Veterans comprise approximately 5% of the civilian labor force in the United States, representing roughly 8.9 million individuals out of a total labor force of approximately 158 million, according to the 2023 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This dissertation presents a conceptual replication and extension of prior research examining the appointment of directors with military officer experience following corporate crises, specifically securities class action lawsuits. By conceptually replicating prior findings in a new crisis context, this study contributes to corporate governance research, veteran representation scholarship, and the growing literature on replication in management science. This study extends that framework by examining whether publicly traded U.S. firms increased the appointment of commissioned military officers to boards of directors in response to an exogenous environmental crisis — the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on the original study and utilizing crisis management theory, this research investigates whether military officer status is positively associated with board appointment during periods of crisis and explores other related variables to examine any impact on firm financial performance. I conclude with recommendations for advancing theory and practice.
