WAR IN THE SHADOWS: IRA INTIMIDATION AND ASSASSINATION, 1919-1921.

by

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ABSTRACT

MICHAEL AARON CANNADY. War in the shadows: ira intimidation and assassination, 1919-1921. (Under the direction of DR. PETER THORSHEIM)

This work addresses a gap in the historiography of the Irish revolution: the use of intimidation and assassination by the IRA. Although some studies have focused on whether IRA assassinations were justified, little scholarship exists about their effect on British policy in Ireland or their role in altering public perception of the conflict in Ireland. Historians have written even less about IRA intimidation during the Irish revolution, even though people were more likely to be a victim of intimidation than to be involved in a gun battle. This thesis examines the ways in which IRA intimidation and assassination affected British public opinion of the conflict in Ireland, and it considers the role that these actions played in forcing the British government to seek a truce with the Irish republicans. I argue that the IRA's campaign of intimidation and assassination was the most important tactic in forcing the British government to seek a treaty with the members of the provisional Irish Republican government.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Irene, my Mom and Dad, and Mick.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this work would not have been possible without the help of many people. First, I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee: Dr. Peter Thorsheim, Dr. David Johnson, and Dr. Steven Sabol. They have all shared their vast knowledge with me throughout the completion of this project and I would not be the historian that I am today without their guidance. Dr. Thorsheim always asked the hard questions regarding my research and pushed me to answer them. He also spent countless hours reading my drafts and providing feedback on how I could improve my writing. I would not have been able to complete this project without his never-ending guidance and advice. Dr. Johnson pushed me to think outside the box when exploring my topic and shared with me the importance of always exploring every angle in order to gain the most truthful picture of an event. Dr. Sabol encouraged me to explore the various facets of nationalism, and to avoid the pitfalls that come with writing about it. I would also like to thank the staff at the National Library in Dublin, who was most accommodating and helpful during my visit. Thanks also to the staff of the University College Dublin Archives, and The National Archives, Kew, who were most gracious in answering my emails and sending me numerous photocopied documents. Thanks to Dr. Brian Hughes who provided me with a copy of his PhD dissertation, and to Dr. Gerard Noonan who provided me with an advanced copy of his book. Their kindness and advice was a warm reminder that as historians we are all truly part of a bigger community. I would like to thank my parents who have supported me through so much in life, and continue to push me to pursue my dreams. I would also like to thank my Granny, Aunt Sissy, and Mama and Papa Ermitano, who have never stopped supporting

me in everything that I do. Finally, I am eternally grateful to have had the support of my fiancé Irene while working on this project. She listened to me ramble about the Irish revolution for countless hours and accompanied me on my research trip to Dublin. I am truly blessed to have such an amazing person in my life.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

It was early in the morning on 21 November 1920. Dublin was cold and covered with a lingering fog. Nineteen-year-old Vincent Byrne noticed that there were few people out in Upper Mount Street that morning when he knocked on the door of number twenty-eight. A servant girl admitted Byrne and his friends, and he enquired as to where he could locate two men named Bennett and Aimes. A few minutes later he stood in a bedroom at twenty-eight Upper Mount Street with his gun trained on two men standing on top of a bed. Byrne paused for a moment and said a quick prayer for Bennett and Aimes, ending with "The Lord have mercy on your souls." He rapidly pulled the trigger of his Peter the Painter handgun multiple times and riddled the men with bullets. Lieutenant Bennett and Lieutenant Aimes, both suspected British military intelligence officers, fell dead. These men were among the 100 suspected British intelligence agents whom the Irish Republican Army shot in Dublin that morning, on what became known as Bloody Sunday. Bloody Sunday was the largest assassination campaign that the IRA carried out during the conflict. It managed to gain headlines worldwide.

Throughout the Irish War of Independence, young men like Vincent Byrne engaged in acts of intimidation and assassination. Historians have frequently debated whether or not the assassinations were justified, but they have yet to devote much attention to examining the ways in which intimidation and assassination affected British

public opinion and the British government's agreement to the truce and eventual peace agreement that created the Irish Free State.

My thesis examines the period from January 1919 through the start of the truce that ended the official hostilities of the Irish War of Independence, on 11 July 1921. I argue that the IRA's campaign of intimidation and assassination was the most important tactic in forcing the British Government to seek a treaty with the members of the provisional Irish Republican government. The IRA never attained the strength to beat the British in a conventional military war, and even their guerilla actions were limited. The IRA's carefully executed campaign of intimidation and assassination created a false concept of radical republican power in Ireland and led the British government to believe that they were up against a far more formidable force than they actually were fighting. British soldiers, spies, and government officials feared straying outside of their local military barracks, because they felt that they could be killed at any point. During the Irish War of Independence, the IRA sought to gain as much attention from the press as it could, and intimidation and assassination attracted the headlines it sought. British public opinion largely swung to support a swift end to the war because many citizens, including members of the government, lived in terror that they would be the next victims of an IRA assassination. Michael Collins, the IRA Director of Information (intelligence), as well as most of the IRA hit men, managed to survive the entire conflict by living on the run. While members of the IRA were free to strike, the loyalist Irish public, as well as the British public, lived in fear. Only in Northern Ireland did the loyalist public carry out attacks against republicans, and these were typically in the form of large-scale, violent riots.

When examining the recent historiography of the Irish Revolution, it is easy to see that numerous authors have written about the violence of the conflict. The late Peter Hart was one of the first historians to delve into the violence of the period and try to present the truth of the conflict instead of the traditionally accepted history that often glosses over the horrors of the war. Hart wrote two books that are useful to historians who are examining the violence of the Irish Revolution. His first book *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923*, examines the rise of violence in Cork. Hart argues that a sectarian "tit-for-tat" conflict existed in Cork during the revolution. He describes the killings in Cork as unjustified acts of violence. The Cork IRA frequently deemed innocent civilians as enemies of the republic and murdered them because of suspicions. Hart suggests that in most cases no evidence exists to support the belief that the people targeted by the IRA were informers or British agents.[1]

Mick: The Real Michael Collins is the second book by Peter Hart that examines the violence of the revolution. While the book is a biography of Michael Collins that aims to present the true story of his life instead of the mythological status that he accrued, it does focus largely on the violence in Dublin. No biography of Collins is complete without an examination of his role in the violence that occurred in Dublin. Hart's biography provides much insight into the reasons that Collins chose to assassinate British government officials as well as police and intelligence officers throughout the city during the War of Independence.[2]

Both of Hart's books fall short in that they fail to assess the intimidation and assassination campaigns in Dublin and Cork as factors that turned the British

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[1] Peter Hart, *The I.R.A and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
[2] Peter Hart, *Mick: The Real Michael Collins* (New York: Viking Press, 2005).

government and public opinion against the war in Ireland. The biography of Collins in particular would have benefitted greatly from this assessment because of the active role that he played in the treaty negotiations with the British. He was instrumental in pushing the IRA to use intimidation and assassination to combat British control in Ireland. He also used the IRA's power, not only to force the British to seek a truce, but also to try to influence the treaty discussions.

Hart's work sparked lively debate among his fellow Irish historians who disagreed with much of what he argued regarding the Cork IRA in *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923*; therefore, historians have since published numerous other works that try to dispute those arguments. In his book *Spies, Informers, and the 'Anti-Sinn Féin Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1920-1921,* John Borgonovo tries to further Hart's discussion about IRA killings in Cork. He directly challenges Hart's argument that the IRA wrongly executed numerous civilians during the revolution and ultimately argues that the IRA intelligence network in Cork was able to accurately identify informers. Borgonovo also states that the majority of people whom the IRA executed were indeed spies or informers.[3]

Gerard Murphy's book *The Year of Disappearances: Political Killings in Cork, 1921-1922*, tries to reach a middle ground between Borgonovo and Hart. Murphy argues that members of the Cork IRA executed people for many reasons besides just being a spy or an informer. They used the last year of the revolution to cleanse Cork of all those who they deemed undesirable. Murphy states that the IRA planned each execution well. They covered up the murders of people that could result in bad

[3] John Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Féin Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1920-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007).

propaganda, often making the person look like an informer. Murphy's work is very controversial because he argues that the Cork IRA spent time chasing down teenagers and adults who were not active combatants in an effort to cleanse the area of all those who did not fit into their view of the Republic, like beggars, tramps, and British loyalists. These groups were considered undesirable citizens in the new republic because they were not respectable Catholic, nationalist citizens. Instead, the IRA could have spent their time fighting those who actively opposed the republicans.[4]

From Public Defiance to Guerilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence 1916-1921 by Joost Augusteijn explores how the IRA's tactics evolved from passive resistance to public defiance, and finally to violence, as well as what drove the ordinary men fighting for the IRA to push forward with these changes. His work examines five counties in different regions throughout Ireland. He compares Dublin, a particularly active county, to Mayo, Wexford, Tipperary, and Derry, to assess whether there was an equal rise in radical violence throughout the country or if large-scale radical violence was limited to certain areas. He ultimately concludes that multiple factors including the number of men willing to carry out actions, the number of available weapons, and the availability of targets, ultimately determined the amount of violence that occurred in an area.[5]

David Fitzpatrick's monograph *Politics and Irish Life, 1913-1921: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution* is a groundbreaking study of the Irish Revolution and its effects on the various groups involved, including the IRA, the British military

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[4] Gerard Murphy, *The Year of Disappearances: Political Killings in Cork, 1921-1922* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2011).
[5] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996).

and the Irish civilians. While Fitzpatrick focuses largely on County Clare, his broader arguments and themes can be applied to most of Ireland, with the exception of the Northern Counties. Because his work examines the various groups of loyalists and the toll that the revolution took on them, it is essential reading for any historian who seeks to understand their role in the Irish Revolution.[6]

Three edited collections also widely discuss violence during the revolution. David Fitzpatrick's *Terror in Ireland, 1916-1923* examines the IRA's use of terrorism during the revolution, including intimidation and assassination. Within this collection, Gerard Noonan's "Republican Terrorism in Britain, 1920-1923," Brian Murphy's "Persecuting the Peelers," and Eunan O'Halpin's "Counting Terror: Bloody Sunday and the Dead of the Irish Revolution" are the highlights.[7]

In *The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923,* edited by Joost Augusteijn, Keiko Inoue's essay "Propaganda II: Propaganda of Dáil Éireann, 1919-1921" discusses the Dáil's use of propaganda to portray their cause to the world. A large portion of this propaganda was aimed towards the British public, and therefore played a role in helping to shape their opinion of the revolution in Ireland. Michael Hopkinson's essay in the collection "Negotiation: The Anglo-Irish War and the Revolution" discusses some of the ways that the IRA's campaign against the British was successful. Any successes that the IRA had must be taken into account when examining why the British were eager to seek a treaty in the summer of 1921.[8]

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[6] David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life, 1913-1921: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998).
[7] David Fitzpatrick, ed., *Terror in Ireland, 1916-1923* (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012).
[8] Joost Augusteijn, ed., *The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh's *Michael Collins and the Making of the Irish State* contains two articles that are useful for the study of assassination and intimidation during the Irish Revolution. Eunan O'Halpin's essay "Collins and Intelligence, 1919-1923" examines the role that Michael Collins played in directing the intelligence war in Dublin. O'Halpin argues that the efficiency and ruthlessness with which Collins acted on the intelligence that he gained from his officers and informers, helped to turn the tide of the war in Dublin to the IRA's favor. Ronan Fanning's essay "Michael Collins: An Overview" argues that many revisionist historians have taken their criticism of Collins's ruthless intelligence system so far in search of new arguments that they have created new myths about the man. Fanning instead believes that the truth about Collins and his intelligence work lies in the middle between the myths created by earlier historians and the new ideas created by revisionist historians.[9] Therefore, if Fanning's assumption is true, this means that any of the past works written about Collins's intelligence operations are not entirely truthful. It is up to future historians to determine whether Fanning's assumptions are valid.

Michael T. Foy's monograph *Michael Collins's Intelligence War: The Struggle Between the British and the IRA, 1919-1921* examines the efforts of the IRA intelligence officers in Dublin. Collins established a superior intelligence system, which utilized IRA intelligence officers and sympathetic citizens to maintain a continuous flow of information. The IRA intelligence officers played a large role in making life in Ireland's leading city difficult for the police, soldiers, and government

[9] Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh, eds., *Michael Collins and the Making of the Irish State* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2006).

officials stationed there. The assassinations that they carried out, he argues, crippled British control over the city.[10]

The Squad and the Intelligence Operations of Michael Collins by T. Ryle Dwyer is the only work to focus exclusively on the hit squad that Collins employed to carry out assassinations in Dublin and elsewhere in Ireland. The Squad ruthlessly and efficiently eliminated targets whom Collins's intelligence agents deemed threatening to the IRA and the Dáil. Dwyer argues that although the Squad's actions were vital to the war effort, they alone did not win the war. Where Dwyer's work falls short is that he does not take into account the ways in which assassinations garnered attention and made headlines both in Ireland and abroad in England. This publicity certainly played a major role in altering the British perception of the conflict.[11]

Numerous works focus on the actions of the British during the revolution. *The Black & Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence* by D.M. Leeson examines the violent acts carried out by the British police and auxiliaries during the revolution. Leeson argues, "It was the condition in which they served rather than their pre-existing dispositions that drove many Black and Tans to fight terror, as they saw it, with terror." Leeson's monograph is one of the few academic works to focus on the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries who joined the Royal Irish Constabulary during the Irish revolution. It is important to examine the actions of the police and military in any study of IRA assassination and intimidation during the revolutionary period.[12]

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[10] Michael T. Foy, *Michael Collins's Intelligence War: The Struggle Between the British and the IRA, 1919-1921* (Glouchestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2006).
[11] T. Ryle Dwyer, *The Squad and the Intelligence Operations of Michael Collins* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2005).
[12] D.M. Leeson, *The Black & Tans: British Police and Auxilaries in the Irish War of Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

William Sheehan's monograph *A Hard Local War: The British Army and the Guerrilla War in Cork, 1919-1921* examines how the British forces in Cork had to adapt their tactics to battle IRA terrorism in the area. The British army's role in the Irish conflict is a rarely analyzed subject; therefore, Sheehan's work is a valuable contribution to the historiography. Throughout the book, he works to separate the propaganda myths about the British during the war, particularly that they were drunkards, destructive, and treated all Irish citizens poorly. He also rejects as myth the notion that the IRA had defeated the British military in Cork by the summer of 1921 and argues instead that the nature of the battle simply became less overt.[13]

The IRA in Britain, 1919-1923: "In the Heart of Enemy Lines" by Gerard Noonan explores the activities of IRA brigades in Britain during the Irish revolution. Noonan argues that although few in number, these brigades made a significant contribution to the IRA's campaign during the revolution. Noonan's work is one of the first to offer a full examination of IRA action in Britain. His work is an important contribution to the historiography, because IRA attacks in Britain caused widespread fear as they brought the conflict home to people who had previously only read about it in the newspapers.[14]

My thesis aims to show how the young gunmen of the Irish Republican Army brought the British government to its knees with one of the most effective and well-executed campaigns of intimidation and assassination in history. Contrary to T. Ryle Dwyer's argument that the actions of the Squad proved insignificant, I argue that the

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[13] William Sheehan, *A Hard Local War: The British Army and the Guerrilla War in Cork, 1919-1921* (Glouchestershire: The History Press, 2011).
[14] Gerard Noonan, *The IRA in Britain, 1919-1923: 'In the Heart of Enemy Lines'* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014).

Squad and other IRA gunmen played a crucial role in forcing the British to seek a truce with the IRA. The goal of my thesis is to fill a gap in the historiography, which has previously not assessed the role of the IRA's campaign of intimidation and assassination in turning British public opinion against the conflict in Ireland and ultimately convincing the British government to seek a treaty to bring an end to the violence not only in Ireland but also in Britain. I have chosen to focus on both countries for a variety of reasons. Ireland was the center of the conflict, however IRA brigades in Britain also carried out missions of intimidation and assassination. The British public was tuned into the conflict in Ireland, but it became much more real to them when attacks began happening in the cities in which they lived. Ordinary Britons began voicing widespread disdain for the conflict only after attacks began occurring on British soil in November 1920. This in turn meant that the British government had to pay more attention to the conflict and find, under mounting public pressure, a means to end the war in Ireland.

This thesis relies heavily on both published and unpublished material from the period. The National Library of Ireland contains many of these primary sources. The Florence O'Donoghue papers provide first-hand information on the war in Cork, including assassinations carried out by the Cork IRA. Piaras Beaslai's papers likewise contain similar information regarding actions by the Dublin brigade of the IRA. The National Library of Ireland also maintains a collection of orders and memos issued by the General Headquarters of the IRA to all brigades, and two collections of orders and memos issued to members of the Dublin brigade.

The Irish Military Archives holds many valuable primary sources that were useful for this project. Recently released pension records and associated papers detail

the service of men involved in each brigade area of the IRA. This collection helps historians to grasp how large brigades were, as well as their roles in the revolution. Applicants who applied for military pensions frequently detailed their own individual actions throughout the revolution. The Bureau of Military History, which works in conjunction with the Military Archives, also recently released a collection of witness statements. These are particularly valuable for gaining an understanding of individual people's views of the revolution and the violence of the period, as well as the operations carried out by various IRA men.

