DRAFTING DISNEY FOR VICTORY: ANIMATION, PROPAGANDA, AND POLITICAL RESISTANCE, 1941-1942

by

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ABSTRACT

CARLY AMIE-NOELLE GREGORY. Drafting Disney for Victory: Animation, Propaganda, and Political Resistance, 1941-1942. (Under the direction of DR. MARK WILSON)

History has forgotten animation, and film companies are often complicit in failing to acknowledge its influence on our social and cultural history. Walt Disney came of age in the film industry during the Golden Age of Hollywood, an era that coincided with a world stage set for war and conflict. The threat of Nazi Germany was felt both home and abroad, and the United States struggled with indecision on whether or not to support its European allies or remain isolationist. When the Second World War began, the American response was lukewarm with Lend-Lease being the only acceptable political means of interference in the European conflict. Walt Disney, struggling over lack of profits due to war-related distribution overseas, sought US Government contracts for morale and instructional films to keep his company afloat and his artists paid. Though Disney's popularity and success in Hollywood in the late 1930s should have made him an easy sell to politicians, he was largely met with distrust over questions of cost and the future viability of animation in government use.

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my paternal grandfather, Johnny R. Gregory Jr. (1914-2004), who served in the United States Army from August 24, 1940 to November 24, 1945 during the Second World War. Without his service, sacrifice, and stories my interest in history might not have been realized.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BFND	*Bund der Freunde des Neuen Deutschland* (Friends of New Germany)
NFB	National Film Board [of Canada]
OGR	Office of Government Reports
OWI	Office of War Information

PREFACE

"When a man goes about writing an inclusive history of film, throwing out animation seems to be the first order of business, right after rolling up the sleeves and clearing the desk of rubber bands."[1] Though this quote appeared in Joe Adamson's 1975 biography on legendary animator Tex Avery, the academic treatment of animation has changed very little in the decades that followed. Some academics give only a passing, sometimes dismissive, mention of animation's role in 20th century history while others ignore it entirely. Despite the resurgence of historiography on the Golden Age of Hollywood and its role in the Second World War, arguably due in part to the digitization of classic films, animation studios continue to be left out of historical discourse. Bargain-book popular history, however, seems to have an inexplicable chokehold on the market. Any reasoning for the omission in academic study is subject to broad speculation and assertion, at best.

The role of animation in film, cultural, and political history is far greater than a handful of heavy coffee table books with an abundance of colorful pictures. Live-action cinema and cell-drawn animation are intrinsically linked to Hollywood. Though these are entirely different mediums, the relationship should be likened to "two different trees growing out of common soil."[2] Hollywood was both a temporal and ethereal center of entertainment, culture, and escapism that dominated much of the first half of the 20th century; arguably, this is still true today. Film technology and evolving storytelling techniques led to a creative explosion in cinema in the 1930s, the decade often referred to

[1] Joe Adamson, *Tex Avery: King of Cartoons* (New York: Popular Library, 1975), 11.
[2] Richard Allen Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up: the Walt Disney Studios during World War II" (PhD diss, University of Michigan, 1976), 2.

as the Golden Age of Hollywood. Likewise, the Golden Age of Animation also lays claim to this decade, due in no small part to legendary animator and director Walt Disney.

Academic history has not been very kind to Disney's legacy outside of the plethora of work related to his theme park business models. Arguably, one might find it difficult to remember Disney was once a respected artist and storyteller before the ground was even broken for Disneyland in 1954. Disney's cartoon short *Steamboat Willie* (1928) was the first to feature a synchronized soundtrack, and it was the technical cornerstone for his first feature length animated movie, *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs* (1937). Disney was the first to innovate new animation and film techniques in the industry, and he had a natural gift in both working with film and communicating his ideas to fellow animators in his studios. Ben Sharpsteen, one of Disney's lead animators and directors from 1929-1964, said in an interview: "Walt knew how to take an animator's work, he knew how to feel the animator ideas, and he knew how to put them together and produce a picture. Just that alone was a terrific talent that nobody else in the producing end of the animated cartoon business had."[3]

