MODERATING EFFECT OF POLITICAL AFFILIATION, KINSHIP TIES, ENVIRONMENTAL MUNIFICENCE AND ENVIRONMENT UNCERTAINTY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION.

by

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ABSTRACT

TCHIJICA HENRIQUES. Moderating Effect of Political Affiliation, Kinship Ties, Environmental Munificence and Environment Uncertainty in The Relationship Between Institutional Trust and Entrepreneurial Orientation (Under the direction of DR. FRANZ KELLERMANNS).

Micro-entrepreneurship constitutes undeniably an important development strategy in developing countries. Earlier empirical studies have shown it generates 20 to 45% of full-time employment and 30% to 50% of rural household income in Africa. However, when assessing employment growth through the expansion of existing microenterprises, data suggests that most small enterprises in rural Africa do not grow. This research seeks to examine the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa. The study investigates how external factors such as political connections, environmental uncertainty, munificence and kinship ties affect the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation. The research builds on an alternative approach to institutional theory as it relates to the African context. The research questions are addressed through both an exhaustive review and synthesis of the literature and using primary data gathered from surveys from microenterprise owners organized in cooperatives in rural communities of Angola. The data analysis tests the hypothesized relationships through ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with tests for moderation.

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Kendra, my son Yohan, my parents Henri and Adolphine, my siblings Tim, Mimie, Makal, Jota, Katy, Sissy, Noella, Claudia, Monica and Titan for supporting my academic goals and aspirations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES....................viii

LIST OF FIGURES....................ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS....................x

CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH OVERVIEW....................1

Introduction....................1

Research Objective and Questions....................5

Contributions....................9

Organization of Dissertation....................11

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW....................13

The Role of Institutions....................13

Emerging countries....................14

Africa....................15

Colonial History....................15

Ethnic Group Identity....................18

Informality....................20

Family Business....................25

Institutional Theory: Formal Institutions, Institutional trust, and Entrepreneurial Activity....................27

Institutional trust and Government Assistance....................28

Solving Poverty through Entrepreneurship....................32

Quality of Institutions and the Productivity of Entrepreneurship....................33

Poverty Alleviation through Entrepreneurship....................34

Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO)....................37

Hypothesis Development....................41

Institutional Trust and Entrepreneurial Orientation in Developing Countries....................41

Environmental Munificence....................48

Environmental Uncertainty....................51

Social Capital and Innovation....................56

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY....................66

Overview....................66

Survey Instrument....67
Survey Approach....68
Sampling Frame....68
Data Analysis....69
Data Collection....69
Measures....70
Independent Variable: Institutional trust....71
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurial Orientation....71
Moderators: Environmental Uncertainty, Munificence, Kinship and Political Affiliation....73
Control Variables....76
Common Method Variance....77
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS....78
Preliminary Analysis....78
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis....81
Regression Results....83
Summary of Results....89
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION....90
Discussion....90
Review of Dissertation Findings....92
Contributions....96
Limitations....98
Future Research....99
Conclusion....101
REFERENCES....102
APPENDIX A....118
Survey....118
APPENDIX B....125
Recruitment Script....125

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Summary of Variables, Measures and Data Sources..70

Table 2: Scale Items for Institutional Trust..71

Table 3: Scale Items for Entrepreneurial Orientation..72

Table 4: Scale items for Environmental uncertainty..73

Table 5: Scale items for munificence...74

Table 6: Scale for kinship...75

Table 7: Scale Reliability Analysis..80

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations...82

Table 9: Results of Linear Regression Analysis: Four Models..84

Table 10: Hypothesized Relationships and Results...89

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Theoretical Model of Proposed Hypotheses..41

Figure 2: Institutional Trust and Environmental Munificence Interaction Effect.......................86

Figure 3: Institutional Trust and Environmental Uncertainty Interaction Effect........................87

Figure 4: Institutional Trust and Political Affiliation Interaction...88

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EO - Entrepreneurial Orientation

IT – Institutional Trust

EM – Environmental Munificence.

EU – Environmental Uncertainty

KT – Kinship Ties

PA – Political Affiliation

CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction

Micro-entrepreneurship constitutes undeniably an important economic and employment driver in many nations (Chandy & Narasimhan, 2011; McPherson, 1996; Nyadu-Addo & Mensah, 2018). This segment of employment generates higher outputs in developing countries, where economic activities are centered in small scale production featured by informal survival activities for urban and rural people, as well as middle-income people, mostly micro-entrepreneurs running fairly stable businesses (Mead & Liedholm, 1998; Ndhlovu & Cleeve, 2007). Several studies on developing economies and African growth have shown that micro-enterprises (MEs) account for more than twice the numbers reported on job creation by large companies and public entities (Nichter & Goldmark, 2009). Earlier empirical studies (Liedholm, McPherson, & Chuta, 2001) have shown that they generate 20 to 45% of full-time employment and 30% to 50% of rural household income in Africa (Liedholm, McPherson, & Chuta, 1994).

Rural entrepreneurship is considered as an important development strategy in developing countries (Boohene & Agyapong, 2017). However, when assessing employment growth through the expansion of existing microenterprises, it is critical to mention that most small enterprises in rural Africa do not grow (Liedholm & Mead, 2013; Mead, 1994) . Data pertaining to microenterprises launched with one to four workers, shows that only a quarter of all microenterprises grow to add one person to their work force (Mead, 1994). For Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the geographical focus of this dissertation, a host of factors can be brought up, starting with high rural to urban migration, often attributed to undeveloped infrastructure in rural areas, mediocre agricultural productivity and price paid by intermediaries, as well as low income level and poverty (Hove, Ngwerume, & Muchemwa, 2013). Conversely, rural Africa encompasses an overflow of natural resources and minerals such as oil, bauxite, gold, diamond and vast unexplored arable land (IFAD, 2013). Therefore, it is critical to further assess this anomaly to ensure that rural entrepreneurship flourishes to better impact the welfare of individuals in those communities.

Extant literature has highlighted the existing relationship between countries' institutions and entrepreneurship (Minniti & Lévesque, 2008). Previously, it has been argued that government institutions have a pivotal role in facilitating entrepreneurship as well as being central in determining its survival. According to (Casson, 1982) and (North, 1990a), such role subsumes entrepreneurial reinvestment. For instance, state institutions dealing with property rights are crucial because they provide the necessary assurance that one can invest and be certain of keeping the expect returns (North, 1990). Formal institutions are, therefore, central to evaluating entrepreneurial investment practices from a wider viewpoint of government institutions. (Baumol, 1996).

While it is mainstream knowledge that weak institutional trust will harm and demotivate entrepreneurship (Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 2000), several studies have shown that even with weak institutional trust, entrepreneurship can thrive (Stenholm, Acs, & Wuebker, 2013). Recent studies have noted that even with deficiency among formal institutions, economies had been found to have a high level of entrepreneurship through investments and activities (Zhou, 2013). For instance, countries like Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa or China, which have been reported to have weak institutional environment, high levels of corruption, and insufficient market intermediaries (Meyer & Meyer, 2017) display strong entrepreneurial activities and have an enabling business environment(Cheng, Gutierrez, Mahajan, Shachmurove, & Shahrokhi, 2007). Such apparent paradox leads to the inclusion of a number of moderators that could potentially provide answers as we examine the effect of institutional trust on entrepreneurial orientation in emerging countries.

In prominent literature concerning microenterprises in Africa, entrepreneurial orientation of small business owners is highly linked to success (Krauss, Frese, Friedrich, & Unger, 2005). While entrepreneurship is the aptitude to seek opportunities and turn them into profitable enterprises, an essential predictor for becoming an entrepreneur and for being successful in it is entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Entrepreneurial orientation is described as a framework of strategic structures that empower organizations with a foundation for entrepreneurial actions and decisions (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).

As to rural entrepreneurship in Africa, due to the appeal of urban lifestyle, also exacerbated by high concentration of potential employment opportunities, social services and infrastructure, urban cities are often flooded with congestion, corruption, unemployment and poverty (Hove et al., 2013). Consequently, the devastating results are usually the shift from agriculture in rural areas to the very competitive service industry in urban centers, originating postharvest losses and lack of value addition in rural areas. Extant literature on rural entrepreneurship in Africa suggests a neglect of these contextual realities in research and the wholesale application of western experience in the study of entrepreneurship in rural Africa (Nagler & Naudé, 2014). Therefore, in this dissertation, I investigate the concept of Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) and its relationship with Institutional trust in rural Africa. In addition, I explore several factors that moderate this relationship such as kinship ties, political affiliation of entrepreneurs, business environment and munificence in local communities. Ultimately the existence of rural business opportunities and the potential for assessing challenges to small-scale business initiatives in rural areas in Africa are important issues to address in this dissertation.

It has been reported that kinship ties play a pivotal role in entrepreneurial success (Basco, 2013). Factors like family involvement, and control with respect to benefits and costs among others are the major influencers of entrepreneurial success (O'Boyle Jr, Pollack, & Rutherford, 2012). Other scholars have examined social capital in the case of the family businesses, noting its impact on entrepreneurial performance (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007). Therefore, I posit that social capital and social networks facilitate the acquisition of resources used to exploit the entrepreneurial opportunities as well as the effects on the creation of value. Ultimately, extant literature indicates general advantages associated with kinship ties in business, namely the ability to form strong and dependable relationships with government officials and to draw on family members to bridge institutional voids (Brinkerink & Rondi, 2020; Gilson, 2007; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b)

In addition, the business environment, environmental uncertainty as well as the political affiliation are major determinants of success or failure of business enterprises. Uncertainty from quality governance points to legal, economic, political and regulatory actions of government that can be detrimental to the ability of the firm to pursue strategic choices. Environmental uncertainty (EU) intensifies the propensity of firms to seek more entrepreneurial strategies through increased acceptance of risky measures, innovativeness and proactivity (Duncan, 1972).

According to Kiggundu (2002), societal and cultural manifestation, national security, and political uncertainties shape the business environment in Africa. Several scholars argue that it is not only what entrepreneurs know that play a critical role in business performance in Africa, but also who they know (Adomako & Danso, 2014). In many African countries, governments and political figures play and important role in shaping business activities and availing opportunities and resources for businesses (Bräutigam, Rakner, & Taylor, 2002; Sen & Te Velde, 2009). Thus, in general, businesses rely heavily on governments and political networking relationships established with external entities to positively impact business performance and help overcome structural and institutional weaknesses. Therefore, it is imperative to assess these moderators as we gauge their role in entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa.

For the last moderator, I focus on munificence. Munificence has been identified as a mechanism of influencing the interactive processes of exogenous institutional environment. According to Zoogah, Peng & Woldu (2015), munificence is the degree to which environments facilitate organizational effectiveness. Dess & Beard (1984) note that this mechanism is based on capacity-enhancement, environmental settings, predictability and stability. It also means enabling institutional norms that influence desired outcomes (North, 1990). Environmental munificence, as understood in our context, refers to the abundance or scarcity of important resources desired by businesses functioning within an environment (Tang, 2008). Translated into emerging countries' context, munificent markets and their vibrancy empower businesses to thrive amidst of negative practices such as corruption. Businesses can integrate and develop systems to counter incongruent or dysfunctional institutional processes and mitigate the impact of their effects (Zoogah et al., 2015). Scholarly research on innovation and creativity have suggested that a munificent business environment attract investors, new ventures' survival, profitability, and growth (Barney, 2001b; Crook, Ketchen Jr, Combs, & Todd, 2008; Newbert, 2007; Tang, 2008). Munificent environments protect businesses from failures in stock, uncertainties, and chaos as well as enable these enterprises to counter institutional voids.

To sum up, in this dissertation, borrowing from Lewis and Weigert (1985), trust is characterized as an intention rather than an action, that is, a different degree of intention or ability on the part of one party to expect another party to behave dutifully and competently in a risky course of action. Newton and Norris (2000) argued that institutional trust is a prerequisite for states to function and earn the legitimacy, by leveraging public support of the institutions as well as the system in general. In fact, the public needs to generally support a regime and have faith in its institutions for political and economic stability.

Furthermore, Inglehart and Baker (2000) posited that economic development and greater wealth are associated with higher levels institutional trust, regardless of the type of regime. Indeed, even for authoritarian regimes, wealth and perceived regime performance create a sense of "performance legitimacy for the regime," leading to higher levels of social and institutional trust. Therefore, the choice of circumscribing this dissertation to emerging countries and Africa in particular, is to some extent based on the idea that institutional trust will be higher in countries that are wealthier than in countries that are less affluent.

As to the choice of moderators, this dissertation targets some of the commonly known societal characteristics of Africa. Many African countries remained essentially authoritarian as they moved towards electoral democratization in the 90s, while incorporating some democratic innovations to one degree or another (Tripp, 2004). The type of regime is also recognized as a significant factor that affects levels of social and institutional trust. Institutional trust levels are significantly lower in authoritarian regimes than in countries that are relatively more democratic (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2010). To an extent, this is because in the form of "divide and rule," the regime may deliberately seek to atomize society and create distrust among citizens.

The extent to which a society is ethnically divided is another societal characteristic that the literature suggests is related to social trust. Generally, ethnic heterogeneity has been seen as depressing social confidence in general (Leigh, 2006). Several scholars view ethnic diversity as having a negative effect on community cohesion, drawing on psychological theories of social identity and intergroup conflict. Furthermore, Putnam (2007) noted the negative correlation between ethnic diversity and intergroup trust, and indicates that ethnic diversity causes people, regardless of the color of their skin, to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbors.

Hence, the societal characteristics highlighted above not only sustain the theoretical lenses used to draw specific features of African societies, but also serve for justification in my attempt to provide extensive historical and cultural background specific to Africa as shown throughout this dissertation. With all the above variables taken into consideration, I am now able to coherently introduce the objectives of this dissertation.

1.2 Research Objective and Questions

The main objective of this research is to examine the relationship between Institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa. The specific objectives are:

i. To assess the main effect of institutional trust on entrepreneurial orientation in Africa.

ii. To examine how external factors such as political connections, environmental uncertainty and munificence as well as kinship ties affect the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation.

iii. To analyze institutional trust from two perspectives.

   a. By establishing the conditions and factors under which institutional trust and good governance can be used more efficient in terms of boosting entrepreneurial activity.

b. By examining the conditions under which, even with the lack of institutional trust, a parallel system can be empowered and lead to high entrepreneurial orientation.

Specifically, my research examines the effect of Institutional trust on entrepreneurial orientation within cooperatives in rural Africa. Feng & Hendrikse (2012 p.242) define cooperatives as "an enterprise collectively owned by many independent farmers as input suppliers in a production chain. The members own collectively a joint resource where they either further process or market their produce. They delegate certain rights to the cooperative enterprise. Subsequently, the cooperative enterprise concludes contracts with members, specifying, for example, delivery requirements. The vertical ties between the members and the processor therefore consist of a transaction element and an ownership".

Cooperatives and traditional systems of solidarity and mutuality have always been prevalent in African societies and are still relevant nowadays, creating employment, and enhancing social protection to many Africans living in rural areas (Wanyama, Develtere, & Pollet, 2008). While cooperatives exist all around the world, they are of particular relevance in the African setting considering their distinguished socio-political and historical context, evident idiosyncratic structures that make them stand out compared to their western counterparts. Considering the ravages of unprecedented political instability and poverty, the operation of cooperatives has been associated with the task of fighting underdevelopment. Hence the implementation of cooperatives in Africa has been supported by the ideal of turning them into agents of change (Hussi, Murphy, Lindberg, & Brenneman, 1993; Wanyama, Develtere, & Pollet, 2009).

Through synthesis and exhaustive review of the literature on these variables and using primary data gathered from surveys from microenterprises and small family firms' leaders organized in cooperatives in rural communities in Angola, hereafter generally referred to as rural Africa in the dissertation. I engage the following research questions:

1. Can institutional trust affect entrepreneurial orientation in Africa?
2. Can political affiliation moderate the effect of institutional trust on entrepreneurial orientation?
3. Can kinship relations moderate the effect of institutional trust on entrepreneurial orientation?
4. Can environmental uncertainty and munificence conditions moderate the effect of Institutional trust on entrepreneurial orientation?

1.3 Contributions

The findings of this research will inform organizations and family business literature in the following areas: (1) Add to the literature on the development of rural entrepreneurship from an African-centric view, also based on communal or collective entrepreneurship. Cooperatives are formed to provide local communities with a mechanism to navigate economic environments that have ignored the priorities of these communities in their pursuit of survival (Nilsson, 2001). The underlying aspect of collective entrepreneurship consists of the value system upon which African communities succeed, which suggests that a person is a person through other people (van der Walt, 2008). (2) the importance of analyzing the implications of acquiring resources using one's social capital, particularly from family members or kin relations.

Previous models appear insufficient to describe the diverse and dynamic features of the African environment. This study will help grasp organizational effectiveness from an integrative and dynamic standpoints that is heightened by (1) the high volatility of the African context (Munene, 1991); (2) the co-existence of the formal and informal economies in Africa (Godfrey, 2011b); and (3) a significant number of African nations that transitioned to capitalism from socialism (Zoogah, Peng, & Woldu, 2015).

For literature on institutional theory, entrepreneurship research to date has often linked the decision to start a new business venture or organization with the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities and profit as their enter new markets (Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011). Our research builds on an alternative approach to institutional theory as it relates to the African context. The creation of organizations like rural cooperatives in Africa can be understood as social products, which are based on the definition of entrepreneurship as an economic activity that can vary across social networks, space and time (Light & Rosenstein, 1995).

For the literature on resource-based theory, the results could reveal important nuances. The resource-based theory of the firm focuses on the firm's internal dynamic competences and external environment as key factors of organizational success (Barney, 2001a; Hawawini, Subramanian, & Verdin, 2003). From the resource-based theory standpoint, in order to sustain profit, resources must be scarce and difficult to trade or substitute (Lockett & Thompson, 2001). Moreover, an organization must organize its business processes efficiently and effectively in order to realize the full competitive potential of its resources and capabilities. For instance, employees and computers (tangible resources) can be bundled with a distinctive form of social capital such as kinship ties (intangible resource) in order to more effectively interact with government officials to influence formal institutions for their own benefit. Therefore, the findings of this dissertation will add to the literature by building on features of the resource-based theory to assess the effect of various firm and contextual factors on the relationship between the institutional environment and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa.

For practice, this study offers an extension to the assessment of factors surrounding entrepreneurial success in less developed and transition economies. Entrepreneurs often need not only business skills, but also political connections to manipulate or even control unfavorable institutional environments (Zhou, 2013). However, those political relations do not inherently have to form government legislation in ways that are beneficial to entrepreneurial companies. Indeed, considering their comparatively limited scale and low socio-political power, entrepreneurial companies in less developed and transition economies frequently do not have the potential to affect government policy. Alternatively, to minimize uncertainty and dependency, they can establish company-level operational agreements to allow government agencies into their organizational systems. The next section will depict the sequence and structure of this dissertation.

