meet

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[213] Louis Fischer, "Why Stalin Won," 22 July 1930, in *Documents of Soviet History Vol. 5: Revolution From Above, 1929-1931,* edited by: Alex G. Cummins (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 2000), 282.
[214] Ibid.
[215] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition,* 497.
[216] Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century,* 96.
[217] Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 33.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid., 35.

the grain procurement quotas set by collectivization, these activists often "went from hut to hut…seizing everything they could find."[220] According to Timothy Snyder, these brigades "looked everywhere and took everything," and often used "long metal rods to search through stables, pigsties, [and] stoves" to look for grain.[221] In the process of taking anything that "resembled food," Snyder also argued that party activists humiliated and disgraced peasants.[222] According to his findings, activists "would urinate in barrels of pickles, or order hungry peasants to box each other for sport, or make them crawl and bark like dogs, or force them to kneel in the mud and pray."[223] Peasants, particularly in the Ukraine, despised the efforts of 25,000ers. Oleksander Honcharenko, a former peasant from Kiev, described the 25,000ers as follows,

> The Twenty-Five Thousander was a propagandist-agitator…but who listened? No one. This liar made his way from one end of the village to the other. No one wanted anything to do with him. Everyone knew what was going on.[224]

Because of their overzealous efforts to collectivize agriculture, by 1930 "about one in every six households was deprived of its possessions."[225] In response, peasant insurgencies quickly "broke out across the Soviet Union, in virtually all of the chief grain-growing regions" as peasants sought to preserve the standard of living experienced under the NEP.[226] Consequently, historian David Marples argued that in the early 1930s, "the Stalin regime had not only succeeded in creating a civil conflict once again; it had

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[220] Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin,* 39.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.
[224] "Case History LH38," *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 327.
[225] Marples, *Russia in the Twentieth Century,* 96.
[226] Ibid., 97.

also alienated perhaps the majority of the Soviet population" as peasants attempted to understand and adjust to these rapid changes.[227]

The degree of change that peasants experienced varied considerably depending on their location within the Soviet Union, as some regions experienced far greater alterations to their farming customs than others. In Siberia and parts of Western Russia, for example, the collectivization of agriculture initially proved less drastic and dramatic. During the tsarist era, peasants who resided in these regions of Russia often operated within the confines of the *mir*. These communal-based, agricultural communities provided a sense of collectivized farming well before Stalin's forced grain requisitions began in the late 1920s. According to a French observer in the late 1800s, the *mir* served as "an assemblage of families holding…a common quantity of land, in which members collectively farmed for sustenance, and "to satisfy…[financial] obligations" and debts."[228] Therefore, early peasant resistance towards collectivization in these areas often resulted in far less situations of violence and dissent, due to the peasantry's familiarity with this form of communal farming.[229]

In the Soviet Ukraine, however, the shift to a collectivized system of agriculture resulted in far greater change for the peasantry. Similar to the nomads of Kazakhstan, Ukrainians possessed little knowledge about the communal labor practices of the *mir* in Russia due to their isolation and independent forms of farming.[230] According to Leonid

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[227] Ibid.
[228] Combes De Lastrade, "The Present Condition of the Peasants in the Russian Empire," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2,* Vol. 2 (1891): 83.
[229] Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants,* 9.
[230] Niccolo Pianciola, "The Collectivization Famine in Kazakhstan, 1931-1933," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies Vol. 25 No. 3/4* (2001): 237.

Korownyk, a former peasant from Dnipropetrovsk, "nobody wanted [collectivization], because historically Ukrainian farmers were individualist."[231] Likewise, historian Graham Tan described Ukrainian agriculture as a "system [that] shared many similarities with the communal system found in Central Russia [the *mir*] but… [with an] emphasis on the individual rather than the whole."[232] As he stated, in the Ukraine, "the most common form of land tenure…was the *podvornoe* system where land was held by individual households and passed to relatives as hereditary property."[233] As historian Anatole Romaniuk described, "the Ukrainian peasantry had a strong sense of property," which contrasted sharply with "the more collectivist-minded Russian peasantry…[and] its tradition of *obschena* (communality)."[234] Thus, forcing peasants of the Ukraine to work on collectivized farms resembled serf-like conditions of the nineteenth century and a return to a master-slave relationship. This sort of social and economic reality provoked great distress amongst those it touched. As a result, many Ukrainians chose rebellion as their best option to block Stalin's plans for an industrialized Soviet Union.

RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION IN THE UKRAINE

As seen with the economic development of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, conflict between the state and peasantry during these years fostered an atmosphere of anger and hatred that persisted well into the 1930s. As tensions mounted over the course of a decade, it is not difficult to understand why so many peasants chose to resist the

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[231] Interview: Leonid Korownyk, 20 March 2009, http://www.holodomorsurvivors.ca/Video/video/Files/Leonid%20Korownyk_video.html.
[232] Graham Tan, "Transformation versus Tradition: Agrarian Policy and Government-Peasant Relations in Right-Bank Ukraine 1920-1923," *Europe-Asia Studies,* Vol. 52, No. 5 (2000): 917.
[233] Ibid.
[234] Anatole Romaniuk and Oleksandr Gladun, "Demographic Trends in Ukraine: Past, Present, and Future," *Population and Development Review,* Vol. 41, No. 2 (2015): 318.

onslaught of Stalinism. Nor is it difficult to understand why the Stalinist regime resorted to such animosity in enforcing its collectivization policies. According to historian, Orlando Figes, "many Bolsheviks felt threatened by the peasant mass," and perhaps for good reason.[235] He argued that it was precisely "this fear of the peasant [that] was the great unresolved tension of the 1920s" and was "one that led inexorably towards the tragedy of collectivization."[236]

The tragedy of collectivization was particularly acute in the major grain-producing regions of the Soviet Union. The large swathes of nutrient-rich farmland across the Ukraine made it an ideal target for both Stalin and his cadres. Once collectivization officials arrived in 1927, peasants quickly found themselves immersed in a desperate fight to preserve their way of life amidst great Soviet oppression.

As collectivization efforts (and demands) increased throughout the Ukraine during the early 1930s, the levels of repression meted out against recalcitrant peasants also grew, as party activists and brigades ruthlessly deported, imprisoned, and executed peasants who attempted to hide or steal grain from Soviet authorities.[237] During collectivization (particularly in the early 1930s), "all agricultural production was declared to be state property." As a result, "any unauthorized collection of food [was] deemed theft, and…[was] made punishable by immediate execution."[238] According to Snyder, some of the most "enthusiastic" supporters of this requisitioning system included younger people, "educated in the new Soviet schools, [and] who believed in the promise of the

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[235] Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1996), 788.
[236] Ibid., 789.
[237] Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, 39.
[238] Ibid., 38.

new [Soviet] system."[239] As a result of their faith and devotion to communism, Snyder argued that Soviet cadres, who were "disproportionately Russian and Jewish," enforced collectivization with a particular ferocity against Ukrainian peasants, and punished, repressed, and "humiliated peasants wherever they went."[240] According to Snyder's findings, abuses against peasants who resisted collectivization reached extremes in the Ukraine, and often involved the violation of women. For example,

> women caught stealing on one collective farm were stripped, beaten, and carried naked through the village. In one village the brigade got drunk in a peasant's hut and gang-raped his daughter. Women who lived alone were routinely raped at night under the pretext of grain confiscations—and their food was indeed taken from them after their bodies had been violated.[241]

Thus, collectivization, "which was supposed to secure the Soviet order, seemed instead to destabilize" the region, as the ferociousness of these attacks encouraged dissident peasants to revolt against government-sponsored abuse.[242]

Stalin equated resistance in the Ukraine to a form of nationalism, as he argued that peasants and *kulaks* sabotaged collectivization policies "in order to spread" nationalist sentiment.[243] Peasants, however, viewed resistance as a legitimate response to foreign intrusion (on Ukrainian soil), and perceived collectivization as an attempt to eradicate their culture, language, and identity.[244] These views derived from decades of conflict between Russians and Ukrainians. During the tsarist era, for example, historian Nicholas Riasanovsky argued that the tsars displayed tremendous "hostility

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[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Ibid., 39-40.
[242] Ibid., 31.
[243] Ibid., 44.
[244] "Chapter One", *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 32.

to…Ukrainian nationalism," and undertook numerous measures to eradicate Ukraine's cultural identity.[245] Tsar Nicholas I, in particular, implemented "Russification" policies in the early 1800s as a means to centralize his authority through an assimilation of Russia's border-states.[246] Thus, resistance to collectivization reflected an attempt by the Ukraine to not only forge a separate and distinct identity from their Russian neighbor, but to also reject a policy that, in the peasantry's view, resembled Russian imperialism of the 1800s and early 1900s.[247]

Chapter three provides an in-depth analysis of the variations in resistance that occurred through a cross-comparison of oblasts/districts of the Ukraine. In the following chapter, I argue that in areas where smaller numbers of peasants resided, such as Odessa and Crimea, resistance remained more stifled and relied predominantly upon passive forms of aggression. In central areas of the Ukraine, however, peasants exhibited increased levels of violence against collectivization. In the regions of Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev, for example, peasants commonly turned to active forms of resistance to counter the drastic social and economic changes that occurred in their communities.

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[245] Nicholas Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 333.
[246] Ibid., 332.
[247] Case History LH8, "Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine" (Washington D.C., 1988), 257.

CHAPTER 3: RESISTANCE IN THE UKRAINE

Before examining the oblasts of Odessa, Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kiev, it is important to understand the differences between both passive and active resistance. What constitutes a passive form of resistance? More importantly, how does one distinguish passivity from active forms of revolt? Are there substantial differences between the two terms?

Lynne Viola argued that "passive" resistance assumed many different forms as peasants attempted to disrupt collectivization. These methods included (but were not limited to) the petitioning of government officials, bribery, theft, migrations, and appeals to local and top-level government officials for help. Viewed in this perspective, Viola's definition of "passive" reflected the peasants' desire to express anger and frustration through a largely non-violent manner.[248] I argue that this form of non-violent "passivity" dominated the Odessa and Crimea oblasts between 1927 and 1933.

Although passivity served as a non-violent countermeasure to the Soviet regime's actions in Odessa and Crimea, a far more violent and active form of rebellion erupted elsewhere across the Ukraine. In the greater context of the Soviet Union, Viola argued that active forms of resistance reflected activities of an entirely different scope and intensity. Viola defined "active" resistance as a desire of the peasantry to express anger through both violence and outright rebellion in their attempt to block collectivization.[249] Active forms of resistance included sabotage, arson, destruction, and vandalism of government property, as well as murder and assassinations. Moreover, active resistance

[248] Viola, *Peasant Rebels Under Stalin,* 206-207.
[249] Ibid.

also included mass-riots against Soviet authorities. I argue that active forms of resistance dominated the central oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev. In conjunction with passive forms of resistance that occurred in these regions, both areas served as hotbeds for rebellion and greatly troubled local and national-level Soviet authorities.

Using these definitions as a point of reference, passive and active resistance are distinguishable through their incorporation of either "non-violence" or "violence." Moreover, these forms of resistance also reflected a general division between "small-scale" and "largescale" forms of protest, as passive resistance remained more individualized than the group-oriented nature of active revolts. Taken together, both of these definitions reflect James C. Scott's description regarding "weapons of the weak." As he argued in his article, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," passive and active resistance "are an integral part of the small arsenal of relatively powerless groups," and "include such acts as foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, [and] anonymous threats."[250]

RESISTANCE: TIMELINE AND CAUSATION

One final note must be addressed in regard to the causative factors for resistance and the general timeline of events. Peasant resistance against collectivization can be understood as two separate responses between 1927 and 1933. Between 1927 and 1931, for example, resistance to collectivization was primarily directed against abuses by Soviet officials (i.e. extreme demands, arbitrary punishments, and overzealous cadres).

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[250] James C. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," in *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, edited by Forrest Colburn (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 1989), 5.

Resistance between 1932 and 1933, however, shifted as a result of famine conditions across the Ukrainian countryside. Although peasants continued to fight against Soviet abuses as before, the latter years of resistance reflected more of a struggle against starvation. In both periods, peasants across the Ukraine incorporated their "weapons of the weak" with varying degrees of success.

Finally, and critically, it is important to note that "grain-requisitioning and food removal" was carried out, primarily, by local Ukrainians with ties to the Communist regime.[251] These local leaders received their orders from Moscow, and were overseen by "thousands of [Soviet] fanatics" from abroad.[252] Thus, in many cases, resistance towards collectivization and starvation was directed at fellow Ukrainians who sympathized strongly with the Bolshevik-regime.

[251] Shkandrrij, "Breaking Taboo: The Holodomor and the Holocaust," 264.
[252] Ibid.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE IN THE ODESSA OBLAST

 [253]

FIGURE 3: ODESSA OBLAST

During collectivization, peasants in the Odessa oblast exhibited numerous forms of passive resistance against the Soviet state. Documents that pertained to resistance strategies in this region were both numerous and extremely detailed. Specifically, these documents revealed major trends in the resistance structure of Odessa that demonstrated a clear and conscientious effort by the peasantry to engage the Soviet regime in both a discreet and passive manner. Although active elements of resistance certainly occurred in Odessa – such as the mass-strike of factory workers in July of 1930 – these activities remained relatively rare occurrences.[254] Consequently, accounts of active rebellion in Odessa remained largely absent from primary sources, such as letters, diaries,

[253] Google, "Map of Odessa Oblast," Google Maps, Accessed November 14, 2016. https://www.google.com/maps/place/Odessa+Oblast,+Ukraine/

[254] "Extract From a Report by a Secret Informer of the Odessa Okrug Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding Information Obtained by the Japanese Embassy from the Japanese Consulate in Odessa," 30 July 1930, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's, Unknown Documents from the Archives of the Secret Services: Holodomor, The Great Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933,* translated by Dariusz Serowka (Kiev, Ukraine: The Institute of National Remembrance, 2009), 81.

government reports, and memoirs because these sort of actions served primarily as outliers to the majority of resistance cases.

Acts of passive resistance between 1927 and 1933 dominated much of the Odessa oblast. According to a "Top Secret" report from the Odessa Okrug[255] Division Chief, Petro Shostak-Sokolov, the director stated that "among the people [of Odessa] there is a great exasperation caused by the undertakings of the Sov[iet] authorities, particularly in regard to the grain exports abroad, and the lack thereof on our market."[256] As a result of Stalin's mass-collectivization drives in the countryside and the tremendous amount of grain requisitioned by Soviet officials, many residents of Odessa Oblast resented the "unfavorable economic situation" that the government implemented.[257] Yet, instead of actively rebelling and resorting to violence in order to resist, Odessans methodically and deliberately chose subversive tactics, such as theft, protest, and mass-migrations, as their primary countermeasure against the state. Such measures served to guard the interests of the peasantry because outright rebellion and attacks against Soviet forces brought the risk of severe repression and punishment. As peasants engaged Soviet officials through a more subtle manner, this afforded them an opportunity to protect their cultural practices, beliefs, and traditions, as well as prolong their overall survival amidst the turmoil that surrounded them. Odessans accomplished this through a wide variety of approaches,

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[255] In Russian, the term *okrug* refers to an administrative district or region.
[256] Yefim Kriviets and Petro Shostak-Sokalov, "Report by the Odessa Okrug Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Statements by Representatives of the Italian Consulate," 1 August 1928. Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 54.
[257] Yefim Kriviets and Petro Shostak-Sokalov, "Report by the Odessa Okrug Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Statements by Representatives of the Japanese Consulate," 1 February 1929, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 60.

which all sought to avoid unwanted and unnecessary attention from the Soviets in regard to their day-to-day activities.

REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN COLLECTIVE FARMING

One particular form of passive resistance in Odessa involved the widespread refusal or "unwillingness to join" the *kolkhoz* (collective farming communities) during the early stages of collectivization.[258] By abstaining from membership, the peasants of Odessa placed themselves in direct defiance of Stalin, the Soviet leadership, and local cadres that operated in their oblast. Refusal and unwillingness not only reflected their anger and frustration towards collectivization and communal farming practices, but it also served as a means to undercut Soviet authority in a non-aggressive manner and demonstrated to the regime that a general "weakening of Soviet authority" and "loss of influence and trust" had occurred throughout much of the Ukraine.[259]

To resolve this challenge to state power, Soviet officials (Ukrainian members of the Communist Party) aggressively enrolled defiant peasants into the *kolkhoz* against their will through the confiscation of private property, intimidation, and the threat of banishment.[260] The notion of "forced-enrollment" ran counter to the Soviet proclamation that membership in the *kolkhoz* represented a voluntary act by the peasantry. Soviet law

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[258] "Report by a Secret Informer of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding a Statement by the German Consul," 15 November 1929, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 65.

[259] "Report by the Chief of the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR for the Chief of the Counterintelligence Unit of GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding Statements by Foreigners on the Situation in Odessa," 26 July 1930, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 79.

[260] Miron Dolot, *Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1985), xiii.

required that no peasant or individual join the *kolkhoz* against their will. Stalin himself echoed this pronouncement in his 1930 article, "Dizzy With Success." As Stalin stated,

> The successes of our collective farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the *voluntary character* of the collective-farm movement and *on taking into account the diversity of conditions* in the various regions of the USSR. Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry.[261]

Miron Dolot – a peasant who experienced collectivization first-hand as a young boy – also recalled this in his memoirs. Dolot summarized the tension between Soviet officials and peasants over the issue of *kolkhoz* membership, as follows:

> He [the Soviet official] told us that the Communist Party had given us an opportunity to join the collective farm voluntarily, but we, ignorant farmers, had misused this chance and had stubbornly defiled the Party's policy. We had to join the collective farm now! If we did not, we would be considered 'enemies of the people' who would be exterminated as a 'social class.' Having said this, he sat down. It made no sense to us, for the words 'voluntary' and 'must' did not mesh.[262]

Because the Soviet government provided a legal exit from collectivized farming, peasants in Odessa naturally gravitated towards this legal gap to preserve a sense of their independence and freedom from the communist regime. Odessans interpreted this as a legitimate means to resist the encroachment of Soviet authorities, all in a peaceful, passive, and non-violent manner.

The mass-refusal of peasants to join the *kolkhoz* created tremendous problems for the Soviet regime and its grain procurement quotas. Moreover, their refusal to conform to Soviet ideals greatly surprised Soviet leaders and party members, and greatly

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[261] Joseph Stalin, "Dizzy With Success" in *Documents of Soviet History: Revolution From Above, 1929-1931 Vol. 5*, edited by Alex Cummins (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 2000), 201.
[262] Dolot, *Execution by Hunger*, 20.

hampered agricultural output in Odessa.[263] The Soviet regime acknowledged this loss of production in a 1932 report, as officials discovered that "grain procurement quotas were less than 30 percent fulfilled" in several *raions*[264] of the Odessa Oblast because of climate factors, and the refusal of peasants to join and participate in communal farming.[265]

MASS MIGRATIONS

When refusal to join the communes proved impossible, Odessan peasants looked for alternative methods to passively resist collectivization. As more and more peasants fell victim to collectivized farming in the late 1920s, local Ukrainian officials recognized an alarming new trend across the Odessa Oblast. To elude forced enrollments into collective farms, a large majority of peasants in Odessa chose migration to escape the effects of the "First Five Year Plan." Migration to cities (or to regions abroad in extreme cases) afforded peasants a chance to elude the serf-like conditions of the *kolkhoz* altogether. This mass-migration (exodus) of peasants from the countryside reached its zenith in Odessa between the years of 1929-1930, but also continued into the years of famine (1932-1934).[266]

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[263] "Telegram from the CC CP(b)U to the Oblasts on Economic Blockade of Raions Not Fulfilling Grain Procurement Plans," 6 November 1932. http://faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm. (Kiev: Kyiv Mohlya Academy Publishing House, 2008).

[264] In Russian, the term *raion* refers to an administrative unit. In the Ukraine, *oblasts* (provinces) were subdivided into *raions* which served as local power structures (similar to counties in the United States).

[265] "Telegram from the CC CP(b)U to the Oblasts on Economic Blockade of Raions Not Fulfilling Grain Procurement Plans," 6 November 1932. http://faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm. (Kiev: Kyiv Mohlya Academy Publishing House, 2008).

[266] "Report by a Secret Informer of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding a Statement by the German Consul," 15 November 1929, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 66.

German colonists[267] that lived within the region contributed to this collection of migrants. These colonists, located primarily along the coastal and border regions of the *oblast*, sought to emigrate abroad once it became evident that the Soviets had no intention of abandoning their collectivization program. In November 1929, a secret informant working with the Ukrainian authorities in Kiev reported "the escape of 6,000 [German] peasants" from the Odessa region to Moscow.[268] Dissatisfied with the failed policies of the *kolkhoz* and the extreme demands placed upon them each day, these peasants chose "escape" as their best means to survive. News about this largescale departure of peasants greatly troubled the Ukrainian authorities, particularly when the informant reported that, "it [was] clear that the escape of 6,000 peasants [was] only the beginning of [these] mass departures…due to unfavorable conditions for individual farms."[269] These sentiments proved true when an official 1933 report to the OGPU once again brought attention to the growth of migration across the Ukraine. In Odessa, OGPU Chief, Vsevolod Balitsky, reported that "incidents of flight [had] been registered in 19 raions, 177 villages and 228 collective farms."[270] Across these *raions*, villages, and farms, Balitsky found that "2,642 families…1,683 individual collective farmers, 1,259 collective farmer families, 1,320 individual private farmers, 1,007 private farmer families, 438 individual kulaks, 377 kulak families and six Party activists" fled from Odessa to escape not only their work

[267] German colonists arrived in Odessa during the reign of Catherine the Great as part of a Russian policy to settle parts of the Ukrainian countryside.
[268] "Report by a Secret Informer of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding a Statement by the German Consul," 15 November 1929, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's*, 66.
[269] Ibid.
[270] Vsevolod Balitsky, "Report from Balitsky to the OGPU on the Mass Exodus of Villagers from Ukraine," 22 January 1933. Located in: http://faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm. (Kiev: Kyiv Mohlya Academy Publishing House, 2008).

duties, but famine.[271] In addition, Balitsky discovered that in November 1932, "879 tickets for long-distance trains were sold" with an additional "3,614 [tickets]" sold in December.[272] These statistics reflected a pattern of migration unique to Odessan peasants, as Balitsky stated that "no rapid spikes of long-distance train ticket sales [had] been observed at other railway junctions" outside of the Odessa oblast.[273]

Craftsmen, scholars, and the youth of Odessa also fled the countryside in large numbers.[274] According to a special report issued to the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU in May 1932, government informants notified authorities of the tendency amongst "household workers and craftsmen" to move "out of the countryside and into the cities" in order to "find work in factories and other enterprises as locksmiths, blacksmiths, carpenters, etc."[275] Similarly, the report also addressed the migratory nature of both the youth and intelligentsia of Odessa, and stated that "the youth…is particularly keen on moving [away] from the countryside into the cities" in order to attend school and break "their links with the countryside."[276] As collectivization continued to intensify and engulfed Odessa's residents, the report also stated that village teachers were "inclined and willing to move to the cities, continuing education being their stated reason for doing so."[277]

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[271] Ibid.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Ibid.
[274] "Report by A Secret Informer of the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Abandonment of a Village by the Peasants," 13 May 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 113.
[275] Ibid.
[276] Ibid.
[277] Ibid.

According to a July 1932 operational report, migrations became especially problematic for both the Kominternovsk and Karl-Liebknechtovksy *Raions* of Odessa as middle-class peasants (*sedniaks*) contributed a large percentage of migrants.[278] A separate report from the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU also alluded to the migratory nature of Odessan peasants. According to an investigative analysis performed on the widespread migrations, authorities discovered that it was "the *Kulaks* and wealthier farmers who [were] escaping – the latter, out of fear that they will be taken for *Kulaks*, [were] closing down their farms and moving out to the city."[279] Yet, even with these mass-departures every month, Soviet documents make no mention of hostility or violence by Odessan peasants toward government officials. According to an OGPU report from May 1930, Soviet officials stated that "people…have not only displayed no hostility or displeasure [toward officials], they have even rejoiced…held dance parties, [and] sang songs" as they departed towards their destinations.[280]

Illegal travel intensified in early 1933, which corresponded directly with famine conditions and the decision of Soviet authorities (both locally and nationally) to intensify pressure on the local populace in order to meet food-production quotas.[281] In a meeting held by the Odessa Regional Committee of the Ukraine in January 1933, Secretary Mykhailo Mayorov observed countless "unauthorized visits of peasants, both collective

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[278] "Operational Report by the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Difficult Situation in German Settlements," 7 July 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's* Document 40, July 7th 1932, 138.
[279] "Fragment of a Report by a Secret Informer of the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Abandonment of a Village by the Peasants, 13 May 1932, 113.
[280] "Report by the OGPU Operations Group on the Results of the Work to Exile Category 2 Kulaks," 6 May 1930, TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 329, ll. 1-28, 31-33, 37-44, in *The War Against the Peasantry,* ed. Lynne Viola et. al (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 305.
[281] "Executive Summary," *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), xiv.

farmers and sole monopolies, from the villages of the Odessa region beyond its borders to other republics and territories."[282] According to Mayorov, such actions from the peasantry not only "undermine[d] the collective farms," but they also caused irreparable harm to the stated goals of the kolkhoz.[283] Officials responded to mass-migrations through the implementation of a "passport system" that "enabled the Soviet government to control who could live in cities and who would have to remain in the village."[284] This system "was to be carried out by the end of 1933 with top priority" given to "Kharkiv, Kiev, and Odessa."[285]

By leaving the countryside, peasants demonstrated a sense of resistance towards the Soviet regime that distinguished Odessa from other regions of the Ukraine. Odessan resistance served to deny the agricultural labor and production that Soviet officials needed for the "First Five Year Plan" to succeed – much like peasants did with their initial refusal to join the *kolkhoz*. This sort of resistance reaffirmed to the Soviet government that peasants lacked enthusiasm for Communism and communal-based agriculture. More importantly, however, migration to the cities or abroad offered peasants a viable escape from the ever-visible horrors of collectivization that occurred around them. Due to the government's desire to improve industry in the urban sector, cities offered peasants an escape from the high-agricultural demands placed upon them in

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[282] "Resolution of the Odessa Commodity of the KP (B) on the Reconciliation of the Mass Customs of Krestyans From the Odessa Area," 24 January 1933, Located in State Archives of Odessa Region, http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Odesa-1932-33.php#nom-47, in *Holodomor in Ukraine: Odessa Oblast (1921-1923, 1932-1933, 1946-1947). Memoirs, Documents, Research*. By L.G. Bilousova et. al, 2005.
[283] Ibid.
[284] "Soviet Press Sources on the Famine," *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 83.
[285] Ibid.

their rural communities, and offered fleeing peasants an opportunity for work as well as the possibility to receive food rations as urban-based workers.[286] According to the "U.S. Investigation of the Ukraine Famine," city rationing "ensured a meager diet for civil servants and workers."[287] Thus, city life offered peasants the possibility to escape penury, starvation, and the abuse of government officials across the Ukrainian countryside.

THEFT

In addition to insubordination and mass-migrations, peasants that resided in the Odessa Oblast also turned to widespread theft as a means to battle poor economic factors. Popular items for theft included both livestock and farming equipment. In a 1932 "Top Secret" report, Division Chief of the Odessa Oblast, Yuriy Piertsov, reported nearly "12 cases of group theft of cattle" within the month of July.[288] The Division Chief also expressed great concern over a similar case of cattle-theft that involved the Karl-Liebknechtovsky *Raion* in the Odessa Oblast. The report indicated that "a *Kulak* woman, [known as] Shefer Emma," led a large contingent of women into the local *kolkhoz* and managed to steal "[a herd of] cattle numbering 16 cows" from a council member that resided there.[289] In another case, the same Division Chief of Odessa also reported on the

[286] Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow,* 329-330.
[287] "Summary of Public Hearings," *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 203.
[288] "Fragment of a Special Communique of the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Political Situation and Agent-Based Operational Work Carried Out Among National Minorities, July 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 160.
[289] Ibid.

mass-theft of horses and wagons from *kolkhoz* farms that operated within the Blagoyevsky *Raion*.[290]

In each of these aforementioned cases, the "Top Secret" document in question noted that the individuals responsible for theft attempted "to establish individual farms" away from the communal lands developed by collectivization officials.[291] A separate "Top Secret" document from the same month concluded with similar findings, but added that many peasants in Odessa turned to theft as a result of their frustration with the *kolkhoz*, and from the extreme hunger they faced from food shortages during the famine.[292] Rather than provide livestock for the government and foreign consumers, peasants in Odessa found it more beneficial to take cattle and pigs for themselves in order to provide sustenance for their families. As a local peasant from Odessa stated in 1932, "why should we feed the cattle and take care of them when they will be taken away anyhow?"[293]

Theft, therefore, allowed peasants to resist the onslaught of Stalinism in a passive manner because it avoided direct confrontation with Soviet officials. Theft allowed farmers to disrupt the operations of *kolkhoz* farms and to slow the overall development of collectivization. More importantly, theft offered the peasantry an opportunity to reassert a sense of agency amidst a Communist culture that sought to prohibit independence from reaching fruition.