Likewise, Disney saw great potential in the prospect of producing animated educational and morale films for the US Government as early as January 1941, which led him to extend an offer of his talents and studio to US defense industries that same year. Disney was the first animation studio to open negotiations with the US Government for the production of animated films, and the first to be contracted after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Walt Disney Productions produced

[3] Ben Sharpsteen, interview by Don Peri, *Working With Walt: Interviews with Disney Artists* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2008), 6.

approximately 204,000 square feet of film under government contract between 1942 and 1943, which was just over five times Disney Studios' pre-war annual output at an estimated 37,000 square feet.[4] Walt Disney Productions maintained its own Defense Films Division, and over 90 percent of the Disney Studios was designated for the production of war-related animated morale and educational films by 1943 — an unparalleled degree of mobilization not exemplified by any other wartime production studio.[5]

Richard Allen Shale, Professor Emeritus of Youngstown University, is the only academic historian who researched and published a definitive exploration of Disney's wartime pursuits, in his 1976 PhD dissertation "Donald Duck Joins Up: the Walt Disney Studios during World War II." His dissertation was later released as a book, but with extremely limited publishing restrictions.[6] Shale was the first student ever allowed into the newly-created Disney Archives where he worked alongside the founder and former chief-archivist of the Disney Archives, Dave Smith. There, he sat at a cluttered desk with a mess of unorganized materials to hopefully tell the story of Walt Disney Productions' role during the Second World War.[7]

Shale's dissertation is, however, a broad and general history of the company during this time period constructed entirely from internal corporate documents, memorandums, and limited government reports. While Shale exhaustively explored and catalogued the various military instructional films and animated shorts produced by Walt

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[4] Carl Nater, "Walt Disney – A War Plant," *Journal of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers* 42 (1944): 171, quoted in Richard Allen Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up: the Walt Disney Studios during World War II," 54.
[5] Richard Allen Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 54.
[6] This is explained further in Chapter 2.
[7] Richard Allen Shale, telephone conversation with author, March 23rd, 2016.

Disney Productions during the war years, he left most of the year 1941 out of his central narrative — implying Disney's signing of government contracts was somehow natural and easy. In fact, Walt Disney and his chief Defense Films Division liaison, Robert "Bob" Carr, spent almost the entirety of 1941 attempting to persuade the US Government to believe in animation as both a respectful and effective medium deserving of federal funding. 1941 was a year of intense and often lengthy dialogue between Walt Disney Productions and the US Government, and exploring this narrative serves to better elucidate Disney's wartime role in propaganda production. Animation was a new medium that was not as established and utilized as live-action film, and the US Government proved difficult to convince otherwise until after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

This thesis is not a critical correction of Shale's work, but a respectful amendment and addition. Shale and I share a common love for all-things Disney, even from an early age and especially in academia, and this thesis is my contribution to completing a rich and often-controversial narrative of Disney's wartime contracts. I do not immediately recall when I first learned of Disney's role in wartime propaganda production, but I continued researching it throughout my work in Second World War history and propaganda studies. Ultimately, this path led me to discovering Shale's work and the inspiration to unearth more information on what I perceived to be a narrative gap regarding government resistance to Disney and the animated medium for propaganda.

Methodology

This thesis consists of three main chapters, but the lack of academic works and historiography on animated films and cartoons during the Second World War means the core of this thesis was constructed with primary sources. In keeping with Adamson's

earlier quote on animation, new publications and works on Hollywood's role in Second World War film and propaganda studies conveniently leave out narratives with respect to animation studios. Again, animation appears to be relegated to the dusty corners of popular history, thus making Hollywood live-action cinema the dominant narrative in these written works. However, the abundance of historiography on the Golden Age of Hollywood provides the basic framework for reintroducing both animation and Walt Disney Productions back into academic historical discourse.

Chapter One, "Disney's Golden Age, Hollywood, and US Isolationism," introduces Walt Disney and his animation studio while placing Golden Ages of Hollywood and Animation into a broader narrative of US Government isolationist policies. This chapter reconstructs a general narrative of US isolationism and the roots of Hollywood interventionism by exploring a selection of relevant historiography on the 1930s film industry and American political history. The US Government did not immediately engage in nor condone anti-Nazi propaganda, and its pre-war relationship with a "war-mongering" Hollywood was tense and skeptical at best. These tensions provide the narrative framework for government resistance to Disney's defense films interests in Chapters Two and Three.