1.4 Organization of the dissertation

My dissertation contains five chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the theoretical focus and the unique political, social, cultural and environmental context in which microenterprises operate in Africa. It contains a statement of purpose or research objective, the questions that guide this research, and the intended contributions. Chapter 2 is divided into three sections. The first section provides a broad overview of institutional theory, and resource-based theory. The second section considers the attributes of the African environment, and particularly the rural areas, in the context of entrepreneurship literature grounded in institutional theory and resource base theory; It identifies commonalities, exposes limitations and offers ideas for future research. The third section presents a research model and the development of hypotheses for integrating institutional and resource-based perspectives in micro-entrepreneurship to predict entrepreneurial orientation. Chapter 3 explains the methodology, including the approach and survey instrument, measures, sample and data analytics. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results of the analysis. Chapter 5 ends the study with a summary of the findings and an overall evaluation of the appropriateness, boundary parameters and potential research opportunities associated with the application of these theories in entrepreneurship research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Role of Institutions

According to Scott (1995), institutional theory has been used to emphasize the influences of the systems that surround enterprises shaping their organizational and social behavior. The decision-making in an organization, as well as its processes, are directly affected by institutional forces. The various perspectives derived from examining the institutional forces have sociological and economic orientations (Clague, 1997; North, 1990a).

Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis (1995) posit that the new institutional economics have their focus tailored toward the interaction of the institutions as well as all the firms that arise from the imperfections in the market. Consequently, North (1990a) noted that institutions provide the rules of the game that shape the human interactions in the societies they are part of. He further argued that the formal and informal rules bind all the institutions and their functionalities. Institutions play a significant role in the economies through the reduction of information and transaction costs by lowering the uncertainties and the establishment of stable structures used to facilitate the interactions (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000).

Institutional theory suggests that individuals, organizations and groups behave in ways, which reflect the normative, political, cognitive and regulatory rules of their institutional environments, adherence to which warrants legitimacy. As a result, it is possible to broadly classify institutions as formal and informal ones. Societal transactions in the areas of politics (e.g. corruption, transparency), law (e.g. economic liberalization, regulatory regimes) and society (e.g., ethical norms, attitudes toward entrepreneurship) are governed by institutions (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). It is important to note that while firms' capabilities and resources are paramount for operations, research has demonstrated that the characteristics of a particular country or context tend to dictate firms' strategies (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Peng et al., 2008). Therefore, the status on institutional development in emerging countries plays a major role in firms' strategies. A review of institutional contexts in emerging countries is provided below.

Emerging countries

Oliver (1991) noted that institutions can facilitate organizational strategy and firms have different strategies for responding to institutional pressures. This allows enterprises to react to the institution environment. The enterprises can play an active role if the firms have an adaptive ability that permits them to move beyond the existing institutional constraints. Several theorists have argued that the number of theoretical and empirical studies that use an institutional perspective in emerging economies is relatively scarce. This is particularly true with the focus on entrepreneurial behavior, as seen in the context of emerging economies (Shenkar & Von Glinow, 1994). Emerging economies, often known for trends toward privatization and marketization, while still highly regulated, offer a unique institutional setting toward the development and testing of theories. Earlier studies have shown the importance of investigating the nature and speed of institutional change as well as its impact on the entrepreneurial strategies in Africa (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).

Any firm can develop a strategic response to change their institutional environments (Oliver, 1991). This proactive mindset anticipates future market events and avoids constant reactive actions. Therefore, several studies have been carried out to establish the relationship between how firms develop growth-oriented responses from a rather active strategic choice standpoint instead of the constrained strategic selections (Bluedorn, Johnson, Cartwright, & Barringer, 1994). The suggested perspectives will go a long way in extending the ideas competitive advantage of the selected firm to emerge in an economic context (Hennart, 1994; Oliver, 1997). The process that firms undergo to restructure themselves in adapting to the institutional change can form a focus on strategic research grounded in institutional economics.

More importantly, the effect of the greater institutional context on individual responses instead of whole firms has not been given thorough attention in the literature (Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin, 1992; Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Datta, 1993). Research on individual approaches to institutional norms could significantly improve the understanding of the overall institutional effects on entrepreneurial behavior.

The next section reviews the institutional context in Africa. In addition to problems of weak governance frequently associated with post-independence dynamics and the subsequent corruption trends, Sub-Saharan African countries are defined, at least to some degree, by complex institutional structures, which appear unique to the continent (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004). Reviewing this context will provide insights on the environment this dissertation is utilizing and developing theory in.

Africa

In Africa, institutional challenges should be considered when studying entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship in Africa faces numerous issues dealing with external environments, including conflict and political instability, institutional voids and poorly ran markets, natural environmental challenges, etc. (Branzei & Abdelnour, 2010; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2015). It is not surprising that these challenges manifest themselves in rankings from the World Bank’s Global Ease of Doing Business Index, where five of the bottom 10 countries in the index have been located in Africa (Littlewood & Holt, 2018). A high ease of doing business ranking indicates that the regulatory environment is more amenable to a local company's beginning and operation. Hence, it is warranted to review the African context in more detail. The subsequent sections will introduce important features of institutional context in Africa, namely: colonial history, ethnic group identity, informality and the role of family firms.

2.2 Colonial History

In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the postcolonial context or colonial has a strong influence on doing business. Entrepreneurship studies in SSA have paid less attention to this paramount local reality (Jackson, 2012). In this regard, Rivera-Santos, Holt, Littlewood, and Kolk (2015) argued that understanding SSA's entrepreneurship dynamics requires a knowledgeable historical theory. This requires a postcolonial lens to ensure that a transparent analysis is performed on the current experiences of entrepreneurship. Sambajee and Weston (2015) proposed that the postcolonial theory is an analytical tool that helps in understanding the SSA's entrepreneurship dynamics.

Within SSA, the colonial history of a country influences entrepreneurship to the extent that it affects the other economic aspects (Rivera-Santos et al., 2015). Whereas colonization occurred in a specific period of time in the history of African nations, the consequences resulting from the ex-colonizing power nation can still be felt across multiple dimensions, including the present economic development levels (Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Whatley & Gillezeau, 2011). For example, researchers have found that countries colonized by Britain seem to be successful and also contain developed formal institutions compared to African nations colonized earlier by France, Portugal, German, or Belgium, implying greater investment on economic institutions(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001).

Grier (1999) in his study on colonial legacies and economic growth found that the nature of colonizing country had a major and lasting impact on subsequent development and growth beyond independence. Colonies kept for longer periods of time seem to do better after independence. This assessment remains valid even when the observation is limited to British and French Africa. Taking into account the degree of education at the time of independence can help understanding much of the development disparity between countries in Africa. Data collected in 24 African countries suggests that the British have been more effective in educating their dependents than the French (Grier, 1999).

While empirical studies regarding the link between levels of education and entrepreneurship in Africa have yielded contradictory results (Chiliya & Roberts-Lombard, 2012; Solomon, Dickson, Solomon, & Weaver, 2008; Van der Sluis, Van Praag, & Vijverberg, 2005), Parker (1995) found that Kenyan business owners who had basic education were able to better cope with uncertainty and lead more effectively their businesses. Mead (1999) also found that going beyond elementary school or beyond a certain threshold had a significant impact on profitability. Compiling World Bank data, Ramachandran and Shah (1999) also concluded that low levels of education by black entrepreneurs in Africa showed to be detrimental to their competitive advantage compared to other entrepreneurs who had better education.

This significant difference appears likely to encompass entrepreneurship implications and, especially, how people perceived entrepreneurship. Overall, Rivera-Santos et al. (2015) noted that one could, therefore, expect the colonial history of African countries to influence self-perception of the business as a social enterprise, implying a discrepancy between self-perception and actual social mission. This explains an important feature of African economies, where economic activities are centered in small scale production featured by informal survival activities, mostly family business businesses and fairly stable micro-enterprises (Mead & Liedholm, 1998; Ndhlovu & Cleeve, 2007).

Within the African continent's specificities, there is broad consensus in the literature that slavery, colonialism, and post-colonial interactions have had major consequences for sub-Saharan African nations (Hearn, 2007). Therefore, we intend to examine another feature impacting institutional settings in Africa, namely ethnic group identity. National borders were determined by the colonizers, allowing several ethnic groups, including the Maasai between Tanzania and Kenya, to spread across many countries. At the same time, other groups have been left to coexist in the same country despite their differences (Ostien & Dekker, 2010). Recent work further proposes that differences in such types of pre-colonial ethnic institutions also had important consequences for later economic performance (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2015).

2.3 Ethnic Group Identity

The environment of SSA has also been known for its comparatively stronger influence of ethnic groups compared to other regions worldwide (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2015). In a summary of the literature on African political economy, the Western academics and policymakers project their idea of nation-states, which is grounded on pervasive national identification, strong governments, and the well-defined political limits (Rivera-Santos et al., 2015). Using domestic economic variations, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015) demonstrated that regional growth is considerably higher in original homelands of ethnic groups with concentrated, bureaucratic, pre-colonial political structures. Thus, several states in Africa challenge the Weberian construct of a legitimate state as being an entity that enjoys the total monopoly use of force providing law enforcement, protection, the rule of law, property rights and security. Most of post-independence continent history has shown that several states in Africa found it hard to dominate and maintain continuous order and uniformly imposed the law.

Besides, the state identity has just emerged, as several states in Africa are colonial constructions with weak historical antecedents (Samatar, 1997).

The identity of the ethnic group provides another parallel organizational framework to the state institutions that the state may recognize even though it will conflict with the state. It is likely that within SSA, the strong identities of ethnic groups would influence entrepreneurship like they influence the economy. Especially, the naturally sub-Saharan African ubuntu approach, based on the world's view within which the reciprocity and human interdependence are stressed over individualism (West, 2014), might impact the social ventures within African regions with strong tribal or ethnic identities (Rivera-Santos et al., 2015).

Regarding self-perception, these regions may have social ventures associating more with social than for-profit-oriented ones, translating the "ubuntu" approach of the less-individualistic sub-Saharan African view. As opposed to a social mission, social ventures are expected to select activities that stress communities' inclusion in making decisions since this aligns more with traditional ubuntu and the group-based decision-making approach than with the decision structures from top to bottom. According to (Rivera-Santos, Rufin, & Kolk, 2012), it is crucial to highlight that even though ethnic organizations are typically unofficial, informality exists outside and inside of different ethnic groups. This explains the reason for expecting a particular impact of identifying ethnic groups on entrepreneurship from the informality (Godfrey, 2011a).

Therefore, the Weberian notion of bureaucracy is at odds with African realities, and overall family businesses, with its universalist principle of equal treatment of all according to a set of formal rules (Kragh, 2016). It is most explicitly seen in recruiting and promotion practices where social distance criteria continue to overrule the practical and universalist theory that the best qualified individual should be selected for work. Selecting the most qualified candidate may indicate that an out-of-group member is included in a position where trust and cooperation are important and may alienate in-group members who are dismissed (Kragh, 2016).

The next section will introduce informality in the African setting. Even though there are considerable differences across countries, the historical and political contexts in sub-Saharan African countries tend to be even more complex than many parts of the globe (Julian & Ofori-dankwa, 2013). In the context of emerging economies in particular, a stream of research has emerged around institutional theory, emphasizing the vulnerability of formal institutions and the consequent importance of understanding the relationship between formal and informal institutions (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009)

2.4 Informality

As noted by Vanek, Chen, Carré, Heintz, and Hussmanns (2014), just like poverty, informality is considered an international condition. However, as mentioned earlier, informality is especially prevalent within Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) because of the less efficient or typically weaker formal governments. Economic informality is characterized as all market-based legal production of goods and services intentionally disguised from public authorities' for tax, job and administrative reasons (Schneider, 2005). The informal and formal enterprises can stress on social missions just like they can purely focus on the profit-oriented missions. An example is the local money lenders who, rooted within the informal economy, may target the deprived population, but still seek to optimize profits.

The microfinance organization, on the other hand, has its basis within the formal economy. They also stress on a social mission along with profitability (Akula, 2008). The implications of the existence of informality in the business environment are not so easy to measure, considering the relation between informality and poverty that is well established by macro-and micro-level development economists. (Günther & Launov, 2012). Generally, based on current observations, conceptualizing the relationship between entrepreneurship and informality within the sub-Saharan African nations appears to be complex.

The theory of modernization portrayed informality as a declining, fading, and minor residue of an old production mode; its prevalence in many nations only indicates both their backwardness and underdevelopment (Williams, Martinez–Perez, & Kedir, 2017). Many believed that such an economic setting would inevitably and naturally disappear with modernization and economic advancement.

However, as pointed out by Williams and Schneider (2013), over the previous decades, it has been acknowledged that the informal sector is a persistent and extensive African feature, equal to between 40% and 60% of the GDP, with the workforce (60%) having their major jobs within the informal economy, of which 70% are self- employed. Indeed, despite the lack of comprehensive information about the total unregistered businesses, Acs, Desai, Stenholm, and Wuebker (2013) went further to show that not less than half the total number of enterprises are not registered. Besides, Autio and Fu (2015) also noted that about two-thirds of the all businesses are not registered at inception.

There have been significant advances in understanding how prevalent the informal entrepreneurship is within the developing nations. According to Williams et al. (2017), entrepreneurship is regarded as the socially constructed conduct, and institutions as referees, which support, monitor, prescribe and enforce what is socially satisfactory (Mathias, Lux, Crook, Autry, & Zaretzki, 2015).

Helmke and Levitsky (2004) suggested that most cultures have both formal structures (regulations and codified laws) setting out the game's legal rules, and informal institutions that are the "socially transmitted, usually unwritten rules that are developed, communicated, and implemented beyond officially sanctioned networks. Informal entrepreneurship is seen as an activity that exists beyond traditional institutional guidelines, but within informal institutions' norms, principles and beliefs (Siqueira, Webb, & Bruton, 2016). For instance, Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi, and Ireland (2013) noted that even though avoiding the registration regulations is formally unlawful, the registration requirements in most developing economies are perceived as overly troublesome because of the official organizational inadequacies and, thus, their circumvention is deemed socially acceptable. Therefore, this lawful perspective has described the informal entrepreneurship within the developing nations as a result of either official organizational inadequacies or incongruence between informal and formal institutions (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009).

It is important to mention that the majority of family businesses in Africa are informal (Fafchamps, 1994); these micro-enterprises often have less than five workers, are unlicensed, unregistered, and usually do not pay taxes (Pretes, 2002). Informal economies portray a sense of corruption, illegality, deception, shadiness and lawlessness, but recent informality concepts clearly exclude criminal activity(Portes & Haller, 2010).

Among the multiple reasons African family businesses choose to remain informal are the encumbrances associated with registering a business as well as cost of creating a business. On average, it takes 14 days to create a business in OECD countries while 56 days are needed in Africa(Maloney, 2004; Meghir, Narita, & Robin, 2015). Therefore, a large percentage of family businesses do not register due to governance and institutional inefficiencies.

While informality clearly reduces the cost of being in business (no tax or registration), it creates in the long run a limiting effect on wealth accumulation(De Soto, 2000). When property rights are not transparent and unenforceable, the underlying properties are difficult to value and exchange. As a result, family businesses need to invest in alternative approaches to replicate market strategies to expand and build capital.

As outlined by Webb and Ireland (2015), there are four categories of such informal organizational or institutional imperfections: first, the formal institutional voids that comprise the absence of, or the poorly defined, rights of property, absence of fundamental utilities, and the poor social safety that forces people into the necessity-based informal entrepreneurship, which constitutes a strategy for survival (Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011).

Second, the formal institutional inadequacies or the mismanagement of resources by formal institutions, often implemented through maximizing or defending the economic rents for the elites, manifested in excessively troublesome taxes, as well as the licensing and registration costs and regulations that deter new entrepreneurs from formality (Williams, Shahid, & Martínez, 2016).

The third category of institutional imperfection is the formal organizational uncertainty when sociocultural changes and technology outpace the alterations in how capable the formal institutions can be to accommodate the new activity domains. The fourth and final involves the institution's instability and weakness, which are manifested in the inability to enforce laws and the persistent changes in regulations and laws (Williams & Vorley, 2015).

However, in the explanation of informal entrepreneurship, concentrating on formal institutional imperfections alone disregards the responsibility of the normative and cognitive organizations that may be combined within the comprehensive group of informal organizations. Informal entrepreneurship has always been perceived as emerging due to the incompatibility between whatever the informal and formal institutions define as legitimate. Considering that the clear definition of developing economies is based on their underdeveloped formal institutions, the entrepreneurs draw on the present beliefs, values, and norms to facilitate, structure, and govern their economic undertakings rather than depending on the formal codified regulations and laws (Williams et al., 2017). Whenever these informal and formal institutions are asynchronous, as it is common in several developing nations, they give rise to informal entrepreneurship, perceived as socially genuine, even though formally unlawful.

Indeed, in the case of dissonance between the informal and formal institutions, the level of informal entrepreneurship can be explained by the extent of incongruence between those institutional settings. Therefore, there is a more extensive informal entrepreneurship within the developing economies compared to the developed ones because of the greater imperfections of formal institutions and greater incongruence existing between the informal and formal institutions, leading to the utilization of informal settings as an alternate guiding framework (Godfrey, 2015).

Regarding the impacts of informality in family businesses in Africa, the findings have revealed that enterprises guided by the informal institutional framework environment are poorer and less efficient than those that operate in the formal organizational environments (Benjamin & Mbaye, 2012). The new ventures that operate legally show increased levels of profits and revenue. Such ventures also hire more workers and have more intensive capital compared to their informal counterparts. However, there is evidence showing that the informal firms' registration results in higher performance of the firm compared to if they were not registered (Demenet, Razafindrakoto, & Roubaud, 2016).

Communities play a critical role in developing entrepreneurship in the African context (Ansari, Munir, & Gregg, 2012). In navigating institutional voids, entrepreneurs will often use embedded social relations such as social connections, externally with communities and internally with family members, to rally wider networks and access necessary resources. In order to function within the context of voids within the formal institutional setting, where informal institutions dominate, businesses develop familial logic, known as generativity, nurturing and loyalty to family members (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011). Below is a review of family businesses in Africa.

2.5 Family Business

In African economies, family businesses are a guiding force for economic development. Family businesses in South Africa together account for roughly 80% of all companies and 50% of economic growth (Visser & Chiloane-Tsoka, 2014). Family companies are prevalent in the informal economy, allowing them to circumvent barriers and dysfunctional official bodies (Khavul, Bruton, & Wood, 2009). However, research on African families has shown that this organizational type is more motivated by need because family businesses encounter many challenges (Smith, 2009). Family business networks, for instance, may induce moral risk and create circumstances that trigger business instability (Khayesi, George, & Antonakis, 2014).