Memoirs written by IRA men, British soldiers, police, government officials, and civilians also serve as valuable primary sources to this project. *My Fight for Irish Freedom* by Dan Breen[15], *Dublin Made Me* by C.S. Andrews[16], *With the Dublin Brigade* by Charles Dalton[17], and *Army Without Banners* by Ernie O'Malley,[18] are memoirs written by IRA men who were actively involved in intimidation and carrying out assassinations during the revolution. John Borgonovo also edited Florence O'Donoghue's memoirs, which provide good insight into the intelligence operations of the Cork brigade.[19] *Dublin's Fighting Story 1916-1921: Told By the Men Who Made It* contains various statements by members of the IRA, dealing with various events that occurred during the revolution.[20] William Sheehan released a similar collection of edited statements made by British soldiers and officers who served in Ireland during the

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[15] Dan Breen, *My Fight For Irish Freedom* (Dublin: Anvil Books, 1989).
[16] C. S. Andrews, *Dublin Made Me: An Autobiography* (Cork: Mercier Press, 1979).
[17] Charles Dalton, *With the Dublin Brigade: Espionage and Assassination with Michael Collins' Intelligence Unit* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2014).
[18] Ernie O'Malley, *Army Without Banners* (London: Four Square Books, 1967).
[19] John Borgonovo, ed., *Florence and Josephine O'Donoghue's War of Independence: A Destiny That Shapes Our Ends* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006).
[20] Brian O'Conchubhair, ed. *Dublin's Fighting Story 1916-1921: Told By The Men Who Made It* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2009).

revolution, titled *From The Irish War of Independence, 1918-1921: The Words of British Servicemen Who Were There.* Sheehan's collection of statements is particularly valuable for the insights that it provides into British viewpoints of the war, as well as the opinions of the soldiers who fought in Ireland.[21]

Numerous collections of British documents are available free online or for purchase in book form. The British National Archives at Kew released the British Cabinet papers from 1915-1984 online. These are a superb resource for any historian who wants to study the British government's decisions regarding the situation in Ireland during the revolution. The cabinet was responsible for making decisions that affected British officials in Dublin Castle, and it ultimately altered the course of the war. The cabinet also played a role in negotiating the Anglo-Irish Treaty; therefore, the insight of the cabinet is valuable for this project. Peter Hart published an edited version of the final British intelligence reports on Ireland titled *British Intelligence in Ireland, 1920-1921: The Final Reports.* This source is useful for understanding the position of British Intelligence in Ireland, as well as the intelligence service's view on the various assassinations of government officials and intelligence agents.[22] William Sheehan's *Fighting for Dublin: The British Battle for Dublin, 1919-1921* is an edited version of the "British record of the rebellion in Dublin, volume four." This British report, published immediately after the war in Ireland, discusses the British role in combating the Irish revolution in the capital city. There are also notes in the record that discuss the

[21] William Sheehan, ed., *British Voices From the Irish War of Independence, 1918-1921: The Words of British Servicemen Who Were There* (Cork: The Collins Press, 2005).
[22] Peter Hart, ed., *British Intelligence in Ireland 1920-1921: The Final Reports* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002).

intimidation and assassination of government and police officials in Dublin.[23] William H. Kautt published an edited edition of the first volume of the British record of the rebellion, *Ground Truths: British Army Operations in the Irish War of Independence*, which discusses the role of the army in Ireland during the revolution.[24]

I have also utilized a wide variety of newspapers from both sides of the conflict. *An T-Óglach* was written and distributed by members of the IRA. The issues frequently included articles that discussed operations, as well as the necessity for intelligence and even assassination to help win the war. *The Irish Times* and *The Irish Independent* provide valuable perspectives on the conflict in Ireland, as does *The Times* of London.

I have also used a variety of secondary sources throughout this thesis. Many of the works mentioned in this introduction are staples of the historiography and factored extensively into my research. These sources will provided a good base of information to support my primary source research, and they helped me frame my arguments and demonstrate how my thesis is an important addition to the historiography of this topic.

This thesis seeks to show that intimidation and assassination were useful as political bargaining tools, and ultimately helped the IRA to force the British into seeking a truce. My argument is presented thematically, with the first chapter focusing on acts of intimidation, including the boycott of the Royal Irish Constabulary, threatening letters, personal threats, and the destruction of property. Chapter two examines assassinations carried out by the IRA and Michael Collins's hit squad.

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[23] William Sheehan, ed., *Fighting for Dublin: The British Battle for Dublin, 1919-1921*(Cork: The Collins Press, 2007).
[24] W. H. Kautt, ed., *Ground Truths: British Army Operations in the Irish War of Independence* (Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2014).

The actions of the flying columns, mobile groups of IRA men who carried out guerilla actions throughout Ireland, and large-scale raids have garnered much attention from historians. However, the actions carried out in the shadows of the conflict such as intimidation and assassination were much more common than large battles. The average person caught up in the Irish Revolution was likely never involved in a major battle, but he or she may have been a victim of intimidation or witnessed an assassination. Intimidation and assassination ultimately played the biggest role in turning British public opinion as well as moderate Irish nationalist and Irish loyalist opinion against the conflict in Ireland, and by July 1921 they pushed the British government to agree to a truce.

CHAPTER TWO: INTIMIDATION

The 1882 Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act defines intimidation as "any word spoken or act done in order to and calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business or means of living."[1] The IRA employed intimidation as a tactic throughout the Irish revolution, but historians who study the most violent years of the revolution, 1919-1921, often overlook it. One reason for this is that intimidation did not receive the excitement, intrigue, and worldwide attention that assassinations did. However, intimidation was equally as important as assassination in not only helping to eliminate threats in Ireland, but also in forcing the British government to seek a truce with the IRA.

The IRA generally chose intimidation as the first choice of operations that they carried out. Brian Hughes argues that the average experience of crown forces in Ireland during the revolution was dealing with intimidation, and not murder or guerilla warfare.[2] Both the Dáil and IRA General Headquarters preferred that the IRA use intimidation. Both groups were concerned that widespread assassination would alienate the Irish public and cause setbacks to the republican movement. Therefore, the IRA conducted a major effort to intimidate the forces of the crown so that they would deem

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[1] Charles Townshend, *Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 173.
[2] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 3-4.

Ireland ungovernable.[3] While the Dáil and IRA General Headquarters sanctioned the use of intimidation, they did not control how the individual IRA brigades throughout the country employed the tactic. Each brigade decided whom, when, and how they would intimidate. The success of the intimidation campaign truly rested entirely on the grassroots level local IRA brigades.

The four main types of intimidation that the IRA used throughout the revolution were boycotting, sending threatening letters, threatening a suspected individual or their families in person, and destroying personal or crown property. The IRA's use of intimidation began early in the conflict with boycotting and threatening letters, both mild forms of intimidation. As the conflict continued to drag on the IRA adopted more violent forms of intimidation, such as threatening individuals or their families in person, and destroying property, with the hopes that they would prove more successful. The following chapter will examine these four types of intimidation, and the role that they played in undermining the British government in Ireland. It will also assess their worth in turning British public opinion against the war in Ireland, and in encouraging the British government to seek a truce.

The boycotting of police and government officials was not a unique tactic to the Irish Revolution; it had occurred frequently during the land wars of the late 1800s. The Irish public carried out the boycott by refusing to acknowledge the presence of the police. They stopped socializing with them and providing services to them. By boycotting police and government officials during the revolution, republicans believed that they could directly challenge the British state's administrative capabilities and

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[3] Peter Hart, *Mick: The Real Michael Collins* (New York: Viking Press, 2005), 217.

legitimacy in Ireland. Ostracizing the police and government officials in Ireland also helped to soften the Irish public's mind to the idea that they were legitimate targets.[4] The history of the Irish revolution often focuses on the policemen who were murdered, but the average police officer was never wounded or even shot at. As Brian Hughes states, "More often they were shunned in public, refused supplies and transport, denied information and forced to endure an isolated and dangerous existence."[5] The boycott of the RIC likely caused more trouble for most officers than the threat of IRA attacks. Social ostracism and being confined to living in barracks or government buildings drove many men to the verge of insanity. This caused a breakdown of morale that was far more dangerous and challenging to the British forces in Ireland than murder.

The IRA began pushing for a boycott of the RIC in 1917, but it was not until 10 April 1919 that the Dáil officially supported the boycott.[6] An order issued by IRA GHQ on 4 June 1920 laid out the parameters of the boycott for IRA members and the Irish public, stating that "they shall have no intercourse with the R.I.C…and shall stimulate and support in every way the boycott of this force ordered by the Dáil." The order also stated that "those persons who associate with the R.I.C. shall be subjected to the same boycott, and the fact of their association with and toleration of this infamous force shall be kept public in every possible way."[7] Thus, the IRA aimed to ostracize the RIC and punish anyone who did not go along with the order to boycott them. This meant that merchants and landlords often fell under the wrath of the local IRA men and

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[4] Charles Townshend *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 29.
[5] Brian Hughes, "Persecuting the Peelers" in *Terror in Ireland: 1916-1923,* ed. David Fitzpatrick (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012), 206.
[6] Charles Townshend *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 84.
[7] General Order No.6: Boycott of the RIC (National Library of Ireland: General Orders from GHQ relating to the Dublin Brigade, MS 900).

found their own business boycotted. The IRA forced these people to pay a fine and promise to stop serving members of the RIC, before it lifted the public boycott on their business.[8] By ostracizing members of the RIC, the IRA succeeded in separating them from the bulk of Irish citizens. This helped the IRA to paint RIC officers as enemies and traitors of Ireland, and it likely led to the myth that these men were not Irish. Citizens proved more likely to support campaigns of intimidation and violence against people to whom they did not relate.

Martin Mulvihill was a retired RIC officer who owned a public house in Listowel, County Kerry. He became a justice of the peace in 1919, and he frequently did business with members of the RIC. Members of the IRA later beat him. They also tarred the walls of his public house and broke its windows on multiple occasions. Mulvihill stated that as a result, civilians were terrified to conduct business with him.[9] The IRA used Mulvihill as an example of what would happen to anyone who continued to interact with the RIC.

In Arva, County Cavan, Simon Henry Hewitt owned a successful business as a vintner, grocer, and auctioneer. In February 1921 a company of Auxiliaries arrived in the town and began purchasing "liquid refreshments and tobacco" from him because he "was the only loyalist publican in the town." The IRA boycotted his store for serving the Auxiliaries and released a notice stating that no one should deal with him. Hewitt later claimed that his business suffered a loss of profit because of the boycott. [10] Just as in the case of Martin Mulvihill, people stopped doing business in Hewitt's store because

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[8] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 86-87

[9] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 82.

[10] Some Henry Hewitt claim (The National Archives, Kew: Irish Grants Committee Papers, CO 762/196/13).

they were afraid that associating with an IRA target implicated them as supporters of the British in Ireland and that they would become targets as well.

Mary Anne Curtis owned a restaurant on Lower Main Street in Arva, which in her opinion was "doing a flourishing business." When the Auxiliaries arrived in February 1921, she supplied them with meals and afternoon tea. The IRA threatened that if she did not cease all communication with the Auxiliaries and stop conducting business with them that they would boycott her restaurant. When she refused to comply the IRA boycotted her restaurant and the Roman Catholics, who previously made up seventy-five percent of her customers, stopped coming to her restaurant. The loss of the majority of her customer base meant that her profits decreased rapidly.[11] In the case of Mary Anne Curtis, the Roman Catholic population in Arva likely supported the IRA boycott of the RIC. This explains why they simply stopped coming to her restaurant. Many of them were likely friends and relatives of the IRA men, or strong supporters of the republican campaign, who sought to do anything in their power to help the local IRA succeed in pushing out the British.

The infamous Black and Tans, who are the focus of much of the historiography of the Irish revolution, likely have the boycott of the RIC to blame for the mismatched uniforms that gave them their nickname. Because most tailors in Southern Ireland began boycotting the RIC when its new recruits arrived in Ireland in January 1920, the latter could not find anyone to tailor a bottle green RIC uniform for them. In response, they had to make do with whatever overstock RIC uniform pieces they could find that fit, and substitute army khaki pieces from England for the rest of their uniforms. The

[11] Mary Anne Curtis claim (The National Archives, Kew: Irish Grants Committee Papers, CO 762/170/24).

new recruits were dubbed Black and Tans because of the combination of dark bottle green and army khaki clothing that made up their uniforms.[12] This is one example of how the IRA boycott of the RIC affected the police forces on various levels.

Bernard Matthews was one of the few tailors in Ireland who was willing to continue working with the RIC after the republicans initiated the boycott in 1919. However, because of this the IRA issued a boycott notice on his shop. Members of the IRA and Sinn Fein, as well as their supporters, stopped doing business with Matthews, and as time went on almost all of his Roman Catholic customers ceased doing business with him as well. His business was largely dependent on these people, and when they ceased to come, his profits largely decreased.[13] Much like the case of Mary Anne Curtis's restaurant, the local population of Roman Catholic nationalists generally supported the boycott and stopped frequenting Matthews shop as a sign of their support for the republican movement.

The IRA encouraged the general public not to acknowledge members of the RIC when they passed them in the streets, and to avoid sitting beside them at Mass.[14] In April 1919 Cumann na mBan, the women's republican organization, issued orders to its members forbidding them from even sitting on the same church pew as a policeman.[15] The IRA often posted boycott orders publicly throughout the cities and towns, and

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[12] D.M. Leeson, *The Black & Tans: British Police and Auxilaries in the Irish War of Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 25.
[13] Bernard Matthews claim (The National Archives, Kew: Irish Grants Committee Papers, CO 762/170/22).
[14] Brian Hughes, "Persecuting the Peelers" in *Terror in Ireland: 1916-1923,* ed. David Fitzpatrick (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012), 208.
[15] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 200.

enforced them with violence and threats.[16] One order posted in Ballyvourney menacingly stated, "Anyone talking to the police will be shot dead on the spot."[17] These threats helped to push the Irish public to socially ostracize the RIC. It is depressing to walk through any city, even one that you call home, for days and be ignored by everyone you meet. This helped to demoralize the police forces in Ireland, which not only made them less effective, but bitter towards the Irish population as well.

As a whole, the boycott made life difficult for members of the RIC and their families, but it does not appear that many men resigned their positions simply because of it. There were usually merchants who conducted under the table dealings with the RIC, so the men were still able to purchase the goods and supplies that they needed. These merchants often continued dealing with the RIC out of economic necessity instead of sympathy for their views, but at the same time could not risk being caught selling goods to them in the open for fear of being publicly boycotted by the IRA.[18] Even in the most depressing and demoralizing situations, where officers were completely socially ostracized and hated by the local population, they were willing to try and weather the storm because they needed the pay from their job to support their families. In revolutionary Ireland, it was virtually impossible for an ex-RIC officer to find employment outside of the force due to the boycott of the RIC. The IRA did not trust ex-RIC officers, and viewed them as traitors to the republican cause. This was one of the reasons that the IRA targeted these men. Ex-RIC officers had to go to great

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[16] D.M. Leeson, *The Black & Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 209-210.
[17] Peter Hart, *The I.R.A and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 297.
[18] Brian Hughes, "Persecuting the Peelers" in *Terror in Ireland: 1916-1923,* ed. David Fitzpatrick (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012), 214.

lengths to prove that they were willing to aid republicans, and would not betray their trust by passing information along to the RIC or British military.

Some members of the RIC became so frustrated with the boycott that they lashed out against the community to try to break it. It seems that being despised and shunned by an entire community took a large toll on some members of the RIC, and the boycott can be linked to causing reprisals. Some members of the IRA took it upon themselves to physically deny members of the RIC access to certain buildings, which frequently resulted in personal altercations.[19] In Galway in September 1920, member of the RIC raided homes and shops belonging the citizens who were boycotting them. They damaged property and goods, and often looted whatever valuable personal possessions or merchandise they wanted.[20] The more respectful members of the RIC put on a good show by holding up a store at gunpoint while they gathered the items they wished to purchase. However, once their shopping was finished they often left money on the counter before exiting with their items instead of merely stealing them.[21] Nothing beneficial was gained from RIC violence. Every time members of the RIC lashed out against the Irish public, the local population became radicalized, turned away from them more, and instead gave their support to the RIC.

While the boycott of the RIC is well known, the IRA also boycotted ex-soldiers from the British army. The IRA encouraged citizens to boycott men known to be ex-soldiers, and to avoid associating with them. This was similar to the IRA's public campaign to boycott the RIC. The IRA also encouraged employers throughout Ireland,

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[19] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 201.
[20] D.M. Leeson, *The Black & Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 46.
[21] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 207.

generally in a threatening manner, to fire all ex-soldiers who were working for them and to avoid hiring such men in the future. The IRA also frequently boycotted ex-soldiers when they tried to acquire land or a home as well.[22] The IRA's goal in doing this was to ostracizing men who were out of work and likely to take RIC jobs. The IRA also wanted to stop these men from taking jobs in the community that republican supporters needed to support their families. If these men could not find work in a certain area they were also likely to leave in search of a job elsewhere. Therefore, if the IRA could push out any ex-soldiers who could not find work because of the boycott, they achieved another victory by getting rid of a group that they saw as threatening.

As a whole, the boycott was only moderately successful in intimidating members of the RIC and forcing them either to resign or neglect their duties. In areas where the IRA was strong, they strongly enforced the boycott, but in communities where the IRA was more of a marginal organization they were not able to enforce the boycott and it generally failed to take hold in these areas. Even in the regions where the IRA was strongest, they were unable to maintain a sufficient level of intimidation to discourage everyone from dealing with the police. There were always merchants and restaurants willing to serve the police, as well as civilians who still turned to them for help.[23] These people needed to make a living as well, and if they were already lacking steady customers, they were willing to serve whoever had money to spend regardless of the future implications.