Chapter Two is the full reconstruction of Walt Disney Productions and their negotiations with the US Government in 1941, and is the crux of my research. This chapter, entitled "From First Contact to First Contract: Skepticism, Resistance, and the Canadian Question," explores Disney's interest and outreach to the US Government to produce animated films under contract, and explains why the government was reluctant to entertain his offer until the day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Unlike Shale, who

omitted much of 1941 and predominately used internal memorandums and documents from Walt Disney Productions, this chapter is constructed using memorandums from various government agencies, such as the Office of Government Reports and the Bureau of Motion Pictures, and conference transcripts providing a more detailed government perspective on their general dismissal of Disney's offer.

Chapter Three, "The New Spirit of Service: Disney Mobilizes and Congress Seethes," introduces Disney's first wartime animated short *The New Spirit* (1942), contracted by the US Department of the Treasury. While 1941 was a tumultuous year of failed negotiations between Walt Disney and the US Government, *The New Spirit* and the Treasury Department faced extensive Congressional backlash over the use of taxpayer dollars to fund an animated short film instead of being appropriated for war assets. This chapter utilizes full congressional records from the House of Representatives and Senate in February 1942 to further reconstruct a narrative of government resistance against Disney and the use of entertainment for propaganda films. Excerpts from these records are ineffectively and sparingly used in Shale's work and other historiography, and the full account of political resistance cannot be appreciated without a more extensive insight into the debates.

The objective of this thesis is twofold: to demonstratively show that Disney's entry into wartime contracts was neither natural nor easy, as evidenced by often-tense communications between Walt Disney Productions and officials in the US Government in 1941 and early 1942; and to further elucidate how Disney's wartime accolades and successes can only be fully appreciated by exploring the politics behind his struggle to legitimize animation as an educational medium for the US Government. I hope this thesis

will be one of many new contributions to reinvigorating academic explorations of both Walt Disney and animation in Second World War propaganda studies.

CHAPTER 1: THE PRELUDE TO WAR PROPAGANDA: DISNEY'S GOLDEN AGE, HOLLYWOOD, AND US ISOLATIONISM

Hollywood and animation were intrinsically linked by the 1930s as they experienced their parallel Golden Ages, but they shared this decade with another prelude into American history: the Second World War. Even before the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Hollywood was already producing films inspired by anti-Nazism and a general sense of impending war. As early as May 1939, Warner Bros. released *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* (1939), a fictitious story based on real incidents of Nazi German espionage on American soil that drew both critical acclaim and political concerns over potential war-mongering.[8] The release of *Confessions* marks the moment where cinema and world politics intersected, and prompted the US Government to recognize and intervene in Hollywood's propaganda potential, for better or worse.

This chapter introduces Walt Disney as a creative visionary in animation and film, reconstructs a brief and general narrative of the beginning of Hollywood interventionism amidst America's isolationist policy during the 1930s through 1940, and reintroduces Walt Disney and the Golden Age of Animation back into relevant historical discourse. The Golden Ages of Hollywood and Animation ran parallel because of their popularity after embracing synchronized soundtracks instead of orchestrated musical overlays, and Disney was arguably the father of animation's Golden Age with his release of *Steamboat Willie* (1928) — the first animated short with such synchronization. Disney, forever an innovator in animated techniques and storytelling, experienced unparalleled success

[8] Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies* (Berkeley: University of Los Angeles Press, 1987), 27-28

compared to other animation studios throughout the 1930s. Disney's national acclaim and artistic vision led him to create the first animated feature film, *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs* (1937), thus cementing animation as an inseparable part of Hollywood film culture.

Disney's swift rise to the top, however, had an equally-impressive fall prior to America's entry into the war. Following the financial success of *Snow White,* Disney overestimated the future popularity and profits of his later animated feature films, especially due to war-related international distribution problems. Nor did he expect his own animators to unionize and threaten the stability of his studios. With his losses mounting and animators threatening to strike over his business practices, Disney sought alternatives in the form of government contracts to both supplement his studio income and keep his animators working amidst growing crises on multiple fronts.