Although these enterprises draw on family or community relationships to expand (Khayesi et al., 2014), they require also community standard rules to manage the burden associated with family connections (Khavul et al., 2009). In particular, researchers have recognized that the duty of African family businesses to help extended family members is excessive (Luke & Munshi, 2006). In his study on competitive advantage and business strategies for family enterprises in Ghana, Acquaah (2011) showed that strategic family business practices are moderated differently by the social networking relationships with community members versus political leaders. Forged social networking relationships with community leaders are a vital source of data, information, learning and expertise that is leveraged to mitigate risks, maximize opportunities and promote effective business strategy implementation. Social networking relationships with political leaders, on the other hand, hinder the impact of the business strategy on performance. Social networking partnerships with government officials require substantial commitments to reciprocate favors that can hinder the willingness of even resource-poor family enterprises in Ghana to seek new markets and to implement a corporate plan that can boost efficiency quickly and effectively(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000).

Nevertheless, all types of organizations tend to have their network-usage advantages (Acquaah 2011). Family businesses have special issues to contend with (Adendorff & Halkias, 2014). Family businesses have an entrepreneurial family legacy (Morris, Williams, Allen, & Avila, 1997), which can include children as their employees from an early age (Webbink, Smits, & De Jong, 2012). The measures taken by families against the “cousin consortium” are also important, which allow remote relatives, after the passing of male owners, to enter a family business as there are also limited avenues for ownership by women (Sarkis, Naser, Mohammed, & Nuseibeh, 2009).

Overall, this study proposes that the four key dimensions outlined above (colonial history, ethnic groups, informality and family businesses) can be expected to influence the entrepreneurial selection of activities and self-perception as a social enterprise and thus provide particular African insights to our knowledge about entrepreneurship. To better theoretically circumscribe my dissertation, I contextualize and pinpoint specific theoretical frameworks with the variables and moderators I develop in the next pages. Hence, the following depiction of theories will encompass all the factors comprised in my theoretical model.

2.6 Institutional Theory: Formal Institutions, Institutional Trust, and Entrepreneurial Activity

Institutions are humane constraints that shape economic, political, and social interplay (North, 1991) and form a national structure where people choose business and entrepreneurship (Baker, Gedajlovic, & Lubatkin, 2005; Baumol, 1990, 1996). Baumol (1996) claimed that institutions, through the creation of rules of the game in an economy (taxes), establish conditions that impact entrepreneurship in various ways and categorize them between either productive activities (innovation) or unproductive activities (organized crime). Here, I concentrate on entrepreneurial structures and institutions that help us shed more light on the roots of social capital, embedded in the structures open to policy-makers change.

To understand formal institutions, I borrow from the hierarchy of institutions by Williamson (2000) and follow the distinction by Estrin and Mickiewicz (2012) between regulatory and constitutional levels that correlate to the labels "collective choice" and "constitutional choice" labeled by Ostrom (1994). Estrin, Mickiewicz, and Stephan (2013) thus synthesized two-dimensional hierarchical institutions: (1) rules and policies for lower order and (2) higher-order (constitutional) characteristics. These include (1) the rule of law, protection of property and effective limits to the discretionary power of the government executive branch regarded as an interlinked cluster of constitutional characteristics and (2) Government scale and scope covering an interlinked category of collective choices, which include the scope of welfare and government-spending capacity. These institutions are closely tied to commercial entrepreneurship. The institutional structure determines the protection of property rights at the constitutional level.

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) suggest that the possibility of expropriation can be decreased by successful prohibitions of unilateral intervention by the executive branch of the state. Entrepreneurship and agency beliefs are promoted through strong property rights (Harper, 2003), allowing transparent and equal transactions and enabling economic value to be taken into account. Hence, the agency is at the center of all entrepreneurship, and the absence of predictability or even coercion by those in authority impedes the commercial and social private enterprise. Strong institutional structures would, therefore, be conducive to sustained entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, the authoritarian government will battle social movements strongly and use official instruments of violence to propel powerful private interests.

Evans (1996) presented several cases from Africa and Latin America that a centralized form of government and a weak rule of law are not in favor of self-enterprise. Ultimately, the consequences of a poor institutional environment may originate from the prophecies of self-fulfillment: those negatively impacted by the weak rule of law on institutionalized markets often appear to reduce their expectations (Banerjee, Banerjee, & Duflo, 2011).

Governance and Government Assistance

Because trust in institutions arises as one of the most important components on which the legitimacy and sustainability of political-administrative systems are built, trust has become a major concern for many world leaders, scholars and public officials (Hardin, 2002). Kim (2010) introduced the following cycle: governability relies on governance, and for the development of trust, governance is paramount. In any country, building trust is not an easy task, and in developing countries, the task is even more difficult.

Building institutional trust can be compared to a game of billiards. It is not possible to directly hit the target ball; it is attained by striking an intermediary ball. Likewise, public trust cannot be affected directly. Institutional trust will eventually result in the targeting of legality, integrity, efficiency, effectiveness, participation, reliability, transparency and fairness, all of which are part of good governance (Goodsell, 2006). Thus, trust in institutions is the pinnacle byproduct of good governance.

Various interpretations of the governance principle were recorded by Asongu (2016). To be descriptive, this study narrowed its focus to four key meanings drawn from recent literature. Dixit (2009) described economic governance as the functioning and structures that could ensure contract compliance, promoting the protection of property rights and collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructures to the legal and social institutions. Tusalem (2015) sees governance as the rule of law, an antidote of corruption, bureaucratic efficiency, political stability, and standard of regulation. According to Fukuyama (2013), four major approaches that foster "state efficiency" can strengthen the definition of governance. These approaches include performance steps, procedural metrics, administrative self-government, and capability indicators, which reflect the level of professionalism and resources.

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) identified the governance metrics that are most frequently employed into three major categories: (1) political governance, which tests the election and dismissal of political leaders, (2) economic governance, which is characterized by identifying and enforcing policies that provide public goods and services and are focused on quality regulatory standards and efficiency of government, and (3) the quality of the institutions that regulate relations between states and people, which is reflected in institutional governance. The rule of law and the prevention of corruption measure its level of effectiveness.

In academic circles, scholars have directed several critics to the use of Kaufmann et al.'s (2010) governance metrics. The argument between Schrank on the one hand and Kurtz on the other has been the most important of these critics and been examined in four variants: (1) the response, (2) the argument, (3) the rejoinder and (4) models, measures, and mechanisms.

Kurtz and Schrank (2007) were concerned that good governance is positively correlated with economic development by making a case for reconsidering the conventional trust in the empirical literature related to governance growth and traditional governance indicators. They also concluded that foundational metrics of governance are problematic because they were clouded with a variety of problems including conceptual bias, sampling adverse selection, and policy choices.

Asongu (2016), in his assessment on unbundling institutions in African growth, builds on the governance indicators. These include regulatory and governmental efficiency as the most critical predictors for stimulating innovation (Oluwatobi, Efobi, Olurinola, & Alege, 2015); corruption-mitigation as the most powerful instrument for combating software piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013).

What is a government with high standard? Weber (1968) introduced a fundamental theory that deeply shaped the government's understanding in various fields, including sociology, politics, and economics. High-quality governments in the Weberian tradition are better branded by a modern system of judicial public governance than a pre-modern system of patrimonial governance. A sound legal governance structure is subject to impersonal rules, relies on hierarchy, is politically neutral, and provides compensation to wage-based government servants. State authorities have no right to collect rent from individuals under judicial public governance. A system of patrimonial governance, by comparison, relies heavily on government allegiance and grants officials the permit to seize "prebends" from residents as a legal reward for their services.

Scholars in different fields have achieved broad consensus that government officials have to faithfully conduct government functions under good public governance according to the Weberian principles. They are highly restricted from the general public's extraction, and this leads to the growth of economic development (Knack & Keefer, 1995; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Rauch & Evans, 2000)

It is generally agreed that governments are best suited to galvanize entrepreneurship and help provide productive formal structures such as educational and financial systems (De Clercq, Lim, & Oh, 2013). While this can be largely true, policymakers need to focus on how programs that promote entrepreneurial projects can be structured. Countries, however, encounter challenges implementing proper public assistance when the most productive use of resources is not observed (Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007). Rijkers, Laderchi, and Teal (2010) mentioned that aid programs still do not expectedly impact small businesses. They noticed that companies, which receive program funding, seem to be receiving a premium in terms of income through employment, not through the introduction of new technology or increased production of labor (Rijkers et al., 2010).

Similarly, further analysis found that many government aid programs do not meet the needs of small firms and are not well-designed (Obeng & Blundel, 2015). In particular, the services are poorly advertised and lack business preparation (Obeng & Blundel, 2015). Analysis indicated that these services could be beneficial and present wide-ranging recommendations for bringing real improvement (Ladzani & Van Vuuren, 2002). A study conducted by Sievers and Vandenberg (2007) shows that support services should be demand-based and offer more than basic management training. It recommends that successful programs allow for interactions between businesses, suppliers of programs, and financial institutions (Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007).

The argument that entrepreneurial training programs must be broader was backed by Ladzani and Van Vuuren (2002). Glaub, Frese, Fischer, and Hoppe (2014) stated in an experimental study that a training intervention between entrepreneurs improved the actions of the individual initiative and contributed to an entrepreneurial spirit, which then had a positive impact on the results. Mano, Iddrisu, Yoshino, and Sonobe (2012) also support that government aid initiatives should pay attention to problems in the business sector as a means to enhance business practices and their performances in competitive markets.

2.7 Solving Poverty through Entrepreneurship

Since remote times and its inception, entrepreneurship research has paid very little attention to poverty (Venkataraman & Shane, 2000). While poverty is not the focus of this dissertation, in order to develop a good understanding of the institutional context in Africa, one cannot overlook the underlying issue of poverty. The solution lies in understanding how to help those living in poverty create their own businesses by unleashing creativity, rather than seeing those in poverty as a market for goods (Bruton, Ketchen Jr, & Ireland, 2013). Entrepreneurship among those in poverty will ultimately provide a long-lasting solution to their poverty.

In recent studies, it has been estimated that about 2.47 billion people live in poverty worldwide (Hussain, Bhuiyan, & Bakar, 2014). They have an income of $2 or less in a day. According to the World Bank, based on assumptions on the impact of Covid-19, 40 to 60 million people will fall into extreme poverty in 2020 compared to 2019, and the global extreme poverty rate will rise by 0.3 to 0.7 percentage points, to around 9% in 2020 (Mahler, Lakner, Aguilar, &

Wu, 2020). Scholars, together with business organizations, have identified this population as a good market potential since a variety of goods and services can be sold to them. Hence, one can adopt a completely different perspective putting forth the argument that entrepreneurship provides people with an opportunity to dismantle the poverty cycle inherent in society (Bruton et al., 2013).

Quality of Institutions and the Productivity of Entrepreneurship

Economists have continued to make immense contributions in terms of literature to the entrepreneurship field for over 300 years (McMullen, Bagby, & Palich, 2008). Many historical contributions have been documented to have made some of the biggest impacts. Cantillon, Schumpeter, Kirzner, Knight, and Mill are among the most significant historical contributors who have helped in advancing our understanding of the role of entrepreneurs in the economy. William Baumol is perhaps one of the most recent contributors whose ideas are widely used (Sobel, 2008). He first published his works, the "productive and unproductive entrepreneurship," in 1996, in which he shifts the point of focus from the field of academic inquiry to the role of institutions in affecting enterprises and entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1996).

Baumol founded his concept on the notion that many entrepreneurs exploit opportunities that tend to bring profits into the business. They not only focus on the private markets but also emphasize the exploitation of the legal and political arenas to maximize the profits. Therefore, the variations in the measured proportions in the private *sector* entrepreneurship arise partly because of the varied directions that the entrepreneurs direct their energies due to the prevalent political institutions and economic situations (McMullen et al., 2008). The players affect the reward and incentives that affect the entrepreneurial persons in the way they run their operations.

Some regions have been known to have good structures in terms of the provision of secured property rights as well as a fair judicial system that is working for the people. Such regions also have effective limits in which the government can transfer her wealth through taxation as well as proper regulation. In such areas with the streamlined institutions, creative individuals can engage in very productive market entrepreneurship activities that enhance wealth creation in terms of activities such as the creation of new products (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008). Alternatively, areas that lack strong institutions are prone to attract entrepreneurs that engage in activities that tend to manipulate the legal or political systems. They will tend to capture or transfer the existing wealth and resources by employing unproductive entrepreneurship through lawsuits and lobbying, hence destroying the existing wealth facilities and its avenues. These effort allocations take place since the institutional structures primarily determine the kind of person together with the financial rewards obtained (Sobel, 2008). Entrepreneurial leadership can either be invested in productive market activities or unproductive legal and political activities based on the existing laws and regulations and how they are implemented.

Poverty Alleviation through Entrepreneurship

Alvarez and Barney (2014) asserted that many people appreciate entrepreneurship as the main approach of fostering development and reducing income deficiency in poor countries. The collective efforts of Kimmitt, Muñoz, and Newbery (2019) have successfully demonstrated the connection between poverty and entrepreneurship, which has predominantly revolved around the link between a certain set of consequences and antecedents and entrepreneurial agency. Previously, several kinds of research have regarded resource access as a vital ingredient of reducing poverty (Sutter, Bruton, & Chen, 2019). In the latter, income generation and business performance constitute critical outcomes of entrepreneurship (Bradley, McMullen, Artz, & Simiyu, 2012).

Given the limited available resources, the expected impact of income creation involves entrepreneurship, which is known to increase the prosperity of an individual as well as the prosperity of those relying on them (Sutter et al., 2019). Some have contended that indeed, entrepreneurship can prevent the related adverse impacts of poverty, enhancing future as well as present conditions, or even counteract any further decline of the living conditions (Chliova, Brinckmann, & Rosenbusch, 2015). Also, Kimmitt et al. (2019) noted that through the expansion of people's total choices, entrepreneurship can also inverse the pessimistic spiral of scarce options that generates reduced chances of advancement and freedom. It may also allow returns for the poor in the form of increased relative consumption and income, resulting in increased life satisfaction and social mobility (Kautonen, Kibler, & Minniti, 2017).

With this "remedial" perception, poverty is known to result from the rare resources; consequently, resource provision enables the success of entrepreneurship. This is perceived as a host of actions that deal with the instant concerns about resources (Shantz, Kistruck, & Zietsma, 2018). Therefore, unleashing entrepreneurship among those in poverty results in a high possibility of the market to thrive and may also benefit individuals. As suggested by Sutter et al. (2019), this requires three means: human capital investment, financial resource provision, and relationships or social network development. When these means are combined, Bradley et al. (2012) noted that they have noticeable impacts on the entrepreneurship results within the impoverished settings: market creation for those in poverty and rise in life satisfaction and income. According to Sutter et al. (2019), the eventual result is the "new" condition where there is an alleviation or remedy of poverty.

Based on research by Kimmitt et al. (2019), while the correlation between poverty and entrepreneurship can be established, this explanation is limited and partial. From this viewpoint, promoting entrepreneurship in environments with resource constraints suggests the generation of income as a way of enhancing the fundamental living conditions. This shows a hedonic view of poverty alleviation and entrepreneurship. Here, growth is perceived as a result of current life-satisfying income that entrepreneurship is seen as leading to to (Uy, Sun, & Foo, 2017), or undermining (Bhuiyan & Ivlevs, 2019). Therefore, entrepreneurship is portrayed as a tool for achieving economic results (Muñoz & Kimmitt, 2018).

In addition, within poverty contexts, it can be inferred that human ambitions such as belonging, self-realization, and life-response can be understood as secondary and may be undermined because of more urgent and pressing issues. This, according to Hall, Matos, Sheehan, and Silvestre (2012), indicates that the goal of social development (eudemonic) can neither be the primary catalyst nor the desired outcome of entrepreneurship.

As noted by Bruton, Khavul, and Chavez (2011), such understanding about decision-making and desires has resulted in the understanding that individuals within the poverty context make today's decisions, lacking forward-thinking and planning. Although this may at times be accurate, it does not prevent people from thinking of the future as well as how the decisions today will alter tomorrow and even beyond. As they evolve, individuals tend to create future images through self-evaluation and reflecting upon their values, motivations, and actions in order to pursue their goals (Kimmitt et al., 2019). Therefore, determining whether entrepreneurship can offer a better future cannot be merely captured through the lenses of immediate satisfaction and today's entrepreneurial activities, but instead, through desires and expectations for a better tomorrow, based upon the assessment of values, life goals and conditions.

When these issues are combined, they show the black box within our recent space theorization, where today's entrepreneurship decisions remain theoretically separated from wealth anticipations, ignoring the impacts of the complex idea and, therefore, the several ways that entrepreneurship may allow future pursuits (Shantz et al., 2018). The next section will present the construct of entrepreneurial orientation.

2.8 Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO)

Entrepreneurial orientation refers to the process through which a strategy is made for an organization based on entrepreneurial decisions (Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, & Frese, 2009). Miller (1983), in his attempt to define entrepreneurial orientation, posits that an entrepreneurial firm is an entity with multiple characteristics such as being innovative in terms of the market and the products produced as well as the willingness to seek with innovations and pursue risky ventures. As such, entrepreneurial orientation consists of concepts such as "proactiveness," "risk-taking", and "innovativeness." Entrepreneurial orientation concepts are used to describe a given firm that has entrepreneurial criteria. Covin and Slevin (1989) suggest that regarding entrepreneurial firm performance, the scale-measuring method, which comprises proactiveness, risk-taking, and innovation, is used to assess a firm's strategic position.

Lumpkin and Dess (1996) added two other constructs in a further extension of the model, which included competitive aggressiveness and autonomy. Autonomy means the ability to be independent while executing an idea. In contrast, competitive aggressiveness denotes the propensity to vehemently challenge and outstrip any existing competitors in a given market. Porter (1985) asserts that aggressiveness is very important for new entrant firms to increase their possibility of success. In another account, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) proposed that entrepreneurial orientation is best used to describe processes, practices, and decision-making geared toward a new entrant to form a new venture within the firm.

Lumpkin and Dess (1996) indicated five levels of entrepreneurial orientation of a firm. These include aggressiveness to the competitors, having the predisposition to act independently, proactive to opportunities, the willingness to face and take risks, and being innovative. In the previous studies by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) and Miller (1983), it is perceived that the five dimensions take place at an organizational level. Many studies suggest that entrepreneurial orientation at the organizational level may collectively include all the five dimensions (Lumpkin, Cogliser, & Schneider, 2009; Runyan, Droge, & Swinney, 2008).

Proactiveness

According to Lumpkin and Dess (1996), proactiveness refers to the anticipation of future needs, changes, and issues. Consequently, proactiveness is essential to an entrepreneurial orientation in that it implies a forward-looking perspective that is followed by new-venturing activity (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). The model of entrepreneurial strategic posture for such firms involves being productive, innovative, and the ability to take risks, hence making proactiveness to be referred to as aggressive competitive orientation in the market (Covin & Slevin, 1989). Lumpkin and Dess (1996) proposed that competitive aggressiveness is not similar to proactiveness. It should be used to refer to how a firm reacts to market trends and demand in the existing market concerning the competitors. The reaction should be along with the competition arising from the demand due to being adaptive to the arising challenges. Conversely, proactiveness relates to the ability to meet the demand of a new market by initiating an influence on the environment and taking advantage of them being a new entrant (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).