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[22] Jane Leonard, "Getting Them At Last: The I.R.A. and Ex-Servicemen," *Revolution? Ireland 1917-1923*, ed. David Fitzpatrick (Dublin: Trinity College, 1990), 120.
[23] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 209.

The IRA chose to post threatening letters because it was one of the easiest and safest ways for the IRA to intimidate members of the crown forces. It was also typically one of the first methods of intimidation attempted. The content of each letter varied based on the sender, but they usually warned that if the recipient did not cease their actions or resign; they would be victim to violence or death. Often the IRA included drawings of guns or coffins in their letters to press home the point that violence would come to the recipient if they continued their actions. The IRA sent one of these warning letters to almost everyone whom they deemed a threat, before they took any further action against them.[24] The IRA sent Sergeant Mulhern, a special branch officer stationed in Bandon, numerous threatening letters in the early part of 1920. The IRA only began trying to assassinate him after it became clear that he was not going to heed the warnings and stop conducting intelligence work.[25] There was no risk involved for the IRA when they sent threatening letters. It was also a way of justifying later violence. IRA men could claim that an enemy target had ignored their initial warnings and that they had to use violence to persuade them. This was particularly true in the case of police officers, military, and higher level government officials, who often ignored the letters as empty threats. What they did not realize was that the threats were real, and the IRA men were ready to back them up with force.

The IRA also targeted Catholic police officers with threatening letters. Many republicans believed that Catholics who continued to work with the British government were traitors to the fight for independence. The IRA sent a threatening letter to one

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[24] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 74.
[25] Peter Hart, *The I.R.A and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 73.

police officer in Drumshambo, County Leitrim, stating that "as a Catholic and an Irishman" he should stop performing the "degrading duty he was called on to perform in the interests of England and the present military campaign carried out at the behest of the Freemason lodges." The IRA purposely called out the officer for being a "Catholic and an Irishman," to make him feel ashamed for working against his fellow countrymen.[26] They also referenced the Freeman lodges to try to place the blame for the conflict in Ireland on the Protestants who lived there. This type of threat made use of the religious divide that had existed in Ireland since the before the famine. Many Catholics viewed Protestants in Ireland as oppressors who had constantly ruled over the poor Catholics. By appealing to an officer's religion, the IRA hoped to convince him that he was working with the enemy and betraying not only his true countrymen, but also, and more importantly, his fellow Catholics. Threatening letters that contained these appeals to the religion and nationality aimed to be more successful in convincing a police officer to resign. They caused the officer to either resign out of fear from the threats or shame from the religious and national appeals.

The Cork IRA was particularly active in sending threatening letters to suspected spies, informers, and members of the community known to associate with the enemy. The Cork RIC even noted that "some Loyalists have left the country, it is believed, on receipt of a warning notice from the IRA."[27] George Tilson, a suspected spy, received a threatening letter in February 1921 warning him "your time is nearly up."[28] Tilson became paranoid and felt that IRA hit men were constantly tailing him. A railway

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[26] W.J. Lowe, "The War Against the R.I.C., 1919-1921," *Eire-Ireland: a Journal of Irish Studies* 3-4 (Fall-Winter 2002): 100-101.
[27] John Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Féin Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City 1920-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 50.
[28] John Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Féin Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City 1920-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 50.

worker eventually found him dying in the lavatory of an English train that connected the Cork Ferry to London; he had slit his own throat with a razor blade. The worker found a note in Tilson's pocket that read "I have been shadowed from Cork, not to be done in by them."[29] He was clearly so afraid of the Cork IRA that he chose to commit suicide than risk being caught by them. While it is plausible that Tilson was not a British spy, if he had nothing to hide, he likely would not have committed suicide. He had not heeded the IRA's warnings, and knew that they had discovered he was a spy. He choose to take his own life on the train instead of being captured by the IRA, murdered, and buried in an unknown location. Tilson's suicide is proof that the loyalist public in Ireland was fearful of the IRA.

The IRA also sent ex-soldiers threatening letters, often warning them to quit their jobs or to leave the area that they lived in. This was largely because the IRA was suspicious that many of these men were providing information to the police and military forces in Ireland. The Cork IRA sent ex-soldier Michael Hogan a threatening letter that encouraged him to quit his job because "no ex-soldiers are wanted."[30] This was the IRA's way of telling soldiers like Hogan that no ex-soldiers were wanted in that community, because the IRA did no trust them, and viewed them as unsupportive of the republican cause.

The IRA often sent threatening letters to Officers and wardens who worked in the prisons and treated republican prisoners poorly. The IRA hoped that by threatening these men they could secure better prison conditions for their comrades in prison. A

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[29] John Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Féin Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City 1920-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 45.
[30] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 106.

Sergeant Major stationed at Spike Island prison was verbally abusive towards republican prisoners, and frequently forced them to do strenuous work that other prisoners did not have to do. Sean Moylan found out where his family lived sent him an anonymous letter from the IRA threatening that harm would come to his wife and mother if he continued to treat the prisoners poorly. After the Sergeant Major received the letter, he immediately began treating the prisoners in a much more civil manner.[31] The fact that the IRA could forcefully control how their comrades held in Irish prisons were treated, made them seem very powerful not only to the prison warders, but to the British government in Ireland as well. The IRA was virtually able to dictate the daily lives of the prisoners, with the exception of forcing their release.

The IRA also sent threatening letters to the families of men who served the crown. Wives and parents frequently received letters that encouraged them to force their husband or son to resign his post. If the officer did not meet these demands then harsh penalties could befall the family, including banishment from an area. The IRA did this because men were more likely to resign to protect their families, than they were to resign just to protect themselves. Landlords who housed servants of the crown, and businessmen who still conducted business with the RIC during the boycott also often received threatening letters from the IRA that promised violence against them or destruction of their property if they did not cease their offenses immediately.[32] This was the first step taken before more violent actions were carried out against these people. By forcing landlords to stop housing the enemy and businesses to stop serving them, the IRA hoped that these men would resign their posts and return home.

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[31] Bureau of Military History Witness Statement 838, Sean Moylan, 267-269.
[32] Brian Hughes, "Persecuting the Peelers" in *Terror in Ireland: 1916-1923,* ed. David Fitzpatrick (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012), 211.

The IRA sent threatening letters to civilians to dissuade them from aiding police or government officials. During the boycott of the RIC, the IRA sent numerous civilians threatening letters urging them to boycott not only the RIC, but also those institutions that still served them, and instead utilize alternative places that supported the republic.[33] The IRA often sought to enforce the boycott through intimidating letters before taking further action. One resident of Hollyford, Co. Tipperary who frequently sold supplies to the police received a threatening letter from the IRA ordering him to cease in December 1919.[34] The IRA also sent threatening letters to members of the community who were also deemed to be too friendly with the police or military, and warned them not to associate with such people.[35] By sending threatening letters to civilians who were either too friendly with the police, or who frequented businesses that were being boycotted, the IRA was able to not only enforce the boycott, but work towards socially ostracizing the police from the community as well.

The IRA also sent threatening letters to men who held the position of Justice of the Peace, urging them to resign. One Cork Justice of the Peace received a letter that read, "Our attention has been drawn to the fact that you are still a magistrate under the despotic government that is the essence of every crime more devilish than Satan himself viz murderers, church desecrators, robbers, torturers of human beings, as a matter of fact violators of every principle of civilized Christian morality and civilization ever established…We hereby notify you that you are to hand in your resignation and have same published within a week from the receipt of this notice. Failing this you shall be

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[33] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 113.
[34] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 273.
[35] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 205.

summarily dealt with by the Irish Republican Army."[36] The widespread distribution of threatening letters to Justices of the Peace throughout Ireland resulted in the majority of them resigning or neglecting to perform their duties.[37] With the Justices of the Peace failing to do their duties, the IRA was able to break down the British court system in Ireland, and push people to utilize the republican courts to resolve their disputes. The republican courts handled civil disputes in Ireland in the same way that the British courts did. They typically did not tackle criminal cases unless the death penalty was warranted, because they did not have jails to house prisoners. The more effectively that the republican courts functioned, the more credibility that the republican movement gained. If people were able to gain results from the republican courts, they were more likely to support the republican movement.

In a similar fashion, the IRA often sent threatening letters to jurors to deter them from appearing in court at the trials of republican prisoners. This served a dual purpose because in addition to preventing the trial, the threats worked to undermine the British justice system in Ireland, ultimately leading to the collapse of the British courts and the rise of the republican court system. In Waterford all of the jurors failed to show up at the assizes in July 1920 because they had received threatening letters from the IRA. One such letter read, "Take notice that it has come to my knowledge that you haven been summoned as a juror at the forthcoming Assizes. Now be it known to you that to obey such summonses will be considered an act of treason against the Irish Republic

[36] Lieutenant Colonel George Tarry claim (The National Archives, Kew: Irish Grants Committee Papers, CO 762/9/12).
[37] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 94.

and you are hereby warned that you will do so at you own peril."[38] The British courts fined the jurors if they failed to show up to a trial. Many people could not afford to pay the court fines, but they understood and respected the IRA's threats and the punishment that would occur for not giving in. Therefore Irish citizens frequently did not show up for jury duty, often times skipping out on paying the court fine as well if they couldn't afford to pay it.[39] This illustrates just how much power the IRA had over the Irish population in many parts of the country. People who often times did not have much money, were willing to risk it to either support the republican campaign, or avoid defying the IRA.

The IRA sent threatening letters to those whom it suspected of working as informers for the RIC. In Arva, County Cavan, William Jackson and his brother had passed along information to Constable Early about upcoming IRA raids. The IRA sent threatening letters to both of the brothers. Two of the threatening letters have survived in the correspondence between Constable Early and the Jackson brothers. The first letter stated, "You are giving the Black and Tans information. Stop it or you will be shot. Spy. Beware. Sooner or later we will get you." The second letter noted specific incidents in which the brothers had passed along information to the police. It stated, "You are giving information to the Police. You saved them from an ambush on the Bruse Bray. You informed on Commandant McKeown. You tried to get him dun (sic) in. Traitor beware. Sooner or later we will get you."[40] In Cork, the IRA sent threatening letters to William Connell and Matt Sweetnam for passing along

[38] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 125.
[39] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 126.
[40] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 221-222.

information regarding an IRA levy to the local police. Connell and Sweetnam ignored the warning and were later shot by IRA men. [41] The IRA sent threatening letters to low-level informers who at first glance were not causing much trouble for the republican movement. The hope was that these people, who were not professionals, would flee the country out of fear, and the IRA would not have to spend more time trying to push these traitors out of their communities. Higher-level informers who were more dangerous to the movement typically got little warning before the IRA gunned them down.

The IRA also sent threatening letters to civilians known to own firearms, urging them to drop them at a certain location and time so that members of the IRA could retrieve them. Members of the IRA took their arms by force if they failed to comply. Edmond Power, a member of the Waterford IRA, sent a letter to a butcher that he knew had a revolver in his possession. The letter threatened that he had three days to drop off his revolver at the designated house. If he failed to do so he risked incurring the wrath of the local IRA, who would come to his home and take the gun.[42] By threatening civilians who owned firearms, the IRA was able to build up its weapon arsenal without violent confrontation. This also served a dual purpose by taking weapons out of the hands of people who were either not going to use them at all, or could have potentially used them against the IRA.

It is impossible to gauge exactly how many threatening letters the IRA sent out over the course of the Irish revolution. The majority of recipients never reported the threat. Some people who tried to report that they had received a threatening letter may have failed in their attempts to notify the authorities because the IRA frequently

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[41] Jasper Ungoed-Thomas, *Jasper Wolfe of Skibbereen* (Cork: The Collins Press, 2008), 116.
[42] Bureau of Military History Witness Statement 1130, Edmond Power, 5.

intercepted mail destined for police, military, and government offices throughout Ireland. A letter dated 20 April 1921 from IRA GHQ to Florence O'Donoghue, the head of intelligence for the first Cork Brigade, inquired as to whether or not they had intercepted a message concerning a Mr. Patterson who had received a threatening letter from the IRA. The letter continued by stating that the British intelligence office in Cork believed that the writer of the threatening letter is Timothy O'Halloran.[43] By intercepting these messages, the IRA was not only aware of the identities of those who spoke out against their being threatened, but also in the case of Mr. Patterson, they received a warning that the authorities had a suspect in mind. We will likely never know if Timothy O'Halloran sent a threatening letter to Mr. Patterson, but if he had, he would have also received ample warning to avoid the police due to the IRA intercepting the message naming him as the suspect. In turn, the accused could have used this information against the person whom they had intimidated, and justified carrying out more violent actions against them.

If the letters were not successful in intimidating their targets, then the IRA used other more drastic measures to intimidate them. This meant that the IRA intimidated individuals, or in particularly difficult cases even their families, in person. When the IRA chose to intimidate individuals in person, they typically did so at night and at the persons' home. This ensured that they were home and sleeping, which meant that the IRA caught them off guard. Personal threats helped to show off the strength and knowledge of the IRA. These threats also helped to create the myth that the IRA could

[43] Letter from GHQ to Intelligence Cork I Brigade 20, April 1921. Florence O'Donoghue papers MS 31,192(2)

strike anyone, whenever and wherever they wanted, because there were able to track their targets and intimidate them in person.

In Dublin, the IRA sent threatening letters to the detectives of the G division, Dublin Metropolitan Police, warning them to stop their activities. G division was the plain-clothes detective division of the DMP, and the main force that carried out political intelligence work. Because of their vast knowledge of the IRA and Sinn Fein leaders, they posed a threat to the republican movement in Dublin. For this reason alone, the IRA decided to begin a campaign against them. They needed to eliminate the threat before their best officers, as well as the members of the Dáil, were arrested. The IRA decided to take further action when the G division officers ignored those letters. Dick McKee and Michael Lynch picked squads of men from the Dublin Brigade IRA to wait outside the homes of ten of the G division detectives. IRA men captured the detectives when they arrived home late that evening and tied them to the railings in front of their homes. Before leaving, the IRA men warned the detectives "if they did not resign at once and cease their active hostility against their fellow countrymen, the next warning would come in the shape of a bullet."[44] G division detective Eamon Broy, who worked as a double agent for Michael Collins, also recalled an incident where one of his fellow detectives was threatened. Detective Denis O'Brien, was particularly active in gathering information on the IRA and Sinn Fein, was caught outside of his home and tied to the railings. The IRA gave him a final warning that if he continued carrying out his duties "there would be no mercy shown to him next time."[45]

[44] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 511, Michael Lynch, 152.
[45] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 1280, Colonel Eamon Broy, 80.

Frank Henderson recalled that IRA intelligence gave lists to the various divisions of the Dublin Brigade documenting the names and addresses of all known detectives living in their areas. Henderson and his men then located many of the lower level G division junior detectives and led them down alleyways where they beat them and forced them to promise to cease their work against the IRA and Sinn Fein. The IRA allowed these officers to continue their detective work against common criminals, but if they broke their vows and conducted intelligence operations against republicans, the IRA would shoot them. Most of the detectives accepted this warning and ceased all activities against both the IRA and Sinn Fein.[46] In some cases, IRA men also raided the homes of G division detectives. This action likely served a dual purpose. The IRA was able to use these visits to threaten the detectives, while at the same time collecting any firearms that might be stored in the houses. This helped to cut down the threats to the IRA and better arm their soldiers.[47] By threatening the G division detectives, the IRA was able to separate the ones who were serious about combating the republicans, from the ones who only maintained their position for the money. The officers, who were not serious about pursuing republicans, either resigned their posts or neglected their duties for the remainder of the conflict, while the IRA began to target the more serious detectives for assassination.

The British government in Ireland posted RIC members outside of their native counties to prevent their families from being threatened. However, the IRA tracked RIC men to their homes when they went on leave, and intimidated them at home in front of their families. This made the IRA seem much more powerful and organized

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[46] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 821, Frank Henderson, 62.
[47] Brian O'Conchubhair, ed. *Dublin's Fighting Story 1916-1921: Told By The Men Who Made It* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2009), 379.

than the police in Ireland. IRA intelligence could successfully locate and track a suspect to their homes, however police intelligence struggled to locate IRA leaders. Often times the police forces could not determine who was working for the IRA. A group of armed, masked men approached RIC constable Daniel O'Sullivan at his home in Limerick. These men threatened to shoot O'Sullivan on the spot unless he resigned from the RIC. O'Sullivan initially refused but after seeing the stress that the incident was causing his family he finally agreed, and signed a resignation form in front of the masked men.[48] In a similar instance, a group of around twenty armed and masked members of the IRA threatened RIC constable Thomas Calnan while he was at home on leave. The men dragged Calnan out of his house and placed him on his knees. Calnan feared that they were going to execute him and promised to resign from the force if the spared his life. Shortly after the incident, he resigned.[49] IRA threats against family were important for two reasons. First many police officers would not resign to protect themselves, but once it became evident that their families were in danger, they often resigned to protect them. Second, these attacks were important because they helped to further the idea that the IRA was powerful, and was gaining control of the country.