Walt Disney and Modest Beginnings

The animated cartoon has two historical father figures: J. Stuart Blackton and Walter Elias Disney. Blackton, a sketch artist, was hired for Joseph Pulitzer's newspaper *New York World* in the mid-1890s to create comic strips.[9] In addition to his comics, Blackton was sent to interview famous inventor Thomas Edison around the same time about his work on and the evolution of the Kinetoscope.[10] The Kinetoscope was a small box that a person would pay to peer inside, and utilized a simple projected light beneath a flip book-like series of translucent film stills in order to simulate movement. Edison was already planning his next iteration of the device known as a Vitascope, the precursor to

[9] Gordon B. Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination: A Brief History* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2017), 4.
[10] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 4.

the film projector. Enamored with the possibilities of the Vitascope, Blackton acquired one of the units in 1897 and created the American Vitagraph Company with his business partner Albert E. Smith.

Blackton produced numerous trick films[11] for vaudeville shows throughout the next few years, even starring in most of them, and they were a major draw for audiences eager to see moving pictures on a large screen.[12] Most of these short films only featured Blackton working as a sketch artist who brought his drawings from immaterial to material, such as a drawing of a wine glass becoming a glass in his hand.[13] In early 1906, Blackton experimented with a new medium to test on his vitascope: animated drawings. His three-minute short entitled *Humorous Phases of Funny Faces* (1906) was little more than an animated sequence of chalkboard-like caricatures coming to life, moving about with fluid motion and featuring one character who even draws himself into existence.[14] Though this was Blackton's first and only fully animated and hand-drawn creation, *Humorous Phases of Funny Faces* was immensely popular with vaudeville audiences, and is credited as the first animated cartoon that gave rise to an entire genre.[15]

Blackton's short, despite being a new and revolutionary art form in the early days of film production, is often eclipsed by one who is arguably the most famous among animation artists in history, Walter Elias Disney. Disney had a love for art and cartoons since an early age, and there was no shortage of animated shorts and cartoon gag reels

[11] A "trick film" is a type of film that uses stop-motion camera trickery to produce effects that are not able to be replicated in live performances, such as disappearing and reappearing or transforming objects.
[12] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 7.
[13] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 7.
[14] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 1-2.
[15] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 2.

produced by other artists once Blackton left the scene for more conventional film production. After briefly serving as an ambulance driver for the Red Cross during the Great War, the only job he could get since he was too young for military service, Disney secured his first post-war job in October 1919 as a graphics artist and cartoonist at Pesmen-Rubin Commercial Art Studio in Kansas City, Missouri.[16] It was at this studio where he met a young Ub Iwerks, another aspiring artist and cartoonist, who was impressed and enthusiastic about Disney's artistic talent. After only a few months at the Pesmen-Rubin Commercial Art Studio, both Disney and Iwerks were laid off in January 1920 as the business experienced a significant financial downturn.[17]

Unemployed yet completely optimistic, Iwerks and Disney decided to create a small shell of a company named Iwerks-Disney Commercial Artists, but the opportunities and financial stability never came to the two unestablished artists.[18] Both Iwerks and Disney abandoned their own business venture in late 1920, and took jobs at the Kansas City Slide Company producing advertising shorts to be shown before feature films in movie theaters.[19] Disney used his new filmmaking experience to experiment with animation on the side, and he created his first animated short in early 1921 when he was only 19 years old.[20] Disney showed the one minute film to a manager at a local theater who was impressed enough to offer him a small contract to produce more. Disney's shorts were renamed *Newman's Laugh-O-Grams* after the 1,000 seat Newman Theater where they were shown, but he made only a paltry 30 cents per foot of film — not

[16] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 53.
[17] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 53.
[18] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 53-54.
[19] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 53.
[20] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 53-54.

enough to leave his job and animate full-time, and barely enough to cover his expenses.[21] In late 1921, Disney placed an ad in the local paper offering an opportunity for cartoon and animation experience, rather than pay, to assist him in completing his Newman contract.[22] A small handful of individuals answered his ad to help him finish out the terms of his contract, and later assisted him in the creation of Disney's first legitimate fledgling studio, Laugh-O-Gram Films in May 1922.[23]