Venkatraman (1989) described proactiveness as a process involving anticipating and acting on upcoming needs by pursuing new openings that may be connected or differ from an existing operation. It brings forth new brands and products before the competitors. It strategically disbands the business operations when it attains its peak in maturity or at the commencement of a decline in the lifecycle of their business.

Risk-Taking

Cantillon (1755) initiated the concept of entrepreneurship aiming to describe the different critical characteristics of entrepreneurs compared to employees, where he referred to the entrepreneurs' willingness to accept risks and endure uncertainty from self-employment. Risk is a crucial factor in the decision-making context when entrepreneurs engage in launching new products or want to venture into a new market (Devinney, 1992; Timmons, Spinelli, & Tan, 1994; Timmons, Spinelli, & Tan, 2004). According to Gasse (1982), the degree of uncertainty is intrinsically embedded in the idea of risks such as psychological risk, social risk, and personal risk. From an organizational standpoint, these entities engage in risk-taking behaviors such as investing in projects and are involved with substantial economic resources and extensive debts; they are considered to have an entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).

Innovativeness

Schumpeter (1942) used the term "creative destruction" to explain how the market tends to be interrupted by new services, products, and solutions, which then drive the economic resources from existing entities to new enterprises that result in innovations. The driving component for this economic transformation is brought about by entrepreneurship that tends to embed innovation as a crucial factor. Innovation is an entrepreneur's particular tool employed to exploit changes and opportunities (Druker, 1985). According to Gabor (1970) and Bird (1989), innovation involves a process that expands an invention to become a feasible product during commercialization. While innovations may differ in their level of "radicalness"(Hage, 1980), innovativeness is a fundamental willingness to deviate from current practices or technologies and to move beyond the existing state of the art.

According to Kimberly (1981), at the organizational level, innovativeness tends to indicate the propensity in adopting new concepts and experiments and engages in creative processes conducive to the development of new products, processes, technology, or services beyond the current practice. Previous researches show the difference between technological innovation and product-market innovation. Scherer and Ross (1990) advocated that the product market tends to be driven by market research, design, and advertisement. In contrast, Maidique and Patch (1982) advocated that technological innovation entails developing processes and products through engineering techniques performed by professional experts. The difference results in several approaches used in measuring the change. In evaluating the product market's innovation, the sales to cost of market commencement and implementation ratios are used; while assessing technological innovation research and development, the cost to sales ratios are employed to measure the financial commitment to innovation (Miller, 1987). Innovativeness involves the tendency to creativity and experimentation in producing new products, technology, and services through research and development of the new methods.

Based on the definitions and elaborated literature review, the next section will consist on the generation of the hypothesis and each of the relationships is discussed in greater detail below.



Figure 1: Theoretical Model of Proposed Hypotheses

2.9 Hypothesis Development

Institutional Trust and entrepreneurial orientation in developing countries

Although research on entrepreneurship based on institutional theory has expanded in recent years, much of this work now focuses on entrepreneurship in developing countries (Eijdenberg, Thompson, Verduijn, & Essers, 2019). Moreover, the institutional impacts in developed countries have been explored a great deal in recent studies. Tang and Koveos (2004) suggest that entrepreneurs are often weary and demotivated from formally registering and start new enterprises if they are required to comply with too many laws or be accountable to an excessive number of agencies and spend substantial money and time meeting paperwork requirements.

In addition, lack of access to important information pertaining to steps for business creation is seen as a major obstacle (Saini & Bhatia, 1996). For instance, Tanzanian companies often tend to adopt or imitate behaviors that limit their competitiveness in terms of price and quality (Kristiansen, Kimeme, Mbwambo, & Wahid, 2005). Such actions force them to depend on social networks within their communities. In general, this community-based unity is referred to as "Ubuntu", which means compassion, unity, empathy, sharing, and a way to support others (West, 2014). Studies show that this kind of social network plays a major role in entrepreneurship in Africa (Khavul et al., 2009).

It is worth to analyze the dynamics between of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and local enterprises in emerging economies. As they penetrate emerging markets, MNEs often find existing monopolies comprised of local diversified business groups (Meyer et al., 2009). Overtime, with the increased competition, these local business groups lose their market share over their foreign competitors. Such market share loss is even greater as institutional changes occur and the need to adapt increases.

Therefore, Khanna and Palepu (1997) posited that entrepreneurs need to engage in proactive and innovative actions to mitigate the frictions resulting from institutional changes. Additionally, there is a need to initiate more freedom and decentralization of business units (Guillen, 2000). One way of retaining the best managers in the industry is to allow room for flexibility in setting salary scales for sales executives.

Local business groups often develop strategies for the relationship-based management in the environment they operate in as a substitute due to the unavailable institutional infrastructure. Such assets can be utilized locally or transferred to other emerging economies where they will be of use (Guillen, 2000). The development of the distribution mechanism may be vital in the protection of domestic firms against the entry of foreign firms.

Additionally, in an emerging economy, a domestic firm may want to circumvent the onslaught of a rival multinational firm by exploring markets that are yet to be globalized. Moreover, by leveraging a commodity area in which the natural resources or labor offer a low-cost advantage, it may be possible to fairly compete in the global market (Aulakh, Kotabe, & Teegen, 2000). To remain viable in the market, a firm must ensure that it understands the relationship between characteristics of the industry as well as the institutional infrastructure and its company assets. In doing so, the emerging firm may be in a position to rise to the standard of being an aggressive contender, either globally or domestically, by utilizing its resources to attain competitive advantage (Dawar & Frost, 1999).

Several competitive advantages in the emergent economies rely on a network of relationships as well as government ties. In such context, firms are effective monopolies within their home markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000). With the inevitable changes in the institutional context, firms are obligated to adjust and also revisit their asset structure. New resources have to be put in place to meet the challenges and opportunities that arise in the course of business operations (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a). For example, businesses in the past have had various merits that arise due to the asymmetries arising from foreign direct investments. The new markets have to be set up in a manner that they adapt to the change and evolve in their operations so that they do not depend on government lobbying or other generic financial investment approaches (Galvez & Tybout, 1985).

Additionally, the product markets should also evolve because there is a continuous development of more dynamic completion in the market. According to Lei, Hitt, and Bettis

(1996), examining the dynamic competencies, such as the ability to constantly learn and the knowledge-based view of a firm, will continue to gain prominence in the study of the emerging economies. Therefore, more research should be carried out on how firms can adapt and learn new techniques as markets continue to emerge.

Serious examinations must be undertaken toward the barriers that exist in the acquisition of these resources. For instance, according to Filatotchev, Hoskisson, Buck, and Wright (1996), The actions of local entrepreneurs can lead or encourage preservation of core rigidities. On the same note, without an enforceable legal system, the downside of networks is that local business groups can coalesce and take action to resist change. Therefore, it is important to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the barriers to resource development (Peng & Heath, 1996). The analysis should be carried out following the appropriate timing, with the correct sequencing of the available resources. Resource development should yield the necessary insights about the interaction between the resource-based view factors and the institutional factors. There is a need to further analyze the role of the foreign investor as well as providers of managerial resources.

Undoubtedly, institutional trust affects the development of entrepreneurship as well as micro, small, and medium enterprises in Africa. It is, therefore, a precondition for growth and advancement or exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Munemo, 2012). Entrepreneurship can be stimulated by efficient government policies coupled with effective institutional bodies (Atiase, Mahmood, Wang, & Botchie, 2018). Alence (2004) claimed that Africa’s weak performance transcends economic issues such as hostile global markets and economic rigidity. Instead, Africa’s poor economic performance is due to poor policy enactment and implementation, ineffective public administration, and corruption. Good governance activists in Africa suggest, therefore, that strong institutions, protection of private property (property rights), upholding the rule of law, enforcement of contracts, transparency, and good governance are critical tools to empower entrepreneurship in Africa (Naudé, 2011).

Government regulations that effectively enhance market processes are critical for creating an atmosphere conducive to the growth of entrepreneurship in Africa. This can be achieved by African governments through the elimination of conditions producing fragmented markets and administrative rigidities. Governments need to build a "culture of business" that encourages companies to risk and seek benefits (Gnyawali & Fogel, 1994).

In light of these findings, there are still three avenues to expand entrepreneurial work in developing countries and Africa in particular, based on institutional theory. The first step consists of examining at the country level the impact of institutional environments on entrepreneurship using adequate data and detailed sample surveys (Stenholm et al., 2013). It is important to note that in addition to the above-referenced anomalies, local insights and nuances are not fully understood. Moreover, some of the contextual information such as the expectations of local entrepreneurs who must react creatively to these institutional limitations are still concealed, misconstrued, or incomplete.

Secondly, since we do not have enough studies exploring small business activities and also informal micro-entrepreneurship, we are also unable to investigate inductively how various institutions can allow or constrain entrepreneurial activities (Su, Zhai, & Karlsson, 2017). There is often a sense of under-representation of the personal stories and perspectives of people in and around the business in a complex institutional setting like Africa.

Finally, in the absence of micro-level and inductive research, the entrepreneurial activities in developing countries (Africa) are still very little understood (Mair & Marti, 2009).

As previously stated, while entrepreneurs undoubtedly use informal network connections to solve institutional vacuums, many innovative solutions to institutional constraints remain non-identified. This dissertation, therefore, differs with many previous studies that have explored macro and meso-level effects by focusing on rural area entrepreneurs who must unleash creativity in a challenging institutional environment such as rural Angola, the African developing country and subject of this study.

General knowledge suggests that good governance promotes entrepreneurship. Trust in government effectiveness, voice in government affairs, rule of law and political stability should be linked to the willingness of citizens to take risks related with investing, starting and managing new enterprises (Acs, Desai, & Klapper, 2008). Also, severe institutional voids generate strong stimuli that as part of their entrepreneurial goals, make entrepreneurs even more aware of social needs and create an aspiration to find innovative ways to address proactively these needs. (Moulick, Pidduck, & Busenitz, 2019).

The rationale is that the social, economic and self-actualization advantages of starting up and running new enterprises must outweigh the burdens and challenges for entrepreneurship to take place. Entrepreneurship is believed to thrive under favorable governance conditions (Acs et al., 2008). Starting a company requires such perceptions as confidence in government efficacy, political stability to the point where entrepreneurs don’t fear their enterprises are prone to be nationalized, or the concerns of lack of rule of law. This is necessary in order to maintain a reasonable degree of confidence.

There is a dynamic and recursive relation between institutional trust and the overall entrepreneurial context (Welter & Smallbone, 2006). The essence of the overarching institutional framework determines both the scope and the levels of trust to be found within a society. Hence the importance of studying entrepreneurship in its social context (Johannisson, Ramírez-Pasillas, & Karlsson, 2002). There has been a comprehensive debate with respect to entrepreneurship and trust as to whether institutional environments should be broken into divisions of "low-trust" and "high-trust" (Fukuyama, 1995). While promoting unproductive and parasitic entrepreneurship, a "low-trust" environment is also seen to limit competitiveness, market entry and innovation (Fukuyama, 1995). On the other hand, a "high-trust" setting is seen to encourage entrepreneurial growth and competitiveness (Fukuyama, 1995). Consequently, developing and emerging countries would be characterized as "low-trust", whereas strong market economies such as Western Europe and the US, could be considered "high-trust" countries (Smallbone & Welter, 2001). Generally, institutions can only function efficiently if individuals and entrepreneurs are able to establish a basic degree of trust, not only in the reliability of transactions, but also, where appropriate, in the enforcement of penalties and sanctions (Welter & Smallbone, 2006). This suggests an essential function for institutional trust, which leads to the establishment of the "missing middle" between entrepreneurs and institutions, communities and the state, i.e. the development of partnerships between unrelated and unfamiliar individuals and the growth of new social and business classes (Fukuyama, 1995).

Taken together, these claims assert reasons why institutional trust enables the propensity of firms to be more creative, proactive and risk oriented. Therefore, we hypothesize that,

H1: Institutional trust is positively associated with entrepreneurial orientation in rural areas of Africa.

Environmental Munificence

The resource-based view is particularly relevant in the context of firms because it argues that their long-term survival rests upon the development of unique offerings by nurturing the firm's core competencies (Kelliher & Reinl, 2009). This also means that the firm must strategically adapt to its environment. Studies have shown that enterprises establish relations with the outside environment, wherein operating from their position in a perfectly competitive market, these enterprises have limited competitive influence (Dutta & Evrard, 1999). Considering the competitive external environments, in order to survive, firms' ability to adapt must be faster than the rate of change in their environment (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen Jr, 2001).

The theory also indicates that the success of small and medium enterprises lies in the ability of the organization to attract and maintain stakeholders in the task environment (Zajac, 1988). The concept is that companies seek to minimize or increase reliance by means of partnerships and joint ventures. The theory also describes how small and medium enterprises may use direct and indirect internationalization markets to minimize exposure to domestic markets, which can be adverse due to high market penetration and cost of production while concentrating on more desirable markets (Guo & Acar, 2005).

Munificence is a mechanism that facilitates collaborative processes of the external institutional environment (Zoogah et al., 2015). It refers to the role of environment in enabling the effectiveness of organizations (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009). It focuses on stability, predictability and environmental settings that drive institutional success (Dess & Beard, 1984). Innovation and entrepreneurship studies show that investors are attracted by countries with munificent market environments (Doh, Jones, Mudambi, & Teegen, 2005). Therefore, munificent African countries mediated by institutional quality lead to the desired organizational results (North, 1990a).

Munificent environments are control vessels amidst uncertainty and refer to the availability of resources in the environment. allowing organizations to tackle transaction costs and institutional vacuums. Munificence helps organizations to build integration frameworks that combine diverse operational processes in a harmonious, cohesive, and efficient way (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). When conflicting demands of formal and informal institutional control are mitigated, organizations effectively combine collaborative forces to decrease the effect of institutional voids.

Entrepreneurs have to deal with unfriendly government policies or requirements (Mbaku, 2004). Such statutory provisions often do not adapt to contingencies such as the creation of a new business or provide inadequate security for businesses (Dia, 1996). African entrepreneurs often find relief in informal institutions in order to escape the harsh consequences of unfriendly legislation or non-munificent entrepreneurial environment (Hyden, 2012). There are informal guidelines, such as standards and codes of conduct, which have a particular effect on rural activities in Africa.

Usually, informal institutional actors have shared set of values and rely on basic reciprocity principles as self-reliance. Transactions are distinctive, idiosyncratic, non-contractual and ambiguous in terms of time, execution or privacy. The concept of “ubuntu” is basically a strong form of collectivism, a pattern of deeds that helps incorporate members of a community into large, unified in-groups (Mbigi & Maree, 1995). People are supportive of each other and share resources in exchange for absolute loyalty; show empathy and consideration to ensure a high level of community life; build structures of social responsibilities that connect managers to ethnic groups and extended families; and lay the foundations for horizontal and personal relationships within organizations that often originates competitive advantage. Informal institutions or environmental munificence, along with governments, not only shape the institutional environment, they also affect entrepreneurial orientation in both formal and informal economies (Zoogah et al., 2015).

Literature indicates that the need for a favorable business environment is essential in the production and promotion of innovation(Goll & Rasheed, 2004). Environmental munificence is characterized as the abundance or scarcity of essential resources that organizations need as they operate within an environment. Therefore, the resources available in the economy have an impact on the sustainability and development of businesses that share that environment and also have an impact on the potential of new businesses to enter that environment(Castrogiovanni, 1991).

In Africa, concepts such as wasta (i.e. obtaining something through favoritism) and ubuntu (i.e., the accumulation of personal, family, and clan credibility) reflect the importance of informal institutions (Mangaliso, 2001). Due to the great influence of the chieftaincy (and council of elders) on administrative and judicial functions and thus on economic and social exchanges, the ethnic background of entrepreneurs matters substantially in many communities (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2015).

It is generally believed that, compared to those with a scarcity of resources, organizations with abundant resources can survive and grow and can more effectively pursue their objectives. Entrepreneurs in developing economies with highly munificent environments turn more extensively to informal workaround activities in the midst of high institutional uncertainty raised by low institutional trust (Sydow, Cannatelli, Giudici, & Molteni, 2020); when entrepreneurs consider their institutions unpredictable, their response and strategies are likely to be more detailed, extensive and multifaceted. The scarcity of resources in hostile or non-munificent environments forces firms to pay greater attention to their conservation when institutional trust is low.

Therefore, environmental munificence is a crucial mechanism of entrepreneurial success in Africa and I hypothesize that,

H2: Environmental munificence moderate the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation such that at higher levels of munificence, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is positive, whereas at lower levels of munificence, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is negative.

Environmental Uncertainty

Business ventures are known to be vital to the prosperity and growth of both regional and national economies (Coulibaly, Erbao, & Mekongcho, 2018). However, it is also important to acknowledge that these enterprises operate in an increasingly dynamic and complex environment, which heighten the challenges to their ability to survive and prosper. It is obvious that under these conditions of environmental uncertainty, some of these enterprises are doomed to fail, while others will take the necessary steps to rise above the challenges and implement mitigation plans such as innovation and risk assumption.

African history, its economy, institutions, community, and government policies are a prominent theme in Africa's enterprise literature. Despite attempts by several countries to adopt structural adaptation programs, small companies need better working conditions, and Africa fails to promote progress (Frese & Friedrich, 2002). Recent work has shown that government changes are important to strengthen these conditions, citing the positive impact of economic stability and the implementation of deregulation to build an atmosphere conducive to new enterprises (Munemo, 2012).

Likewise, Mahadea (2012) concluded that poverty and regulation were positively associated, suggesting that both employment and future economic development that reduce poverty are being affected by countries with high degrees of regulation. While many African countries are aware of the problems facing entrepreneurship with lack of infrastructure, they make poor decisions as to how they can remediate their situation (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012). To establish entrepreneurship and to affect economic development, the government plays a major role in fostering the appropriate business climate (Bradford, 2007). Policy devising, however, should be at the forefront of such initiatives and inform them.

Rijkers and Söderbom (2013) state how little opportunity is available in rural Africa for non-farm companies. Since rural areas focus on farms, growth out of urban centers is being limited. Entrepreneurs have significant disadvantages when the tools available including schooling, finance, protection of property rights and regulation are inadequate (Deininger & Byerlee, 2012; Trulsson, 2002). Additionally, (Goodstein & Velamuri, 2009) suggest that certain unsuccessful policies are the product of postcolonial power dynamics through which states use their power to control various institutional sectors to enhance legitimacy.

Despite progress in that front, very little is done to encourage potential change in recognizing difficulties that African entrepreneurship encounters. Nonetheless, international companies in Africa have a road to growth that can be promising or potentially alarming. To several countries in Africa, foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign multinational enterprises (MNE) pledge a more sustainable growth. Considering this incentive, these international companies either contribute to welfare or take advantage of the institutional void (Luiz & Stewart, 2014). Although these decisions are not mutually exclusive, government policies must be tailored closely to economic prosperity and structural changes. Demirbag, Apaydin, and Tatoglu (2011) explain, for example, how low economic freedom and weak institutions in North Africa are being used by Japanese MNEs.