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[290] Ibid.
[291] Ibid.
[292] Ibid., 161.
[293] "Operational Report by the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Difficult Situation in German Settlements," 7 July 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 138.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE IN THE CRIMEA OBLAST

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FIGURE 4: CRIMEA OBLAST

Similar to the resistance strategies that occurred in Odessa, the Crimean Oblast also resorted to passive countermeasures to curtail the onslaught of collectivization. Yet, unlike the Odessa oblast, these peasants resorted to mass-migrations, the rejection of *kolkhoz* membership, and theft, the peasants of Crimea often cleverly used the poor economic situation that surrounded them to their advantage and used violence against Soviet officials only in rare and desperate situations. An OGPU report from November 1929 illustrated this point with its regional analysis of "anti-Soviet" demonstrations against collectivization. In their report to Moscow, OGPU officials credited the Crimea with only eleven total incidents of "*kulak* terror" (over a month-long period), which included nine beatings, one assault, and one reported injury against Soviet officials in the area.[295] These numbers contrasted sharply with incidents across the rest of the Ukrainian SSR in which 142 separate events, which included eleven murders, nine injuries, seventy-

[294] Google, "Map of Crimea Oblast," Google Maps, Accessed November 14, 2016. https://www.google.com/maps/place/Crimea+Oblast,+Ukraine/

[295] "OGPU Report: Antisoviet Incidents in the Countryside Related to Grain Procurements, From the Start of the Grain Procurement Campaign [July] Through 4 November 1929, After 4 November 1929," TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 7, d. 42, ll. 2-3, in *The War Against the Peasantry,* ed. Lynne Viola et. al (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005), 151.

eight cases of arson, fourteen assaults, twenty-eight beatings, and two cases of property damage were described.[296] As seen in the report, Crimea largely avoided violence and, instead, relied on passive strategies that aimed to prolong survival in their newly collectivized society. One of the primary forms of passive resistance that developed within the region involved the creation of a black market and the sale of illegal goods to provide for both sustenance and monetary gain.[297]

BLACK MARKET

As the Soviet government implemented numerous regulations and restrictions on trade throughout the Ukraine, the black market served as a crucial avenue to resist collectivization in the Crimea (and to survive the 1932 famine) as it allowed peasants to sell both stolen and illegal goods, particularly food, behind the backs of Soviet officials. The marketing of stolen grain not only increased the amount of food available to the Crimea, but it negatively impacted the total amount of grain collected for the Soviet regime's procurement quotas and, in turn, hurt overall goals for Stalin's "First Five Year Plan." In a July 1932 government report filed from Crimea's capital city of Simferopol, the Division Chief of Crimea's Economic Department expressed great concern over the massive amount of illegal goods that entered the market.[298] According to the document, the Chief acknowledged a large increase in "not only individual buyers who [were] active on the markets, but also trade representatives and agents of various econ[omic] and ZRK

[296] Ibid.
[297] Ibid.
[298] "Circular by the Economic Department of PP OGPU Crimea Regarding the Fight Against Abuses in Kolkhoz Trade," 19 July 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 150.

entities."[299] The Division Chief's findings concluded that these individuals were guilty of "undertaking wholesale purchases of agri[cultural] products from the *kolkhozniki* [members of the collective farms] as part of self-supply" for illegal market activities.[300] Evidence of black market activities in the Crimea were evident as early as 1927. In a report from the OGPU to A.I. Rykov (Chairman of the USSR *Sovnarkom*), Soviet officials found "acute shortages at the markets" that were "attributable…in large measure to the speculation [*spekuliatsia*] that has overtaken the most widespread procurement markets (flour, vegetable oil, raw leather and semifinished [sic] leather products, wool, yarn, etc.)"[301] In the report, Soviet officials found that in the Crimean wool market "private traders [were] exceeding procurement prices by as much as 200 percent," and obtained substantial profits from the illegal trade of wool and apparel.[302]

Government reports from the Crimea's Economic Department indicated that black market activities remained "common in the countryside," and continued to grow (and flourish) due to the participation of corrupt government officials in illegal trade.[303] "Joint dealings" carried out between state representatives, peasants, and "cooperative institutions" were particularly common, as corrupt officials often sought to enter illegal contracts with the *kolkhozniki* and peasantry that financially benefitted all parties

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[299] Ibid.
[300] Ibid.
[301] "Report From the OGPU to the USSR Sovnarkom On the Need to Take Repressive Measures Against Private Traders," 29 October 1927. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 6, d. 567, ll. 1-5, in *The War Against the Peasantry, 1927-1930: The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside,* ed. Lynne Viola et. al (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005), 29.
[302] Ibid., 30.
[303] "Circular by the Economic Department of PP OGPU Crimea Regarding the Fight Against Abuses in Kolkhoz Trade," 19 July 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 150.

involved.[304] According to a 1932 Economic Department document, government informants discovered that peasants near local *kolkhoz* farms often entered into direct negotiations with Soviet officials over food-supplies and arranged for the payment of "prices higher than the market prices for the purchased products."[305] Through these arrangements, peasants and corrupt officials benefitted financially because it allowed both parties to split the leftover "sums…[that were] significantly higher than those actually paid."[306] Widespread dealings such as these, proved problematic for Soviet leaders in the Crimea because unlawful trade greatly disrupted the flow of economic supplies to (and from) the region. Chief Ivanovsky of the Crimea's Economic Department reported about the impact of illegal trade. He claimed, "those deceitful businesses [trading] have brought loss to the system of workers' supplies by artificially raising the price levels" of market goods.[307] The "sale of industr[ial] products to the *kolkhozniki*" in the latter months of 1932 only amplified these problems as peasants continued to broker deals with corrupt officials.[308]

As government leaders continued to monitor the number of illegal transactions that took place across the region, the OGPU division of Simferopol discovered in July 1932 that black market trade was particularly common near the *kolkhoz* bazaars. Hidden in plain-sight of government officials, peasants brazenly chose to ignore Soviet law, and the potential for severe punishment, in order to conduct illegal trade.[309] Black market

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[304] Ibid.
[305] Ibid.
[306] Ibid.
[307] Ibid.
[308] Ibid.
[309] "PP OGPU Crimea Guidelines Regarding the Fight with Speculators on the Kolkhoz Bazaars," 2 July 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's*, 136.

trade among peasants became so widespread in 1932 that government officials systematically "set up militia posts on the *kolkhoz* bazaars and roads" in order to step up its "fight against the traders, as well as…other criminals who harm[ed] the socialist structure" of the *oblast*.[310] Yet, such action against the peasantry often proved fruitless as Crimean peasants managed to thwart Soviet operations through both personal and professional connections.

BRIBERY AND NETWORKING

The ability of peasants to negotiate and bribe government officials served as another source of passive resistance toward the state. It demonstrated not only the resilience of Crimean peasants, but also their ability to adapt to social, political, and economic changes in a timely manner. In particular, the art of networking proved highly effective for peasants who sought to continue their illegal operations on the black market, as it afforded them an opportunity to mask their operations through mutual arrangements made with corrupt and greedy government officials who sought to profit from unlawful trade. These illegal networks also included transportation services – most notably the Crimean railroads.[311] In a document issued by the Simferopol OGPU in June 1932 to railroad entities and *Raion* officials across the region, Chief Dashevsky issued a statement that warned of the peasantry and its dependence on railway transportation to conduct illegal trade. In the letter, Dashevsky proclaimed that, "the professional fences, [and] traders…have ties to the railroad employees and take advantage of those ties to

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[310] Ibid.

[311] "Guidelines From the Heads of PP OGPU Crimea Regarding the Fight Against Speculators Trading Grain," 14 June 1932. Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's*, 125.

transport [illegal] grain."[312] In his message, Dashevsky encouraged both private and public officials to prosecute the violators to the fullest extent possible.[313]

In contrast to other areas of the Ukraine, the Crimea's black market activities reached unprecedented heights in both its scope and magnitude, and infiltrated nearly all aspects of region's social, political, and economic sectors by the early 1930s. In a circular document dated a month after the Economic Department's discovery of black market activity in July 1932, Crimea's Division Chief expressed great concern over the discovery of additional information that pertained to the expansion of black market operations in the region.[314] Following an in-depth investigation of the region's activities, undercover agents managed to discover that black market trade was even more diverse and intricate than Soviet officials first believed. According to the report, Soviet informants managed to uncover countless privateers who worked within the market, as well as the existence of a vast trade network that spanned the entirety of Crimea. As the Division Chief stated in his report, "numerous…*kulaks*, [and] traders-speculators, continue their operations in the markets and bazaars in all the regions of Crimea, trying to use the *kolkhoz* trade to their own [benefit] and direct it onto a capitalist path."[315] The Chief continued in his report with the statement that:

> The facts attest that the purchasing of products and the sale of industrial articles on village markets are conducted primarily by former traders, *kulaks*, the dekulakized, persons of no established profession and declassed elements. It has

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[312] Ibid.
[313] Ibid.
[314] "Circular by the Economic Department of PP OGPU Crimea Regarding the Fight Against Speculators," 23 August 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 174.
[315] Ibid.

> also been established that the speculators organize themselves into groups, each dealing with a particular type of goods.[316]

For Soviet authorities, the discovery of this vast network proved highly problematic to establish a firm hold over the region, as the Crimea demonstrated its ability to resist government encroachment within its day-to-day operations. Moreover, the existence of a black market demonstrated to the Soviet regime that capitalism continued to thrive within the Crimea, regardless of its extensive attempts to subdue it from further development.

For the Crimea Oblast, the black market remained a key aspect of passive resistance throughout much of the early 1930s as problems with grain supplies continued to mount from Stalin's seemingly endless collectivization drives. Yet, even as the Soviet government increased pressure on illegal trade, peasants across the Crimea continued to expand their opposition strategies through both fencing and speculation practices with corrupt Soviet officials. In August 1932, approximately eight months before the Great Famine intensified and reached its climax across the Ukraine, the Economic Division of the Crimea reported the receipt of numerous testimonies that pertained to speculators who purchased agricultural products. The report indicated that in many cases, officials discovered that Crimean peasants purchased products directly from the *kolkhozniki*, Soviet guards and patrols, and from corrupt officials, despite the expanded efforts of the government to arrest and deport peasants that committed these crimes.[317] By bribing collectivization agents with particular goods and offering free services, "such as weighting the products for them," peasants illegally bought "products at low prices" from

[316] Ibid.
[317] Ibid., 175.

these officials which allowed them to, in turn, "resell the same produce...on the market at speculative prices."[318]

ROBBERY

In addition to the establishment of fences and speculative operations, peasants in the Crimea also resisted collectivization through theft. Robbery often incorporated a great deal of strategy and deception as it unfolded. Through common knowledge that theft carried great risks to their well-being, Crimean peasants often acquired material goods, primarily grain and other foodstuffs, through manipulative processes. One particular item that peasants favored involved government-issued grain receipts.[319]

In order to stop the illegal black market operations in the region, Crimean and Soviet authorities discontinued the use of paper currency in transactions that involved government officials and grain deliverers.[320] Instead, officials chose to carry out the sale and procurement of grain through the use of receipts in place of hard-currency.[321] By dealing with transportation agencies in this manner, Soviet officials hoped to eliminate widespread instances of bribery through an elimination of currency exchange.[322]

Crimean peasants circumvented this new policy through the direct theft of receipt books from government officials and stations.[323] By taking these books, peasants entered into direct negotiations with grain deliverers through the impersonation of Soviet

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[318] Ibid.
[319] "Telegram from the Economic Directorate of the OGPU Regarding Intensified Fight Against Grain Theft, 15 December 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 237.
[320] Ibid.
[321] Ibid.
[322] Ibid.
[323] Ibid.

officials.[324] This, in turn, allowed peasants to acquire large-scale quantities of goods, destined for export, at no cost. As a result, "*zagotzernos*," or grain-storage centers, became chief targets for peasants in the Crimea as the facilities often possessed both large quantities of grain as well as numerous receipt books.[325] In a December 1932 telegram from the Economic Directorate of the OGPU to Moscow, Chiefs Lev Mironov and Yosif Ilyitsky detailed the widespread theft of receipt books and its impact on Soviet supplies in the region. In the telegram, both Mironov and Ilyitsky reported that undercover investigations had uncovered "a whole system of misuse…leading to the theft of large quantities of grain" by the peasantry.[326] In the investigation, the two chiefs stated that large numbers of "receipt book registers were missing, together with [signs of] control of their use (receipts being issued to the grain deliverers during deliveries)."[327] The report concluded that the "situation was widely exploited for stealing of grain" and that "the theft of grain [had been] enhanced by deep penetration of the lower apparatus [peasantry] by foreign and criminal elements [dealing] with grain purchases."[328] Mironov and Ilyitsky's telegram stressed the role of "*kulaks* and the richer [farmers]" in the promulgation of this theft-system and the need to closely monitor the further exploitation of "*zagotzerno*" centers.[329]

Through negotiations, networking, manipulation, and deceit, peasants in the Crimea managed to resist collectivization efforts through the disruption of both supplies

[324] Ibid.
[325] Ibid.
[326] Ibid.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Ibid.
[329] Ibid.

and "indust[rial] goods to the *kolkhozniki*."[330] This passive, non-violent form of resistance allowed Crimean peasants to endure many of the food shortages and hardships that plagued much of the Soviet Ukraine, and provided them with an effective means to survive, along with an ability to make small-scale profits from their work in a political system that aimed to subordinate peasants to the state's will.

SUMMARY OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE

The incorporation of passive resistance across Odessa and Crimea meant the peasantry seldom engaged with the Soviet government or its agents. To engage Soviet forces with violence and direct attacks only increased the risk of additional pain and suffering to these regions. Although defiance to Soviet policies failed to halt the expansion of collectivization, passive resistance helped to postpone complete government control that collectivization sought to incorporate in the Ukraine.

[330] Ibid.

ACTIVE RESISTANCE IN THE DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST

 [331]

FIGURE 5: DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST

Although passivity formed the backbone of peasant resistance in the Odessa and Crimea Oblasts, some of the strongest and most active forms of resistance emanated directly from the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast between 1927 and 1933. Although the exact number of incidents against government forces were unknown, the actions within this region remained well documented as they invoked a great deal of anxiety amongst both the Ukrainian and Soviet leadership.[332] Active forms of rebellion within Dnipropetrovsk also attracted the attention of political figures within the Soviet regime. In a private letter to Party First Secretary, Lazar Kaganovich, which spoke of the troubling situation in this region, Stalin expressed a deep concern about the social and political unrest in Dnipropetrovsk. As he stated, "unless we begin to straighten out the situation in the Ukraine, we may lose the Ukraine…things cannot go on this way."[333]

[331] Google, "Map of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast," Google Maps, Accessed November 14, 2016. https://www.google.com/maps/place/Dnipropetrovsk+Oblast,+Ukraine/
[332] Joseph Stalin, "Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich," 11 August 1932, in *The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence 1931-36,* translated by Steven Shabad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 180.
[333] Ibid.

Dnipropetrovsk not only possessed a large peasant population, but it also maintained largely rural and agrarian traits devoid of an urban sector. This distinguished the region from other districts of the Ukraine because it allowed for grain-production to take place on an unprecedented scale. This, in turn, made the region vitally important for the fulfillment of the Soviet Union's procurement quotas. A resolution of the CPC USSR in December 1932 reflected this notion, which recognized Dnipropetrovsk as one of three important regions to the fulfillment of grain quotas.[334] These rural and agrarian traits also served another role. The vast countryside of Dnipropetrovsk created a major advantage for rebels that wished to partake in resistance against collectivization. A large countryside meant far greater opportunities to elude Soviet officials because most villages within this area remained outside the tight confines of cities and away from the ever-cautious and suspicious eyes of secret police. As a result, Dnipropetrovsk became a haven for resistance against the Soviet state.