The IRA frequently approached RIC recruits, or men that they suspected of joining the force at their homes and threatened them into not accepting the posting. Masked IRA men approached new RIC recruits who lived along the border of Cavan and Leitrim at their homes and forced them to "promise to remain at home" instead of showing up for duty at their new postings. The threats were so extreme that the father

[48] RIC, Weekly Summaries of Outrages against the Police and Returns of Recruitment, Retirement and Dismissal, 9 May 1921 (The National Archives, Kew: Colonial Office Papers, CO 904/148)
[49] RIC, Weekly Summaries of Outrages against the Police and Returns of Recruitment, Retirement and Dismissal, 9 May 1921 (The National Archives, Kew: Colonial Office Papers, CO 904/149)

of one constable who had already left tracked him down and convinced him to resign and return home.[50] By threatening RIC recruits, the IRA was able to keep the RIC from filling vacated positions, and thus from strengthening their forces. The threats against recruits also made the IRA seem more powerful, because they were able to learn the names and residences of recruits and threaten these men before they had even joined the force and had an opportunity to carry out actions against the IRA. It was one thing to be able to recognize a uniformed policeman and threaten him but it took much more skill to locate the men who were not yet in uniform.

The IRA did not confine personal threats against the police to only active members of the force. The IRA visited two retired members of the RIC living in Ballyhaise, County Cavan, and ordered them to leave the area immediately. The IRA suspected that one of the men had taken part in the "shooting of civilians by the police at Mitchellstown" in 1887.[51] Radical nationalists held on to their grudges and used the violence of the Irish revolution to seek revenge for the past actions of many police officers and military officials, even if they had not been directly affected by those actions. The IRA typically carried out these attacks on a local level, and sought to drive these men, whom they viewed as traitors, out of the region.

The IRA threatened ex-soldiers as well. In Arva, County Cavan, the IRA threatened Mary Sheridan's son who was an ex-soldier and forced him to leave the area. Mary claimed that her son's loss of income, a result of the IRA forcing him to leave Avra, caused the family hardships.[52] The IRA frequently targeted ex-soldiers employed

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[50] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 75.
[51] RIC, Weekly Summaries of Outrages against the Police and Returns of Recruitment, Retirement and Dismissal, 9 May 1921 (The National Archives, Kew: Colonial Office Papers, CO 904/150)
[52] Mary Sheridan claim (The National Archives, Kew: Irish Grants Committee Papers, CO 762/51/9).

as postmen, because they suspected them of being spies for the police. IRA men captured and tied up an ex-soldier in Wicklow and warned him to quit his job.[53] The Cloghan IRA threatened Michael Reilly twice, warning him both times to stop sharing information with the police.[54] The IRA was able to drive out ex-soldiers by using threats, which eliminated a source of intelligence for the police and military in Ireland. While the ex-soldiers did not pose a violent threat to the IRA, the damage that they could do with the intelligence information they shared was just as deadly.

Local IRA men threatened justices of the peace in person if they did not resign after receiving a threatening letter. In December of 1920, the Monaghan IRA visited local Catholic Justices who had not resigned their position, and personally ordered them to resign or face the consequences. All of the justices complied with the threat and resigned.[55] The IRA captured Captain Daniel Howlett, a justice of the peace in Kilkenny, and held him prisoner for three days. They threatened him and put him through a mock trial for his actions against the republic. He eventually agreed to resign his position and the IRA released him from captivity.[56] The IRA caused the British court system in Ireland to breakdown when they threatened the Justices of the Peace into not carrying out their duties. This was critical because it helped to further weaken the British governments control in Ireland, and instead helped to lend more power and credibility to the Sinn Fein politicians, as well as the IRA.

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[53] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 106.
[54] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 187.
[55] Brian Hughes, "Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities in Ireland, 1917-1922" (PhD Dissertation, Trinity College, 2013), 95.
[56] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 1609, Michael O'Carroll, 8.

IRA GHQ only approved of assassinating women in the most extreme circumstances; therefore, intimidation was the main alternative action. The IRA threatened women who worked for the RIC, as well as those they deemed unfriendly to the republican cause, or who posed a threat to the movement.[57] IRA GHQ General Order No. 13 made it clear that any women found guilty of spying were to be "ordered to leave the country within seven days." It was also to clear that "only the consideration of her sex prevents the infliction of the statutory punishment of death."[58] Women were also the victims of violent punishment and intimidation, frequently having their hair cut off, or even being beaten. The Ballyshannon IRA threatened one woman, who worked as a breakfast cook for the RIC at her house. When she did not agree to stop working for the RIC, IRA men beat her and cut off her hair. The girl who had previously held her position had "been driven out through terrorism."[59] In one extreme case in Roscommon, the IRA caught a lady sending information to Dublin Castle through the mail, doused her in petrol and lit her on fire. This likely resulted in her death.[60] One of the reasons that the IRA did not assassinate women was because public opinion would have likely turned against them. By utilizing intimidation, the IRA could push out any women who were traitors to the republican cause, without stirring up much public outcry. The IRA men also sought to exercise their control over the Irish women, because they did not want fraternizing with the enemy.

If the offenders did not respond well to personal threats and continued working against the IRA or Sinn Fein, then the IRA often threatened their parents or families.

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[57] Eunan O'Halpin, "Problematic Killing, 334-335.
[58] General Orders (New Series), 1920, No. 13 "Women Spies", 9 November 1920 (University College Dublin Archives: Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/45)
[59] Dublin Castle Statements to the Press, September 1920 (The National Archives, Kew: CO 904/168/1).
[60] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 479, Michael Murphy, 10.

Parents of RIC men were often victims of armed raids and personal threats. By 1920, most of the men in the RIC who would be intimidated into leaving through letters or personal threats were gone. Those men who remained were much harder to persuade. Therefore, the policy of threatening parents of RIC men became more widespread and violent during 1920. On 9 April 1920, IRA men raided the home of RIC officer Hugh Cunniffe's sixty-five year old father. They warned Cunniffe's father that if he did not promise to bring his son home that they would return and punish the family. Two days later Cunniffe resigned from the RIC, citing intimidation of his family by the IRA as the reason for his resignation.[61] The IRA was much more successful in forcing police officers or government officials to resign their posts or neglect their duties by threatening their families. This again was because men were more likely to resign to protect their families.

The IRA felt that the intimidation of RIC constable's families was a successful tactic in forcing the constables to resign. The weekly IRA memorandum from 30 October 1920 stated that RIC men continued to resign at a steady rate, and "in very many cases these are stated to be brought about by pressure exerted by their relatives at home who are suffering a tacit boycott because of them." The memorandum also stated, "They cannot of course be held responsible for him and must not therefore be actually boycotted, but they must bear his shame."[62] While the memorandum only vaguely alludes to the IRA employing intimidation and boycotting techniques against family members, both were widely used and generally more successful in convincing constables to resign than intimidation directed against the police officers.

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[61] Brian Hughes, "Persecuting the Peelers" in *Terror in Ireland: 1916-1923,* ed. David Fitzpatrick (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012), 210.
[62] "Weekly Memorandum No. 5" 30 October 1920 (National Library of Ireland: MS. 739).

Even the families of men who had come from Britain to serve in the RIC or the Auxiliaries were not safe from intimidation. In 1920, the Dublin IRA frequently raided the General Post Office or held up mail carriers, and stole large amounts of letters. Many of these letters were from the families of men who were serving in Ireland. The IRA made note of all of these addresses, as well as the names of the men to whom the letters were addressed. The IRA intelligence officers then sent this information to the IRA brigades in England. The London and Liverpool brigades in particular then visited the homes of the British men serving in Ireland. They intimidated the families of these men and encouraged them to beg their relative serving in Ireland to resign his post and return home. The hope was that the men serving in Ireland would resign and return home out of fear for the safety of their family.[63]

Edward Brady recalled carrying out an operation to intimidate the families of British men serving in the RIC. Dublin GHQ sent over the addresses of 14 homes belonging to RIC men. The British IRA men then carefully patrolled the neighborhoods these homes were in and established a plan for raiding them. They carried out the raids on a Saturday night at 11:45pm. The IRA carried out the attacks late in the evening and on a Saturday night because most people were home in bed at this time. This meant that the attackers would be met with little resistance.[64] These attacks were unique because they helped to further the myth that the IRA was able to strike whenever and wherever they wanted. The attacks also proved to the British that the IRA's intelligence services were very successful in gaining information. While the British struggled to locate IRA leaders, IRA men were raiding the homes of British soldiers in London. This made the

[63] Brian O'Conchubhair, ed. *Dublin's Fighting Story 1916-1921: Told By The Men Who Made It* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2009), 381.
[64] Edward M Brady, *Irelands Secret Service in England* (Dublin: Talbot Press, 1928), 64-65.

British forces seem much weaker than the IRA, and many British soldiers returned home to protect their families because they didn't feel that the government was capable of doing so.

The IRA often threatened the relatives of RIC men, but only in rare cases did it physically harm them. IRA men shot Horace MacNeill when they came to his house looking for his nephew, C. H. Horns. When MacNeill informed them that his nephew did not live there, things got physical, and an IRA man shot MacNeill. In a similar incident, IRA men raided the home of Auxiliary division soldier Lanclet Ashby, where they beat and shot him and his wife. They also tied up their landlady so that she could not call for help.[65] The IRA men turned to violence either out of fear, or out of anger at not being able to locate their targets. Many of the IRA gunmen were young and inexperienced, and they sometimes made rash decisions.

By employing terrorism in Britain, the IRA hoped to force the British people to acknowledge the violent situation in Ireland. According to Paddy O'Donoghue the commanding officer of the Manchester brigade of the IRA, the goal of the campaign in Britain was "to bring home to the British people the sufferings and conditions to which the Irish people were being subjected by their police and soldiers."[66] Ultimately the IRA hoped that a terrified British public would push the government to evaluate their position in Ireland.[67] The goal of the IRA attacks in Britain was to show the British government the power of the IRA.

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[65] Gerard Noonan, *The IRA in Britain, 1919-1923: 'In the Heart of Enemy Lines'* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 164.
[66] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 847, Paddy O'Donoghue, 11.
[67] Gerard Noonan, "Republican Terrorism in Britain, 1920-1923" in *Terror in Ireland: 1916-1923,* ed. David Fitzpatrick (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012), 238.

The IRA also intimidated Irish immigrants in England. The Dáil was worried about the high rate of emigration from Ireland and sought to discourage it. The 15 August issue of An t-Óglác made it clear that the IRA needed every man in the fight for freedom, and warned that those who tried to emigrate would be stopped by any means necessary.[68] IRA men in Britain frequently sought out emigrants and forced them to return to Ireland. Volunteers searched three lodging houses in Liverpool on 18 February 1921, and warned twenty-three emigrants to return to Ireland.[69] The IRA intimidated immigrants into returning home to Ireland, because they wanted these men to join the IRA and take up arms against the British. They needed every able bodied man to join in the fight to increase the strength and presence of the IRA.

The IRA used the destruction of personal and crown property as a form of widespread intimidation that was aimed at terrorizing the public. Destroyed property was a public symbol that illustrated to the Irish public what the consequences could be if they defied the IRA. Destruction of crown property also worked to undermine the British government in Ireland, and lend more credibility to the fledgling republican government.[70] By destroying government buildings, the IRA caused the British government in Ireland various setbacks. In addition to this, the damaged buildings also served as a symbol to the Irish people that the British government did not control Ireland, and that the Dáil, supported by the IRA, was the rightful governing body in Ireland.

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[68] *An t-Óglác,* 15 August 1920.
[69] Edward M Brady, *Irelands Secret Service in England* (Dublin: Talbot Press, 1928), 46-54.
[70] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 96-97.

The destruction of property was one of the first actions that many IRA members carried out. For those who had concerns about taking lives, burning buildings was a way to ease them into action. The IRA GHQ ordered a widespread burning of courthouses, tax offices, and evacuated barracks, throughout Ireland on Easter weekend 1920. Charles Dalton carried orders from Dublin that instructed him and his comrades to "burn all vacated RIC barracks on Easter Saturday Night." IRA GHQ also ordered them to "simultaneously raid the houses of Income Tax collectors and seize all papers, which you will destroy."[71] Dalton himself then returned to Dublin and took part in a raid on a tax office on Easter Saturday night. He and his fellow IRA men piled all of the papers in the center of the room and then lit them on fire before exiting the building.[72] These burnings marked the four-year anniversary of the Easter Rising, but served a much greater purpose. They proved to the citizens of Ireland that the IRA was gaining power throughout the country. They were a form of public intimidation that showed the people of Ireland what happened to those who did not support the fight for national freedom.[73]

The British army often used houses belonging to loyalists as homes for their officers, or if large enough, as billets for entire groups of soldiers. For this reason the IRA began targeting and destroying many of the "Big Houses." As early as February 1920 the IRA began burning these homes. Because of this, the British military decided in September of 1920 that they would no longer use the homes of loyalists for any purpose. The IRA burned around 72 large plantation homes between April 1920 and

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[71] Charles Dalton, *With the Dublin Brigade: Espionage and Assassination with Michael Collins' Intelligence Unit* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2014), 81.
[72] Charles Dalton, *With the Dublin Brigade: Espionage and Assassination with Michael Collins' Intelligence Unit* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2014), 82-83.
[73] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 96-97.

July 1921.[74] The burning of loyalist homes served a dual purpose because it forced the British military to house their soldiers in barracks, which meant that the IRA could monitor their activity around the clock. The burnings also served as a warning to loyalists that supporting the British in Ireland brought about grave consequences, including the loss of their property. Once the IRA had destroyed these people's homes, the citizens often had little choice but to leave Ireland, which meant that the IRA also succeeded in forcing undesirable people out of the country.

An order from IRA GHQ dated 22 June 1921 authorized the destruction of loyalist and crown property as a reprisal for the destruction of property owned by republicans or their sympathizers. For every republican house destroyed, the GHQ authorized the IRA to destroy an equal number of enemy houses or buildings. IRA GHQ also instructed the soldiers to leave a notice on all homes they destroyed, which made it clear they burned the homes in reprisal for the destruction of republican homes. These notices helped to further enforce the idea that this was a public form of intimidation. The other loyalists and members of the crown forces in the area worked to curb the destruction of republican property, so that their own property would not be destroyed in a reprisal.[75]

In May 1921 the IRA attacked and burned the Customs House in Dublin, destroying thousands of government documents, as well as a building that symbolically represented British control of Ireland. The building housed documents for the local Dublin government, the Inland Revenue office, the Stamp Office, and the Stationary

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[74] Terence Dooley, *The Decline of the Big House in Ireland: A Study of Irish Landed Families, 1860-1960* Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 2001), 182-184.
[75] General Orders No. 26, 22 June 1921 (The National Library Ireland: Piaras Beaslai Papers, MS 33913/7)

Office. The loss of these documents was a crushing blow to British rule in Ireland.[76] Oscar Traynor, the commander of the Dublin brigade of the IRA, deemed the operation a success despite the loss of many IRA men who were captured.[77] The attack came a week after Sinn Fein had swept the elections throughout Ireland. The British were already beginning to feel as if they had lost control of the country and had begun sending out peace feelers to Eamon De Valera. The attack on the Customs House helped to prove to the British that republicans had not only gained the upper hand in politics throughout Ireland, but that they had the military strength to support the political wing. This was important for the republicans when they did begin peace talks with the British, because it enabled them to put more pressure on the British to meet their demands. The British were right in recognizing that they could no longer successfully govern Ireland, and the loss of the Customs House only further reinforced that fact.[78]

The destruction of property in Britain during the Irish revolution played a major role in persuading the government to seek a truce in Ireland. The IRA men in Britain attacked and destroyed "warehouses, factories, farms, and privates houses, as well as communications and the railway network."[79] The IRA generally chose property for destruction based on a variety of factors, two of which were how much the destruction would damage the British economy and caused class conflict, and how much the

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[76] Charles Townshend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 291-292.
[77] Brian O'Conchubhair, ed. *Dublin's Fighting Story 1916-1921: Told By The Men Who Made It* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2009), 320.
[78] Padraig Yeates, *A City In Turmoil: Dublin 1919-1921* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012), 272-274.
[79] Gerard Noonan, *The IRA in Britain, 1919-1923: 'In the Heart of Enemy Lines'* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 153.

destruction would terrorize the British public.[80] It was not until the arson attacks in Liverpool in November 1920 that the British became concerned about the IRA presence in Britain. However, after these attacks the British government devoted a large amount of resources to stamping out Irish terrorism in Britain.[81] On 28 November 1920, in the wake of the Bloody Sunday assassinations in Dublin, over one hundred men from the Liverpool Brigade of the IRA attacked twenty-three buildings at the Liverpool docklands and burned nineteen of them to the ground. This resulted in not only a large monetary loss for the British because of the burned buildings, but also raised public awareness about the conflict in Ireland. For the first time the IRA had carried out a large scale, destructive operation on British soil, and the British public responded with fear and panic.[82] These attacks helped confirm the idea that the IRA was powerful and able to strike whenever and wherever they wanted, as a truthful fact in the eyes of many members of the British public.

The IRA sometimes damaged or destroyed the homes of British men serving in the RIC as a form of intimidation to encourage them to leave Ireland and return home. On 14 May 1921, IRA men in London and Liverpool raided the homes of RIC men and their families. During these raids, the personal property of these individuals was set on fire and destroyed. In one attack on a boarding house where the father of an RIC man lived, the IRA set fire to various rooms in the house before leaving.[83] These attacks were aimed at forcing RIC men in Ireland to resign and move back to England, but also

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[80] Gerard Noonan, *The IRA in Britain, 1919-1923: 'In the Heart of Enemy Lines'* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 156.
[81] Gerard Noonan, *The IRA in Britain, 1919-1923: 'In the Heart of Enemy Lines'* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 270.
[82] Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War, 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 151.
[83] Gerard Noonan, *The IRA in Britain, 1919-1923: 'In the Heart of Enemy Lines'* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 160-161.

at showing the British government the strength and power of the IRA. This helped to further the myth that the IRA was powerful and could strike whenever and wherever they wanted, with little repercussion.