Kshetri (2011) admits that Africa is used for its resources by foreign companies both in the field of natural resources and low-cost labor. Similarly, entrepreneurs from China have been very fortunate in recent decades in Africa, with increased capital from their home country and taking more risks in their achievements (Shen, 2012). In comparison, FDI does not have to be unilateral in certain situations and can have beneficial spillover effects, promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth (Washington & Chapman, 2014). In addition, 85% of the U.S. to Africa resources flow from private sources, indicating both the investment opportunities and the value of FDI for growth (Cloete, Nel, & Theron, 2006).

Throughout the years, several scholars have studied relationship between the firm and its environment. One of the highlights of these studies has been environmental uncertainty (Duncan, 1972; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). Regardless of the dimensions environmental uncertainty can assume, scholars have suggested that it should be defined as a basic feature of the business environment (Peterson, Cumming, & Carpenter, 2003; Wack, 1985). This means that they need to possess the ability to deal with uncertain environments in order to flourish and survive. Hence this dissertation seeks to assess the effects of environmental uncertainty on the dynamic between quality governance and entrepreneurial orientation. Uncertainty from quality governance points to legal, economic, political and regulatory actions of government that can be detrimental to the ability of the firm to pursue strategic choices(Miller & Friesen, 1982).

Environmental uncertainty (EU) intensifies the propensity of firms to seek more entrepreneurial strategies through increased acceptance of risky measures, innovativeness and proactivity (Foxall, 2014; Khandwalla, 1977). In the presence of increased environmental uncertainty, the adoption of entrepreneurial orientation is not only a function of the entrepreneurial personality, but also a conscious strategic response to environmental uncertainty (Smart & Vertinsky, 1984; Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, & Zhao, 2017). In addition, considering that prior research on the effect of environmental uncertainty on entrepreneurial orientation have mostly used data from western countries, business environment differences can require different strategic postures. Hence the effect may vary according to the location. This dissertation tests the moderating effect of environmental uncertainty in an alternative location: Sub-Saharan Africa and Angola in particular.

As explained under hypothesis 2, traditional systems of solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation and mutuality exist in all African societies and are still in place today, particularly in rural areas and the informal economy. This social apparatus entails the characteristics of a social organization, such as trust, standards and networks, which enhance the efficiency of society; therefore, EU increases the economic efficiency of public governance by helping to overcome the limitations of a formal institution, which are rules designed to control economic interaction (Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2000). Ultimately, EU affects entrepreneurial activity in its relationship with institutional trust and the impact is even greater in developing countries where formal institutions are less efficient(Rodrik, 2008). It is fair to believe that EU could have induced economic growth in developing countries to a greater degree, because while formal institutions are weak in these countries, economies continue to expand (Ahmad & Hall, 2017).

Market failure adds to the complexity due to underdeveloped institutional support, with additional burdens coming from bureaucracy and high rates of corruption. The lack of stable institutions combined with a more uncertain environment results in the emergence of informal institutional constraints, prominent in the form of informal networks and personalized exchanges, which have an indirect impact on competitiveness and scaling-up (Tracey & Phillips, 2011).

Due to knowledge asymmetry and imperfections in the market demand for labor, capital and goods, complexity and dynamism become important to environmental uncertainty in developing countries. Therefore, the greater the environmental uncertainty, weak institutional trust triggers firms to invest more in searching information for success in Africa (Meyer et al., 2009), which promotes entrepreneurial orientation. Low environmental uncertainty in weak institutional trust, on the other hand, discourages the need to pursue informal networks and hinders the dynamism needed to penetrate in a difficult market.

Institutional trust, which subsumes contract enforcement has been considered a critical mean to propel entrepreneurship and safeguard opportunistic conduct in business ventures (Wang, Yeung, & Zhang, 2011). Institutional trust helps mitigate and minimize the effect of goal incongruence in business partnerships and is generally accepted as vital for entrepreneurial cooperation(Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). Trust in institutions as instruments to safeguard opportunistic behavior will also define the degree to which business partners believe their counterparts will act with benevolence or face penalties and contract enforcement. Extant research has concluded that environmental uncertainty limits the efficacy of control mechanisms and institutional trust (Wang et al., 2011). Low institutional trust, institutional voids and the lack of confidence in the existing legal system boost or encourage opportunistic behavior in emerging economies, which in turn inhibits entrepreneurial orientation(Gong, Shenkar, Luo, & Nyaw, 2007; Luo, 2005; Zhou & Poppo, 2010). Institutional trust, on the other hand, will transcend the inflexibility drawbacks of contractual-based governance in environmentally uncertain markets(Wang et al., 2011). In emerging economies with high environmental uncertainty, institutional trust tends to strengthen entrepreneurial relations in business partnerships (Zhou, Li, Zhao, & Cai, 2003). Therefore:

H3: Environmental uncertainty moderate the relationship between the institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa, such that at higher levels of environmental uncertainty, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is negative, whereas at lower levels of environmental uncertainty, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is positive.

Social Capital and Innovation

The principle of social capital is believed to be rooted in social relations (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Portes, 1998; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). The concept is that relationship networks are a resource, which facilitates and also limit social and economic activities and effective results (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). While no generally agreed concept of social capital exists, scholars agree on the fact that social capital is a valuable resource embedded in a relationship network, which makes it easier for individuals and organizations to enhance other resources (Coleman, 1988). Social capital is defined as the network of relations by a focal player (individual or group), which entails institutional, relational, and cognitive aspects that can boost or restrict effective results or actions (Coleman, 1988).

African entrepreneurship literature includes social capital, culture, kinship connections, and social networking (Khavul et al., 2009; Khayesi, George, & Antonakis, 2014; Kiggundu, 2002). Prior research has revealed that it is difficult for African entrepreneurs to create and maintain successful social networks (Kiggundu, 2002). Recent research, however, has been less focused on this reality and more concerned with their largely positive consequences. While studies have shown that non-family businesses profit more generally, they often highlight both the positive and negative implications of kinship ties in the context of family firms (Acquaah, 2011).

In developing countries, strong family ties and the collectivist culture of the society are the foundations for social protection (Meagher, 2005). Social and family ties are known to play an important role by providing a variety of benefits for households and individuals. In the absence of formal institutions, these networks are critical in reaching private solutions to market failures (Anderson, Jack, & Dodd, 2016). Studies in various countries have found that, under these conditions, social and family ties can provide informal risk-sharing to poor and rural households. These settings are an alternative platform to enforce social norms or contracts, which in turn reduce risks and lower transaction costs.

Informal entrepreneurs are often disqualified from institutions providing micro-credits as they operate out of the purview of government regulations (Kebede, 2018). They generally benefit from wide, ongoing social support ties, with efficient kinship ties providing start-up resources to circumvent the inefficiencies dealing with institutional trust. It is worth to note that 89% of the start-up capital for micro-entrepreneurs in Africa originates from relatives and friends (Haftu, Tseahye, Teklu, & Tassew, 2009). Research also points to the fact that entrepreneurs in developing countries try to circumvent institutional voids by leveraging informal institutions such as kinship, family and community relationships. Hence the link between institutional trust and EO will be affected by this workaround practice.

Madsen et al. (2007), in their cross-cultural experimental research on kinship and altruism, concluded that individuals are prone to endure economic hardship for their relatives proportionally based on their degree of genetic relatedness. Similarly Foster, Wenseleers, and Ratnieks (2006) in their kin selection theory suggest that individuals tend to provide assistance to relatives than non-relatives, and close relatives than distant relatives. As categorized by Madsen et al. (2007), generally close kin are siblings and parents, and distant kin are other genetic relations.

The lack of adequate support policies, regulatory and institutional incentives to the private sector growth is not a novelty in many developing countries. Therefore, due to weak institutional trust, entrepreneurs often turn to kinship and family networks to access information on market opportunities, physical capital, suppliers, innovative technologies and clients (Kebede, 2018). The entrepreneurial orientation of small enterprises, including family businesses, lays on the establishment of an effective kinship and family network in which the entrepreneur is embedded.

When it comes to willingness to help, Korchmaros and Kenny (2006) in their close relationship model of helping suggested that the relationship factors such as duty, emotional closeness and similarity lead to a link between genetic relatedness and willingness to help or assist. People spend time together, form relationships, become interdependent, feel sincere empathy for each other and are able to support each other. Since domestic society is typically structured in kinship groups, individuals are more often involved with kin and closely genetically related kin than with non-kin in this process. As a result, the propensity to help increases as genetic relatedness increases.

When individuals do not rely on institutional arrangements or when institutional arrangements are alien to them, kinship ties may supplement institutional trust (Granovetter, 1985). Kinship ties are of critical importance for entrepreneurs in low institutional trust settings, particularly where they are unable to rely on networks with public officials (Peng, 2000; Welter, Kautonen, Chepurenko, Malieva, & Venesaar, 2004). The recognition and exploitation of business opportunities often relies on personal trust, as expressed in the use of family relations. While personal trust can stem from as kinship ties, it can also originate from longstanding relationships where individuals trust each other and have come to know each other. Considering these dynamics, despite the absence of explicit legal contracts, individuals often believe that their parents, spouse, or relative would not act opportunistically (Welter & Smallbone, 2011). This suggests that informal norms regulate these relationships. A high degree of institutional trust, on the other hand, encourages entrepreneurs to venture into transactions outside the trustworthy network of people that are individually familiar to them (Raiser, 1999; Raiser, Haerpfer, Nowotny, & Wallace, 2002). Therefore, institutional trust enables business dealings with anonymous sources such as non-related individuals (no kinship), assuming that there are enforcement mechanisms and legal safeguards in the event of failure or default in those partnerships. Therefore, I hypothesize that,

H4: Close kinship ties moderate the relationship between the institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa such that for those entrepreneurs with close kinship involvement, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is positive, whereas for those entrepreneurs without close kinship involvement, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is negative.

Firm Resources and Political Affiliation

The resource-based view emphasizes the importance of resources to compete in the market, both tangible and intangible (Wernerfelt, 1984). A business enterprise can emerge as a set of financial, physical, organizational, and human resources, which can form its strength and weakness. The resources of an organization, therefore, provide a superior competitive advantage. Unless they are replicated, the development of such resources takes a longer cycle of learning to make them a part of the complex organizational culture that is usually unique to every business (Thong, 2001).

Wernerfelt (1984) described a resource as something considered as a company's strength or weakness. Resources include human capital, information stocks, financial assets, and other factors, which a firm possesses, manages, and capitalizes to deliver market offerings that are productive and competitive (Bakar & Ahmad, 2010; O'Regan & Ghobadian, 2004). More formally, those existing and non-current assets are the company's properties, which are semi-permanently associated with the company (Dess, Lumpkin, & McGee, 1999). Intangible resources, such as creativity, product or service quality, human capital, development of innovations, and tangible resources and locations are included (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Prahalad & Hamel, 2006).

Many scholars have sought to establish specific categorization of tools for small businesses. Such classes include tangible, economic, and intangible properties, including in-house information, professional staff recruitment, brand names, technology, commercial contacts, and productivity (McGivern & Tvorik, 1997). This being said, resources encompass human, political, reputational, social, technical, and physical capitals (Barney, 1991). Manolova, Brush, Edelman, and Greene (2002) identified human capital as an asset representing an individual's acquired knowledge and skills that require unique and novel acts based on the qualities of people and their behavior.

Human capital requires experience, creativity, and skills in management with the purpose to increase the level of customer loyalty (Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2016). The social capital consists of human and organizational relationships. It affects the exchange of inter-firm and inter-unit resources, the creation of supplier relationships, inter-company learning, intellectual capital, product innovation, and enterprise (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). Financial capital comprises equity and income, debt, personal sources, and patent capital (Hadjimanolis, 2000). Tangible and sustainable assets in a company are physical and technological resources, which allow the firm to increase competitive advantage through increased efficiency and superior geographical position. Boateng, Boateng, and Bampoe (2014) found in their analysis that the lack of skills, assistance, resources, business opportunities, and risks are the key obstacles to entrepreneurship in rural communities.

According to Liedholm et al. (1994), underdeveloped infrastructure, inadequate public facilities, poverty, and skills shortage are all obstacles to rural entrepreneurial growth. The development of rural entrepreneurship in the local communities is undermined by these issues. The series of social, economic, and political issues, as mentioned by Idam (2014), create a hostile environment that prevents the progress of business enterprises and other small businesses. Mead and Liedholm (1998) posited that inadequate funding, undeveloped transportation networks, inadequate markets, distant markets, energy shortages, insufficient facilities, corruption, and the absence of marketing initiatives inhibit the entrepreneurial climate. Indeed, Senyard, Baker, and Davidsson (2009) concluded that a community-based enterprise relies mainly on investment, which can be established through local resource mobilization or partnerships with various agencies.

It is important to note that corporations frequently take aggressive political actions to manage and exploit the unfavorable environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). They rely on their resources and environment for legitimacy to function and may act to mitigate environmental instability, even in the presence of serious environmental constraints. In accordance with the environment, businesses should employ various techniques to reduce uncertainty and dependency. Companies may enter in various kinds of inter-organizational arrangements, including joint ventures, interlocking, mergers and acquisitions, and partnerships, to reduce their reliance on other organizations for critical resources (Drees & Heugens, 2013).

Nevertheless, corporations may embrace political activities and means for the broader social system (government) to change the adverse condition of an outside environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). They may also participate in various political activities for this purpose. The current empirical work primarily focuses on how large corporations seek to tilt institutional regulations to their advantage (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013). The study shows that business enterprises in developing economies frequently do not have the potential to influence public policies in view of their fairly limited size and low socio-political credibility and power in the process of democratic change. Rather, they establish organizational frameworks at the corporate level, which involve government agencies in their organizational structures, to reduce ambiguity and dependence. The private-public hybrid structures discussed here are organizational arrangements at the level of companies formed by entrepreneurs during the process of gradual reform. Two main public-private hybrid structures were formed during the progressive transition according to the extant literature.

The political arena can offer entrepreneurs with preferential treatment, good policies, private information, and access to resources, which have a direct or indirect effect on their economic market growth aspirations. Viewing government as a resource, entrepreneurs may act politically to mitigate the effects of transaction costs and boost their ability to supply potential clients with cheaper, better, or unique goods and simultaneously raise the cost of their foreign and domestic competitors (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Political relations can also create a competitive advantage by allowing a business to protect and maintain its market share (Lawton et al., 2013). Furthermore, they can decrease the environmental uncertainty and cost of transactions and improve sustainable development (Lawton et al., 2013).

Politically connected firms receive support from public enterprises, lower taxes, and preferential consideration when bidding for public contracts (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Faccio, 2006; Ge, Stanley, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 2017). Therefore, political ties are a valuable tool to foster entrepreneurial orientation. In addition, political capital can be combined with other resources for greater firm performance (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Politically connected firms, as shown by Faccio (2010), earn more profit compared to those that do not establish such networks.

In emerging countries, political connections protect firms against public agent's exactions of all sorts. It is also known that in countries where corruption abounds, the political connections help firms grow fast (Farrell et al., 2006). It is generally accepted that entrepreneurship is influenced by institutions and Institutional trust (North, 1990b). Because it affects entrepreneurial processes, the institutional trust is expected to influence entrepreneurs' growth aspirations and willingness to reinvest in their business (Ge et al., 2017). In developing countries, where the government and political affiliation still play a critical role in the business environment, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is likely to be contingent on entrepreneurs' political affiliation.

In the context of Angola, since the independence, the ruling party controls the political landscape, which makes use of the full advantages of incumbency to entrench its power. The MPLA is a tremendous machinery, with systems that still derive from the socialist era down to neighborhood level. The party claims millions of supporters and actual affiliated, as there are many advantages of being “one of ours," opening doors to business opportunities and jobs.

It is important to note that Talavera, Xiong, and Xiong (2012) in their study on social capital and access to financing in developing countries posited that adherence to the main political ideology and the dominant political party's role influence patterns of social networking and business success. Thus, for all purposes, entrepreneurial success in such context of low institutional trust like Angola is conditioned to the affiliation to the MPLA or not. It is also a binary choice between the ruling party and the others, regardless of the numbers of parties and actual affiliations. Very often, such affiliation does not need to be official: a simple public acknowledge of adherence will suffice.

Hence, in the dynamics between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in Africa, political affiliation to the ruling party can help circumvent institutional constraints, and bypass institutional voids such as administrative slowness, access to bank credit and so forth. Those with no adherence to the ruling parties are less likely to succeed compared to those affiliated to the ruling party. Entrepreneurship in developing countries tends to flourish through political networks, and private information trading is the basis for the development of these networks (Li & Wu, 2010). Due to the reduced public information and low institutional trust, these relation-based markets are often vulnerable to corruption and trading of favors through unofficial means(Alon et al., 2018). Amidst low institutional trust, lobbying and political affiliation constitute a collaborative tactic in which entrepreneurs create support for particular initiatives and help them mitigate the effects of institutional voids. In such environments, entrepreneurs without political affiliations are often unable to gain privileged access to essential information, security, resources and protection(Lawton et al., 2013). Whereas this clientelism is also present in high institutional trust markets, it is often exacerbated in low institutional trust contexts, where the risk of expropriation is fairly high and the rule of law is absent (Sydow et al., 2020). In the case of Angola, we intend to simply look at the affiliation to the ruling party and hypothesize that,

H5: Political affiliation moderates the relationship between the institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa such that for those entrepreneurs with political affiliation to the ruling party, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is positive, whereas for those entrepreneurs without political affiliation to the ruling party, the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation is negative.

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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The current section will be divided into seven subsections. The first subsection will provide an overview of the research study. The second and third subsection will provide specific depiction of the survey instrument and approach. The fourth subsection will discuss the proposed analysis for hypotheses testing. The following section details data collection and procedures proposed for the survey. The next section describes the preliminary measures to be used for data collection. The final section considers common method variance and the actions that will be taken to curtail the effect.

3.1 Overview

The current study proposes the use of quantitative methods (Creswell, 2014). This approach consists of a quantitative survey. Data were collected via local distribution of paper-based surveys to microentrepreneurs, a very popular approach among family firm scholars (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008). Consistent with existing literature, the survey was directed at owners or founders of small businesses, here defined as microenterprises organized in cooperatives (Wolff & Pett, 2006). The data were collected in rural areas of a Sub-Saharan African country called Angola. To accomplish this task, I partnered with a local and reputable NGO called ADRA.

ADRA operates at three territorial levels in integrated and complementary dimension: the municipal, provincial and national levels. In Luanda, the capital (headquarters), the majority of lobbying and social advocacy actions are carried out, which have national coverage. In the remaining six provinces - Malanje, Huambo, Benguela, Kwanza Sul, Huíla and Cunene - the actions wee aimed at municipalities and rural communities. Data were collected in 6 cooperatives, which cover 3 of the 7 provinces served by ADRA. Due to financial and logistical constraints, all 7 provinces were not surveyed; however, in order to ensure variance or dispersion, here referring to the degree of scatter or variability among a collection of observations, 3 provinces were surveyed. For example, in surveying the effectiveness of a governance quality, ratings from individuals differed.