ANTI-SOVIET AGITATION AND REFUSAL TO WORK

Although Dnipropetrovsk Oblast possessed numerous places to hide from authorities, many peasants and workers often made their voices heard through direct engagement with both the Ukrainian and Soviet leadership. In a correspondence with Kaganovich, Stalin revealed the widespread anti-Soviet atmosphere in Dnipropetrovsk when he described that "nearly 50 raion Party committees" of the region publicly

[334] Joseph Stalin and Viacheslav Molotov, "Resolution of the CC AUCP(B) and CPC USSR on Grain Procurement in Ukraine," 19 December 1932, in *The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine,* edited by Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012), 248.

dismissed the "grain-procurement plan as unrealistic" in the summer of 1932.[335] Public acts of dissent did not end here. In a similar act of defiance, the national newspaper *Pravda* published an article in February 1933 that detailed the problems local Ukrainian leaders faced in their fight against social unrest in the region.[336] In the article, Stanislav Kosior, a key individual of Stalin's administration in Ukraine, described the attitudes that prevailed amongst workers who refused to work within the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. As he stated,

> I should first of all recall the attitudes prevailing at the start of the grain procurements…and through June-September. What were those attitudes made up of? Of whining that the plan was difficult, that the plan given was incorrect, and so on… We spoke about this more than once with district workers of…Dnipropetrovsk…but, even so, we must frankly admit that we did not bring this matter to an end.[337]

Through their refusal to work and by speaking out against collectivization directly, peasants, workers, and party members of Dnipropetrovsk all sought to make their voices heard to the regime through a concerted effort that aimed to undermine Soviet authority in the area. As these two documents revealed, peasants and workers actively defied the Soviet regime. More importantly, even local members of the Communist Party itself made their opinions known.

Other elements of active dissent accompanied the peasantry's refusal to work in Dnipropetrovsk as well. Public denunciation of government officials and the proliferation of anti-Soviet propaganda only encouraged the peasantry's struggle against

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[335] Joseph Stalin, "Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich on changing the Ukrainian SSR leadership," 11 August 1932, Located in *The Holodomor Reader*, 239.
[336] Stanislav Kosior, "On Errors and Shortcomings in Organizing Grain Procurements in Ukraine," *Pravda*, 15 February 1933, Located in *The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933," edited by Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012), 239.
[337] Ibid.

collectivization as tensions continued to rise in the area. One particular case of public denunciation involved the *kulak*, Matvey Golovko. In July 1932, Soviet authorities arrested Golovko for conducting "a systematic a[nti]-Sov[iet] propaganda campaign against all undertakings of the Sovi[iet] authority and party."[338] In his denouncement of Soviet officials, Golovko hoped to provoke anti-Soviet sentiment across Dnipropetrovsk in order to suppress the expansion of collectivization into the countryside and to encourage rebel activity. During one of his many public attacks on the Soviet regime, government officials seized Golovko as he tried to rally workers from the Dnieprostroy Dam project to fight against the injustices of Soviet policy. In his speech, Golovko stated,

> It [the Soviet regime] is not authority, but a gang. They have profited, they rob peasants to the last [kopek], people starve, they take everything away…once again there will be a landlord in power, they will once again beat peasants in the future. There is no spark, there are no initiators, there is no life at all, the matters have touched the poor as well; they are also being oppressed…The authorities want to turn artels into pigs – the Sov[iet] authority does not need us. The War will come soon…I see whom to crush. I would go and shoot all those bastards. Bloody gangsters, they want to do [us] in completely. Damn the workers who work, better they all leave work, it would all be over faster.[339]

Although Soviet authorities managed to catch Golovko before his words provoked a widespread riot at the dam, statements such as this remained a common theme in the region and helped to spur anti-Soviet sentiment across the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Peasants largely regarded such indictments against the regime as self-evident and

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[338] Gavrilo Nikelberg, "Final Decision of the Zaporizhia Municipal Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in the Case of Matvey Golovko, Worker at the Dnipropetrovsk Construction Site," 17 July 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 147.
[339] Ibid.

truthful. Ukrainians needed only to look at their current economic and social condition to understand that oppression was both real and ever-present.

Although the public dismissal of authority does not immediately invoke thoughts of an "active" form of resistance, Miron Dolot, a survivor and witness to both collectivization and the Great Famine, argued otherwise. According to Dolot, the Soviet regime viewed this sort of resistance in a particularly harsh and negative perspective. Even though "speaking out" followed a non-violent form of expression, Soviet officials viewed the act as both a severe and direct attack upon the Soviet government.[340] As Dolot stated, anyone "who opposed an official's activity, incurred a severe penalty as a suspected enemy of the people."[341]

ACTIVE REBELLION

In conjunction with the dismissal of Soviet authorities and their policies, peasants across Dnipropetrovsk also sought to remedy their social and economic situation through active rebellion against the Soviet government. Although Soviet officials recorded several uprisings throughout this region in the early 1930s, the most organized and concerted effort to destabilize Soviet authority involved the Pavlohrad Uprising in 1930. This episode of peasant violence, more than any other event, established the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as a stronghold for rebel activity due to the vast number of peasants that chose to fight against the state.

During the rebellion, peasants managed to sweep across five separate *raions* of Dnipropetrovsk, "armed with old rifles, sawn-off shotguns, shotguns, stakes and

[340] Dolot, *Execution by Hunger*, 11.
[341] Ibid.

pitchforks."[342] Using their vast numerical superiority as an advantage, the peasant rebels coordinated their efforts "to remove Bolshevik authorities and Soviet and party activists" from the *oblast*.[343] With each district that fell to the rebels, hundreds of additional peasants joined in the march toward Dnipropetrovsk City. During this advance, peasants took control of key bridges, and broke numerous "telephone line[s] to disrupt communication between the local Soviet leaders and the district and *oblast* authorities."[344]

Upon their arrival at the city of Pavlohrad, only fifty miles east of Dnipropetrovsk City, the peasant rebels entered into a fierce firefight with Soviet troops stationed nearby. Through their determination, the peasants forced the infantry division to capitulate and "[enter] into negotiations" in order to avoid encirclement and destruction.[345] To counter this attack, the Soviets deployed thousands of "GPU troops and militias" to put down the insurrection before it spread any further.[346] Although the exact number of peasants involved in this assault on the Soviets may never be known, historian Robert Conquest proclaimed that "the total ran into [the] thousands."[347] In the end, "charges of participation…were brought against 210 people; 27 insurgents were executed…a mere 19 were released, while the rest were sentenced to 3-10 years in prison."[348]

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[342] Ivan Patryliak, "A Different Peasantry," The Ukrainian Week, May 6, 2011, http://ukrainianweek.com/History/22097.
[343] Ibid.
[344] Ibid.
[345] Ibid.
[346] Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow*, 155.
[347] Ibid.
[348] Ivan Patryliak, "A Different Peasantry," The Ukrainian Week, May 6, 2011, http://ukrainianweek.com/History/22097.

MURDER AND ASSASSINATIONS

In addition to large-scale rebellions, peasants in the Dnipropetrovsk region also made widespread attempts to assassinate and murder Soviet officials in order to resist the onslaught of collectivization. Documents from the area mentioned the occurrence of assassination attempts and murders as early as the 1929 winter. In January of that year, correspondence between local leaders referred directly to the assassination of "Soviet Comrade Kvach" by peasants in the city of Novomoskovsk. The letter explained that Kvach, a local leader of the Communist Party in Ukraine, served as "chairman of the village Soviet," and was "killed after warnings in anonymous letters."[349] Soviet officials also reported similar incidents in the Verkhnesamar area in which a district chairman "was wounded" by peasant activists.[350] In another case, "the chairman of the village council of the Kutyarino [collective] farm" was also found dead after an attack by so-called *kulak* groups who organized and armed themselves in the district.[351] Local Soviet leaders in Dnipropetrovsk discovered similar attacks against government agents "in almost all districts" of the oblast.[352] Officials blamed *kulaks* and middle-class peasants for these widespread attacks, which, they argued, stemmed directly from "the grain procurement campaign."[353] In order to counter government activities in the area, local leaders argued that *kulaks* expressed their frustration through "active anti-Soviet agitation…against representatives of the Soviet government," and against poor workers

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[349] "On Bread Production in Dnipropetrovsk: The Status of Multilingualism and the Work of the Local Apparatus," 19 January 1929, Located in Central State Archives of the Ukraine, http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1929.php#nom-4, Document #4.
[350] Ibid.
[351] Ibid.
[352] Ibid.
[353] Ibid.

known to possess positive feelings toward the communist regime.[354] Murders and violence against Soviet officials in the area remained so intense that an OGPU report (filed in November 1932 by Kosior himself) listed the Dnipropetrovsk region as one of three localities "most affected by the activity of hostile forces at the present time."[355]

Although the peasantry ultimately failed to defeat the Soviets in Dnipropetrovsk, their violent actions successfully instilled a sense of fear amongst government officials. Documents from Dnipropetrovsk allude to the ever-present theme of terrorism used by peasants against government agents and sympathizers. The active resistance against the state demonstrated not only the capabilities of the peasants, but it also revealed their determination to escape collectivization and government control. In the end, these actions mattered little, however, because they served to block collectivization efforts only for the short-term. Rebelliousness, in turn, only strengthened the resolve and desire of Soviet leaders to further subjugate the region to their rule. Soviet officials met counterrevolutionary activity with mass-arrests and deportations.[356] Rebel groups, particularly those regarded as Petliurists (nationalists), were "eradicated" by shock brigades organized to defend Soviet interests.[357] Finally, peasants (both individuals and

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[354] Ibid.
[355] "GPU Report on the Repressive Measures Taken Against the Kulak-Petliurist Counterrevolutionary Elements," 22 November 1932, in *A Selection of Soviet Documents On the Ukrainian Holodomor,* ed. Roman Serbyn, Located in Central State Archives of the Ukraine, http://history.ua.org, 75.
[356] "Memorandum on the Illegal Organizations in the USSR Uncovered and Eradicated by the OGPU Organs," January 1933, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 266.
[357] Ibid., 266, 274.

groups) accused of grain-theft, terrorism, or anti-Soviet behavior, "[were] sentenced to be shot or to serve 6 to 10 years in labor camps in Siberia."[358]

ACTIVE RESISTANCE IN THE KIEV OBLAST

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FIGURE 6: KIEV OBLAST

Similar to Dnipropetrovsk in the south, Kiev Oblast also experienced some of the strongest and most violent forms of resistance that occurred in the late 1920s and early 1930s. As the situation for peasants continued to deteriorate across the Ukraine during collectivization, active resistance served as a standard countermeasure to Soviet encroachment in Kiev as the peasantry looked for new strategies to preserve their traditional way of life.

MURDER

One particular form of active resistance that occurred in the Kiev Oblast involved the systematic murder and assassination of Soviet officials who operated within the area.

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[358] "Letter from the Polish Consul in Kiev to the Polish Representation in Moscow with Enclosed Letters from the Student Buczak," January 1933, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 277.

[359] Google, "Map of Kiev Oblast," Google Maps, Accessed November 14, 2016. https://www.google.com/maps/place/Kiev+Oblast,+Ukraine/

In a confidential report filed by the Polish Consulate of Kiev in May 1932, Consul Henryk Jankowski expressed great concern over the development and rapid growth of this deadly new pattern of resistance. Jankowski's report to the Polish government indicated that murder and assassinations remained extremely common within Kiev, particularly as grain requisitions started to increase in late 1932.[360] With these dramatic increases, many peasants left the *kolkhoz*, altogether, in search of food. As a result, Jankowski reported that guards were often "instituted to monitor the fields" by Soviet officials in order to prevent the mass-theft of food crops.[361] Without fear of reprisals from the Soviet regime, peasants stole and looted from state-sponsored farms in large numbers. In particular, Kiev's peasants favored potato theft because it offered a quick meal that could be obtained with little effort.[362] In a statement about the mass-theft of potato crops in Kiev, Consul Jankowski stated that, "in a majority of cases, once planted they are immediately dug out by hungry people."[363] For the watchmen tasked to protect these vital crops, the defense of these farms often proved fatal as "cases of murder committed against the guards" became an all-too-common practice for peasants desperate to eat.[364] In fact, murder and assassinations became so widespread across Kiev that guards often went "into hiding as soon as they spot[ted] approaching vagabonds, leaving them undisturbed in their pursuits."[365] Faced with mobs and angry peasants, guards

[360] Henryk Jankowski, "Report by the Polish Consulate in Kiev for the Polish Representation in Moscow Regarding the Famine in Right-Bank Ukraine," 11 May 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 112
[361] Ibid.
[362] Ibid.
[363] Ibid.
[364] Ibid.
[365] Ibid.

resorted to self-concealment as a means to escape not only confrontation but the possibility of death as well.[366]

MASS STRIKES AND RIOTS

In addition to the widespread murder and assassination of Soviet officials, peasants in Kiev also resorted to mass-strikes and riots to counter the spread of collectivization. Kiev's industrial sector, in particular, served as a hotbed of dissent because "severe food shortages" continued to grow and "supplies to factories…greatly decreased" in the early 1930s.[367] In a statement issued by the Polish Consulate in Kiev, Consul Jankowsi proclaimed that "disputes…between the [factory] workers and the administration" represented a daily occurrence for Kiev as "the poverty of the workers…reached such levels that their families are forced to eat products of poor quality, such as bread with peas and potato peelings."[368] Unable to cope with such circumstances, many men chose to fight factory administrators and Soviet officials in order to escape the poor economic conditions that collectivization brought. For individuals "disillusioned with the authorities," such as these, the OGPU responded by arresting…then sending them to jail."[369] According to a 1933 letter from the Polish Consul in Kiev, Soviet jails soon became "overfilled with workers, peasants and other suspicious elements."[370]

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[366] Ibid.
[367] Ibid., 111.
[368] Ibid.
[369] "Letter from the Polish Consul in Kiev to the Polish Representation in Moscow With Enclosed Letters From the Student Buczak," January 1933, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 280.
[370] Ibid.