Overall, intimidation in both Ireland and Britain played a large role in turning British public opinion against the war effort in Ireland. The British government became increasingly convinced that Ireland was ungovernable. Major acts of intimidation like the burning of the Customs House, and the IRA attacks on British soil only helped to reinforce those feelings. In a meeting of the British Cabinet on 28 May 1921, they acknowledged that the burning of the Customs House in Dublin had resulted in the destruction of a majority of the official documents relating to property, land, and local governments in Ireland.[84] Because of this, the government in Ireland faced major setbacks and inconveniences. They had essentially lost their ability to affectively govern because they no longer had the documentation to support their rulings throughout the country. The Cabinet also admitted that intimidation in Southern Ireland was out of control. They felt that the lack of government support in Ireland was due not only to Sinn Fein political victories, but also to the intimidation of civilians, government officials, and police officers as well.[85] With the government officials and police intimidated and ineffective, the population had little alternative but to support Sinn Fein and the IRA, because they were the two groups working hard to control and govern the country. Both groups also actively worked to aid those that supported them. It often proved more beneficial to the public to back these groups, even if they did not

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[84] Survey of the State of Ireland for the Week Ended 28 May 1921. (The National Archive, Kew: The Cabinet Papers, CAB/24/125).

[85] Survey of the State of Ireland for the Week Ended 28 May 1921. (The National Archive, Kew: The Cabinet Papers, CAB/24/125).

agree with their policies, because they were more likely to get their problems resolved by republican aid, than by the government. By June 25, Sinn Fein had once again swept the elections in holding 124 out of 128 seats in the Southern Irish Parliament. However, the elected Sinn Fein politicians refused to recognize the authority of the Parliament because of its ties to the British government in Ireland, and declared that they would not take their seats. Once the British government realized that they had lost complete control of the country by the end of June 1921, and were faced with mounting public pressure in Britain to end the conflict in Ireland, they were left with little option but to push for a truce and an eventual peace agreement.[86]

The historiography of the Irish revolution has focused on the big raids and the actions of flying columns, but it was in fact the more small-scale operations, like the acts of intimidation discussed throughout this chapter that really caught the attention of the British government. Intimidation was the main weapon used to combat the police forces in Ireland, as well as civilians that supported them. The IRA also used it to persuade government officials to neglect their duties or resign their posts. Those that failed to head the warnings of intimidation often met a violent death. The IRA's campaign of intimidation was almost solely responsible for causing the government system to teeter on the verge of complete breakdown. As the next chapter will show, when coupled with a campaign of assassination, it succeed in rendering the British government in Ireland ineffective, and helped to sway British public opinion against the conflict in Ireland.

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[86] Survey of the State of Ireland for the Week Ended 25 June 1921. (The National Archive, Kew: The Cabinet Papers, CAB/24/125).

CHAPTER THREE: ASSASSINATION

On the evening of 9 November 1920, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George gave a speech at the Mansion House relating to the situation in Ireland. During his speech he famously declared, "Unless I am mistaken, by the steps we have taken we have murder by the throat."[1] Twelve days later, on 21 November 1920, the IRA assassinated thirteen British intelligence agents and military officers throughout Dublin. British forces in the city were terrorized and began flocking to Dublin castle for protection. Lloyd George had clearly misspoken because the British were far from containing murder in Ireland. As early as December 1920 he began sending out peace feelers to the IRA and worked actively to get in touch with Michael Collins. With each assassination, the British forces in Ireland became more terrified to leave the safety of their barracks, which meant that they were essentially unable to govern the country. The assassinations also made headlines in Ireland and in England, and they played a major role in turning British public opinion against the war in Ireland.

The IRA chose to carry out assassinations for a variety of reasons. The four main reasons that the IRA assassinated people were political, military, for revenge, and for "cleansing" if they were deemed an undesirable member of the community. Political targets were typically members of the British government, either in Ireland or in Britain. The IRA believed that by killing them they could slowly dismantle

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[1] Frank Pakenham, *Peace by Ordeal: An Account, from First-Hand Sources, of the Negotiation and Signature of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921* (Cork: Mercier Press, 1951), 33.

British rule over Ireland. The IRA targeted British military officers, members of the police forces, and secret agents for their military value. By eliminating these targets, the IRA could weaken the military power of Britain in Ireland. The IRA targeted some people for revenge because they had killed or arrested republicans in the past. They targeted a few unfortunate people because of grudges that went back years before the revolution began. The IRA targeted others for the role they had played in suppressing the Easter Rising in 1916, while they targeted some people as reprisals for actions they carried out during the revolution. Finally, in some counties like Cork, the IRA adopted an unofficial policy of "cleansing" the population of all persons that they deemed undesirable. Loyalists, beggars, tramps, informers and anyone the IRA deemed a traitor to the republican cause was lumped into this group of undesirable people. The IRA made a point to select only targets that they felt would not provoke widespread revulsion among the Irish public. This explains why women were not targeted for assassination. IRA also increased their assassination campaign as the conflict became drawn out. While some assassinations did occur in 1919, the years 1920 and 1921 both saw an increase in the number of IRA assassinations. This chapter examines the four types of assassinations that occurred between 1919-1921 and argues that the increasing violence ultimately terrorized the British government in Ireland and forced them to seek a settlement with the republicans because they could no longer control the country without fighting a campaign of total war in Ireland.

The IRA did not carry out many assassinations in 1919 because the organization was largely afraid of how the public would react to them. Eamon Broy, one of Michael Collins' double agents in the Dublin Metropolitan Police, remarked that before the first assassination Collins was "extremely anxious as to what effect the shooting of

detectives would have on the volunteers themselves and on the Sinn Fein movement generally, and how it would be taken by the public."[2] It was only after every effort was made to intimidate their targets into abandoning their posts or ceasing their work against republicans that the IRA began to adopt a campaign of assassination. Collins formed a group of men to carry out assassinations mainly in the Dublin area, but they occasionally travelled outside Dublin to hit high-profile targets. These men were known by some as "The Twelve Apostles," however the majority of people, including the members, simply referred to the group as "the Squad."[3]

The first individuals whom Collins chose to target in the summer of 1919 were the plain-clothed officers of the G Division of the Dublin Metropolitan Police who continued to work against Sinn Fein and members of the IRA. Many of these detectives were assigned to political work. This meant that they were frequently tracking and reporting on members of Sinn Fein. The IRA targeted these men because they could readily identify many republicans, which meant that they posed a large threat to the movement.[4] The G division officers were the first military style targets that the IRA targeted for assassination. These men were actively combating the republican movement with force and the IRA needed to eliminate them not only to protect the Dáil, but to protect their own men as well. This ensured that the republican movement continued to gain power in Ireland.

The Squad's first target for assassination was G division detective Patrick Smyth, who was very active in political work. He was beginning to cause problems for both Sinn Fein and the IRA. Collins decided that he must be eliminated when he failed

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[2] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 1280, Eamon Broy, 80.
[3] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 423, Vincent Byrne, 34.
[4] Padraig Yeates, *A City In Turmoil: Dublin, 1919-1921* (Dublin: Gill& Macmillan, 2012), 48-50.

to heed the warnings to quit his work. IRA intelligence gave James Slattery, Tom Keogh, Tom Ennis, and Mick Kennedy Smyth's address and told them to assassinate him when he returned from work. They waited about two weeks before they finally had the opportunity to assassinate him. The men opened fire on Smyth with their .38 pistols, but he did not fall down. Instead, he ran all the way to his door, ultimately living for about 40 days after the shooting before he finally died from his wounds.[5]

An article published in *The Times* on 6 August 1919, titled the "Grave State of Dublin," described the attack in gory detail stating that Smyth was "literally riddled with bullets." The article continued by condemning the Irish public for not acting to stop the attackers and the British government for not denouncing the outrages like this that were occurring in Ireland.[6] This article reveals that the Irish public was either too afraid to stop the attackers, or that they supported them, and it shows that as early as the summer of 1919, the British public was becoming critical of how the government was handling the situation in Ireland. When the government failed to denounce the attacks in Ireland, the people began to react critically.

This first assassination was important to the IRA for many reasons. First, it helped the IRA to better plan for their future assassinations. They never used .38 caliber pistols again, but instead switched to the much more powerful .45 caliber. They also developed a more efficient plan of attack that utilized two shooters. The first shooter aimed to stop the target, while the goal of the second shooter was to finish him off. The members of the Squad wanted to make sure that their targets did not survive the initial attacks, not only because they had orders to kill them, but also because they

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[5] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 445, James Slattery, 4-5.
[6] "Grave State of Dublin" *The Times*, 6 August 1919.

did not want to be identified later and arrested for the attempted murder. James Slattery mentions that he was "more worried than Mick until Smyth died."[7] The first assassination was also important because it helped the IRA to get a grasp on how public opinion would react. For this reason, Collins chose not to order another assassination for some weeks after the attack on Smyth. Ultimately the public did not react negatively to Smyth's death in Ireland, and Collins determined that he could move forward with a full-fledged campaign of assassination.[8] The lack of public outcry in Ireland over Smyth's murder also showed that the Irish people were frustrated with the current policies of the British government in Ireland and had begun to lose respect for the people working in Ireland to help maintain that government.

On 11 September 1919 Lloyd George and Bonar Law, leader of the House of Commons, declared that the Dáil was an illegal governing body and began working to suppress it. They ultimately decided to do this because they believed that radicals within the Dáil were ordering the assassinations and violent attacks against the police and military in Ireland. By suppressing the Dáil, they hoped to capture its members and bring a stop to the violence. The next day Detective-Sergeant Hoey of G division raided the Sinn Fein office in Harcourt Street. Collins barely escaped the raid and viewed it as directly connected with the suppression of the Dáil. In the wake of its suppression, the Dáil authorized the IRA to carry out offensive actions against the British. In Risteárd Mulcahy's biography of his father Richard, he confirms that the suppression of the Dáil was the turning point that forced them to officially authorize the

[7] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 445, James Slattery, 4-5.
[8] Michael Foy, *Michael Collins's Intelligence War: The Struggle Between the British and the IRA, 1919-1921* (Glouchestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2006), 26.

IRA to carry out more violent attacks.[9] Collins also felt that the British had committed acts of war against the Irish state, and he immediately ordered Hoey's assassination as a response.[10] The goal of Hoey's assassination was to send a message to the British government and the police forces in Ireland that anyone who supported the suppression of the Dáil, and continued to actively pursue republicans in Ireland, would be subject to death. If the British government had not suppressed the Dáil, but instead pushed for negotiations with the group, the IRA likely would not have been able to carry out their assassination campaign. Public opinion would not have supported the violence without some basis of justification. By suppressing the Dáil and actively hunting down republicans, the British government gave the IRA a reason to carry out more assassinations. The IRA had to combat the British threat, and the Dáil and the Irish public had shown that they were willing to support the campaign of assassination.

IRA intelligence selected Jim Slattery again for the job of killing Hoey. He stated that the IRA targeted Hoey because he had become "the leading spirit in the raiders."[11] The IRA felt that it was important that he was eliminated because he had come close to capturing Collins in the 12 September raid. Near the end of the month, Slattery stalked Hoey through the streets of Dublin, before finally shooting him outside of the garage behind the police barracks in Brunswick Street.[12] Hoey's assassination was important because it was the first official assassination carried out by the IRA that had the approval of the Dáil. Because the operation was carried out successfully, and public opinion in Ireland did not react negatively, it opened the door for the IRA to

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[9] Risteárd Mulcahy, *My Father, The General: Richard Mulcahy and the Military History of the Revolution* (Dublin: Liberties Press, 2009), 52-55.
[10] Richard Mulcahy, Talk given to Members of the 1916-1921 Club, Jury's Hotel, 20 February 1964. (University College Dublin Archives: Mulcahy Papers P7/D/66).
[11] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 445, James Slattery, 5-6.
[12] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 445, James Slattery, 6.

carry out future assassinations throughout the country with the Dáil's approval. It also proved to the members of the IRA intelligence division and the Squad that they could successfully find and eliminate enemy targets. The DMP suffered a major blow to their morale with Hoey's assassination, as it was becoming more evident that little was being done to support them against the IRA. Collins again gauged the Irish public's reaction to the assassination before authorizing another. There was little negative feeling that was voiced among the Irish public regarding the murder of the first two G division detectives.[13] Had the public reacted negatively Collins likely would have held off on pressing forward with the assassination campaign, but since there was little outcry, he began to authorize more assassinations to put pressure on the British government.

During the remaining months of 1919, the IRA targeted many more G division detectives for assassination in Dublin. Collins ordered Paddy Daly to assassinate the detective Thomas Wharton, and Daly recruited Joe Leonard to be his backup gunman on the mission. The two men found Wharton before Leonard was able to retrieve his pistol from the local arms dump, and Daly was forced to carry out the assassination attempt on his own. Daly hit Wharton with his first shot, but his gun jammed before he could fire a second. Wharton was seriously wounded in the attack and was paralyzed for the rest of his life.[14] Even though the Squad did not kill Wharton, he was still unable to continue his duty. His attack also had an effect on the other members of the DMP's G Division, because they became more fearful of the citizens they passed on the streets and they never knew when a member of the IRA, blending in with the crowd, would attack them. This clearly had a psychological impact on the police officers,

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[13] Ian Kenneally, *The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland, 1919-1921* (Cork: The Collins Press, 2008), 59.
[14] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 587, Paddy Daly, 12-13.

because they could no longer trust the public. This led to a drop in morale and meant that the officers struggled to perform their duties.

Detective Johnny Barton was the last G Division detective that the IRA assassinated in 1919. At the end of November, Collins ordered members of the Squad to assassinate him. Vincent Byrne and Mick McDonnell shot Barton multiple times as he crossed the street in front of the Brunswick St. police station.[15] David Neligan, one of Michael Collins's moles in the DMP, stated that Barton was "easily the best detective in these islands, had plenty of touts working for him and was known to be well-off financially."[16] Barton belonged to G division for only a few months, but his assassination damaged the morale of the DMP and clearly roused the citizens of Dublin who did not know that he was carrying out political work. Austin Stack, the deputy chief of staff of the IRA, told *Irish Independent* reporter Mike Knightly, who frequently aided IRA intelligence, that in regards to Barton's assassination, "The whole city is upset." The Dublin public did not remain upset for very long, as word began to spread that the IRA had assassinated him because he was working against them.[17] The fact that Barton was relatively new to G division also shows how active the IRA was in eliminating threats before they were able to cause too much damage to the movement.

These initial assassinations of DMP men took place during the evening because the gunmen had more cover during the darker hours. However, after the attacks on the G Division detectives, the government began to limit the police activity on the streets after dark to protect their officers. This in turn forced the Squad to begin carrying out

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[15] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 423, Vincent Byrne, 13.
[16] David Neligan, *The Spy in the Castle* (London: Prendeville Publishing Limited, 1999), 50.
[17] T. Ryle Dwyer, *The Squad and the Intelligence Operations of Michael Collins* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2005), 68-69.

assassinations during the daytime, which left them more exposed and vulnerable to being identified by witnesses.[18] With each successful assassination, the morale of the DMP became worse and the force was essentially ineffective by January 1920. A report on the Detective Branch stated that the "series of murders coming one after another had a paralyzing effect upon the Division generally."[19] The surviving members of G division were so fearful for their lives that they moved into Dublin Castle, and remained there for the duration of the conflict. They only ventured outside of the castle in groups, to ensure their safety. Both of these factors greatly decreased their effectiveness as detectives. They stood out when traveling through the city in groups, and they could not maintain their covers when they were seen leaving and returning to the castle.[20] Finally, the assassination of the G division detectives eliminated many of the men who could identify the leading IRA men. This allowed the IRA a free hand to conduct further offensive actions in Dublin, including more intricately planned assassination attempts. With the elimination of the G division detectives, the IRA also began to focus their resources on eliminating political targets like British government officials in Ireland who were causing trouble for the republican movement. By eliminating these men, they hoped to send a message to the British government that they could no longer govern Ireland. They also focused on military targets in the form of British secret agents, army intelligence officers, spies and informers. All of these groups sought to supply the British government with valuable information that could prove key in

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[18] Michael Foy, *Michael Collins's Intelligence War: The Struggle Between the British and the IRA, 1919-1921* (Glouchestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2006), 53.
[19] Report on the Detective Branch (The National Archive, Kew: Dublin Castle Records, CO 904/24/5).
[20] Michael Foy, *Michael Collins's Intelligence War: The Struggle Between the British and the IRA, 1919-1921* (Glouchestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2006), 65-66.

defeating the republicans. The IRA placed great importance of discovering and eliminating these threats.

The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Sir John French, took a hard stance against the republicans when he came to power in Ireland in 1918. French knew that he was a target of the IRA and frequently stated that they had mined specific streets in Dublin to try to assassinate him. While this statement was not true, the IRA did attempt to assassinate French on twelve different occasions multiple occasions, but all failed due to slight changes in his plans of travel routes.[21] On December 12, 1919, the IRA came very close to killing French. They attacked him as he travelled to Dublin from the Ashtown train station. The IRA men knew that French typically travelled in the second car of his motorcade, so they focused their attack on that vehicle as it passed them. Although they destroyed the second vehicle and wounded all inside it, they missed French because he was traveling in the first car that day. French retired from public life after the final assassination attempt, only venturing out of Dublin castle to return to England. He was always driven in armored cars and escorted by armed detectives, thus making an attempt on his life virtually impossible.[22]

According to Dan Breen, one of the most wanted gunmen of the Irish revolution, the IRA hoped that French's death would "arouse the interest in Ireland's cause throughout the world; it would strike terror into the hearts of British statesmen, and it would help to render British rule impossible in Ireland."[23] Although French survived, the attempts on his life certainly struck terror into the hearts of British statesmen.