The uniqueness of my approach stems from utilizing 4 ADRA technicians: a local manager and 3 surveyors. The entire process occurred in 3 weeks. This process included an administrative component, considering that the questionnaires were printed locally. Each printed packet included a cover letter or recruitment script, a consent form, and a survey for completion by the individual owner. The manager coordinated the entire process of data collection as well as managing the surveyors, who served as mail deliverers and collectors. In addition, the manager gathered the completed questionnaires and coordinated shipping with the researcher. I collected survey data from small business owners and a mailing list of 150 participants organized in cooperatives were the focus of my data collection. Participants in the quantitative survey were obtained from ADRA's network of 259 cooperatives scattered in 7 provinces.

3.2 Survey Instrument

The prevalence of surveys in empirical studies within social sciences has been established, particularly within family firms and small enterprises (Eddleston et al., 2008; Newby, Watson, & Woodliff, 2003). Therefore, this instrument is used to collect data in this research. In order to mitigate low response rates, key steps were proposed, namely: ensuring the anonymity of participants (Kanso, 2000), indication of sponsorship (Greer & Lohtia, 1994), personalization (Creswell & Creswell, 2017).

My survey addressed these recommendations by: (1) a consent page pledging anonymity of the participants, (2) a statement of university affiliation including contact information for the university's research compliance officer. The remaining recommendations were addressed through the local apparatus put in place with ADRA's technicians. They ensured individual delivery, replacement of the questionnaire if necessary, answering questions, and collection or pick up of the completed questionnaires.

3.3 Survey Approach

My survey is unique in that it was ~~will be~~ administered by a local ADRA team (local NGO) designed to assist with the entire process of data collection. The survey data were collected from the individual owners, who were also part of ADRA's network of 259 cooperatives. Extant literature has previously validated the scales found in these cross-sectional surveys.

3.4 Sampling Frame

The sample consisted of individual business owners selected in 3 provinces of Angola. Two cooperatives out of each province were selected and 25 participants of each cooperative formed the overall sample size of 149 participants. The participants were a mix of male and female from rural areas of Angola. Demographic questions captured the age, province, municipality, cooperative name and education of the participants. Participants were assessed because they are individual rural entrepreneurs and currently active in entrepreneurship. This study did not include individuals who are no longer business owners, which suggests a survivor bias as limitation of this study (Lichtenstein, Carter, Dooley, & Gartner, 2007).

3.5 Data Analysis

The data analysis tested my research model and the hypothesized relationships, provide an initial examination, diagnostics testing, and required tests of biases. I tested the relationships through ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with tests for moderation. This was achieved using the latest version of the IBM SPSS Statistics software. Missing data was anticipated and several steps were performed to account for missing or incomplete data (Creswell, 2014; Forza, 2002).

Furthermore, bias tests were assessed on the data to gauge whether the variance was due to the method rather than the measure (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). On the data of both depend and independent variables, a descriptive analysis was performed that included means and standard deviations of all variables in the study. Then a regression diagnostic test was performed to confirm the data meets the assumptions of linearity, normality, random distribution and homoscedasticity. Lastly, the statistical significance of each hypothesis was tested to assess whether the results supported the dissertation hypotheses.

3.6 Data Collection

This paper-based survey was administered on individual owners affiliated with associations, which included community organizations of family agricultural producers (cooperatives). These individual owners were organized in cooperatives. The governance structure of these cooperatives matched the description by Feng & Hendrikse (2012 p.242) that cooperatives are: "enterprise collectively owned by many independent farmers as input suppliers in a production chain. The members own collectively a joint resource where they either further process or market their produce. They delegate certain rights to the cooperative enterprise. Subsequently, the cooperative enterprise concludes contracts with members, specifying, for example, delivery requirements. The vertical ties between the members and the processor therefore consist of a transaction element and an ownership element".

3.7 Measures

This section addressed the operationalization of each variable in the study model. The dependent variable was first defined, accompanied by a description of the independent variable, the moderators, and control variables. Table 1 includes a description of the variables, measures, and data sources.

Table 1: Summary of Variables, Measures and Data Sources

Variable	Measure	Data Source
Independent		
Institutional trust	4-item Institutional trust measure (adapted) using a 7-point Likert scale (Banerjee & Rosenblat, 2016)	Principal (Owner)
Dependent		
Entrepreneurial Orientation	9-item EO measure (adapted) using a 7-point Likert scale (Covin & Wales, 2012)	Principal (Owner)
Moderators		
Environmental Uncertainty	Count of family members or relatives (close and distant kinship) involved in the firm. Table adapted from Yu et al. (2020)	Principal (Owner)
Munificence	5-item munificence measure using a 7-point Likert scale (Khandwalla, 1977; Bantel, 1998)	Principal (Owner)
Kinship Ties	15-item quality of relationships measure using a 7-point Likert scale (Roberts, Varki and Brodie, 2003)	Principal (Owner)
Political Affiliation	1-item political connections measure using a "yes" or "no" scale (Ge, Stanley, Eddleston, and Kellermanns, 2017)	Principal (Owner)
Controls		
Business Level	Creation date, financial performance, owner's age, Owner's gender, cooperative name, provincial, education, average hours worked, firm industry.	Principal (Owner)

3.7.1 Independent Variable: Institutional trust

Institutional trust: Governability relies on governance, and governance is important for the development of trust and confidence in institutions (Kim, 2010). As defined by Tusalem (2015), quality governance encompasses the rule of law, antidote of corruption, bureaucratic efficiency, political stability, and standard of regulation. It is further assessed by gauging active bribery, which includes firms engaging public officials using the temptation of payments as a method of influence and coercion. The measure was adapted from Banerjee & Rosenblat (2016) and Martin et al. (2007) and assessed through four items measured on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by "always true" and "never true".

Table 2: Scale items for Institutional trust

Please state your perception and experience of doing business in your province (1 = always true; 7 = never true)

	Always True						Never True
I have high trust in the provincial government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have high trust in the local government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have high trust in the local courts	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have high trust in the local police	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

3.7.2 Dependent Variable : Entrepreneurial Orientation

Entrepreneurial Orientation : Entrepreneurial orientation refers to the process through which a strategy is made for an organization based on entrepreneurial decisions (Rauch et al., 2009). The scale was borrowed from (Covin & Slevin, 1989) and assessed through 9 items on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by “always true” and “never true”. The scale was administered twice to distinguish questions pertaining to respondents’ firms and cooperatives.

Table 3: Scale items for entrepreneurial orientation

A strong emphasis on the marketing of tried-and-true products or services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	A strong emphasis on technological leadership, and innovations
How many new lines of products or services has your firm marketed in the past five years (or since its establishment)?								
No new lines of products or services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very many new lines of products or services
Changes in product or service lines have been mostly of a minor nature	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Changes in product or service lines have usually been quite dramatic

In dealing with its competitors, my firm...

Typically responds to actions which competitors initiate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically initiates actions to which competitors then respond
Is very seldom the first business to introduce new products/services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Is very often the first business to introduce new products/services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc.
Typically seeks to avoid competitive clashes, preferring a “live-and-let-live” posture	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically adopts a very competitive, “undo-the-competitors” posture

In general, my firm has...

A strong proclivity for low-risk projects (with normal and certain rates of return)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	A strong proclivity for high-risk projects (with chances of very high returns)

In general, my firm believes that...

Owing to the nature of the environment, it is best to explore it gradually via cautious, incremental behavior	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Owing to the nature of the environment, bold, wide-ranging acts are necessary to achieve the firm's objectives

When confronted with decision-making situations involving uncertainty, my firm...

Typically adopts a cautious, "wait-and-see" posture in order to minimize the probability of making costly decisions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically adopts a bold, aggressive posture in order to maximize the probability of exploiting potential opportunities

3.7.3 Moderators: Environmental Uncertainty, Munificence, Kinship and Political Affiliation.

Environmental Uncertainty: It is known as the rate of unforeseeable change in the environmental factors associated with strategic decision-making (Bantel, 1998). Uncertainty is a critical element in terms of its impact on strategy as it drives decision-makers into adjusting their perception to make appropriate strategic responses and match the environmental reality. The scale was borrowed from Khandwalla (1977) and Bantel (1998). It was assessed through 5 items external environment measure, using a 7-point Likert scale anchored by "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree" .

Table 4: Scale items for Environmental uncertainty.

Please circle the number on the scale that best approximates the actual conditions in your industry.

Our firm must rarely change its practices to keep up with the market and competitors.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Our firm must change its marketing practices extremely frequently (e.g., semi-annually).
The rate at which products/services are getting obsolete in the industry is very slow.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	The rate of obsolescence is very high (as in semiconductors).
Actions of competitors are quite easy to predict.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Actions of competitors are unpredictable.
Demand for the product and consumer tastes are fairly easy to forecast.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Consumer demand and tastes are unpredictable.
The production/service technology is not subject to very much change and is well established.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	The mode of production/service changes often and in a major way (e.g., advanced electronic components).

Munificence: It is defined as the ability or capacity of the environment to support sustained growth (Bantel,1998). A high level of capacity shields businesses from externalities and enhances the accrual of slack resources (Bantel, 1998). It was assessed through 3 items munificence measure, using a 7-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree” (Khandwalla, 1977; Bantel, 1998).

Table 5: Scale items for munificence

How would you characterize the external environment within which your firm operates?

Very safe, little threat to the survival and well-being of the firm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very risky, one false step can mean my firm's undoing.
Rich in investment and marketing opportunities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very stressful, hostile, very hard to keep afloat.
An environment that my firm can control and manipulate to its own advantage, such as a dominant firm has in an industry with little competition and few hindrances.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	A dominating environment in which my firm's initiatives count for very little against the tremendous political, technological, or competitive forces.

Kinship: Refers to relationships by blood and marriage and encompasses one's spouse, parents, children, and other relatives like siblings and in-laws (Khayesi et al., 2014). In African context, kin relations are widespread and consist of nuclear as well as extended families, often amounting to hundreds or even the size of a tribe (Khayesi et al., 2014). Consistent with Yu et. al (2020), close kinship ties include spouses, siblings, parents, or children. Distant kinship includes relatives other than close kinship as well as neighbors, former classmates, former colleagues, and friends of the family. Count of family members or relatives (close and distant kinship) involved in the firm. The table below was adapted from Yu et al. (2020).

Table 6: Scale for kinship

Please select the family member(s) or relative(s) as well as the number or family member(s) or relative(s) involved in your business and indicate the # involved (e.g., 2 children).

	Spouse	Sibling	Father	Mother	Children	In laws	Cousins	Aunt
Count								

	Uncle	Nephew	Niece	Others	Neighbors	Former classmates	Former colleagues	Friends of the family	Non-family members
Count									

Political Affiliation: Defined as the relationships between entrepreneurs and political agents or institutions such as parties, elected legislators and government officials (Ge et al., 2017). To conform it to the Angolan context, the survey was a binary question asking whether the entrepreneur was affiliated with the ruling party MPLA or not. The 1-item scale using a “yes” or “no” scale was adapted from Ge, Stanley, Eddleston, and Kellermanns (2017).

Table 7: Scale item for political affiliation

Please indicate whether you are a member of the ruling party (MPLA).
______Yes ______No

3.7.4 Control Variables

This dissertation considered extant literature on established relationships as source for the control variables to be used in the analyses. When incorporating control variables to the model, the effect of the pre-specified relationship was considered before the results of the present study were tested. Control variables were chosen on the basis of the theory of social cognition, the theory of emergence and the literature on entrepreneurship. The controls to use were: Age(Carnahan, Agarwal, & Campbell, 2012; Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, & Flores, 2010), Education(Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2008; Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2009), Gender (Carnahan et al., 2012; Solomon, Hamidi, Wennberg, & Berglund, 2008).

The Age and Education of the participant were used to ensure that previous expertise is relevant to their business experience and not to formal schooling or any life experience due to age (Schindehutte, Morris, & Allen, 2006; Ucbasaran et al., 2010). Gender also served as control to gauge a number of potential systematic differences between female and male-owned businesses that might explain (at least partially) business performance. The province and cooperative name were used to isolate the model for potential variations that may arise from such factors (Liao & Gartner, 2006; Pellegrino, Piva, & Vivarelli, 2011).

Finally, financial controls were also added. Growth in sales indicates how well a firm relates to their environment by effectively growing their product-market scope (Dess & Robinson Jr, 1984). Strategy involves all dimensions of corporate behavior, more than just financial ratios. Financial performance will be assessed by growth in profitability, the growth of sales, the growth of the number of employees and ability to self-fund (Durand & Coeurderoy, 2001).

3.8 Common Method Variance

Data should be obtained from the majority of survey participants at a particular point in time using self-reported scales; thus, common method variance may become an issue. Common method variance (CMV) is the disparity between the variables that are certified to the means of measurement that may have an effect on behavioral testing responses (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Therefore, to control for CMV, I used the Harman single-factor test. The Harman single-factor test requires loading all the measures in a study into an exploratory factor analysis, with the assumption that the presence of CMV is indicated by the emergence of either a single factor or a general factor accounting for the majority of covariance among measures (Podsakoff et al. 2003, p. 889).

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

This chapter presents the findings of the study and the test of the hypotheses in the research model. First, this section provides a preliminary overview explaining the sample, detailing the missing data statistics and testing for bias in the sample, and assessing the scales that measure each construct. A bivariate correlation analysis and descriptive statistics was then performed, accompanied by regression results of the tested hypotheses.

4.1 Preliminary Analysis

Cooperatives were randomly identified using ADRA's network, and from cooperative members who were interested in completing the survey based on their availability and accessibility. The 2020 pandemic conditions, the lockdown in several provinces of Angola and the overall mobility restrictions had a negative effect in this data collection. This was a paper-based survey and of the 149 surveys administered, 16 had large incomplete sections of the survey, and 133 completed the survey, resulting in a completion rate of 89%. A missing value analysis was conducted in the SPSS prior to data analysis to assess the valid number of cases being used in the statistical analysis. In the few cases selected, the missing data was replaced with the mean. This was the case for 16 surveys.

Moreover, in order to mitigate the impact of missing values, z scores were calculated for for each variable (Mazza & Enders, 2014). Baraldi and Enders (2010) argued that, with missing data, an individual squared z-score is calculated using any data available for that item, and also that the fit for the whole sample is just a weighted sum of the individual fit values. Consequently, without eliminating the data and without filling the data using other means, the maximum probability is to determine the parameters. (Baraldi & Enders, 2010).

The common method bias (CMB) was analyzed after analyzing and assessing missing or insufficient data. CMB emerges when disparities in response are caused by the survey instead of the real patterns of the participants that the survey is seeking to reveal. (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In order to meet the challenges of the common method bias from the beginning, the survey already included various statistical and procedural remedies during the implementation of the survey to minimize this effect (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). As a starting point, the survey participants were assured that their responses or data would only be handled anonymously, and the highest level of confidentiality would be guaranteed throughout the procedure. Consequently, the evaluation apprehension and the effect of social desirability were minimized.

Second, the sequencing and arrangement of the question content in the survey were done in such a way that participants should not notice any direct link between the constructs. Third, the adoption of existing measurement scales from prior research was rigorously upheld from the onset by the dissertation committee. Finally, the Harman's single-factor test was performed loading all survey items into one single factor. Extant research indicates that the use factor analysis should be undertaken in order to highlight an underlying concept and to promote understanding, decreasing factors, from survey objects to a smaller range based on shared variance (Yong & Pearce, 2013). 5 factors were extracted with an eigenvalue greater than one (together accounting for around 62.5% of the total variance). The total variance of the first factor in the sample was around 22%, while the remaining factors accounted for other 40.5% of the total variance. Overall, CMB does not seem to be a problem in terms of both ex-ante procedures and ex-post statistical evidence.

Lastly, the analysis tested the multi-item scales of the dependent and independent variables (institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation) as well as the moderators by evaluating the reliability of the scales as determined by the alpha coefficient. (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). The interpretation of the Likert scale question or alpha coefficient needs to abide by the following rule of thumb: "when $\alpha \geq 0.9$ internal consistency is excellent; $0.9 > \alpha \geq 0.8$ internal consistency is good; $0.8 > \alpha \geq 0.7$ internal consistency is acceptable; $0.7 > \alpha \geq 0.6$ internal consistency is questionable; $0.6 > \alpha \geq 0.5$ internal consistency is poor; $0.5 > \alpha$ internal consistency is unacceptable" (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011, p.53 -55). A look at Table 9 shows all alphas were within acceptable ranges, except for environmental uncertainty with a low $\alpha = 0.594$.

Table 7: Scale Reliability Analysis

Scale Reliability Analysis		
Construct	**Items**	**α**
Dependent Variable		
Entrepreneurial Orientation	9	0.837
Independent Variable		
Institutional Trust	4	0.779
Moderators		
Environmental Uncertainty	5	0.594
Munificence	5	0.763
Kinship Ties	16	0.731
Political Affiliation (Single item yes or no)	1	-

4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis

In this study, Table 10 offers descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between the variables. Regarding the demographics of the survey participants, 87.2 percent were between the age of 17 to 60 years of age; 51 percent of the respondents were males, and 49 percent were females, and 47 percent of the respondents had elementary level education. Creation date ranged from 2007 to 2020.

As to the control variables (province name, firm age, gender, education and firm performance), the participant's age was significantly correlated with many variables: the cooperatives of Kitua (r=0.26, p>0.01), Ngola (r=-0.36, p>0.01), Flor do Campo (r=-0.18, p>0.01), Sementes (r=0.24, p>0.01), and creation date (r=-0.24, p>0.01). The Ngola cooperative was significantly correlated with the Malanje province (r=0.73, p>0.01), Huambo province (r=-0.39, p>0.01) as well as the creation date (r=0.86, p>0.01). Regarding the analysis of the independent and moderator variables, Institutional Trust was significantly correlated among others with Malanje province (r=-0.42, p>0.01), creation date (r=-0.39, p>0.01) and the Ngola cooperative (r=-0.38, p>0.01). Environmental uncertainty showed a significant correlation with the Huambo province (r=0.45, p>0.01), the cooperatives of Flor do Campo (r=0.32, p>0.01) and Sementes (r=0.27, p>0.01) as well as the current performance (r=-0.29, p>0.01). Environmental munificence was significantly correlated among others with the Honde cooperative (r=0.37, p>0.01) as well as environmental uncertainty (r=0.38, p>0.01). Close kinship was significantly correlated with current performance (r=-0.29, p>0.01), while political affiliation was significantly and negatively correlated with environmental munificence (r=-0.30, p>0.01) and close kinship (r=-0.25, p>0.01). Entrepreneurial orientation was significantly and positively correlated with environmental munificence (r=0.46, p>0.01).