Social unrest also characterized Kiev's countryside. By summer 1932, many peasants actively rebelled against the Soviets and refused to work on the *kolkhoz* once famine conditions began to occur. This forced many state-run farms to shut down across the area. A 9 May 1932 report described these rebellious activities. In the document, the Deputy Chief of Kiev Oblast reported to Kharkov's Economic Division about mass-rebellion in the Kievan countryside due to acute food shortages.[371] In a conversation with Ivan Radchenko, head engineer of Kiev's Ukrainian Land Melioration Trust, the Deputy Chief also reported on several discoveries made across numerous *raions* of their district. During an investigation of the countryside, Radchenko discovered that all "the fields were completely bare" as a result of the rebellious actions that occurred.[372] Radchenko attributed this to the fact that "the peasants do not want to work," because they feel as though "there is no hope of fulfilling the sowing plans, as there is nothing to sow with."[373]

Interestingly, rebellions of this scale and magnitude in Kiev were not limited to only men. Women also resisted collectivization through their participation in protests and riots. In a secret transmission to the Polish Consulate, the German Consul in Kiev reported in 1932 that statistics showed a substantial growth in the number of women that protested against the *kolkhoz* farms.[374] According to the report, the German Consulate

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[371] "Report by the Kiev Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Case Codenamed 'Boloto,'" 9 May 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 109.
[372] Ibid.
[373] Ibid.
[374] "Top Secret Report: Report by the Kiev Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Information on the Situation in the Countryside Collected by the German Consulate," 1 June 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 118.

found that "the men [of Kiev had] convinced their wives to start turmoil" in order to stretch Soviet authorities to the breaking point.[375] In one particular case, a large number of women actively protested against a government farm in Kiev. The protest quickly turned into a riot as women loudly scolded the *kolkhoz* officials there, and shouted: "Away with the Soviet Rule!"[376] These women-led protests also occurred in the Pulinsky *Raion* of Kiev where women led a direct attack against a local *kolkhoz* that operated in the vicinity.[377] According to reports, the attack caused substantial damage and destruction to the farm.[378] In a statement made by Kiev's District Chief, "the crowd [of women] broke out the doors and windows in the cooperatives' stores" before "order was restored by the workers from the [nearby] china clay plant."[379] What accounts for these sudden attacks by women? Historians Lynne Viola and V.P. Danilov attributed the rise of women rioters to the fact that "peasant men were far more vulnerable to repression than peasant women."[380] Therefore, men actively encouraged their wives to resist on the "assumption…that women would not be the subject of arrest."[381] General Petr Grigorenko, a prominent military officer of the Soviet Union, offered a similar interpretation to this newfound rebelliousness. Grigorenko argued in his memoirs that women rioters were "a kind of tactic" in that "women would initiate opposition to the collective farm and the men would remain on the sidelines until the local activists began to attempt to quell the disorder."[382] Through this sort of resistance, Grigorenko argued

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[375] Ibid.
[376] Ibid.
[377] Ibid.
[378] Ibid.
[379] Ibid., 117.
[380] Lynne Viola, V.P. Danilov et. al, *The War Against The Peasantry,* 322.
[381] Ibid.
[382] Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 106.

that "men could [then] safely enter the fray as chivalrous defenders of wives, mothers, and sisters, rather than as anti-Soviet *podkulachniki*."[383]

REBELLION

While mass-riots and attacks on collective farms became widespread across Kiev Oblast, peasants also resisted collectivization through the formation of rebel groups and militias. Due to the large amount of grain requisitioned by the state, many peasants started to loot and attack Soviet representatives by the summer 1932 as food and material goods shrank dramatically.[384] Many of these groups maintained strong ties to nationalist organizations, and formed "underground" movements that aimed "to carry out destructive activities in the kolkhozy and sovkhozy."[385] According to the District Chief of Kiev Oblast, Yulian Bzhezovsky, the "Lakhno-Doroshenko gang, active in the Bobrovytsky and Ichnyansky *Raions*" formed perhaps the largest "political gang" that operated in Kiev, and was composed primarily of "Red Army veterans" (Ukrainians) who resided in the region.[386] The fact that veterans made up the bulk of this gang greatly alarmed Soviet officials in Kiev because these individuals possessed not only military training and weaponry, but also the ability and desire to pursue direct confrontations with Soviet

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[383] Ibid.
[384] Yulian Bzhezovsky, "Report by the Kiev Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Data Collected by
the German Consulate on the Situation in Farming," 1 May 1932, , Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 106-107.
[385] "Memorandum on the Illegal Organizations in the USSR Uncovered and Eradicated by the OGPU Organs," January 1933, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 268.
[386] Yulian Bzhezovsky, "Report by the Kiev Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Data Collected by the German Consulate on the Situation in Farming," 1 May 1932, , Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 107.

forces.[387] Consequently, officials were greatly dismayed to discover a trend of "growing banditry" that emanated from this group in the countryside as local government officials remained largely powerless to stop them.[388]

By late 1932, confrontations with other rebel groups reached a critical level within the Novohrad-Volynskyi *Raion*.[389] Government reports from this time detailed a massive upswing in gang-violence as rebel groups directly assaulted Soviet officials and troops as a result of their dissatisfaction with collectivization and the growth of famine conditions.[390] These largescale attacks forced authorities "to dig entrenchments" and to "construct barbed wire entanglements" to prevent violence and bloodshed.[391] Soviet officials also developed special task forces, under the leadership of GPU Chief Levotsky, to conduct counter-insurgent operations in response to attacks in the area.[392] These actions did little to halt rebel activity in Kiev. Instead, the entrenchment of troops only strengthened the peasantry's desire to fight and prompted rural peasants to call upon individuals from the city "to give [their] full support to the countryside" once their general uprisings began.[393] Active rebellion in Kiev became so widespread that in November 1932, Kosior listed the oblast in a report as an area deeply "affected by the

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[387] Ibid.
[388] Ibid.
[389] "Top Secret Report: Report by the Kiev Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Information on the Situation in the Countryside Collected by the German Consulate," 1 June 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 118
[390] Ibid.
[391] Ibid.
[392] "GPU Report on the Repressive Measures Taken Against the Kulak-Petliurist Counterrevolutionary Elements," 22 November 1932, in *A Selection of Soviet Documents On the Ukrainian Holodomor,* ed. Roman Serbyn, Located in Ukraine State Archives, http://history.ua.org, 77.
[393] Yulian Bzhezovsky, "Report by the Kiev Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Regarding the Data Collected by the German Consulate on the Situation in Farming," Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 106.

activity of hostile forces at present time."[394] Kosior found rebellion in Kiev most problematic in the "Umanskyi, Zhashkovskyi, Zvenyhoroskyi, Bukinskyi, Tsybulevskyi, Lesnianskyi, Talnianskyi, Kabanskyi…[and] Haisynskyi *raions*."[395] Thus, out of Kiev's seventeen *raions* (in 1932), rebellion dominated nine separate districts, a figure that represented more than half of the *oblast.* Rebellious activity continued well into 1934. In a 21 December 1934 diplomatic report from the Italian consulate in Kiev, officials reported that "in Kiev both police and troops are being used to patrol both inside the city and in the suburbs" in order to maintain "law and order" amidst general unrest.[396]

ARSON

Finally, peasants in Kiev also resorted to arson attacks in order to instill a sense of fear in the minds of Soviet officials. One particular case of arson involved the January 1933 peasant attack against a local *kolkhoz* farm. In a memorandum issued to officials in Moscow, Deputy Chief of the Kiev OGPU, Mikhail Alokhin, described how a counter-revolutionary leader, known only as Babiychuk, "organized the setting of 500 *kolkhoz* grain stacks on fire."[397] In the memorandum, the Deputy Chief also alluded to the peasantry's widespread use of arson in Kiev, but held Babiychuk, alone, responsible for "setting ablaze…*kolkhoz* property in 18 [different] cases."[398]

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[394] "GPU Report on the Repressive Measures Taken Against the Kulak-Petliurist Counterrevolutionary Elements," 22 November 1932, in *A Selection of Soviet Documents On the Ukrainian Holodomor,* ed. Roman Serbyn, Located in Ukraine State Archives, http://history.ua.org, 77
[395] Ibid.
[396] "Consulate-General of Italy, Kiev," 21 December 1934," *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 493.
[397] "Memorandum on the Illegal Organizations in the USSR Uncovered and Eradicated by the OGPU Organs," January 1933, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 268.
[398] Ibid., 268.

Another large-scale arson attack involved the AMW tractor park in Kiev during February 1933. According to an official OGPU report issued to authorities in Moscow, Deputy Chairman, Georgy Prokofiev, described how the regional "c-r [counter-revolutionary] organization [had] pursued systematic, destructive activities directed towards a complete destruction of the tractor park" by "setting fire to AMW."[399] According to Prokofiev, the fire resulted in a "loss of up to 10% of the tractor park," as well as the "destruction…of facilities producing spare parts whose proper use would secure 50% of the total needs of the AMW."[400] Viewed in this light, arson proved an effective form of active resistance against Soviet forces as it served to greatly disrupt the day-to-day operations of government officials and severely hampered the procurement of grain supplies in the region.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVE RESISTANCE

Due to the resistance strategies of Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev, the peasantry in these regions differed significantly from the populace of Odessa and Crimea as they often engaged directly with the Soviet regime and forced confrontation with government forces whenever possible. Consequently, defiance in these regions reflected not only a strong desire by the peasantry to resist the effects of collectivization, but also their desperation to survive in a social, political, and economic environment hostile to their well-being. Many of these attacks drew inspiration from nationalist feelings of the past (an aspect discussed in more detail throughout chapter four).

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[399] "OGPU Guidelines Regarding the So Called Saboteur Organization Active in Agriculture and the Preparations for the Sowing Campaign," 14 February 1933, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 295.
[400] Ibid.

CONCLUSION

In closing, the evidence suggests a clear trend in peasant resistance that emerged across the Ukraine between the years of 1927 and 1933. More specifically, the above analysis demonstrates that individual *oblasts* of the Ukraine were often more prone to particular types of resistance than others and that rebellious activity varied significantly in intensity depending upon locality. Such an analysis of the region does not preclude the possibility of both active and passive forms of resistance occurring simultaneously in each of these *oblasts*, with Odessa serving as an excellent case in point. However, as this chapter demonstrates, particular forms of resistance often resonated in particular regions more than others. This was particularly true for regions that served as centers for nationalism in the years that preceded collectivization, such as Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev. This, again, highlights the importance of local case-studies in establishing a broader understanding of peasant rebellions across the Soviet Ukraine. Generalized accounts of peasant resistance in the Ukraine continue to remain inadequate because they fail to address the strong regional differences that existed across the country's interior.

CHAPTER 4: RESISTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF HISTORY, CULTURE AND GEOGRAPHY

As chapter three demonstrated, peasant resistance in the Ukraine followed strong regional patterns and variations between the years 1927 and 1933. One obvious question that arises, however, is why did such variations exist across the Ukraine? More specifically, what factors accounted for the large fluctuations in peasant resistance across the Ukrainian interior? This chapter addresses each of these questions, and argues that history, culture, geographic location, and varying levels of repression by the Soviet state all played a key role in the development of peasant hostility against the state. These factors encouraged peasants in both Kiev and Dnipropetrovsk to rebel more actively and openly than the Odessa and Crimea oblasts.

ODESSA OBLAST

For several centuries, the Odessa oblast, located along the north shore of the Black Sea, maintained a long and rich history full of cultural and economic achievements. Apart from this rich past, however, the people of Odessa also acquired notoriety under both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes for its long history of rebellion and dissent.[401] Across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Odessa hosted a large variety of insurgent groups, gangs, and rebels that both challenged and protested against governmental authority. Known as the "city of thieves" in Tsarist times, the region demonstrated a remarkable resiliency and hostility toward government intrusions in the

[401] Roshanna P. Sylvester, *Tales of Old Odessa: Crime and Civility in a City of Thieves* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005), 3.

years and decades that preceded Soviet encroachment into the region.[402] Yet, even with this contentious history, Odessans remained largely passive in their struggle against collectivization in 1927 and chose to shun their prior tendency to rebel in favor of subtle forms of resistance against Soviet officials. What explains this dramatic shift in rebelliousness? More specifically, why did Odessans choose "passivity" over active resistance in their day-to-day interaction with Soviet officials?

GEOGRAPHY AND ETHNICITY

In the 1920s, Odessa's geography and ethnic composition heavily influenced the development of passive resistance against collectivization. In the months and years that followed the First World War and the Russian Civil War, Odessa reassumed its historical prominence as a commercial hub renowned for trade across the region.[403] As Stalin implemented collectivization across the Soviet countryside, Odessa's access to the Black Sea proved vital to the regime's efforts to expand agricultural trade with foreign countries. According to Yurij Lawrynenko, a scholar who resided in the area during the 1920s, the Soviet government often transported "grain…to Odessa…and from there it was transported to foreign lands" for tremendous profit.[404] Likewise, Mykola Kostyrko, an Odessan peasant from the region, described in his memoirs that the Soviets "exported everything [in Odessa] in order to get foreign capital for the 'needs of the state.'"[405]

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[402] Ibid.
[403] Tanya Richardson, *Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 187.
[404] "Testimony of Yurij Lawrynenko, Through the Interpreter, Roman Olesnicki," in *Eighth Interim Report of Hearings Before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1954), Located in: *The Holodomor Reader,* edited by Bohdan Klid and Alexander Motyl, 194.
[405] "Testimony of Mr. Mykola Kostyrko of Sacramento, California," in *Second Interim Report* (1988), Located in: *The Holodomor Reader,* 208.

As agricultural trade increased between the Soviet Union and the international community, Odessa also served as a home for numerous ethnic groups due to its continuous contact with foreign merchants and sailors who arrived daily to conduct business and trade. According to historian Roshanna Sylvester, this "vibrant mix of peoples," in combination with its "notorious criminal underworld," gave Odessa a "distinctive personality" that stood out from the rest of the Ukraine.[406] Likewise, historian Anna Reid substantiated this view with her comment that Odessa represented, perhaps, the most "cosmopolitan" oblast of the Ukraine by the 1920s.[407]

By 1926, Odessa not only possessed a large Ukrainian population, but also encompassed a wide array of minority groups. According to the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI) and its digital mapping program, such groups included Germans, Poles, Belarusians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Moldavians, and Jews.[408] Odessa's population also included a large number of ethnic Russians, which rivaled only the Ukrainians in overall population numbers.[409] While always known for its diverse culture (even in the Tsarist period), Odessa's large number of minority groups expanded significantly with the end of World War One as the oblast served as a sanctuary for individuals, groups, and refugees displaced by the great conflict.[410] As Sylvester argued, "the city was an asylum for tens of thousands of war refugees, who poured into Odessa

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[406] Sylvester, *Tales of Old Odessa: Crime and Civility in a City of Thieves,* 3.
[407] Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
[408] "Digital Map of the Ukraine," Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, http://harvard-cga.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=d9d046abd7cd40a287ef3222b7665cf3.
[409] Ibid.
[410] Sylvester, *Tales of Old Odessa: Crime and Civility in a City of Thieves,* 195-196.

from Poland, Lithuania, Belorussia, and Rumania, putting additional stress on the city's already overtaxed infrastructure."[411]

By the end of the 1920s, this rapid upsurge in ethnic groups and foreign elements served to block the formation of an effective and unified resistance movement against collectivization. Language barriers, along with strong differences in cultural norms and beliefs obstructed unity amongst peasants in Odessa and erased opportunities to create a cohesive rebellion against Soviet authorities after collectivization began in 1927.[412] As argued by Sylvester, this conglomeration of different cultures and beliefs threw "the city out of balance" and promulgated a "distrust of foreigners and other strangers, something that in former times would have been utterly antithetical to the whole idea of being Odessan."[413] These cultural divisions explained why peasant resistance to the state was characterized, primarily, through individual efforts against the state rather than collective and group-oriented attacks, as seen in Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev. The reality of Odessa in the late-1920s was that the oblast reflected, quite literally, a "Tower of Babel" scenario in which social divisions served to alienate Odessan neighbors from one another.