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[21] Michael Foy, *Michael Collins's Intelligence War: The Struggle Between the British and the IRA, 1919-1921* (Glouchestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2006), 23.
[22] Dan Breen, *My Fight for Irish Freedom* (Dublin: Anvil Press, 1989), 86-92.
[23] Dan Breen, *My Fight for Irish Freedom* (Dublin: Anvil Press, 1989), 81.

Finally, the news of the attack on his life also made headlines in many newspapers around the world. This meant that the IRA was able to spread their cause throughout the world. The IRA's cause became more legitimate every time the media focused its attention on their actions. If the media continued to cover the conflict in Ireland then eventually the public would pressure the British government to work towards a settlement. *The Times* in an article published on 20 December 1920, proposed that Lloyd George should rally the government to work towards a settlement in Ireland, because the attempted murder of French highlighted the growing problems in the country.[24] The attack therefore also had some affect on British public perception of the conflict. A large portion of the British people, especially Londoners, read *The Times* daily, and most of the information that they gathered about the conflict in Ireland came from the newspaper. *The Times'* coverage of the assassination attempt of Lord French brought the Irish conflict to the attention of the British public who began following it closer. The British public began putting more pressure on the government to formulate a peace agreement as they continued to read negative press related to the conflict in Ireland.

In late 1919, the Cork IRA began to mimic the Dublin battalion. They established an intelligence brigade that collected information on their enemies, and a hit squad that eliminated them. On 14 December 1919, the Cork IRA assassinated Constable Edward Bolger, while he was walking to the barracks in Kilbrittain. Bolger was the first policeman assassinated in County Cork during the Irish revolution. The IRA killed him because he was active in trying to suppress the IRA in the region, and was known to handle his prisoners violently. At the time the British government

[24] "Attempt To Murder Lord French," *The Times*, 20 December 1920.

viewed the assassination as more of an isolated incident, however it was proof that the Cork IRA was becoming a more active and violent wing within the overall structure of the IRA. Cork became the most violent region of Ireland during the final two years of the revolution.[25] The Cork IRA had acted alone when they decided to carry out Bolger's assassination, and did not consult with GHQ before killing him. This is important because outside of Dublin most IRA brigades made their own decisions about who to assassinate, operating freely from GHQ's guidance.

Superintendent Owen Brien resigned his post in late 1919 after it became evident that the police forces were failing to combat the IRA throughout Ireland. The British government was highly critical of DMP Commissioner Walter Edgeworth-Johnston because of the failings of G Division to combat the IRA in Dublin, however he refused to resign. Instead of forcing him to resign his position, Lord French established a new assistant commissioner position within the ranks of the DMP in late December 1919. He selected District Inspector William Redmond, from Belfast, for this position. French hoped that Redmond, whom he considered an excellent detective, would be able to revitalize the G Division and finally eliminate the IRA threat in Dublin. Redmond set to work immediately upon his appointment to recruit men who were willing to stand up to the IRA, and to dismiss those who were not up to the task.[26] As a result, many of the G division detectives became very active.[27]

Redmond's appointment alarmed Collins, who immediately began planning his assassination. Michael Collins sent Frank Thornton to Belfast to obtain a picture of

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[25] Peter Hart, *The I.R.A & Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 70-71.
[26] Michael Foy, *Michael Collins's Intelligence War: The Struggle Between the British and the IRA, 1919-1921* (Glouchestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2006), 61-62.
[27] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 587, Paddy Daly, 22.

Redmond from IRA intelligence officers there who knew him by sight. An IRA double agent stationed at the Chichester Street RIC barracks let Thornton into the barracks when most of the officers were out enjoying a night off. Thornton was able to steal a photograph of Redmond from files stored at the barracks. This photograph allowed the IRA to identify Redmond when he arrived in Dublin in January 1920.[28] This is important to note because while British intelligence struggled to identify Collins, or locate a photograph of him, IRA intelligence was able to quickly get their hands on photographs of their targets. This helped to amplify the idea that IRA intelligence was far more successful than British intelligence in Ireland.

IRA intelligence in Dublin learned that Redmond was staying in the Standard Hotel until his quarters in Dublin Castle were ready. Michael Collins ordered Tom Cullen to shadow Redmond and learn as much information as he could about his daily routine, particularly the times he came and went from the hotel, and the places he frequented in Dublin. On 22 January 1920, Collins ordered the Squad to assassinate Redmond. Paddy Day shot Redmond in the head as he crossed Harcourt Street to return to his hotel.[29] *The Times* glossed over Redmond's murder with a short four-paragraph article titled "Another Dublin Murder."[30] The title fittingly summed up the mood and attitude of Londoners to the situation in Ireland. They had grown accustomed to reading about assassinations and murders in Ireland.

Redmond was the highest-ranking member of the DMP whom the IRA assassinated during the Irish Revolution. His elimination immediately crippled the G division of the DMP, because the men once again feared for their lives. Most of the

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[28] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 615, Frank Thornton, 36.
[29] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 587, Paddy Daly, 23.
[30] "Another Dublin Murder" *The Times* (London, England) 22 January 1920.

remaining officers did not perform their duties at all, and those who did remain active only served as point men for the army during raids. The British government appointed an RIC inspector to fill the position of assistant commissioner of the DMP, left vacant by Redmond's death. According to David Neligan, he avoided all political matters during his tenure. Because of this, the IRA did not target him.[31] This shows that the assassinations had some effect on the police and military forces in Ireland, mostly in encouraging these men to ignore their duties or abandon their posts. With these forces rendered useless, the IRA was beginning to gain the upper hand in Ireland, even if only in a propaganda sense. Despite the fact that the British still had superior military power, most people began to assume that the IRA was more powerful. Redmond's assassination is one of many incidents where IRA intelligence proved to be far superior to that of the British police and military. The IRA's superior intelligence presence was one of the biggest factors that made the IRA gunmen seem like they could strike any target they wanted with little fear of repercussion.

On 30 January 1920 the British enacted a new policy that they hoped would enable them to gain control of the situation in Ireland. The Chief Secretary of Ireland issued warrants for the arrest of all "Commanders, Officers, and prominent members of the Irish Volunteers and other individuals responsible for the prevalent outrages and terrorism."[32] Anyone on this list, along with anyone arrested for committing a serious outrage, was eligible to be deported to England and imprisoned without trial. The British army records show that 64 people were arrested and deported to England between 30 January and 8 February, however despite their claims they were unable to

[31] David Neligan, *The Spy in the Castle* (London: Prendeville Publishing Limited, 1999), 66.
[32] W.H. Kautt, ed. *Ground Truths: British Army Operations in the Irish War of Independence* (Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2014), 31.

capture any of the true leaders of the IRA in this round up.[33] The British Army's failure to capture any of the major IRA leaders resulted in continued IRA attacks, largely as a response to the mounting pressure the British were exerting on the IRA. These failures did not help to improve the public's idea of the situation in Ireland either though. Anytime that a government introduces measure to help end a conflict the public expects positive results. When these measure fail, the public is let down, and ultimately begins to lose faith in the government and become critical of their future actions. Throughout 1920-1921, this trend can be seen in the British public's perception of, and response to, the Irish conflict.

The IRA claimed many more victims before the year was out. Jack Byrnes, a British army intelligence agent working for the A2 branch, a secret military intelligence agency created after World War I, had worked closely with Redmond during his brief tenure in Dublin and continued to work with A2 and Scotland Yard after Redmond's death. Byrnes' main goal was to infiltrate the IRA's inner circle and gather intelligence on the leaders of the organization. Byrnes first met Michael Collins on 8 December 1919, after which he informed his handlers that he was guiding all of the IRA's actions. In a report to Ralph Isham, the director of A2, Byrnes stated, "COLLINS is the Chief Director of all active movement amongst the Sinn Feiner [*sic*] and … he has now taken the place of De Valera owing to the long absence of the latter. Although Collins does not take any active part in the shooting affairs there seems no doubt that he is the organizer."[34] Collins was not organizing every aspect of the IRA's campaign, but this

[33] W.H. Kautt, ed. *Ground Truths: British Army Operations in the Irish War of Independence* (Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2014), 31-34.
[34] "Notes on No. 8's visit to Ireland" (Yale University Library: Ralph Heyward Isham Papers, MS 1455/1/8).

report illustrates the lack of information that the British had about the organizational structure of the IRA, and shows that Collins carried himself like a leader who commanded the respect of those around him.

A2 intelligence sent Byrnes back to Ireland in early 1920 to gain more information about Collins and lure him into a trap where he would be arrested. However, by this time the IRA had become wary of Byrnes. Collins sent a letter to Art O'Brien, an IRA intelligence contact in London, on 20 January 1920, in which he stated, "I have absolutely certain information that the man who came from London met and spoke to me, and reported that I was growing a moustache to Basil Thompson."[35] It is possible that Collins gained this information from one of his many IRA intelligence operatives in London, however it is more likely that one of his moles in Dublin Castle tipped him off about Byrnes. Frank Thornton, Tom Cullen, and Liam Tobin, Collins's leading intelligence men, provided Byrnes on two occasions with fake addresses of safe houses and arms dumps. These locations were all raided the same night that Byrnes had was given the address, this ultimately confirmed to Collins and his intelligence men that Byrnes was a British agent.[36] Paddy Daly and Joe Dolan picked up Byrnes on the morning of 29 February 1920 and took him to the Dublin suburb of Glasnevin on the premise that he was going to meet with Collins. Instead, he was put up against a wall outside the tram station and told he was going to be executed for spying. Before Daly and Dolan shot him, Byrnes snapped to attention and confirmed that he was a spy and was happy to die for the King.[37]

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[35] Collins to O'Brien, 20 January 1920 (National Library of Ireland: Art O'Brien Papers, MS 8430/1).
[36] Julian Putkowski, "The Best Secret Service Man We Had: Jack Byrnes, A2 and the IRA," *Lobster* 28 (1995), 14.
[37] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 587, Paddy Daly, 26-27.

In the aftermath of Byrnes' death, the Irish and English press speculated as to whether or not he had been a British spy. On 31 May 1920, during a British ministerial meeting held to discuss IRA victories against British rule in Ireland, First Lord of the Admiralty Walter Long confirmed that the IRA had assassinated "The Best Secret Service man we had" when they killed Byrnes.[38] Byrnes' death was certainly a blow to British intelligence operations in Ireland, because by the time of his death, he was the only British agent that successfully penetrated the ranks of the IRA and met with Michael Collins. The IRA viewed Byrnes as a military target, because he was an intelligence agent working for the British government. If he had been able to pass along any important information, the British could have used it to damage the republican movement. Neither the British nor the Irish public responded negatively to Byrnes death, because he was a spy, who was discovered and executed. If anything the British public added his death to the growing list of government failures in Ireland, of which they were becoming increasingly critical.

The IRA executed another spy in February 1920. Timothy Quinlisk had initially attempted to work for the IRA before turning into a double agent and working for Dublin Castle. The IRA intelligence officers in Dublin tricked him into thinking that Michael Collins had travelled to Cork and was staying at the Wren's Hotel. He quickly relayed the information to Dublin castle in the form of a telegram, which the IRA also intercepted due to having infiltrated the Telegraph office in Dublin. Quinlisk went to Cork and began trying to infiltrate the IRA circles there. On 18 February 1920, intelligence officers from the Cork City brigade captured Quinlisk and assassinated him

[38] Thomas Jones, *Whitehall Diary Vol. III, Ireland 1918-1925* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 19.

in Tory Top Lane.[39] However, the press did not know that Quinlisk had been a spy for the British until Tom Cullen notified his friend Michael Knightly, a reporter for the *Irish Independent*. Knightly waited a few weeks before reporting the information that he was given. Because of this public did not know all the details about Quinlisk's murder until late February.[40] *The Times* published an article that exposed Quinlisk as an informer on 24 February 1920. The newspaper did not condemn the murder, but instead seemed to quietly justify it because the IRA had discovered him as a spy.[41] This reflects the British public's growing restlessness with the conflict in Ireland and the tactics that the British government was employing to try to gain the upper hand. By assassinating Quinlisk, the IRA hoped to send a message to the British government that they could not use spies to successfully infiltrate the IRA. Any who did would be discovered and eliminated. Although the IRA failed to eliminate every spy in its midst, it succeeded in demoralizing the British intelligence departments by making it seem like the IRA knew more about the British spies than the spies knew about the IRA.

On 22 February 1920 the British government issued a curfew order in Dublin in an effort to curb the violence that had begun to grip the city during the nighttime hours. Under the new curfew laws, anyone who did not have a government-issued permit was subject to arrest if they were found outside of their homes between midnight and five in the morning. This angered and isolated the Dublin public, who felt that they were being unjustly punished for the actions of a few men. The curfew ultimately did very little to curb violence in Dublin. Members of the Squad were very familiar with the city and

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[39] John Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Féin Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1920-1912* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 76-77.
[40] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 834, Michael Knightly, 10.
[41] "A Cork 'Execution'," *The Times,* 24 February 1920.

able to navigate the streets undetected at night. They also had many safe houses to hide in throughout the city.[42] Because the British curfew laws affected everyone, the people of Dublin came to view the British as an oppressive occupying force. This meant that their support of the British government in Ireland dwindled even lower, and that they became increasingly tolerable of any IRA attacks against the British forces.[43] This was important for the IRA, because they had a base of support throughout the city when the British began to put more pressure on them later in 1920.

On 24 March the Squad assassinated Bryan Mulloy. He had met with Frank Thornton and Vinnie Byrne on 23 March 1920, and expressed his desire to aid the republican movement and to meet Liam Tobin. Byrne set an appointment to meet with Mulloy the following evening and introduce him to Tobin. However, later that evening IRA intelligence learned from one of their moles in Dublin Castle that Mulloy was working for British Army Intelligence and that he must be eliminated immediately to prevent him from identifying members of the Squad and the intelligence department. The next evening Byrne and members of the Squad trailed Mulloy at a distance after he grew tired of waiting and left the scheduled meeting point. When he got to the corner of Wicklow Street and South William Street, the Squad opened fire and killed him.[44] Mulloy's assassination was important because it was the first carried out in Dublin after the imposition of the curfew laws. The IRA proved to the British that nothing was going to stop them from being able to carry out operations in the city. This is another instance where a British policy designed to combat IRA violence was failing. With

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[42] W.H. Kautt, ed. *Ground Truths: British Army Operations in the Irish War of Independence* (Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2014), 39.
[43] Wilmot Erwin, *Betrayal in Ireland: An Eye-Witness Record of the Tragic and Terrible Years of Revolution and Civil War in Ireland, 1916-1924* (Belfast: Northern Whig, 1996), 49-50.
[44] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 423, Vincent Byrne, 37-38.

each new policy that failed in Ireland, the British publics support of the government and the conflict began to dwindle.

In early 1920 the British government assigned Alan Bell the position of president of the Irish Banks Court, a system designed to question the officials at Ireland's largest banks and force them to reveal their account holders. This was designed to uncover any bank accounts that were covertly holding money that was deposited from the Republican Loan program, a fundraising campaign held by republicans to raise money for the Dáil.[45] Bell began his work in Dublin by interrogating bank managers and anyone he could find that he thought might have any information in regards to the account holders who were hiding the loan money. In addition, British intelligence agents were placed under Bell, who was also providing intelligence to Basil Thomson, the director of Scotland Yard. While utilizing their cover as finance agents, they were able to gather useful intelligence information. Bell's investigation into the Republican Loan funds was grounds enough for Michael Collins to order his execution, and his dabbling in the intelligence business only provided Collins with a stronger argument to have him killed.[46] Joe Dolan stated that no one in the IRA knew what Alan Bell looked like until the *Irish Independent* published his photograph in the newspaper. After that, it was easy to watch locations that he supposedly visited, locate him, and begin tracking his movements. Dolan and his fellow members of IRA intelligence learned that Bell lived in Monkstown and rode the tram into Dublin every morning without a guard. They picked a day to assassinate Bell,

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[45] Charles Townshend, *The Republic: The Fight For Irish Independence* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 192.
[46] J.B.E. Hittle, *Michael Collins and The Anglo-Irish War: Britain's Counterinsurgency Failure* (Potomac Books: Dulles, 2011), 107.

and boarded his tram that morning. Mick McDonnell and Liam Tobin took Bell to the back of the tram and at the corner of Simmonscourt Road they stopped the tram and shot him in the street.[47]

The IRA had both political and military reasons for targeting Bell. They suspected that he was conducting intelligence work, which made him a military threat, and his investigation of the republican bank accounts had the potential to politically damage Sinn Fein. Collins targeted him because of his position within the British government in Ireland. The propaganda impact and message that his death would send to the British government also played a role in his selection for assassination. *The Times* published an article covering the assassination on 27 March 1920. The article was a very negative take on the situation in Ireland, remarking that the Irish public had become accustomed to murder and was more excited by news of the Grand National horse race than the murder of Bell. The article also stated that little prospect existed for a solution to the conflict, as the British government did not seem to be motivated to reach a settlement.[48] The newspaper reflected the British public's growing disapproval of the conflict in Ireland. The longer that the people saw the outrages being carried out in Ireland, with no government response, the more their support wavered. The fact that the murder was carried out in a busy street during the day and no one moved to stop it or identify the killers shows that the Irish public opinion was either too fearful to voice their displeasure with the IRA's assassination campaign, or that they were quietly supportive of it. Bell's assassination on 26 March 1920 was successful in undermining and terrorizing the British government in Ireland.