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations

		Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1	Malanje Province	0.44	0.50																		
2	Huambo Province	0.26	0.44	-0.53**																	
3	Creation Date	2014.55	3.94	0.68**	-0.30**																
4	Kitua Cooperative	0.14	0.35	0.46**	-0.24**	-0.16															
5	Ngola Cooperative	0.30	0.46	0.73**	-0.39**	0.86**	-0.27**														
6	Flor do Campo Cooperative	0.18	0.39	-0.42**	0.79**	-0.37**	-0.19*	-0.31**													
7	Sementes Cooperative	0.08	0.28	-0.27**	0.50**	0.03	-0.12	-0.20*	-0.14												
8	Honde Cooperative	0.12	0.33	-0.33**	-0.22*	-0.15	-0.15	-0.24**	-0.17*	-0.11											
9	Age	46.05	14.13	-0.15	-0.01	-0.24**	0.26**	-0.36**	-0.18*	0.24**	-0.07										
10	Gender	1.49	0.50	-0.06	-0.11	0.00	-0.18*	0.08	-0.03	-0.13	0.10	-0.05									
11	Education	2.26	0.84	-0.38**	0.35**	-0.25**	-0.20*	-0.26**	0.18*	0.30**	0.03	-0.15	-0.33**								
12	Current Performance	5.11	1.07	0.17	-0.30**	0.11	-0.01	0.19*	-0.10	-0.33**	-0.14	-0.11	0.09	-0.14							
13	Institutional Trust	3.68	1.26	-0.42**	0.22*	-0.39**	-0.10	-0.38**	0.20*	0.06	-0.03	0.01	0.07	0.20*	0.13						
14	Environmental Uncertainty	2.96	1.06	-0.03	0.45**	0.14	-0.09	0.03	0.32**	0.27**	0.11	-0.07	-0.03	0.11	-0.29**	-0.10					
15	Environmental Munificence	3.26	1.24	-0.21*	0.23**	-0.07	-0.06	-0.18*	0.12	0.19*	0.37**	0.03	0.11	0.15	-0.06	-0.03	0.38**				
16	Close Kinship	3.03	2.50	-0.32**	0.38**	-0.18*	-0.11	-0.26**	0.27**	0.23**	0.05	0.17*	-0.07	0.19*	-0.29**	0.10	0.23**	0.09			
17	Political Affiliation	0.77	0.42	0.31**	-0.40**	0.18*	0.07	0.28**	-0.39**	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08	0.08	-0.15	-0.02	-0.15	-0.17	-0.30**	-0.25**		
18	Entrepreneurial Orientation (Firm)	2.91	0.78	-0.08	0.13	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	0.12	0.03	0.19*	-0.07	-0.01	0.15	0.01	0.08	0.16	0.46**	0.08	-0.09	

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

c. Listwise N=133

When values of VIF exceed 10 and the condition index exceeds 30, it is an indication that there is multicollinearity (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013). However, the highest observed variance inflation factor (VIF) was 1.816, and the highest value of the condition index was 26.333. Some of the variables in this sample are correlated. In this analysis, all values were below the VIF threshold of 10, mitigating multicollinearity issues (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).

4.3 Regression Results

With four models and outcomes for each of the constructs related to the dependent variable, the hypotheses were evaluated using a hierarchical regression analysis. Regression results for Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) as the dependent variable are provided in Table 11. The study controlled for cooperative name, age, gender, education and current performance in all models. In Model 1, cooperatives Ngola, Flor do Campo and Honde were significant and positively related to EO (β=0.284, $p<.05$; β=0.331, $p<.01$; β=0.373, $p<.01$), and current performance was significant and positively related to EO (β=0.128, $p<.01$). The model was not significant ($p<.10$) with a ΔR^2 of 0.119 and suggests that the cooperatives Ngola, Flor do Campo and Honde, as well as well as the current performance have relatively low impact on EO. Model 2 tested for Hypothesis 1 and the independent variable Institutional Trust was entered into the model. Hypothesis 1 proposed that Institutional Trust is positively associated with entrepreneurial orientation; Institutional Trust was not significant in the model, but positively related to EO (β=0.108, ns.); consequently, the hypothesis was not supported.

Table 9: Results of Linear Regression Analysis: Four Models

Variables	**Models**			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Controls:				
Kitua Cooperative	0.199†	0.227†	0.134	0.111
Ngola Cooperative	0.284*	0.351*	0.273†	0.178
Flor do Campo Cooperative	0.331**	0.342**	0.233	0.157
Sementes Cooperative	0.172	0.177	0.045	0.020
Honde Cooperative	0.373**	0.399**	0.167	0.205
Age	0.076	0.090	0.033	-0.023
Gender	0.058	0.049	-0.047	-0.114
Education	0.196†	0.189†	0.102	0.057
Current Performance	0.128**	0.110	0.039	0.070
Independent variables:				
Institutional Trust		0.108	0.141	0.039
Moderators:				
Uncertainty			-0.108	-0.012
Munificence			0.483***	0.470***
Close Kinship			0.056	0.125
Political Affiliation			0.111	0.126
Interaction effects:				
Institutional Trust * Uncertainty				-0.247**
Institutional Trust * Munificence				0.309**
Institutional Trust * Close Kinship				0.110
Institutional Trust * Political Affiliation				0.210*
$\triangle R^2$	0.119†	0.008	0.142***	0.101**
R^2	0.119	0.127	0.269	0.370
Adjusted R^2	0.054	0.056	0.182	0.270
F	1.841†	1.167	5.728***	4.547**

*† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; [1]Standardized regression weights*

N = 133

Model 3 tested for the four moderation effects Environmental Uncertainty, Environmental Munificence, Close Kinship and Political affiliation that were entered into the model with three significant relationships. The moderator Environmental Uncertainty as shown in the model was significant and positively related to EO (β=0.483, p<.001). The model was significant (p<0.001) with an adjusted $R^2$2=0.182 and had a delta R^2=0.142 and suggests that environmental munificence has a direct impact on EO.

Model 4 tests for the four moderation effects of all four moderators, the four interactions were entered and tested for hypotheses H2, H3, H4 and H5. In the model, the moderator environmental munificence was found to have significance and positively related to EO (β=0.470, p<.001). The model was significant (p<.01) with an adjusted R^2=0.270 and had a delta R^2=0.101 and suggests that the interaction between institutional trust and environmental munificence has an impact on EO. Hypothesis 2 argued that environmental munificence moderates the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation. The interaction of institutional trust*environmental munificence was significant and positively related to EO (β=0.309, p<0.01), thus, this hypothesis was supported. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between institutional trust (IT) and environmental munificence (EM) changes directions based on the degree of environmental munificence (EM). For high levels of environmental munificence (EM), there is a positive relationship between IT and EM, while for low EM, there is a negative relationship. The analysis revealed an interaction attributed to EM. The moderating effect of EM on IT → EO can be observed. Higher levels of EM enhance the relationship between IT and EO. Low levels of EM weaken the relationship between IT and EO.

This result supports H2: The relationship between IT and EO is moderated by EM; higher levels of EM enhance this relationship and lower levels of EM weaken this relationship.



Figure2: Institutional Trust and Environmental Munificence Interaction Effect

Hypothesis 3 argued that environmental uncertainty moderates the relationship between the institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation. The interaction of institutional trust*environmental uncertainty was significant and negatively related to EO (β=-0.247, $p<0.01$), hence, this hypothesis was supported. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between institutional trust (IT) and environmental uncertainty (EU) changes directions based on the degree of environmental uncertainty (EU). For high levels of environmental uncertainty (EU), there is a negative relationship between IT and EU, while for low EU, there is a positive relationship. The analysis revealed an interaction attributed to EU. The moderating effect of EU on IT → EO can be observed. Higher levels of EU weaken the relationship between IT and EO. Low levels of EU improve the relationship between IT and EO. This result supports H3: The relationship between IT and EO is moderated by EU; higher levels of EU weaken this relationship and lower levels of EM improve this relationship.



Figure 3: Institutional Trust and Environmental Uncertainty Interaction Effect

Hypothesis 4 argued that close kinship ties moderate the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation. The interaction of institutional trust*close kinship was not significant and positively related to EO (β=0.110, ns), thus, this hypothesis was not supported.

Hypothesis 5 claimed that Political affiliation moderates the relationship between the institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation. The interaction of institutional trust*political affiliation was significant and positively related to EO (β=0.210, p<0.05), therefore, this hypothesis was supported. Figure 4 shows the relationship between institutional trust (IT) and political affiliation (PA) changes directions based on whether there is political affiliation (PA) or not. For entrepreneurs with PA, there is a positive relationship between IT and PA, while for entrepreneurs with no PA, there is a negative relationship. The analysis revealed an interaction attributed to PA. The moderating effect of PA on IT → EO can be observed. The presence of PA enhances the relationship between IT and EO. No political affiliation (PA) by entrepreneurs weakens the relationship between IT and EO. This result supports H5: The relationship between IT and EO is moderated by PA; Political Affiliation (PA) to the ruling party enhance this relationship and absence of PA to the ruling party weakens this relationship.



Figure 4: Institutional Trust and Political Affiliation Interaction.

4.4 Summary of Results

The analyses of the hypothesized relationships and outcomes are summarized in Table 12. In this dissertation, of the five hypotheses, three were completely supported, while two were not supported.

Table 10: Hypothesized Relationships and Results

	Institutional Trust & Entrepreneurial Orientation	
H1:	Institutional trust is positively associated with entrepreneurial orientation in rural areas of Africa.	Not Supported
	Moderating Role of Environmental Munificence, Environmental Uncertainty, Kinship Ties and Political Affiliation.	
H2:	Environmental munificence moderates the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa. Specifically, at higher levels of munificence, low institutional trust increases entrepreneurial orientation and at low levels of munificence, low institutional trust decreases entrepreneurial orientation.	**Supported**
H3:	Environmental uncertainty moderates the relationship between the institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa. Specially, at higher levels of environmental uncertainty, low institutional trust increases entrepreneurial orientation. Conversely, at low levels of environmental uncertainty, low institutional trust decreases entrepreneurial orientation.	**Supported**
H4:	Close kinship ties moderate the relationship between institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa such that for those entrepreneurs without close kinship involvement, low institutional trust will decrease entrepreneurial orientation; conversely for those with close kinship involvement, low institutional trust will increase entrepreneurial orientation.	Not Supported
H5:	Political affiliation moderates the relationship between the institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa such that for those entrepreneurs without political affiliation to the ruling party, low institutional trust will decrease entrepreneurial orientation and for those with political affiliation to the ruling party, low institutional trust will increase entrepreneurial orientation.	**Supported**

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONLUSION

General knowledge suggests that high institutional trust promotes entrepreneurship. Trust in government effectiveness, voice in government affairs, rule of law and political stability should be linked to the willingness of citizens to take risks related with investing, starting and managing new enterprises (Acs et al., 2008). This dissertation attempted not only to explore the effect of institutional trust (IT) on entrepreneurial orientation (EO), but also whether or not other variables such as political affiliation (PA), environmental uncertainty (EU) and environmental munificence (EM) as well as kinship ties moderate that relationship. I could not to find support for the main effect or correlation between IT and EO, but I found three significant moderating effects, all showing moderation of the relationship between IT and EO, namely: EU, EM and PA. I have not been able to find significant support for a moderation effect attributable to kinship ties. Consequently, I was able to provide support to 3 out of 4 proposed moderating effects to the relationship between IT and EO.

5.1 Discussion

In this research, I proposed a theoretical model focused on the use of Institutional Trust (IT) as an independent variable, Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) as a dependent variable and Environmental Munificence (EM), Environmental Uncertainty (EU), Political Affiliation (PA) and Kinship Ties (KT) as moderators. Specifically, my research examines the effect of Institutional trust on entrepreneurial orientation within cooperatives in rural Africa. Cooperatives and systems of cooperation and mutuality have long been widespread in African communities and are still important today, providing jobs and improving social security for many Africans living in rural areas (Wanyama et al., 2008). Although cooperatives exist around the world, they are of special significance in the African context, given their distinct socio-political and historical context, they are clearly idiosyncratic frameworks that make them stand out in contrast to their western counterparts. In view of the ravages of unparalleled political uncertainty and hardship, the function of cooperatives has been related to the challenge of combating underdevelopment. The implementation of cooperatives in Africa has therefore been supported by the ideal of converting them into agents of transformation and change (Hussi et al., 1993; Wanyama et al., 2009).

The presence of institutional trust and support, which is a widely used tactic in emerging countries, enhances EO (Yiu & Lau, 2008). Prior testing of institutional theory for the study of entrepreneurship in developing markets illustrates three significant elements of government support. First of all, it is often limited, available only to companies who conform with government regulations. Second, it provides low-cost resources; immediate reciprocation is typically not needed by the government. Third, the purpose of government institutional support is to resolve market failures or support the growth of strategically significant industries. These advantages show why institutional trust can be positive related to EO, ie, the propensity of firms to be more creative, proactive and risk oriented.

The rationale is that the social, economic and self-actualization advantages of starting up and running new enterprises must outweigh the burdens and challenges for entrepreneurship to take place. Entrepreneurship is believed to thrive under favorable governance conditions (Acs et al., 2008). Starting a company requires such perceptions as confidence in government efficacy, political stability to the point where entrepreneurs don’t fear their enterprises are prone to be nationalized, or the concerns of lack of rule of law. This is necessary in order to maintain a reasonable degree of confidence.

In addition to problems of weak governance frequently associated with post-independence dynamics and the subsequent corruption trends, Sub-Saharan African countries are defined, at least to some degree, by complex institutional structures, which appear unique to the continent. Hence, institutional challenges should be considered when studying entrepreneurial orientation. Entrepreneurship in Africa faces numerous issues dealing with external environments, including conflict and political instability, institutional voids and poorly ran markets, natural environmental challenges, etc. (Branzei & Abdelnour, 2010; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2015). Hence the gap in research specific was specifically the inclusion of several moderators in the model to assess how institutional trust (IT) relates to entrepreneurial orientation (EO).

5.1.1 Review of Dissertation Findings

The goal of this study was to respond to the demand for more empirical testing in emerging markets pertaining to the moderating effect of Environmental Munificence (EM), Environmental Uncertainty (EU), Political Affiliation (PA) and Kinship Ties (KT) on the relationship between Institutional Trust (IT) and Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO). A better understanding of this relationship and moderations could add to the literature on the development of rural entrepreneurship from an African-centric view. Extant studies appear insufficient to describe the diverse and dynamic features of the African environment. This study could help propose a holistic view of organizational effectiveness in complex settings compounded by the high level of uncertainty like the African context. (Munene, 1991) and the co-existence of the formal and informal economies in Africa (Godfrey, 2011b).

My main research question inquired whether IT was positively related to EO and whether EU, EM, PA and KT moderated the relationship IT → EO. To analyze the data and explain the results, I used a moderated regression analysis. Based on the findings of my study, three out of five hypotheses were supported. Below I provide further explanation for this finding.

Hypothesis 1, IT positively correlated with EO was not supported. No correlation was found between these constructs. The regression outcome does not demonstrate or disprove an hypothesis, does not provide proof of the reliability of the study, and does not make conclusions about a population other than the sample (Maxwell, 2000). Furthermore, the p-value does not reflect the strength of a relationship: while a finding at p.01 is often viewed as a better outcome than one at p.05, lower p-values do not mean that relationships are more substantively important (Meyer, Van Witteloostuijn, & Beugelsdijk, 2017). If the sample size or measurement accuracy is large enough, any effect, no matter how small, will produce a small p-value, and large effects will produce insignificant p-values if the sample size is small or measurements are inaccurate (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). Likewise, if the accuracy of the estimates varies, similar predicted effects would have different p-values.

Hence, statistical significance does not explain effect size, which is a quantitative measure of the magnitude of the experimental effect (Maxwell, 2000). The larger the effect size the stronger the relationship between variables (Olejnik & Algina, 2003). Regarding model 2 that test hypothesis 1 in my regression analysis, the effect size Cohen's f^2 equates to .14. Cohen (2013) designated small, medium, and large effect sizes as equivalent to f^2 values of .02, .15, and .35, respectively. Considering the relationship was positive (β=0.108, ns.) and based on extant literature asserting a positive relationship between these variables (Acs et al., 2008), I predict that a larger sample size could potentially support my initial hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2, IT and EO moderated by EM was supported. This was predicted based on extensive literature indicating that the need for a favorable business environment is essential in the production and promotion of innovation (Goll & Rasheed, 2004). Environmental munificence is characterized as the scarcity or abundance of essential resources needed by firms operating within an environment. Therefore, the resources available in the economy have an impact on the sustainability and development of businesses that share that environment and also have an impact on the potential of new businesses to enter that environment (Castrogiovanni, 1991).

Hypothesis 3, IT and EO moderated by EU was supported. This was predicted based on extensive extant research suggesting that EU intensifies the propensity of firms to seek more entrepreneurial strategies through increased acceptance of risky measures, innovativeness and proactivity (Foxall, 2014; Khandwalla, 1977). In the presence of increased environmental uncertainty, the adoption of entrepreneurial orientation is not only a function of the entrepreneurial personality, but also a conscious strategic response to environmental uncertainty (Smart & Vertinsky, 1984; T. Williams et al., 2017). Notwithstanding that prior research on the effect of environmental uncertainty on entrepreneurial orientation have mostly used data from western countries, the intent was to replicate the same findings in an African setting. Ultimately, EU affects entrepreneurial activity in its relationship with institutional trust and the impact is even greater in developing countries where formal institutions are less efficient(Rodrik, 2008). It is fair to believe that EU could have induced economic growth in developing countries to a greater degree, because while formal institutions are weak in these countries, economies continue to expand (Ahmad & Hall, 2017).

Hypothesis 4, IT and EO moderated by KT was not supported. While some studies suggest that strong family ties and the collectivist culture of the society are the foundations for social protection in developing countries (Meagher, 2005), overall extant literature often highlights both the positive and negative implications of kinship ties in the context of family firms (Acquaah, 2011). I modeled this research on literature dissecting kinship into close vs distant kinship, consistent with Foster et al. (2006) in their kin selection theory who suggest that individuals tend to provide assistance to close relatives than distant relatives. As categorized by Madsen et al. (2007), generally close kin are siblings and parents, and distant kin are other genetic relations. While this is true, it could well be at odds with the African setting that often intertwines close and distant kinship, inner and extended family. For instance, the concept of "ubuntu" as depicted in this dissertation, is basically a strong form of collectivism, a pattern of deeds that helps incorporate members of a community into large, unified in-groups (Mbigi & Maree, 1995). People are supportive of each other and share resources in exchange for absolute loyalty; show empathy and consideration to ensure a high level of community life; build structures of social responsibilities that connect managers to ethnic groups and extended families; and lay the foundations for horizontal and personal relationships within organizations that often originates competitive advantage. Therefore, conceptualizing based on location could have been problematic.