DIPLOMACY AND "POTEMKIN" VILLAGES

Passive forms of resistance in Odessa also derived from diplomatic and political efforts. In the late 1920s, Odessa not only served as a political center for communist officials from Moscow, Kharkov, and Kiev, but also hosted numerous diplomatic efforts from the international community, which included Polish, Japanese, Italian, and French

[411] Ibid.
[412] Ibid., 197.
[413] Ibid.

consulates. Because of Odessa's connection with the outside world, the region accommodated a number of state-sponsored visits from international news agencies, reporters, ambassadors, and Soviet sympathizers who wished to observe the development of Soviet agriculture first-hand.[414] As a result of Odessa's diplomatic, political, and economic importance to the global community, the Soviet government undertook special precautions to portray the region in a positive manner to outsiders.[415] In a report filed with the 1988 "U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine," former residents of Odessa described how "foreigner visitors and residents of the port city of Odessa, were treated to Potemkin villages" in the *oblast* as a means to conceal the negative attributes of collectivization.[416] Such measures only increased during the widespread famine that occurred across the Ukraine between 1932 and 1934. Between these years, personal memoirs indicated that Soviet officials in Odessa doubled their efforts "to conceal the Famine from outsiders."[417] As former Odessan resident, Mykola Kostyrko, stated,

> The city 'cleaned up' the corpses every morning. A special club was created for foreign sailors to prevent them from going into the city and seeing what they could not have missed. At the club, they were entertained and distracted, even with girls.[418]

As Soviet officials concealed collectivization's failures from the outside world, Kostyrko also described to Congress how Odessan "peasants in the village of Grendenitsa were dressed up [by Soviet officials] and temporarily moved to a newly whitewashed and renovated school dormitory in order to impress a group of American farmers invited to

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[414] Freda Utley, *The Dream We Lost: Soviet Russia, Then and Now,* excerpt (1940), Located in: *The Holodomor Reader,* 156.
[415] "Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine" (Washington D.C., 1988), 210.
[416] Ibid.
[417] Ibid.
[418] Ibid.

observe 'the attainments of the new life of the Ukrainian peasant."[419] In addition, Kotsyrko testified that government officials in Odessa also commandeered cars on a regular basis and ordered them to be "driven back and forth so that the city would appear prosperous" when foreign visitors arrived.[420]

The 1933 visit to the Ukraine by French Prime Minister, Edouard Herriot (leader of the French Radical Party), exemplified the special efforts undertaken by Soviet officials in Odessa. In a "'show of prosperity' staged to pull the wool over the eyes of the French minister," Kostyrko described how the Soviet government invited Herriot "to the Ukraine [in order] to convince him that there was no famine."[421] Although numerous news reporters, businessmen, and correspondents visited the Ukraine during collectivization, Herriot served as a special case due to his diplomatic and political influence. As a foreign observer with ties to the outside world, Herriot's visit proved crucial for Soviet prestige on the global scale. Through his visit, Stalin and the Communist party were afforded an opportunity to conceal collectivization's failures by falsely depicting Odessa as a rich and prosperous region to the Prime Minister.

Local party members in Odessa not only presented Herriot with "a number of rare paintings from museums," but "as proof that life was abundantly normal, they [Soviet officials] escorted him along streets that had been especially prepared for him."[422] According to Kostyrko's description of the event, "police were stationed around the streets and did not admit people who were poorly dressed or had shabby-looking

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[419] Ibid.
[420] Ibid.
[421] "Testimony of Mr. Mykola Kostyrko of Sacramento, California, in *Second Interim Report* (1988), Located in: *The Holodomor Reader,* 208.
[422] Ibid.

vehicles" during the minister's stay.[423] Moreover, Kostyrko described how "storefront windows were [made] full of all sorts of merchandise," in order to give the impression of prosperity and wealth.[424] Ewald Ammende, a human rights activist from the 1930s, argued that Herriot's visit to Ukraine "had a disastrous influence" because the French Minister not only returned home and "disputed the existence of any famine in Russia," but also asserted "that people who talked about a famine [in Ukraine] could be doing so only in the interests of a definite anti-Russian policy, of separatist tendencies, or the like."[425] Thus, according to Ammende, "the preparation and execution of M. Herriot's expedition [by the Soviet regime]" served as "a masterpiece of Soviet propaganda."[426]

Taken together, each of these actions from the government reflected a strong desire by Soviet authorities to construct an environment in Odessa that both welcomed and appealed to outsiders.[427] To maintain this favorable appearance, Soviet officials not only undertook extra steps to maintain infrastructure within the region, but also provided regular shipments of grain, supplies, and commodities to Odessa's rural and urban populations in order to quell the potential for unrest – particularly amongst peasants. On 21 May 1932, for example, the Central Committee of the USSR provided assistance to five of Odessa's largest districts, which included "Zinoievsky, Dobrovelichkovsky, Znamensky, Velikovky, [and] Novo-Mirgorodsky."[428] In total, the committee released nearly "150 tons of millet" to collective farmers and villages in the region to prevent

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[423] Ibid.
[424] Ibid.
[425] Ewald Ammende, *Human Life in Russia*, (1936), Located in: *The Holodomor Reader*, 146.
[426] Ibid., 148.
[427] Ibid.
[428] Document #46, 21 May 1932, "Telegram of the CC CP (B) of Odessa, Regarding the Party Providing Food Aid to Special Areas of the Area." Located in Odessa State Archives, http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php#nom-46.

famine conditions.[429] Later, the committee also provided Odessa with an additional "11,400 cans of canned goods," and released "9.1 tons" of cereal for infants.[430] Because of regular supply shipments, such as these, a report filed by the Ukrainian SSR GPU in March 1933 listed Odessa as one of the least-affected regions (following the Great Famine) due to the large number of food-provisions provided by the state.[431] The table of statistics compiled in the report indicated the following deaths from famine:

Oblast	Number of raions	Number of affected pop. Centers	Number of starving families	Including those sick (number)	Dead
Dnipropetrovsk	35	336	6436	16211	1700
Kyiv	27	75	1363	253	417
Vinnytsia	20	82	325	201	59
Donetsk	29	83	573	409	263
Odes[s]a	14	32	131	83	11
Kharkiv	5	20	116	151	37
AMSSR [Moldova]	9	110	1823	--	--
Totals	139	738	110674	17308	2487

[432]

FIGURE 7: DEATHS FROM STARVATION

As seen, officially reported rates for starvation in Odessa Oblast were far less than the figures represented by other regions of the Ukraine. In sum, Odessa experienced less than a tenth of the starvation and death rates experienced in both Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev, due to government measures that aimed to alleviate the crisis there.[433]

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[429] Ibid.
[430] Document #52, 25 May "Of the Central Committee Board (B) On Providing Food Aid in the Areas Most Affected," Located in Odessa State Archives, http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php#nom-46.
[431] Document #60, 12 March 1933, "Report From the Ukrainian SSR GPU on Problems With Food Supplies and Raions Affected by Famine in Ukraine (excerpt), http://faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm. (Kiev: Kyiv Mohlya Academy Publishing House, 2008).
[432] Ibid.
[433] Ibid.

Odessa was also spared from the violent repression that permeated collectivization efforts in other regions of the Ukraine. A 1933 report from the "Peoples' Commissariat of Justice" illustrated this point in its analysis of the number of repressions carried out across districts of the Ukraine. In January 1933, the report found that "the greatest number of [daily] repressions were applied in Chernihiv oblast (15 per raion)," while repressive actions peaked at "11 per raion" throughout Dnipropetrovsk."[434] Odessa oblast, in contrast, experienced only "6 [repressive actions] per raion," almost half the rate of Dnipropetrovsk.[435] This lack of repression resulted entirely from Odessa's strategic importance to the Soviet regime. As seen in a 1933 resolution from the CC AUCP, Soviet authorities listed Odessa as one of three oblasts "that will decide the fate of Ukraine's agriculture," due to its status as a commercial hub for exports.[436]

Special precautions, monthly food-shipments, and a lack of repressive action all played a substantial role in the dispersal of peasant anger and quelled Odessa's historical propensity to resist government authority. Thus, Odessa's strategic geographical location, as well as its diplomatic, economic, and political importance, all played a crucial role in the development of passive resistance across the region.

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[434] Document #53, 29 January 1933, "Summary From the Peoples' Commissariat of Justice, Ukrainian SSR to the CC CP(b)U on the Number of Verdicts for the Evasion of Grain Deliveries, Sabotage and Grain Speculation (excerpt," http://faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm. (Kiev: Kyiv Mohlya Academy Publishing House, 2008).
[435] Ibid.
[436] Document #52, 24 January 1933, "Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo Strengthening the CP(b)U Central Committee and Oblast Organizations," http://faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm. (Kiev: Kyiv Mohlya Academy Publishing House, 2008).

CRIMEA OBLAST

In contrast to the Odessa oblast, the Crimean population remained largely devoid of the ethnic diversity that characterized Odessa during the early twentieth century. Although the region boasted a strong Ukrainian presence, along with a number of smaller minorities, such as the Tatars, Russians dominated the Crimean population before and after the years of collectivization.[437] According to historian Serhey Yekelchyk, Crimea was, and remains to this day, "the only region of the Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority" and served as a "political bailiwick of parties cultivating an alternative to modern Ukrainian identity."[438]

During collectivization, the presence of a strong Russian majority played a tremendous role in the development of passive resistance amongst peasants, as Bolshevik favoritism towards Russians prompted the government to lessen the overall use of repression and unmitigated oppression against the Crimea.[439] Following the logic of James C. Scott and his theory about the "moral economy" of peasants, these low-levels of repression encouraged peasants to adopt different forms of passive resistance, rather than active, due to the fact that Soviet authorities left much of the peasant's "moral economy" intact and undisturbed across the Crimea. As Scott stated in his work, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance*,[440] peasants tend to resist as a response to "great

[437] "Digital Map of the Ukraine," Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, http://harvard-cga.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=d9d046abd7cd40a287ef3222b7665cf3.
[438] Serhey Yekelchyk, *The Conflict in Ukraine*: *What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 3.
[439] "Report From the OGPU About the Number of Individuals Repressed by the OGPU Organs in 1930, 31 July 1931, TsA FSB RF f.2, op. 9, d. 539, ll. 224-25, ed. Lynne Viola et. al, in *The War Against the Peasantry*, 340.
[440] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*: *Everyday Forms of Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), xvi.

desperation."[441] Due to the presence of a large Russian majority, however, this sense of desperation remained largely absent from Crimean society.

An OGPU report from 1931 reflected this notion of favoritism and benevolence towards Russians as Soviet officials detailed the overall number of repressive actions carried out against various regions of the USSR. Of the 178,620 cases and trials carried out against the Soviet population between 1930 and 1931, the Crimea registered only 3,055 incidents, which represented 1.7 percent of the total cases.[442] These statistics revealed a striking pattern in the repressive actions of the state. Although regions with dominant Russian-based populations still found their way onto this list, the number of repressive actions carried out in these areas remained low when compared to the number of trials and cases held against non-Russian entities. According to OGPU statistics, the top two repressed regions between 1930 and 1931 were represented by the Ukrainian SSR (excluding the Crimea), as well as the Northern Caucasus.[443] Out of the 178,620 individuals who passed "through the troikas,"[444] the Ukraine and Northern Caucasus suffered 22,204 and 20,230 individuals that stood accused of treasonous activity against the state.[445] These figures, alone, accounted for 12.4 and 11.3 percent, respectively, of the total number of repressive actions carried out against Soviet citizens between 1930 and 1931.[446] Statistics such as these, therefore, substantiated the notion that non-Russian

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[441] Ibid.
[442] "Report From the OGPU About the Number of Individuals Repressed by the OGPU Organs in 1930, 31 July 1931, TsA FSB RF f.2, op. 9, d. 539, ll. 224-25, ed. Lynne Viola et. al, in *The War Against the Peasantry*, 340.
[443] Ibid.
[444] The term *troika* refers to commissions that consisted of three government officials who presided over criminal hearings.
[445] "Report From the OGPU About the Number of Individuals Repressed by the OGPU Organs in 1930, 31 July 1931, TsA FSB RF f.2, op. 9, d. 539, ll. 224-25, ed. Lynne Viola et. al, in *The War Against the Peasantry*, 339-340.
[446] Ibid., 340.

sectors of the Soviet Union experienced a greater number of punitive measures during the years of collectivization.

Even when Soviet officials managed to carry out repressive actions against the Crimea, these forms of punishment remained limited, at best. According to a December 1932 telegram from the OGPU to Moscow, for example, Soviet officials responded to black market activity with closer "supervision" of grain transactions, and the prohibition of particular forms of trade (such as seed purchases).[447] Repression also remained secretive in the Crimea because Soviet officials wished to avoid widespread attention from the populace. According to a 23 August 1932 Circular by the OGPU, Chief Ivanovsky forbade the arrests of "speculators-traders" in public, and stated that such activity "should only be conducted beyond the perimeters of bazaars and markets and away from all such places where they could draw wide attention."[448] Ivanovsky argued that repressive actions required a "high degree of political vigilance so that our operational activities should not bring elements of disorganization into the kolkhoz-sovkhoz trade."[449] Likewise, Ivanovsky also forbade OGPU officials to arrest "workers and persons of social class that are close to us," referring to Communist Party members, members of the *kolkhoz,* and Russians.[450] Thus, repressive action in the Crimea often

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[447] "Telegram from the Heads of PP OGPU Crimea Regarding Activities Related to the Introduction of Free Grain Trade, 31 December 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's*, 243.
[448] "Circular by the Economic Department of PP OGPU Crimea Regarding the Fight Against Speculators," 23 August 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's*, 177-178.
[449] Ibid.
[450] Ibid.

resulted in fewer (and less restrictive) punishment for wrongdoing than elsewhere in the Ukraine.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CRIMEA

The Crimea's economic and financial importance to the Soviet Union also helped to explain the low-levels of repression and the forms of passive resistance that followed suit. *Torgsin* shops, prominent in the Crimea's urban and rural districts, provided a tremendous source of revenue to the Soviet authorities and dominated much of the oblast's urban and rural landscape in the latter half of the 1920s and early 1930s.[451] These government-owned shops, which served as a marketplace for peasants to buy and trade commodities, provided a means for Soviet authorities to acquire hard-currency for their industrial ambitions.[452] Crimean peasants entered the *torgsins* and exchanged "valuable keepsakes" (antiques, coins, jewelry, etc.) for items, primarily food.[453] In order to extract maximum profits from this sort of trade, *torgsin* shops fixed prices at extraordinarily high amounts.[454] As a result, peasants often complained of the uneven trade that occurred, and argued that *torgsins* only profited Soviet authorities and impoverished the peasantry.[455] In an anonymous testimony provided by one peasant, the individual maintained that *torgsins* were "a way of cheating people out of their gold, gold which the Bolshevik Government needed."[456] According to the individual, even the most

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[451] "Introduction," Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's*, 40.
[452] Ibid.
[453] "Anonymous Testimony," 22 April 1988, in *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 299.
[454] Ibid.
[455] Ibid.
[456] Ibid.

valuable items used for trade fetched only "two pounds of some kind of groats and some butter."[457]

Soviet documents cited impressive financial gains from these markets. In 1931, for example, *torgsins* accounted for nearly "6 million rubles in hard currency to the state," while 1932 and 1933 witnessed a rapid influx of 50 and 107 million rubles, respectively.[458] *Torgsin* shops remained profitable for the Soviet regime because the Crimea served as a focal point for foreign-currency transfers made to peasants that resided in the oblast. As collectivization intensified in the early 1930s, peasants in the Crimea increasingly called upon financial help from "relatives living abroad" in order to purchase additional provisions and goods.[459] These familial connections resulted from the Crimea's historical connection to Austria, Poland, and the former Ottoman Empire.[460] Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 1783, many native Crimeans (including the Tatars) fled to these regions to escape Russian encroachment, thus, providing the Crimea with a number of foreign connections in the century that followed.[461] When money from overseas and abroad reached its destination in the Crimea, peasants exchanged these money-orders for hard currency at Soviet banks.[462] This served as a

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[457] Ibid.
[458] "Introduction," Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's*, 40.
[459] "PP OGPU Crimea Guidelines on Preventing Abuse During Confiscation of Foreign Currency," 25 March 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 99.
[460] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition*, 266.
[461] Ibid., 266-267.
[462] "PP OGPU Crimea Guidelines on Preventing Abuse During Confiscation of Foreign Currency," 25 March 1932, Located in SBU Digital Archives, http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=136228, in *Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's,* 99.

tremendous revenue-generator for the Soviet regime because peasants spent the majority of their funds on various (overpriced) commodities at the *torgsin* shops.