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[47] Bureau of Military History Witness Statement 663, Joseph Dolan, 5-6.
[48] "The Terror in Ireland," *The Times*, 27 March 1920.

By the summer of 1920 the British Cabinet had decided that the current laws were not adequate to deal with the situation in Ireland. The solution came in the passing of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920. Under this act, the British considered any crime committed in Ireland to be a violation of the Defense of the Realm regulations, and ultimately punishable by court martial. The British forces in Ireland could also arrest any person they suspected of committing these crimes, even if there was no evidence to prove the suspect's guilt.[49] The British military had argued that if they were given a freer hand to operate in Ireland, they would be able eliminate the IRA. However, the passage of this law did not result in British military victories over the IRA. Instead, it marked the start of a period of escalating violence that culminated with the truce agreement in July 1921. The IRA, in response to growing pressure, began to target the influx of British intelligence agents, and military officers, as well as any informers that provided them with information.[50]

In July 1920, Michael Collins issued an order that non-combatants who supported the British government's policies in Ireland were legitimate targets for the gunmen of the IRA. This order was partially a response to the passing of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 1920 and partially due to hard stance the British had taken against the Irish transport workers, who had boycotted the handling of British war material since May 1920. These men also refused to work on trains that carried British soldiers or weapons. This resulted in numerous trains becoming immobile throughout Ireland, and caused a logistical nightmare for the British military. The British saw this

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[49] Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920 (The National Archive, Kew: The Cabinet Papers, CAB/24/110).
[50] Ian Kenneally, *The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921* (Cork: The Collins Press, 2008), 89.

as a declaration by these workers that they were throwing their support behind Sinn Fein and the IRA. In turn, the British responded by firing all workers who were involved in the boycott, which meant that by August 1920 over one thousand men had lost their jobs.[51]

The first non-combatant target that the IRA assassinated in Ireland was Frank Brooke, chairman of the Dublin and South Eastern Railway. Brooke had supported the firing of any Irish worker who supported the boycott, and he had previously supported the suppression of the Dáil. Thus, he had been a thorn in the side of the republican movement for some time. Brooke carried a revolver at all times, so he clearly knew that he was a target of the IRA. Members of the Squad entered his office at Westland Row station and opened fire on Brooke. As they left the building, they began to doubt whether they had killed him so Jim Slattery returned to Brooke's office and fired a few more rounds into his body before finally fleeing.[52] The IRA's assassination of Brooke was shocking and received much media attention. Brooke was the first member of the unionist community in Dublin to be assassinated for purely political reasons. His murder was a clear sign to the British government that the IRA were not going to be intimidated by any measures introduced to curb their military campaign, and that they were willing to fight for the civilians that supported them. In turn the workers who carrying out the boycott continued to support the republicans because they saw that they IRA worked to protect them. Padraig Yeates, citing an article from the Irish Independent on 27 September 1920, has shown that the Irish people had become increasingly tolerant of violence, especially in the capital city of Dublin, as the British

[51] Charles Townshend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 144-146.
[52] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 445, James Slattery, 9.

government introduced oppressive measures like extended curfew hours that made their lives difficult.[53] To the British public the situation in Ireland seemed like it was completely out of control. They continued to push the government to come up with a solution to the Irish situation, especially as it became clear that the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920 was not effective in stopping the IRA.

On 13 August 1920 the British Cabinet recognized the need to protect civil servants who worked for the Irish Executive in Dublin, because these men had become targets in the days after the government had passed the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act. The Cabinet ordered these men to be moved into Dublin Castle, despite the fact that the move meant that they could no longer carry out their duties effectively.[54] This decision meant that the British government recognized that the situation in Ireland had actually grown worse in the weeks after the passing of the new legislation. This was also a negative sign to the British public, that the government had lost control of Ireland. However, the government was still confident that the British forces would be able to eliminate the IRA threat in Ireland. At a cabinet meeting on 1 October 1920, the chief secretary reported, "he was confident that the Irish Government could restore order and bring about peaceful conditions, provided they continued to have the support of the government."[55] The British public was already critical of the government's handling of the conflict in Ireland, and this statement offered them little reassurance that the situation would improve.

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[53] Padraig Yeates, *A City in Turmoil: Dublin, 1919-1921* (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 2012)
[54] Conclusions of the Cabinet meeting 13 August 1920 (The National Archive, Kew: The Cabinet Papers, CAB/23/22).
[55] Notes of a conference held at 10 Downing Street 1 October 1920 (The National Archive, Kew: The Cabinet Papers, CAB/23/22).

The assassination of D.I. Swanzy in Lisburn on 22 August 1920 proved to be one of the most controversial assassinations of the revolution. Swanzy was targeted as revenge for leading the murder party that killed Tomás MacCurtain, the Lord Mayor of Cork and Commandant of the Cork IRA, in March 1920. IRA intelligence spent months trying to track down Swanzy before they finally located him in Lisburn. Michael Collins dispatched Seán Culhane from Cork to carry out the assassination, and he gunned down Swanzy as he left church. Culhane famously used a revolver that had belonged to MacCurtain to carry out the assassination. While the IRA hailed Culhane a hero when he arrived in Dublin after avenging MacCurtain's death, the Catholic community suffered because of the murder he carried out. Protestants rioted in Lisburn, where they destroyed 300 Catholic homes and drove much of the Catholic population from the city.[56] Swanzy's assassination is one example of how collateral damage resulting from reprisals after the murder were more damaging than the murder itself. Some form of collateral damage usually occurred after each assassination carried out during the Irish revolution. While British reprisals usually resulted in physical damage or injury for republicans, they always ended in a propaganda loss for the British. This is largely because the British public had little expectation that the IRA would fight cleanly, but they expected their own army to maintain their honor. They saw these violent reprisals as an embarrassment to Britain.[57] Often the resulting damage was small but in the case of the reprisal that followed Swanzy's murder, it proved to be significant because a large base of IRA support in the north was damaged. The IRA

[56] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 746, Sean Culhane, 7-14.
[57] D. G. Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy, 1918-1922* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972), 94-95.

continued to weaken in the northern counties as the conflict dragged on due to the loss of many of its Catholic supporters who were driven out during riots like this one.

The British public was highly critical of the British government in the wake of Swanzy's murder. *The Times* published an article on 28 August 1920 titled "The Irish Crisis" that criticized the government for not removing Swanzy from office and relocating him to England after he orchestrated the murder of MacCurtain. The article argued that by forcing Swanzy to move to England, the government could have protected him from being murdered. The article was also highly critical of the fact that the government did nothing to curb the destruction of Catholic homes in Lisburn after Swanzy's murder, yet the republicans did not damage any Protestant or Unionist homes in Cork after MacCurtain's murder.[58] This caused the British public to feel ashamed over the government's inaction in Ireland, because it was proof that the republicans had more control over the IRA than the government had over the loyalist population and the military in Ireland. The Irish public saw the inaction of the British government to control the rioting and protect the Catholic population in Lisburn as one more reason not to support them.[59]

The Cork City brigade of the IRA had established a fully functioning intelligence service by November 1920. Between 29 October and the end of November 1920 the Cork City IRA killed eight suspected members of British army intelligence. On 29 October 1920, Cork IRA men assassinated two men named Brown and Rutherford while they travelled the area on motorcycle. The British Army admitted after the conflict that both men had served as intelligence officers in Ireland. On 16

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[58] "The Irish Crisis," *The Times, 28 August 1920.*
[59] Alan F. Parkinson, *Belfast's Unholy War: The Troubles of the 1920s* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), 71-72.

November, the Cork City IRA struck again, when they forcefully removed Captain N.W. Green, Captain S. Chambers, and Lieutenant W.S. Watts from a train at Waterfall station and shot them in a field. Mick Murphy later claimed that the IRA had proof that all three men were active intelligence officers. On the same day, Cork City IRA also abducted and assassinated Auxiliary Cadets Agnew and Mitchell. Both men were assigned to intelligence duties. Finally, on 23 November 1920, the Cork men captured Captain Thompson, a British Army intelligence officer in the Manchester Regiment, and shot him in a field.[60] In a little under a month the Cork IRA had managed to eliminate eight active British military intelligence officers working in their district. This was a serious blow not only to British intelligence operations in the area, but also to the morale of other military intelligence men stationed there. Many of these men were fearful to travel outside of their barracks unless they were in large groups, which meant that they stood out and could not effectively carry out their duties. The Cork IRA seemed invincible to these men, and they began to regard every civilian as a potential enemy, which caused them to become demoralized. By eliminating these military targets, the Cork IRA was able to move about the region more freely, and thus began to hold and control portions of Cork that the military had abandoned out of fear.

The Cork City IRA also targeted civilian informers during November and December 1920. On 24 November 1920, Cork IRA men captured ex-soldier Tom Downing and executed him for spying. A few days later on 28 November the Cork City IRA intelligence officers abducted James Blemens and his son Frederick who were suspected of providing information to the British military in Cork. Both men were held

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[60] John Borgonovo, *Spies Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Fein Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1920-1921*. (Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2007), 20-21.

prisoner and interrogated for several days before they were finally executed and buried outside the city. The Cork City IRA carried out one last operation against civilian informers on 8 December 1920 when they removed George Horgan from his home and executed him in a secret location. The Cork IRA thus eliminated four civilian informers in just two weeks. The Black and Tans stationed in Cork threatened to carry out violent reprisals if Downing and Horgan were found dead. Downing and Horgan were the first people reported missing in Ireland by December 1920 that warranted a reprisal as revenge for their deaths. Therefore, it seems likely that Downing and Horgan were connected to the police in Cork, most likely as civilian informers. The Cork IRA's elimination of these men served three purposes. First, it removed a threat to their existence, as these men would no longer be able to provide information to the British. Second, it served as a warning that the IRA that anyone found betraying the IRA to the British would be eliminated.[61] Finally, it allowed the Cork IRA to eliminate a group of people that they considered undesirable. Civilian informers either were loyalists or were willing to betray the IRA for money because of their extreme poverty. The Cork IRA did not want these people living in the republic, therefore they not only eliminated a threat to the republican movement, but also worked to cleanse the area of these undesirable people at the same time.

The IRA carried out the largest group of assassinations on 21 November 1920, a date that came to be known as Bloody Sunday in Ireland. The IRA aimed to eliminate multiple enemy intelligence agents who were living in civilian homes throughout the city. They believed that these men posed one of the biggest threats to the movement

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[61] John Borgonovo, *Spies Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Fein Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1920-1921*. (Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2007), 28-31.

because they were able to blend in and live among the Dublin civilian population, where they could potentially infiltrate the volunteer movement. In addition to this a few of the men, like Captain Geoffrey Baggallay and Lieutenant Henry Angliss, were targeted because they were known to have carried out raids against the IRA in which republican supporters had been killed.[62] These assassinations can also be interpreted as a direct response to the mounting British pressure that grew out of the Restoration of Order Ireland Act, as well as a response to Lloyd Georges claim that the British were crushing the republican movement in Ireland. The murders were also a form of revenge for the death of Terence MacSwiney, MacCurtain's successor as the Lord Mayor of Cork and a close friend of Michael Collins, who perished after carrying out a lengthy hunger strike in an English prison.

Historians have disagreed about whether the men whom the IRA killed on Bloody Sunday were actually British intelligence agents. No one will likely ever be able to provide concrete evidence to prove whether or not each of the men murdered that morning were working as intelligence agents in Ireland, unless the British government releases documents confirming which officers were involved in intelligence work. There are still many documents relating to British intelligence in Ireland that the British government will not declassify until they are older than 100 years. Historians can only hope that these documents will shed more light on whether the men assassinated on Bloody Sunday were actually intelligence officers. However, the evidence currently available seems to show that some of them were just British military officers caught up in the shootings. Collins admitted to Richard Mulcahy in 1922 that the IRA had mistakenly murdered Captain McCormack, in the Gresham Hotel, because

[62] Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2002), 88-90.

they had no evidence that he was involved in intelligence work.[63] While the purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the justification for the assassinations that took place on Bloody Sunday, it is important to note how the deaths of these men affected the British intelligence system in Ireland, future government policies, and public opinion about the conflict.

The British military wrote the British *Record of the Rebellion in Ireland, 1920-1921* in early 1922 and in it they explain many aspects of the British war effort in Ireland. Within this report there is a detailed section discussing the activity of the British intelligence service in Ireland during this period. The intelligence section of this report briefly discusses the Bloody Sunday assassinations. According to the authors, "The murders of the 21st November, 1920, temporarily paralyzed the special branch. Several of its most efficient members were murdered and the majority of the others resident in the city were brought into the Castle and Central Hotel for safety."[64] According to this explanation, the assassinations affected the British intelligence service in Ireland, only temporarily though, as opposed to the common myth that they destroyed it on Bloody Sunday. However, the killings did have a negative affect on the British intelligence service in Ireland, because the IRA killed some of their most affective officers. Finding men to replace trained intelligence officers was not easy, and these men took valuable information regarding the republican movement with them to their graves. Even the men who survived the attacks that morning were rendered virtually useless. IRA men who watched Dublin Castle were able to easily identify

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[63] Anne Dolan, "Killing and Bloody Sunday, November 1920," *The Historical Journal* 49 (September, 2006), 809-810.
[64] Peter Hart, ed. *British Intelligence in Ireland, 1920-1921, The Final Reports* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002), 36.

British intelligence agents once they lost their undercover identities and residences. Due to this, the intelligence officers were typically unable to produce the same results that they had before Bloody Sunday. For the remainder of the conflict, the British obtained most of their intelligence information from captured documents and interrogation of prisoners, instead of from intelligence officers.[65] The British public was highly critical of the government in the aftermath of the Bloody Sunday attacks, and the funeral procession of the murdered officers fuel the public outcry that the government must reach a settlement to end the conflict in Ireland. Lloyd George even sent a letter to Arthur Griffith, acting president of the Dáil, urging him to maintain communication in hopes that the British government and Sinn Fein could work out an agreement to end the violence in Ireland.[66] By writing one of the leaders of Sinn Fein and urging him to continue communicating in the hopes of reaching a peace agreement, Lloyd George was in a sense admitting that the British government's efforts to contain the IRA were failing. At the same time he was feeling pressure from the public to end the conflict in Ireland and had to do whatever he could to save face politically if he hoped to remain in office.

The Irish Times wrote a scathing article in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday that summed up Irish opinion on the matters. The article stated that "Today the House of Commons is wholly out of sympathy with Ireland and arguments based on political conciliation and settlement make no appeal to it. Its sympathies are entirely with the widows and orphans of its loyal servants."[67] Many Irish citizens jeered at the funeral

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[65] Peter Hart, ed. *British Intelligence in Ireland, 1920-1921, The Final Reports* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002), 36-37.
[66] Charles Townshend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 208.
[67] "Law and Murder," *Irish Times*, 25 November 1920.

procession that carried the bodies of the murdered British officers through Dublin to the ship that would take them back to England, and refused to remove their hats as it passed by.[68] This was the only reported public procession of deceased British officers carried out in Dublin, and the nationalist Irish public certainly used the event to voice their opinion on British rule. This was a public protest against British occupation of Ireland, and these people showed that they had no respect for the British dead. They were supportive of the IRA's campaign of assassination. In a sense *The Irish Times* article from 25 November had confirmed the views of the Irish public that the British only cared about the lives of their government, police, and military officials that were lost in Ireland. They did not care for the Irish people, or the Irish lives lost during the conflict. Irish opinion was supportive of the IRA and Sinn Fein in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, despite British condemnation of the two groups as a band of murders.

The British government attempted to put more pressure on the IRA after Bloody Sunday. On 6 December 1920, the British cabinet agreed to an increased security presence in London. The British government assigned security details to protect the House of Commons and all other main offices. They also assigned bodyguards to protect ministers and any government officials whose lives were "threatened by the present menacing attitude of the Sinn Feiners."[69] This shows that as early as November 1920, the British were fearful of attacks being carried out in London. After the assassinations of Bloody Sunday, the British government had to take the presence of an IRA brigade in London seriously, because they could attempt to assassinate government officials in a similar fashion. The added security was aimed at eliminating any IRA

[68] James Gleeson, *Bloody Sunday* (Guilford, The Lyons Press, 1962), 184.
[69] Cabinet Conclusions, 6 December 1920 (The National Archive, Kew: The Cabinet Papers, CAB/23/23).

assassins before they could carry out their attack. The Palace of Westminster only had two police guards in 1919, but by the time the Anglo-Irish Treaty was passed in December 1921, as many as 141 policemen patrolled the grounds there.[70] The British government was clearly growing fearful of the IRA's power and seeming ability to strike wherever they wanted.

The British declared martial law in Cork on 10 December 1920, essentially saying that a state of war existed in Cork. Under martial law, all civilians were required to hand in their arms. Civilian possession of a firearm, ammunition, or a British uniform, was declared a crime punishable by death. In addition to this, the declaration also allowed British forces to carry out official reprisals, and to carry hostages in their vehicles as a means of protection. After the declaration of martial law, the Cork IRA did not attempt another assassination until February 1921. This was likely because their intelligence officers were lying low and learning how the British planned to operate under the new martial law policy. This allowed them to be more effective when they did return to action.[71] By lying low, the Cork IRA caused the British government to falsely assume that the military forces stationed there were beginning to successfully combat the IRA.

