The first paper ("Does Executive Compensation Duration Generate Different Risk Incentives? Evidence on Corporate Hedging") investigates whether and how corporate hedging policy is affected by compensation duration. I find a positive and significant relation between compensation duration and hedging policy. The findings highlight the importance of including all compensation components. In the second paper ("Putable Bonds, Risk Shifting Problems, and Information Asymmetry"), I focus on the regular putable bonds and present an empirical examination of issuers’ motives to issue putable bonds. The findings suggest that risk-shifting incentives and information asymmetry are the main motives for the firms to issue putable bonds. I consider the simultaneity of the decisions on putable, covenants, and leverage, and further confirm the findings of the risk-shifting and information asymmetry hypothesis. The third paper ("Shareholder-Creditor Conflict and Hedging Policy: Evidence from Mergers between Lenders and Shareholders") examines the effect of the shareholder-creditor conflict on the hedging policy. Using the mergers between the shareholder and creditor as an exogenous shock, I find that firms that experience mergers between the shareholder and creditor are more likely to hedge and hedge more in terms of the notional value.