According to a 1932 OGPU report, officials in Simferopol blatantly forbade police and military organs of the area to confiscate or arrest the recipients of these money orders in order to preserve the rapid inflow of foreign currency into the Soviet economy.[463] Although many areas of the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine, tolerated the arrest and incarceration of individuals who possessed large sums of money, Crimea served as a special case to government authorities due to the large amount of foreign currency that arrived daily in the oblast.[464] OGPU Representative for the Crimea, Eduard Salyn, addressed the potential fallout that awaited the Soviet government if officials continued to seize the goods of Crimean peasants. As he stated,

> As a result of such practice of confiscating hard-currency and goods purchased (with hard-currency) in *Torgsin* shops, there has been a significant decrease in the amount of fo[reign] currency transferred from abroad to the USSR through individual money orders, accompanied by an intensification of an anti-Soviet campaign for limiting fo[reign] currency transfers to the USSR.[465]

Salyn concluded that "such [a] situation [was] particularly harmful, as it affects fo[reign] currency payments for goods, resulting in serious material loss in the activities of the *Torgsin*."[466] With foreign capital desperately needed for the expansion of industry in the Soviet Union, Crimea's economic and financial contributions to the government overrode all Soviet laws and decrees that jeopardized the status quo of the region.[467] This notion also explained the lack of repressive action undertaken by Soviet officials against the

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[463] Ibid.
[464] Ibid.
[465] Ibid., 99.
[466] Ibid., 100.
[467] Ibid., 99.

Crimea. This afforded peasants a great deal of autonomy and independence in the Crimea, which, in turn, obstructed the overall development of active resistance in the area.

The threat of active resistance also diminished due to the proliferation of goods and supplies to the region. In a private letter forwarded to Kosior on 28 April 1932, local Ukrainian authorities complained bitterly about the "abundant supplies of…grains [sic]" across the Crimea that remained absent in other oblasts.[468] Even in the wake of collectivization and famine across districts of the Ukraine, personal memoirs illustrated the abundance that characterized much of the Crimea.[469] According to Freda Utley, a foreign scholar who resided in Moscow, Crimea even remained a popular destination for individuals to vacation during the early 1930s.[470] In the "summer of 1932," Utley and her mother both "went on holiday to the Crimea" and described the "abundant food" that included "bread and fruit, ices and cake."[471] In a state of exasperation, Utley stated that "the Crimean Republic…was so very 'upper class' that we really had no business there."[472] Moreover, former Crimean, Pavlo Morenec, described in his memoirs how "people tried to escape from Ukraine to the Crimea, to save themselves from starvation."[473] Abundance, therefore, helped to prevent the development of active resistance in the Crimea. According to historian, Tracy McDonald, as long as peasants

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[468] Document #4, "Summary of Letters on Grain Procurements and Famine From the Agitation and Mass Campaigns Department to CC CP(b)U," 28 April 1932, http://faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm. (Kiev: Kyiv Mohlya Academy Publishing House, 2008).
[469] Freda Utley, *The Dream We Lost: Soviet Russia Then and Now*, in *The Holodomor Reader*, 157.
[470] Ibid.
[471] Ibid..
[472] Ibid.
[473] Interview: Pavlo Morenec, 16 December 2008, http://www.holodomorsurvivors.ca/Video/video/Files/Leonid%20Korownyk_video.html.

were not pushed "beyond the line of subsistence," then "violent uprisings…[remained] relatively uncommon" across the Soviet countryside.[474] This proved true for the Crimea between 1927 and 1933. Based on the available evidence, the Crimea's "line of subsistence" remained largely intact which in turn, obstructed the development of active resistance against the state.[475]

GEOGRAPHY

Geography and topography also encouraged passive forms of resistance in the Crimea due to the natural contours of the region that served to discourage open-rebellion and hostility against the state. In a manner similar to the American Great Plains, rolling hills and valleys dotted much of the Crimea's surface.[476] In a 1957 case-study undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), government agents (along with leading scholars and historians) analyzed the Crimea's geography to determine the cost-benefits of an American-led insurgency in the Ukraine.[477] In their study, the CIA described the region as an area with "steppes [that] gently rise and fall with monotonous regularity, seldom varying in elevation by more than 500 feet" across the oblast.[478] However, with little to no natural concealment (such as caves, woodlands, etc.), the CIA concluded that Crimea's geographical traits offered little chance for "refuge and evasion."[479]

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[474] McDonald, "A Peasant Rebellion in Stalin's Russia," 135.
[475] Ibid.
[476] "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," August 1957, Declassified CIA Document, Located in Central Intelligence Agency's Digital Archives, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r002300220007-1, 36
[477] Ibid.
[478] Ibid.
[479] Ibid.

Even along the Crimean Mountains, CIA data concluded that these areas provided little cover for partisan activity, as the terrain was "crossed by a number of paved roads and [remained] dotted with tourist centers and trails."[480] In World War Two, for example, nearly "10,000 partisans were active" against German forces in the Crimean Mountains.[481] Due to the lack of adequate cover, however, the CIA argued that "the Germans were…able to make extensive raids" against the partisans, and reduced their numbers, dramatically by the end of the war.[482] By using events, such as these, as a point of reference, topography likely played a significant role in the peasantry's decision to avoid active resistance against the state (in 1927 to 1933) because the region possessed no viable evasion spots to elude capture from the Soviets.

DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST

Nestled in a central location of the Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk oblast featured a predominantly Ukrainian population in the late 1920s due to its geographical isolation. As a result, 1920s-era Dnipropetrovsk remained largely devoid of the "cosmopolitan" element that permeated oblasts such as Odessa.[483] Although the region possessed a diverse urban sector, due to years of industrial growth and migrations, the oblast's rural elements remained largely uniform in regard to ethnic diversity, as Dnipropetrovsk's countryside consisted primarily of Ukrainians.[484] With little to no social divisions present, this afforded peasants a unique opportunity to call upon a shared sense of

[480] Ibid., 81.
[481] Ibid.
[482] Ibid. 81.
[483] "Digital Map of the Ukraine," Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, http://harvard-cga.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=d9d046abd7cd40a287ef3222b7665cf3.
[484] Ibid.

identity through both their Ukrainian heritage and language; an identity not hindered by language and cultural barriers, as seen in Odessa. This allowed peasants across Dnipropetrovsk to establish an effective and unified resistance strategy against the Soviet regime, and led inexorably to numerous uprisings and rebellions (such as Pavhlorad).

Dnipropetrovsk's countryside, in particular, served as a conduit for rebellion and helped to encourage the development of nationalist aspirations across the area. Nationalism, in turn, developed into a crucial centerpiece for rebel activity in the region. For example, in 1927, as Dnipropetrovsk experienced the process of "Russification" across many of its urban quarters, documents reveal that "only in the villages and agricultural districts was the Ukrainian language preserved and a feeling of distinctiveness from Great Russians kept alive."[485] Consequently, historians have long argued that feelings of nationalism in Dnipropetrovsk were "stimulated by [this] awareness of the differences of language, customs, etc. which separated the Ukrainian and Russian peoples."[486] The Bolsheviks unknowingly cultivated and stoked these nationalist feelings with their widespread repression against the region, which "encouraged [Dnipropetrovsk's] nationalists to oppose Russian rule and to re-emphasize the distinctive character of the Ukrainian people and their right to national authority or independence."[487]

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[485] "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," August 1957, Declassified CIA Document, Located in Central Intelligence Agency's Digital Archives, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r002300220007-1, 1.
[486] Ibid., 2.
[487] Ibid.

HISTORY OF REBELLION IN DNIPROPETROVSK

In the years prior to collectivization, the Dnipropetrovsk region maintained a strong propensity for rebellion under both the Tsars and Bolsheviks. Much of this rebellion stemmed from the region's large number of Cossacks, anarchists, and nationalist forces that resided in the area, particularly in the early 1900s. Historically speaking, the Dnipropetrovsk region served as a home to these various groups due to its geographical isolation. According to historian Shane O'Rourke, the Dnieper River provided "a site ideally suited to the needs of a military brotherhood" due to its remoteness and large number of natural defenses, such as small islands and rapids.[488] This history and geography, in turn, provided Dnipropetrovsk's peasantry with a rebellious foundation that reemerged in the late 1920s through active engagement with the Soviet government.

Dnipropetrovsk served as a stronghold for Cossacks in the years that preceded collectivization and the "First Five Year Plan."[489] According to historians, Zaporozhian Cossacks from the region backed a large number of insurgencies and large-scale attacks against Soviet forces during the Russian Civil War, and remained well-known for their "anti-Bolshevik" stance in the years that followed.[490] In 2017, Anne Applebaum argued that the Zaporizhian Cossacks maintained strong "self-governing, semi-military communities" that consisted of "their own internal laws" across the Dnieper river valley.[491] Because of this strong sense of "autonomy," the Cossacks of Dnipropetrovsk

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[488] Shane O'Rourke, *The Cossacks* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2007), 38.
[489] Applebaum, *Red Famine*, 66.
[490] Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia 4th Edition*, 480.
[491] Applebaum, *Red Famine*, 4.

often "sided with the White Russian imperial armies during the revolution," and prompted the Bolsheviks to carry out severe forms of repression and "mass terror," in response to this "struggle against Soviet power."[492] This propensity for violence against the Bolsheviks proved highly-influential for many peasants that resided in Dnipropetrovsk, and prompted many Soviet authorities of the late 1920s to attribute "violent resistance to collectivization to the influence of Cossacks."[493] Because of the danger posed by Cossacks to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet Union refused to allow Cossacks military positions in the "Red Army until 1936."[494]

Cossacks served as a role-model for many peasants across the *oblast,* as their defiance served as an ideal for peasants to aspire to. According to a peasant by the name of Oleksander Honcharenko, Cossacks represented true "defender[s] of the Ukrainian nation and its traditions."[495] As a result, Honcharenko argued that "Cossack traditions were…passed on in the remotest villages" and served as symbols of hope and inspiration to the peasantry.[496] Cossacks garnered additional respect from the peasantry due to their well-known support and sympathy for the Ukrainian "national movement led by Symon Petliura."[497] This, in part, derived from their own desire to develop "regional autonomy" along the Black Sea.[498]

In addition to the large number of Cossacks that resided in Dnipropetrovsk, Nestor Makhno and his gang of anarchists also provided an impetus for dissent across the

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[492] Ibid., 38-39.
[493] Ibid., 157.
[494] "Chapter 5," *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988). 142.
[495] Ibid., 319
[496] Ibid., 318.
[497] Ibid., 142.
[498] Ibid.

region. In the days and months that followed the overthrow of Hetman Skoropadskyi's government in 1918, Makhno and his followers were left "in a position of considerable power in Katerynoslav gubernia [Dnipropetrovsk] and the surrounding areas."[499] This, in turn, allowed Makhno to gain influence over Dnipropetrovsk's residents, as his occupation of the region allowed him considerable time "to concentrate on ideological work" in the area, and allowed him time to rally a large number of dissident peasants to his cause.[500] Makhno's anarchist agenda gained favor amongst Dnipropetrovsk's peasantry, in particular, as his manifesto called for "the land of the gentry, [and] the church…with all its livestock and equipment" to "be transferred to the peasants" through a redistributive process.[501] In a region slated for increased migration and intense urban development during the early years of Soviet control, Makhno's policies appealed to Dnipropetrovsk's peasantry because of the strong potential for land acquisition and expulsion of foreign elements.[502] Although anarchist by name, this hatred of foreign intrusion also reflected a sense of national identity amongst Makhno and his followers because of their desire to maintain autonomy and independence from outside control.

Aside from serving as a stronghold for Makhno and his anarchist followers, earlier historical records also reflected an inclination amongst the region's peasantry to engage in active rebellion when they desired changes in their status quo. During the 1905 Revolution, for example, peasant resistance reached unprecedented levels in

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[499] Taras Hunczak, *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), 273.
[500] Ibid., 295.
[501] Nestor Makhno, "Manifesto," Located in *The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution: Documents of Revolution*, ed. by: Paul Avrich (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973), 134.
[502] Leonard Friesen, *Rural Revolutions in Southern Ukraine: Peasants, Nobles, and Colonists, 1774-1905* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 239

Dnipropetrovsk (formerly known as Katerynoslav in the Tsarist era) as the region witnessed large-scale peasant revolts against propertied-elites in the area.[503] Resistance to estate owners became so heated and intense during this time that historian, Leonard Friesen, described the episode of revolt as a true "crucible of terror…as peasant hostility…reached its boiling point" across the vast majority of the Dnipro basin.[504] In their struggle for "better lease rates…and higher wages for labor," peasants in Dnipropetrovsk resorted to open-rebellion as a means to garner better living standards. Only a few months into the revolt, government records indicated that peasants in the region resorted to numerous "acts of intimidation" against elites, burned countless "hay and straw stacks, destroyed over seventeen estates, and engaged in acts of terror against migrant workers who settled within the region.[505] Peasants applied active forms of resistance most heavily in the Grushevo-Ruditsino village of Katerynoslav, in which peasants "ransacked and torched the *zemstvo* depot" that supported local migrant workers.[506] In December of that same year, Dnipropetrovsk witnessed perhaps its strongest act of violence in the form of a mutiny that involved "three regiments and a squadron of Cossacks…in the central industrial and administrative center" of the region.[507] The chaos and unbridled violence that ensued prompted government officials to "appeal [directly] to St. Petersburg for troops to restore order among the ranks."[508]

Such attacks, particularly the targeting of migrants, demonstrated not only a predisposition towards active resistance, but also the existence of strong xenophobic

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[503] Ibid.
[504] Ibid.
[505] Ibid., 239-240.
[506] Ibid., 240.
[507] Ibid., 243.
[508] Ibid.

tendencies toward foreigners that resided in Dnipropetrovsk. This hatred for foreigners derived from deep-rooted nationalist feelings, and a desire for local autonomy.[509] These qualities and characteristics continued to resonate strongly between 1927 and 1933 with the peasantry's attack on Soviet forces. With only six years that separated the end of the Russian Civil War and the start of collectivization across the Ukraine (and less than two decades from the revolts of 1905), many peasants of Dnipropetrovsk continued to share a sense of loyalty to the former dissenters, anarchists, and nationalists of years past. According to Mikhail Frenkin, a resident of the Southern Ukraine, "peasant movements [in Dnipropetrovsk] generally reflect[ed] a lot of [Makhno's] anarchist features."[510] Likewise, a 14 December 1932 report from Dnipropetrovsk's Central Committee attributed much of the "organized resistance" towards the Soviet government to Cossacks and former nationalists.[511] Resistance in Dnipropetrovsk, therefore, served two roles for the peasantry. First, it provided peasants with a "voice" to channel their frustration and anger against Soviet encroachment. Second, and perhaps most importantly, active resistance against the state reflected the peasantry's desire to maintain its own identity in lieu of Soviet and Bolshevik expectations. These identities developed during the latter years of Tsarist control and the early Soviet period when nationalists and anarchists (such as Makhno) controlled much of the southern Ukraine.[512] Peasants from Dnipropetrovsk continued to rely on lessons learned from these groups in the late 1920s. Their struggle