In Dublin, the British carried out more curfew patrols, set up more roadblocks and searched more houses, in hopes of rooting out those responsible for the murders of Bloody Sunday. However, the IRA continued to strike at those who aided the British in Dublin. They assassinated Detective Inspector Phillip O'Sullivan a few days before Christmas because IRA intelligence believed he was getting dangerously close to

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[70] Gerard Noonan, *The IRA in Britain, 1919-1923: 'In The Heart of Enemy Lines'* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 283.
[71] Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 2002), 92-93.

locating Michael Collins' office in Henry Street. Two IRA men shot him in the street as he was walking with his girlfriend.[72] In January 1921, IRA intelligence discovered that William Doran, the porter at the Wicklow Hotel, one of Collins's favorite places to dine, was a British informer. Joseph Dolan shot Doran outside the hotel on the morning of 28 January 1921, and returned to the hotel for lunch later that day.[73] Both of these attacks proved that the IRA was still capable of striking against any target without repercussion. They also were designed to show the British government that the pressure they were trying to put on the IRA in Dublin was not going to be enough to destroy them. The British governments support for the stricter use of force in Ireland that had accompanied the passing of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920, began to fade rapidly from January 1921 to the signing of the Truce in July 1921 as the British Army continually failed to crush the rebellion in Ireland. The British public was war weary after dealing with four years of conflict during the Great War, and they had little reprieve before the violence in Ireland flared up. They were desperate to end the conflict and put increasing pressure on the government to do so in the months leading up to the Truce.

In February 1921 the Cork City IRA intelligence officers returned from their hiatus and began carrying out operations against civilian informers in Cork. The IRA suspected that a civilian spy ring had been formed in Cork City, and the month of February proved to be the most violent month of the conflict for civilians in Cork. On 9 February 1921, Cork City IRA intelligence officers assassinated Alfred Reilly, a well-known Cork businessman. He was found with a card pinned to his coat that alluded to

[72] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 547, Joseph Leonard, 13.
[73] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 663, Joseph Dolan, 4.

the fact that he was assassinated for giving information to the British forces in Cork. Within the next week, the IRA assassinated three more civilians that they suspected were informers. The IRA assassinated John O'Leary on 12 February, William Sullivan on 14 February, and Charles Beale on 15 February. Each of the men were found with a card pinned to their bodies that read "Spies and Informers beware." This was meant as a warning to any other civilians that providing information to the British would result in death. The IRA killed three more civilians before the end of the month, so these men did not heed the warnings or they were marked as targets before the February killings began. On 18 February, the IRA dragged Michael Walsh from his bed in a workhouse and assassinated him in the street. Two days later they shot ex-soldier William Mohally, however Mohally lived and was taken to the South Infirmary Hospital. A few hours' later Cork intelligence officers entered the hospital and ordered the staff to carry Mohally outside on a stretcher, where they assassinated him. Finally, the body of ex-soldier and tailor Michael Finbarr O'Sullivan, who the IRA executed for providing information to the British, was fished out of the River Lee on 21 February.[74] One explanation for the rise in IRA assassination of ex-soldiers and civilians in Cork is that the British had put more pressure on civilians in Cork to provide information after the declaration of martial law in the county. The British had managed to gain some ground in the fight against the IRA in Cork during the first two months of martial law. The IRA assumed that the only reason that the British were becoming more successful in the conflict was because civilians were providing them information. By carrying out more assassinations of civilian informers, the IRA not only achieved a military victory by

[74] John Borgonovo, *Spies Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Fein Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1920-1921*. (Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2007), 42-45.

eliminating valuable sources of information that the British needed to combat the republican movement in Cork, but they also continued to rid the area of people that they deemed undesirable for remaining in Ireland after the formation of the republic

The Squad carried out a number of operations from February 1921 to June 1921, all aimed at further destroying British power in Dublin. The Dublin Brigade of the IRA considered the first of those assassinations very important. On 5 February 1921, members of the Squad assassinated John Ryan. Ryan, a British military policeman, had been a target of the IRA since Bloody Sunday, because he had arrested and murdered Dick McGee and Peadar Clancy, both prominent officers in the Dublin brigade of the IRA. Bill Stapleton shot Ryan at the bar as he read a newspaper.[75] This was one example of an assassination being carried out for revenge. While Ryan was a policeman who was actively working against the republican movement, the only reason mentioned for killing him was that he had been the officer who arrested McGee and Clancy. Therefore, the IRA clearly targeted him as revenge for the murder of their comrades. Revenge assassinations were designed to show the British that no one was free from justice if they persecuted the IRA. The goal was that these assassinations would deter other members of the British military and police from targeting IRA members. They were also designed to show the British public that the British forces in Dublin could no longer control the city.

On 23 February 1921 Bernard Byrne and two other men assassinated three RIC officers that the force had brought in to Dublin to identify IRA men from other cities who were in the city. These men were the only officers in Dublin who knew the visiting IRA men by sight, so their assassination meant that these IRA men were free to move

[75] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 822, Bernard Byrne, 38-39.

about the city.[76] It also helped to further the idea that IRA intelligence was more powerful in Ireland than British intelligence, because the IRA was able to identify and eliminate the three RIC officers before they were able to successfully identify any of the visiting IRA men in Dublin. This assassination was successful from a military standpoint because the IRA was able to eliminate a threat to the republican movement, however it was also important because it forced the British government to begin to accept the fact that they were failing to successfully combat the IRA.

Just over a month later, Bernard Byrne and other members of the Squad assassinated Captain Cecil Lees outside his hotel because he IRA intelligence suspected him to be a leading British intelligence agent recently brought into Dublin.[77] The assassination of Lees was designed to prove to the British government that despite their best efforts at utilizing intelligence officers to combat the IRA in Dublin, the IRA still maintained the upper hand in the intelligence war that continued to rage on in the capital. It was important that the IRA continued to dominate the intelligence war, because it made them seem more powerful than they actually were. The more powerful they seemed, the better chance they had at forcing the British to negotiate with them.

On 3 April 1921, the groundskeeper of Ashford Golf Course in Middlesex, England found the body of Vincent Fouvargue on the golf course. Fouvargue was a former IRA member who had turned into an informer for the British after he was captured in early 1921. The British set up a phony escape in the hope that he could travel to England and infiltrate the IRA brigades there. However, IRA intelligence in Ireland saw through this ruse and notified the London Brigade of the IRA, who began

[76] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 631, Bernard Byrne, 22-23.
[77] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 631, Bernard Byrne, 29-30.

hunting for Fouvargue. They had orders to assassinate him once he was located, and Reginald Dunne carried out the assassination.[78] *The Times* described the murder as an act of "Sinn Fein vengeance."[79] This was the only known IRA assassination carried out in England during the period 1919-1921. Fouvargue's assassination was important because it brought the violence that was so common in Ireland at this point, home to Britain. The British public were alarmed by that the IRA was able to carry out an assassination on British soil. Guards were placed to protect the inquest into Fouvargue's murder because the public feared that the IRA would try to intervene.[80] The more fearful that the British public became, the more pressure that they put on the British government to reach a settlement with the republicans. The British public did not want to see the IRA bring their assassination campaign to the British mainland and therefore were eager to see the end of the conflict in Ireland. Fouvargue's assassination also furthered the myth that the IRA could strike whenever and wherever they wanted, even in on the British mainland.

Although members of the Squad played a role in the moderately successful attack on the Customs House on 25 May 1921, they did not carry out another planned assassination in Dublin until 26 June 1921 when District Inspector William Hunt was assassinated. Hunt was having tea in the Mayfair hotel with his wife, daughter and another officer, when the maid allowed Michael Stack and a group of IRA men into the hotel. Stack promptly ordered one of the men to dismantle the telephone so that no one could call for help. Stack and the men then opened fire on Hunt and his fellow officer, shooting Hunt again after he fell to make sure he was dead. They then searched their

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[78] David Neligan, *The Spy in the Castle* (London: Prendeville Publishing, 1999), 129-130.
[79] "Golf Links Murder Mystery," *The Times*, 5 April 1921.
[80] "Golf Links Murder: Police Precautions at the Inquest." *The Times*, 7 April 1921.

bodies for documents and Stack pulled the side board off of the wall to retrieve the two rounds of ammunition that had passed through Hunt and lodged in the wall. All of this was done in front of Hunt's family while he lay dead.[81] This is important because it showed that the IRA felt that they were strong enough to linger at the scene of an assassination instead of immediately fleeing. They were not afraid of being arrested or identified by anyone in the restaurant, which means that they were confident that the IRA had gained the upper had over the British in Dublin. This attitude is important to note because it shows that IRA morale was relatively strong this late in the conflict, while British morale continued to decline. While all assassinations are aimed at terrorizing the population, the IRA's assassination of Hunt proved just how much the conflict in Ireland was turning into a war of terrorism. The assassination was carried out during the day, however Stack and his fellow IRA men spent time at the scene of the crime, thoroughly going through their victim's pockets and retrieving ammunition, before escaping into the streets and blending in with the Dublin crowds.[82] This showed that by the summer of 1921 the British had lost control of Dublin. Despite the setbacks that the IRA was facing by this time, such as a shortage of ammunition and weaponry, and heavy losses resulting from the imprisonment of so many men after the burning of the Customs House, they were still able to successfully carry out attacks in the city. While the attack on the Customs House grabbed more headlines than the assassination of two officers at brunch, these types of murders showed that the IRA was far from willing to end their campaign of violence, and that the British would face a long and violent summer if they did not act to bring an end to the conflict in Ireland.

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[81] Bureau of Military History, Witness Statement 525, Michael Stack, 13.
[82] Anne Dolan, "The Shadow of a Great Fear: Terror and Revolutionary Ireland" in David Fitzpatrick, ed. *Terror in Ireland, 1916-1923* (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012), 36.

The IRA's assassination campaign could in a sense be viewed as a violent form of intimidation. The IRA's goal for each assassination was to eliminate a threat to the movement; however, they intended each assassination to send a message to everyone that working against the IRA resulted in death. This is evident in the cards left by the bodies of many of the men assassinated, which warned other spies and informers that the IRA would hunt them down if they continued their work. The assassination campaign also aimed to force the British government to deem Ireland ungovernable and agree to a settlement. This goal the IRA achieved, with some help from the British public, who had long pressed the government to come up with a solution that would end the Irish conflict. As a whole, the IRA's assassination campaign was successful in maintaining the security of the movement and forcing the British to negotiate with them. In the process, though, it immersed many young Irish men in a world of violence and terror from which they never recovered. When the Dáil passed the Anglo-Irish Treaty in January 1921 amid much criticism, the Civil War began and men who had become trained killers during the Irish War of Independence suddenly began hunting each other, leading to one of the most violent civil wars in history.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

On 11 July 1921 the Anglo-Irish Truce went into affect, signifying a cessation of hostilities between the IRA and British forces in Ireland. While this seemingly ended the conflict in Ireland, violence continued to grip the country for generations to come. A degree of animosity continued between the British and Irish people, and it persists in some circles. Some of this animosity is a result of the violence that occurred among people from both nations throughout their intertwined history, but a large part of that animosity is because of the violence of the Irish revolution.

As this thesis has shown, the IRA had successfully worn down the British government by July 1921 with their campaign of intimidation and assassination. They had also turned British public opinion against the conflict in Ireland. Intimidation was a common experience during the war. A person was more likely to be the victim of IRA intimidation than they were to be shot at or caught up in a large-scale battle. This thesis attempted to show that intimidation in its various forms was typically enough to persuade members of the police and military to neglect their duties. Intimidation was generally also enough to deter the Irish public from supporting the British forces in Ireland. Intimidation also succeeded in terrorizing the British public, who in turn began to put pressure on their government to end the conflict in Ireland. At the same time, assassinations were headline-grabbing actions that terrorized not only the public, but also the police, military and government officials in Ireland and England throughout the

conflict. Assassination succeeded where intimidation could not. It eliminated members of the British police, military, and government who refused to be intimidated, and in turn acted as a form of intimidation to deter others from working against the republicans in Ireland. David Lloyd George admitted to Michael Collins during the peace treaty negotiations that the destructive campaign of the IRA, particularly the brigades working in Britain, put pressure on the British government.[1]

Within the large scope of Irish history, it is important to understand the effects of the IRA's campaign of intimidation and assassination. The Irish revolution trained republican men in the art of violence and murder, skills that these men continued to utilize and pass down long after the revolution had ended, in hopes that a free and united Irish republic could still be achieved. Many positive achievements came about as a result of the Irish revolution, but Ireland was also gripped by years of violence, which had a negative impact on the country. A bloody Civil War followed the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty, in which members of the Anti-Treaty IRA continued to use intimidation and assassination to further their goals. While the IRA ultimately failed to overthrow the Irish Free State government, it continued to exist as an organization in different forms up to the present day. The various incarnations of the IRA have continued to employ intimidation and assassination to promote their goals as well. The IRA employed a terror campaign in England in 1939, in hopes that it could terrorize the British government into abandoning Northern Ireland.[2] The Provisional IRA, which waged war against the British government in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 2005, also used a war of attrition in the form of bombings to press the British government to

[1] London I.R.A Overseas (Bureau of Military History, Military Service Pensions, IRA Nominal Rolls, RO/605)
[2] Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 61.

negotiate with them. The Provisional IRA believed that the bombings would intimidate the British government into relinquishing control of Northern Ireland.[3]

Understanding the IRA's campaign of intimidation and assassination and how it affected the war effort in Ireland is important not only for the study of the Irish revolution, but for its influence on subsequent guerilla warfare and terrorism. Che Guevara, the iconic revolutionary of the twentieth century, studied the Irish conflict, and even wrote to IRA commandant Tom Barry asking for advice and assistance in training his young revolutionaries.[4] The IRA was the first revolutionary military force that the British military was unable to crush, and other revolutionary groups throughout the world copied the Irish model in hopes of overthrowing the governments in their countries. Even today the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, while more religiously grounded, share some common traits with the IRA's campaign of intimidation and assassination, in that they aim to terrorize the western governments into abandoning the middle east, so that the radical revolutionary groups can establish their own governments that are free from western influence. By understanding the IRA's campaign, those looking to combat terrorism in the modern world can learn valuable lessons in keeping the public support on the side of the government. At the same time, the IRA's tactics will continue to serve as a model for those looking to wage revolutionary warfare throughout the world.

It is clear that the IRA's campaign of intimidation and assassination was important in forcing the British government to reach a settlement with the provisional republican government in Ireland during the Irish revolution. However, this argument

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[3] Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 342-343.
[4] Meda Ryan, *Tom Barry: IRA Freedom* Fighter (Cork: Mercier Press, 2005), 354.

also opens up the door for future historians to examine this topic further. Historians still have much to examine in regards to how intimidation at the local level affected local communities. The level of intimidation varied throughout the country, as did the level of IRA support. The success of intimidation and assassination may have varied from region to region. Intimidation and assassination may also have affected one community in a different way than it affected others. These are all topics that future historians need to research further. There also needs to be more examination on how the smaller sectarian war of intimidation in Belfast affected the IRA's overall campaign.

Historians have yet to examine the use of intimidation and assassination by British military and police forces during the Irish Revolution. While this topic lies outside of the scope of my thesis, it would be beneficial for future historians to determine its role in British efforts to sway Irish opinion. In addition, did their use of intimidation and assassination further radicalize and alienate the Irish population? Historians have placed a lot of emphasis on British reprisals and the British and Irish public's negative reaction to them. However, the British engaged in relatively few large-scale reprisals. How did the British assert their authority and power over the Irish public in between carrying out these reprisals? Certainly some degree of intimidation was employed and it would be interesting to explore whether the daily intimidation was more successful at radicalizing the Irish public than the larger reprisals. Seeing British soldiers or police officers beat and torture a family member or close friend either radicalized a person or terrorized them into submission. Further examination of this topic could shed light on which path was more common for the public in Ireland. Future historians may ultimately determine that the British were equally capable of

damaging the republican movement in various parts of Ireland by using intimidation and assassination.

Military historians often examine the effects of war and combat on soldiers. It would be worthwhile for future historians to attempt a similar examination of the effects of the Irish conflict, and particularly the effects of IRA intimidation and assassination, on the British military in Ireland. It would also be worthwhile for historians to examine the long-term distress that IRA men suffered from after carrying out acts of intimidation or assassination throughout the conflict. Men on both sides likely spent the rest of their lives suffering from deep psychological wounds that resulted from the violence they witnessed during the revolution. Understanding this could help further historians' understanding of violence in Ireland in the aftermath of the revolution, as well as a deeper understanding of the effects of guerrilla war on men.

In the aftermath of the Irish War of Independence, Michael Collins made two statements regarding the IRA's campaign of intimidation and assassination carried out against the British during the conflict. First, he stated that by the time of the truce in July 1921, the IRA "had unquestionably seriously interfered with their government, and had prevented them from conquering us."[5] He also stated that to successfully "paralyze the British machine," it was "necessary to strike at individuals."[6] In other words, Collins was saying that the IRA had carried out a campaign of intimidation and assassination during the War of Independence, which had forced the British government to seek a settlement to end the conflict. Although Collins was likely to boast at every

[5] *The Path to Freedom: Articles and Speeches by Michael Collins* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2011), 87.
[6] *The Path to Freedom: Articles and Speeches by Michael Collins* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2011), 69.

opportunity about the success of the IRA tactics that he had promoted throughout the conflict, this thesis has shown that he actually did have something to brag about.

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