Hypothesis 5, IT and EO moderated by PA was supported. This was predicted based on extensive extant research suggesting that the political arena can offer entrepreneurs with preferential treatment, good policies, private information, and access to resources, which have a direct or indirect effect on their economic market growth aspirations. Viewing government as a resource, entrepreneurs may act politically to mitigate the effects of transaction costs and boost their ability to supply potential clients with cheaper, better, or unique goods and simultaneously raise the cost of their foreign and domestic competitors (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Political relations can also create a competitive advantage by allowing a business to protect and maintain its market share (Lawton et al., 2013). Furthermore, they can decrease the environmental uncertainty and cost of transactions and improve sustainable development (Lawton et al., 2013). In emerging countries, political connections protect firms against public agent's exactions of all sorts. It is also known that in countries where corruption abounds, the political connections help firms grow fast (Farrell et al., 2006).

5.2 Contributions

This dissertation's contributions are broken down into 2 main areas. The first area is by adding to the literature on the development of rural entrepreneurship from an African-centric view, also based on communal or collective entrepreneurship. Cooperatives are formed to provide local communities with a mechanism to navigate economic environments that have ignored the priorities of these communities in their pursuit of survival (Nilsson, 2001). The underlying aspect of collective entrepreneurship consists of the value system upon which African communities succeed, which suggests that a person is a person through other people (van der Walt, 2008). The second area consists on the importance of analyzing the implications of acquiring resources using one's social capital, particularly from family members or kin relations; In addition, this dissertation fulfills the call for testing theories that have been extensively testing in western context to African settings. Previous models seem inadequate to explain the complex and dynamic attributes of the African environment.

Hence for literature on indigenous theory, this dissertation caters to existing positions on the essence, viability and challenges of developing universal and indigenous theory within the context of the global management scholarship (Davison & Díaz Andrade, 2018; Jack et al., 2013). Indigenous theory is depicted as the theory of human behavior, that is unique to a culture or context, not borrowed from other regions and meant for people living in that context or culture. Recent calls for organizational researchers to contextualize empirical and theoretical research, and long-standing studies by international management scholars on the necessity of accounting for structural, institutional and national cultural disparities in theoretical development (Jack et al., 2013) are part of the highlights of this study.

For literature on institutional theory, entrepreneurship research to date has often linked the decision to start a new business venture or organization with the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities and profit as they enter new markets (Tolbert et al., 2011). This dissertation builds on an alternative approach to institutional theory as it relates to the African context. The creation of organizations like rural cooperatives in Africa can be understood as social products, which are based on the definition of entrepreneurship as an economic activity that can vary across social networks, space and time (Light & Rosenstein, 1995).

For the literature on resource-based theory, the results reveal important nuances. The resource-based theory of the firm focuses on the firm's internal dynamic competences and external environment as key factors of organizational success (Barney, 2001a; Hawawini et al., 2003). From the resource-based theory standpoint, in order to sustain profit, resources must be scarce and difficult to trade or substitute (Lockett & Thompson, 2001). Moreover, an organization must organize its business processes efficiently and effectively in order to realize the full competitive potential of its resources and capabilities. The moderators added to the studied model are contextualized and studied taking into account important features of African context. Therefore, the findings of this dissertation add to the literature by building on features of the resource-based theory to assess the effect of various firm and contextual factors on the relationship between the institutional environment and entrepreneurial orientation in rural Africa.

Last, this dissertation also offers a practical extension to the assessment of factors surrounding entrepreneurial success in emerging economies. Entrepreneurs often need not only business skills, but also political connections to manipulate or even control unfavorable institutional environments (Zhou, 2013). However, those political relations do not inherently have to influence public policy in ways that are beneficial to entrepreneurial companies. Indeed, considering their comparatively limited scale and low socio-political power, entrepreneurial companies in less developed and transition economies frequently do not have the potential to affect government legislation. Alternatively, to minimize uncertainty and dependency, they can establish company-level operational agreements to allow government entities into their organizational systems. The simple adherence to a political view can benefit firms significantly.

5.3 Limitations

My dissertation was not without limitations. The year 2020 was particularly difficult due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Due to the mobility constraints and lockdowns worldwide and in Africa in particular, my survey was administered in 3 provinces during the month of December. This was the only opportunity from the moment my IRB was approved to the next lifting of inter-province travel restrictions in Angola. Working within such constrained operational timeframe was detrimental to harnessing the desired turnout in terms of participation and quality of the surveys. Therefore, my sample size was limited to only 3 readily available provinces and 2 cooperatives per province. The surveys were also limited in many cases to as little as 10 to 20 or 20 participants per cooperatives based on accessibility and availability. A large sample as well as a greater number of provinces and cooperatives could have made a difference eliciting more conclusive and generalizable findings regarding the hypotheses that weren’t supported.

Another limitation was that my sample was limited to Angolan cooperatives. Further expansion and diversification across the continent of African could provide additional clarity into future opportunities and regional trends. Moreover, technology constraints such as the lack of readily available computers and internet in rural setting of Africa made it impossible for a more robust outreach. Considering the participants' low level of education, the use of a paper-based survey and its propensity to incur into incomplete surveys or double responses heightened the risk of discarding surveys. Hence, identifying strategically a balanced approach, sensitive to countries where technology is fairly developed and countries lacking technology, could offer a larger data set to be examined.

Last, another limitation is that my research was to some extent cross-sectional in nature and thus from my findings, I could not infer causality. (Levin, 2006). I compared population groups in multiple provinces at the same time. Although my hypothesized relationships have generally been supported, it may be conceivable that the causal link between behavior and structure is reversed. This indicates that structures and attitudes may not be static within family firms; the potential dynamic quality of these relationships may not be fully captured by a cross-sectional analysis. Hence, a longitudinal approach could be necessary (Zapf, Dormann, & Frese, 1996).

5.4 Future Research

Other variables could be regarded as part of a potential analysis of the relationship between IT and EO. Many areas were not included in this dissertation but may have yielded important results when analyzed. Despite scholarly work on the causes and effects of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), relatively little attention has been given to institutionalized processes that encourage bribery as the accepted and conventional way of doing business there

(Ufere, Gaskin, Perelli, Somers, & Boland Jr, 2020). Therefore, elements of bribery and corruption could unveil important nuances. In addition, several scholars, who have found that conventional cooperatives have problems in modern economies, note a variety of behavioral concepts that define cooperative members (Nilsson, Kihlén, & Norell, 2009). Hence, business satisfaction as it relates to members' view about their gains while being part of the cooperatives or their genuine willingness to be associated with the cooperatives could also be studied to derive important conclusions.

In addition, EO in this dissertation has been analyzed from the context of members' firms and activities. Future research could analyze EO from the perspective of cooperatives and their activities. Further emphasis could be stressed on collecting a more representative sample, comprised of cooperatives representing every country in sub-Saharan Africa; then controlling for French vs English speaking could inform researchers on close versus distant kinship status and assess of the "ubuntu" concept throughout the continent.

Failure with the hypothesized kinship moderation in this dissertation opens ways to reassess the kinship construct, and its scales and measurements in organizational studies. It is apparent that the construct can encompass various meanings, depending on culture, society and context. In fact, several scholars considered four ways in which kinship could be defined: (1) through blood relationship (consanguinity), which is insufficient in the sense of adoption and other procedures, (2) through genealogy, which, while it could be decided by a blood relationship, could also be established by some other social procedure, (3) through relationships, which may be incomplete if it is presumed that pedigree and genealogy decide the terms of the relationship and not the reverse and (4) through the social function by which individuals are deemed to be related to each other if their roles and rights in relation to each other are those otherwise defined by consanguinity (Read, 2001).

Pursuant to the above-mentioned areas of research, I would encourage the development of a new theory that builds on indigenous theory, which takes into account cultural elements from specific contexts around the world (Davison & Díaz Andrade, 2018; Jack et al., 2013). While certain basic aspects of human behavior (need for housing, health, and safety) can be common and universal, many other aspects consist of culture to a greater or lesser extent. Since culture differs greatly across various geographical and social settings, it is fair to conclude that theoretical explanations for individual actions would often need to vary if they are to be valid at the local level (Davison & Martinsons, 2016). An important example stemming from this dissertation is the kinship construct.

5.5 Conclusion

This research is one of the few studies to examine the relationship between IT and EO by incorporated moderators that resonate with the socio-cultural and political environmental of the African continent. The data collected in a former Portuguese colony in Africa constitutes in and of itself a novelty as opposed to the traditional data insight from English or French speaking countries in Africa, where research is somewhat advanced. While the 3 out of 5 hypotheses were supported, this dissertation did not find any correlation between IT and EO in Africa, at least at the main effect level. Also, kinship as an important feature of African societies did not provide the expected moderating insights to better understand the underlying community-based entrepreneurial drive amongst African family firms. Future study may thus explore additional mechanisms and variables that could influence EO in Africa considering the existing institutional voids.

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APPENDIX A

Full Survey

Consent to Participate in a Research Study

Title of the Project: Rural entrepreneurship in Africa
Principal Investigator: Tchijica Henriques, UNC Charlotte
Study Sponsor: N/A

You are invited to participate in a research study. Participation in this research study is voluntary. The information provided is to give you key information to help you decide whether to participate.

- The purpose of this study is to examine how external factors affect the relationship between Institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation in Africa.
- To protect your privacy, the survey does not ask you for your name or other direct identifying information. Survey responses will be analyzed to obtain information about how external factors impact the relationship between Institutional trust and entrepreneurial orientation. Your survey responses will in no way be traceable back to you.
- If you choose to participate, it will require 15 to 20 minutes of your time.
- There are no potential risks or discomforts that will occur as a result of participating in this survey.
- If you choose not to participate, you need only not take the survey.

Your privacy will be protected, and confidentiality will be maintained to the extent possible. Your responses will be treated as confidential and will not be linked to your identity. Survey responses will be stored with access to this information controlled and limited only to people who have the approval to have access. We might use the survey data for future research studies, and we might share the non-identifiable survey data with other researchers for future research studies without additional consent from you.

Participation is voluntary. You may choose not to take part in the study. You may start participating and change your mind and stop participation at any time.

If you have questions concerning the study, contact the principal investigator, Tchijica Henriques at +1 (336) 558-4094 or by email at thenriq1@uncc.edu. You may also contact Dr. Franz W. Kellermanns at +1 (704) 687-1421 or by email at kellermanns@uncc.edu. If you have further questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this study, contact the Office of Research Protections and Integrity at +1 (704) 687-1871 or uncc-irb@uncc.edu.

If you have read and understand the information provided and freely consent to participate in the study, you may proceed to completing the survey. If not, please do not complete the survey.

Rural entrepreneurship in Africa

A research team from UNC Charlotte is studying family firm performance. The questions below have no right or wrong answers – we are interested in your opinions. All responses are anonymous and confidential. This survey should be answered by the current firm leader.

Please answer the following items in regards to your firm and your activities specifically (NOT THE COOPERATIVE)

Section 1: In this section we are interested in your firms' processes

In general, my firm favors...

A strong emphasis on the marketing of tried-and-true products or services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	A strong emphasis on technological leadership, and innovations
How many new lines of products or services has your firm marketed in the past five years (or since its establishment)?								
No new lines of products or services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very many new lines of products or services
Changes in product or service lines have been mostly of a minor nature	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Changes in product or service lines have usually been quite dramatic

Section 2: In this section we are interested in your firms' planning

In dealing with its competitors, my firm...

Typically responds to actions which competitors initiate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically initiates actions to which competitors then respond
Is very seldom the first business to introduce new products/services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Is very often the first business to introduce new products/services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc.
Typically seeks to avoid competitive clashes, preferring a "live-and-let-live" posture	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically adopts a very competitive, "undo-the-competitors" posture

Section 3: In this section we are interested in your firms' activities

In general, my firm has...

A strong proclivity for low-risk projects (with normal and certain rates of return)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	A strong proclivity for high-risk projects (with chances of very high returns)

In general, my firm believes that...

Owing to the nature of the environment, it is best to explore it gradually via cautious, incremental behavior	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Owing to the nature of the environment, bold, wide-ranging acts are necessary to achieve the firm's objectives

When confronted with decision-making situations involving uncertainty, my firm...

Typically adopts a cautious, "wait-and-see" posture in order to minimize the probability of making costly decisions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically adopts a bold, aggressive posture in order to maximize the probability of exploiting potential opportunities

Now please answer the following items in regards to the COOPERATIVE and its activities

Section 4: In this section we are interested in your cooperative' processes

In general, my cooperative favors...

A strong emphasis on the marketing of tried-and-true products or services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	A strong emphasis on technological leadership, and innovations
How many new lines of products or services has your cooperative marketed in the past five years (or since its establishment)?								
No new lines of products or services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very many new lines of products or services
Changes in product or service lines have been mostly of a minor nature	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Changes in product or service lines have usually been quite dramatic

Section 5: In this section we are interested in your cooperative' planning

In dealing with its competitors, my cooperative...

Typically responds to actions which competitors initiate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically initiates actions to which competitors then respond
Is very seldom the first business to introduce new products/services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Is very often the first business to introduce new products/services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc.
Typically seeks to avoid competitive clashes, preferring a "live-and-let-live" posture	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically adopts a very competitive, "undo-the-competitors" posture

Section 6: In this section we are interested in your cooperative' activities

In general, my cooperative has...

A strong proclivity for low-risk projects (with normal and certain rates of return)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	A strong proclivity for high-risk projects (with chances of very high returns)

In general, my cooperative believes that...

Owing to the nature of the environment, it is best to explore it gradually via cautious, incremental behavior	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Owing to the nature of the environment, bold, wide-ranging acts are necessary to achieve the firm's objectives

When confronted with decision-making situations involving uncertainty, my cooperative...

Typically adopts a cautious, "wait-and-see" posture in order to minimize the probability of making costly decisions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Typically adopts a bold, aggressive posture in order to maximize the probability of exploiting potential opportunities

Also, please indicate whether you are a member of the ruling party (MPLA).

______Yes **______No**

Section 7: In this section we are interested in your cooperative assessment (1 = Strongly dissatisfied/unlikely; 7= Strongly satisfied/likely).

	Strongly Dissatisfied						Strongly Satisfied
Please rate your satisfaction with your cooperative' sales	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Please rate your satisfaction with your cooperative' profits	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Please rate your personal overall satisfaction with your cooperative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Please rate your willingness to join the cooperative again	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Section 8: In this section we are interested in assessing local services.

Please state your perception and experience of doing business in your province (1 = always true; 7 = never true)

	Always True						Never True
I have high trust in the provincial government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have high trust in the local government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have high trust in the local courts	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have high trust in the local police	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

It is common for small business owners to have to pay some irregular "additional payments" to get things done. (1 = always true; 7 = never true)

	Always True						Never True
To get connected to public services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To get licenses and permits	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To deal with taxes and tax collection	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To gain access to microcredit	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
When dealing with transportation to larger centers for sale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Do small business owners typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public officials for any of the following?

	Always True						Never True
To get connected to public services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To get licenses and permits	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To deal with taxes and tax collection	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To gain access to microcredit	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
When dealing with product evacuation/transportation to larger centers for sale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Section 9: In this section we are interested in your business' dynamics. Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the statements below (1 = Strongly disagree; 7= Strongly agree).

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
My family is honest about problems	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My family has high integrity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My family is trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My family is concerned about my welfare	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
When I confide my problems to my family, I know they will respond with understanding	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I can count on my family considering how their actions affect me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel emotionally attached to my family	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I continue to deal with my family because I like being associated with them	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I continue to deal with my family because I genuinely enjoy my relationship with them	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am delighted with the performance of my family	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am happy with my family's performance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am content with my family's performance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am angry with my family	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am frustrated with my family	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am annoyed with my family	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please select the family member(s) or relative(s) as well as the number or family member(s) or relative(s) involved in your business and indicate the # involved (e.g., 2 children).

	Spouse	Sibling	Father	Mother	Children	In laws	Cousins	Aunt
Count								
Average hours worked per day per person								

	Uncle	Nephew	Niece	Others	Neighbors	Former classmates	Former colleagues	Friends of the family	Non-family members
Count									
Average hours worked per day per person									

Section 10: In this section we are interested in assessing adaptability. Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the statements below (1 = Strongly disagree; 7= Strongly agree).

Each of the following items consists of a pair of statements which represent the two extremes on aspects of the industry that accounts for the largest percentage of your firm's sales (your principal industry). Please circle the number on the scale that best approximates the actual conditions in your industry.

Our firm must rarely change its practices to keep up with the market and competitors.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Our firm must change its marketing practices extremely frequently (e.g., semi-annually).
The rate at which products/services are getting obsolete in the industry is very slow.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	The rate of obsolescence is very high (as in semiconductors).
Actions of competitors are quite easy to predict.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Actions of competitors are unpredictable.
Demand for the product and consumer tastes are fairly easy to forecast.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Consumer demand and tastes are unpredictable.
The production/service technology is not subject to very much change and is well established.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	The mode of production/service changes often and in a major way (e.g., advanced electronic components).

How would you characterize the external environment within which your firm operates?

Very safe, little threat to the survival and well-being of the firm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very risky, one false step can mean my firm's undoing.
Rich in investment and marketing opportunities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very stressful, hostile, very hard to keep afloat.
An environment that my firm can control and manipulate to its own advantage, such as a dominant firm has in an industry with little competition and few hindrances.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	A dominating environment in which my firm's initiatives count for very little against the tremendous political, technological, or competitive forces.

Section 11: In this section we are interested in assessing flexibility. Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the statements below (1 = Not at all like me, 2 = Not like me, 3 = Somewhat not like me, 4 = Neutral, 5 = Somewhat like me, 6 = A lot like me, 7 = Just like me).

	Not at all like me						Just like me
I actively look for ways to replace the losses I encounter in life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I believe that I can grow in positive ways by dealing with difficult situations.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I look for creative ways to alter difficult situations.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Regardless of what happens to me, I believe I can control my reaction to it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Section 12: In this next section we are interested in the performance of your business

How would you rate your firm's performance as compared to your competitors?

Indicator	Current							Past three years						
	Much Worse		About the Same				Much Better	Much Worse		About the Same				Much Better
Growth in sales	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Growth in number of members	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Growth in profitability	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ability to self-fund or self-finance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Section 13: In this last section we are interested in some background information about yourself

Age: _____ years. Gender: ___ Male ___ Female. Creation date of your cooperative? __________

Your position (title) in the family firm: _______________________________________

Province: ________ Municipality: __________ Association or cooperative: ______________

Worked in family firm since: _________________ Firm Industry: _________________________

Highest degree earned: ____________________ Field of study: _________________________

Thank you very much for your participation!

APPENDIX B

Recruitment Script

A written paper note will be handed to participants ADRA identifies and solicits to complete the survey contained the following message:

This information is being gathered by ADRA on behalf of Tchijica Henriques in support of a dissertation research project for the Belk College of Business at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Participation is voluntary, and all responses are strictly anonymous and confidential. This study was approved by the University of North Carolina at Charlotte Institutional Review Board on 09/15/2020 (Study #: 19-00807). No personally identifiable information will be collected, and all data collected will be used strictly for research purposes.

Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please contact ADRA at abilio.sanjaia@adra-angola.org or the researcher directly at thenriq1@uncc.edu.