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[509] *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 142.
[510] Ibid., 362.
[511] Document #121, 14 December 1932, "Resolution of the Central Committee of VKP (B) and the SNK of the USSR on Ukraine, The Northern Caucasus and the Western Areas," Located in Dnipropetrovsk State Archive, http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php#nom-115.
[512] "Political Manifesto," in *The Anarchists of the Russian Revolution,* ed. Paul Avrich (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973), 128.

echoed Makhno's call for action against the Bolsheviks. As his political manifesto of the early 1920s stated:

> Victory or death. This is what confronts the peasants of the Ukraine at the present moment in history. But we shall not all perish. There are too many of us. We are humanity. So we must win – win not so that we may follow the example of past years and hand over our fate to some new master, but to take it in our own hands and conduct our lives according to our own will and our own conception of truth.[513]

During collectivization, rebel groups reflected statements such as these, particularly as peasants of the region sought to implement a sense of independence from the Soviet state, even if such measures resulted in death.[514]

GEOGRAPHY AND TERRAIN

Finally, in the 1920s, the terrain and geography of Dnipropetrovsk also played a fundamental role in the development of peasant resistance toward the state. Centered around the Dnieper river (Ukraine's chief waterway), historian Serhey Yekelchyk described the region as a "large 'black-earth' belt of humus-rich soil" across its extensive river basin.[515] This, in turn, served as a fundamental base for much of Ukraine's agricultural production during Stalin's grain procurement programs of the late 1920s and beyond.[516] According to CIA data on the region, the meadows, "dunes overgrown with pine groves," and fertile steppes in the higher elevations dominated much of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast.[517] Foliage, waterways, and dense forests, in turn, all provided

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[513] Ibid..
[514] Ibid.
[515] Yekelchyk, *The Conflict in Ukraine,* 12.
[516] Ibid.
[517] "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," August 1957, Declassified CIA Document, Located in Central Intelligence Agency's Digital Archives, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r002300220007-1, 39.

ample escape routes for rebel groups who desired active engagement with Soviet forces. This connection between geography and rebel activity remained strong during World War Two as well. Between "October 1941 to January 1942," Dnipropetrovsk's natural landscape helped "approximately 350 partisans…to maintain themselves" against German forces in the area.[518] According to a 1957 CIA document that analyzed partisan activities across the Ukraine, the report found that these partisans "were not easily uprooted" by the Germans, as "the forested section lying in the bend of the Samara River between Novomoskovsk and Pavlograd [sic]" provided ample cover and support for rebel activities.[519] Viewed from this perspective, Dnipropetrovsk's natural terrain likely played a key role in the development of peasant rebel groups in 1927.

KIEV OBLAST

Similar to Dnipropetrovsk, Kiev Oblast's population consisted primarily of Ukrainians and Russians during the years of collectivization (and prior). According to HURI's digital mapping program, however, Kiev's population also included a small number of minorities that included Jews and Poles.[520] Because of this, language-barriers and cultural gaps remained less-prominent in Kiev, when compared to *oblasts* such as Odessa, which encompassed multiple ethnic-groups. As a result, the Kiev oblast remained largely uniform in its customs, traditions, languages, and beliefs.[521] Between 1927 and 1933, these characteristics, combined, allowed active rebellion to flourish

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[518] Ibid. 82.
[519] Ibid.
[520] "Digital Map of the Ukraine," Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, http://harvard-cga.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=d9d046abd7cd40a287ef3222b7665cf3.
[521] "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," A"Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," August 1957, Declassified CIA Document, Located in Central Intelligence Agency's Digital Archives, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r002300220007-1, 4.

across its boundaries with little hindrance, as a shared sense of national identity (and Ukrainian patriotism) permitted peasants to develop cohesive rebel-movements devoid of divisive elements.

NATIONALISM AND UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

The presence of a large Russian minority aided in the development of Ukrainian nationalism in Kiev as close-contact between the two groups helped to spark considerable aggression in the region.[522] In the days, months, and years that followed the collapse of Tsarist authority, nationalism served to rally many of Kiev's peasant groups to fight against the encroachment of Russians and the Bolsheviks.[523] As Tsarist power diminished in the Ukraine during the final years of World War One, rebel groups and political leaders eagerly exploited the contentious gaps that existed between Russians and Ukrainians to their advantage for the hope of establishing an independent Ukrainian state free from foreign control.[524] Division and anger between Ukrainians and Russians remained a common theme throughout history, but became a major source of contention during the early 1900s, as "Russification" programs provoked widespread resentment amongst the Ukrainian people.[525] These programs, which aimed to replace Ukrainian customs, language, culture, and beliefs with Russified ideas and concepts, led to great divisions between Ukrainians and Russians, as the former viewed such encroachments as a form of imperialist expansion. Kiev, perhaps more than any other region of the

[522] Ibid.
[523] Ibid.
[524] Ibid.
[525] Ibid.

Ukraine, revealed this sense of division. In 1905, for example, an English tourist in Kiev observed,

> the city [Kiev] and the surrounding country are, in fact, Little Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections of the population there are profound differences – differences of language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore, domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization…I should say that we have here two distinct nationalities further apart from each other than the English and the Scotch.[526]

Kiev also witnessed numerous political uprisings after the removal of Tsar Nicholas II from power, and served as a political center for nationalist aspirations against Russian and Soviet elements in the Ukraine. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, "almost at once a group of Ukrainian intellectuals and students meeting in Kiev formed a Ukrainian council – The Central Rada – which…became a sort of regional government for the Ukraine."[527] During its short rule, the Rada demanded "regional autonomy, the right to use the Ukrainian language in the schools, and in government and public life, and the formation of separate Ukrainian military units."[528] Due to its extensive control over "a number of military regiments," the Bolsheviks viewed the Rada (and Kiev) as a tremendous threat to their power and authority, which prompted the newly-formed Communist state to overthrow the Provisional Government in 1918.[529]

Following the withdrawal of German troops and the collapse of the Rada in 1918, nationalist aspirations in Kiev continued under a new government entity known as the Directory. In 1957, an investigative team of historians under the supervision of the CIA argued that "more than any previous government the Directory was supported [directly]

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[526] Ibid.
[527] Ibid., 7.
[528] Ibid.
[529] Ibid.

by Ukrainian peasants."[530] Before its eventual defeat at the hands of the Bolsheviks in November 1920, the Directory enjoyed fervent support, particularly in Kiev and its surrounding areas. According to CIA analysts,

> it [the Directory] was defended by small military units and by peasant bands which were intensely nationalist and in some cases large and well-organized. At times it claimed the support of a broad section of the Ukrainian people, and the movement it guided grew in certain districts into a mass national uprising.[531]

The Rada and Directory also served as an administrative center for Symon Petliura during the early 1920s. Petliurists (followers of Petliura) were emblematic of strong nationalist sentiment as well as the Ukrainian independence movement.[532] Their movement served as a tremendous threat to the Bolsheviks and their consolidation of power, particularly in the early years of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War.[533] According to a former resident of Kiev, Varvara Dibert, Soviet authorities "considered anyone who supported Petliura to be an enemy of the people."[534] In 1922, Bolsheviks attempted to actively "hunt down Petliurists" in the Kiev oblast, which served as a stronghold for Petliura and his army due to its industrial capabilities and presence of military-grade factories.[535] Thus, in the early 1920s, Kiev served as not only a crucial military hub, but also a key political center for nationalists that operated in the central Ukraine. Many of Kiev's rebel groups and leaders of the late 1920s and early 1930s embodied this early form of nationalism in their resistance to collectivization. Their ideological motivations stemmed directly from ideals first learned and developed in the

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[530] Ibid., 8.
[531] Ibid.
[532] Ibid.
[533] Ibid.
[534] "Case History SW1," *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 371.
[535] Ibid., 372.

final years of World War One.[536] As Oleksander Honcharenko, a peasant from Kiev, told interviewers in the 1980s, Kiev's peasant population "thought well" of Petliura, and "never heal[ed] from his loss."[537] As he stated, "where I lived, Petliura was regarded as a saint. This opinion was shared by child and adult alike, with the exception of the Communists."[538]

MORAL ECONOMY

Kiev also witnessed a significant number of repressive actions against its population during the years of collectivization. Once again echoing the arguments first espoused by historians James C. Scott[539] and Tracy McDonald, these attacks on Kiev's peasantry reflected clear violations to the oblast's morals, and prompted the peasantry to rebel against abuses that not only threatened their existence, but which also violated their values (i.e. murder, rape, theft, etc.).[540] These norms included In an anonymous testimony given to the 1988 "U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine," one eyewitness to these attacks described an incident that involved violent police action against peasants waiting in a bread line. According to the witness, "mounted police yanked the people by their hair…pulled the people about by their hair…and spurred their horses on the people" in order to disperse the crowd before the arrival of an important diplomat in the city.[541] The brutal action resulted in the death of several people, and injured countless others.[542]

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[536] Ibid., 321.
[537] Ibid.
[538] Ibid.
[539] Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, xvi.
[540] McDonald, "A Peasant Rebellion in Stalin's Russia," 135
[541] *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 298.
[542] Ibid.

Brutality against peasants and their families also took on other forms throughout Kiev. In another anonymous testimony, a witness described how orphans in the early 1930s were systematically discarded by the authorities when famine reached the borders of Kiev. According to the witness, once police gathered "250-300" children, Soviet authorities "transported [them] by steamer to fields about 40-50 kilometers away from Kiev." There, the orphans would be "thrown out right onto the shore where they [ran] off in different directions" leaving "the majority [to] die in the fields."[543]

The theft of food supplies and equipment by requisition brigades also violated Kiev's "moral economy," as private farmers were among some of the favorite targets of Stalin's cadres.[544] According to a letter of complaint written to Molotov and Stalin in June 1932 (several months before the Great Famine reached unprecedented heights), Vlas Chubar, a Ukrainian Bolshevik who travelled through the region, described the unrealistic procurement quotas placed upon individual farmers in the Kiev oblast.[545] His letter described, in detail, the "tens and hundreds of malnourished, starving, and swollen people [that were] dying in every village" due to overzealous officials that requisitioned grain supplies.[546] Moreover, Chubar described the total disregard that Soviet authorities paid to the disabled and orphaned children across Kiev, as authorities allowed many of them to starve or to remain malnourished during the 1932 famine.[547] Thus, unbridled attacks such as these served to agitate the inherent anger and mistrust of Kiev's peasantry

[543] Ibid., 295.
[544] "Letter From Vlas Chubar to Molotov and Stalin on Agricultural Affairs in the Ukrainian SSR," in *The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine,* ed. Bohdan Klid and Alexander Motyl (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012), 231.
[545] Ibid.
[546] Ibid.
[547] Ibid.

towards Russians and government officials, alike, and often prompted reciprocal acts of vengeance against their oppressors in the form of active rebellion.

GEOGRAPHY

Finally, geography also encouraged dissident behavior across the Kiev oblast due to the preponderance of forests that permeated the region's landscape. Not only did forested regions provide rebel groups with numerous hiding spots and escape routes for peasants to elude capture, following their attacks on government forces, but they also provided a base for dissidents to organize themselves in secret.[548] An anonymous testimony from a Ukrainian woman who resided in the Kiev region provided evidence of the connection between rebel groups and forests. As she argued, "wherever there were forests nearby, there were uprisings."[549] Likewise, she attributed many of the sporadic uprisings that occurred in nearby Vinnytsia to its abundance of forests as well.[550]

In addition to forests and woodlands, Kiev also possessed a large assortment of marshes (most famously the Pripet Marshes) as well as sandy dunes, and rolling valleys.[551] According to a topographical analysis of the Kiev region by the CIA, analysts found that "the typical landscape is cheerless, being monotonously flat, wooded, and wet" with swamps, streams, canals, and ditches dominating the region.[552] As a result,

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[548] *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress/Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington D.C., 1988), 249.
[549] Ibid.
[550] Ibid.
[551] "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine," August 1957, Declassified CIA Document, Located in Central Intelligence Agency's Digital Archives, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r002300220007-1, 40-41.
[552] Ibid., 41.

CIA analysts argued that Kiev's geographical distinctions served "as an excellent refuge and evasion area" for rebel groups.[553]

Given its great assortment of hideaways, Kiev's terrain afforded rebel groups in the late 1920s and early 1930s a tremendous opportunity to ambush, vandalize, and engage directly with Soviet forces as the natural contours of the *oblast* allowed for partisan bands and individual rebels to vanish before government reinforcements arrived to counterattack. Claims such as this were supported thoroughly by Kiev's successful, and "large-scale guerilla activities" during collectivization, and by the region's large number of partisan groups that successfully engaged German troops during World War Two.[554] According to CIA records, Kiev's "heavy forest cover and extensive swamps and marshes" greatly "limited…German counter-measures" against partisan bands in the area.[555] Because of Kiev's geography, CIA analysts concluded that "partisan groups [in Kiev] were both more numerous and more strongly entrenched than in any other region of the Ukraine," and reached numbers as high as "20,000 men" during 1943.[556]

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, history, geography, cultural habits, and varying levels of oppression all played a significant role in the development of peasant resistance against the Soviet state between 1927 and 1933. As collectivization intensified in the latter half of the 1920s, regional histories, customs, and traditions contributed to peasant resistance in a number of ways, and led particular regions to rebel more openly and aggressively

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[553] Ibid.
[554] Ibid.
[555] Ibid., 78.
[556] Ibid., 79.

(such as Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev), while subduing and pacifying resistance in other oblasts (such as Odessa and the Crimea).

The existence of this large variation in resistance reveals the possibility for new theories; in particular, new concepts regarding the Ukraine Famine of 1932. A deeper understanding of the variations that existed with peasant resistance is important to address because it may help to explain why particular regions (passive zones) often fared far better than others (active zones) during the Great Famine. If the Ukraine famine was artificially constructed by the Soviets (as Applebaum and Conquest have argued), then it is also possible that the famine's fatality rates followed a structured, coordinated effort to starve high-resistance regions for their insubordination towards Soviet control. Thus, if we are to follow the logic of this study, pinpointing regions of active resistance may provide a sense of causation to discrepancies in death-rates that occurred across the Ukraine during the years of starvation. This offers a unique addition to modern scholarship, as it not only helps to verify the genocidal nature of the famine, but also provides a strong counterpoint to revisionist historians, such as Mark Tauger, who have argued that the famine derived from natural, unforeseen events.[557] If high-resistance areas, indeed, suffered higher fatality rates during the 1932 Great Famine, it is highly plausible to conclude that the famine was both man-made and deliberately implemented by Stalin to eradicate pockets of Ukrainian nationalists. Therefore, further research regarding the variations in resistance that occurred is crucial for a complete and holistic understanding of the Ukraine between 1927 and 1933.

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[557] Mark Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933," *Slavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 1* (1991): http://www.jstor.org.librarylink.uncc.edu/ (accessed: 24 April 2018).

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