Though Disney appreciated the gag-oriented, slapstick cartoons, he wanted to experiment with using animation to convey art through classic stories. Laugh-O-Gram Films was Disney's new outlet and means to produce animated short stories that allowed him to tap into the traditional tales of morality and sensibility, even if they retained some aspects of silliness present in all cartoons of the time.[24] Unfortunately, Disney was never able to secure a contract with a major film distributor due to lack of industry establishment and finances. Pictorial Clubs, Inc. was the only company to offer a contract, but they only distributed to organizations such as schools or churches rather than theaters.[25] With no other offers, Disney reluctantly accepted the contract for only $100 per film upon delivery — a deal that was only better than no deal at all.[26]

Disney's last film under the Pictorial Club, Inc. contract was *Alice's Wonderland*, a short film inspired by Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* that featured the first true interaction between a live-action actor and animated cartoon character. Unfortunately, Pictorial Club, Inc. had to release Disney from his contract in early 1923 due to financial

[21] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 55.
[22] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 55.
[23] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 55.
[24] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 57.
[25] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 56.
[26] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 56.

difficulties, and Laugh-O-Gram Films was left without a distributor or any income whatsoever.[27] Without a contract or distributors, *Alice's Wonderland* could not be released, and Disney filed for bankruptcy before moving to California to live with his brother Roy in August 1923.[28] Disney kept the reel for *Alice's Wonderland* when he moved to California, though he sent a letter to famous independent distributor Margaret Winkler in outlining his animation project prior to his relocation in hopes of securing any measure of interest in his work.[29]

Margaret Winkler and her fiancé Charles Mintz were well-established and famous distributors of Pat Sullivan's *Felix* featuring Felix the Cat and the Fleischer Studios *Out of the Inkwell* series. Winkler was impressed by Disney's artistic talent and vision, and requested a viewing of *Alice's Wonderland* in New York along with other potential distributors. Disney arranged for the film reel to be sent to New York, and Winkler later telegraphed Disney with her interest in making a deal for an *Alice* series of short films.[30] Disney's work arrived at the perfect time as Winkler and Mintz's company was in a contractual dispute with Sullivan over distribution, and their future with both the *Felix* and Fleischer properties were on shaky ground.[31] It is unclear whether or not Winkler's interest was genuine, financial, or both. Regardless of Winkler's motivation, Disney was offered a contract to produce *Alice's Wonderland* in a series called the *Alice Comedies* in late September 1923. Walt was ecstatic at the opportunity to begin animating again, and he convinced his brother Roy to partner with him in the creation and management of his

[27] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 58.
[28] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 58.
[29] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 59.
[30] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 59.
[31] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 59.

new studio company. With his brother, a businessman, as his partner, the two founded the Disney Brothers Studio in October 1923.[32] Not long after, Ub Iwerks was quick to join the ranks of animators with his friend and new boss, Walt.

The Disney Brothers Studio began almost as modest as Laugh-O-Gram Films, but the reasonable financial stability from the contract and the success of the *Alice Comedies* allowed for the hiring of an adequate staff to meet production needs. By August 1927, there were 57 animated shorts in the *Alice Comedies*, but Mintz was looking for fresh material as early as fall 1926. Disney was encouraged to create a new character as part of a new contract negotiated between Mintz and Universal, which later became Oswald the Lucky Rabbit.[33] Oswald was an immediate hit for Universal, but became a thorn in Disney's side by late 1927 even though it further established his credibility and talent as an animator.[34]

Both Walt and Roy attempted to negotiate a new contract for Oswald the Lucky Rabbit to include more pay based on the success of the series, but Mintz was determined that they would have to sign on for less pay, not more. Walt knew he was successful, and neither of the Disney brothers were about to accept less than what they were due for their work and creative genius. The Disney brothers refused to accept any contract with less pay, and Mintz released them from any future contract — but not before revealing he had convinced most of Disney's staff of animators to leave to work with Universal.[35] Oswald the Lucky Rabbit remained the intellectual property of Universal and Mintz as per the original contract, even though the Disney Brothers Studio wrote and produced the

[32] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 59.
[33] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 60-61.
[34] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 61.
[35] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 61-62.

animated cartoon series. Walt along with Roy and his loyal friend Iwerks cut all business ties with Winkler's distribution firm, which Mintz was now clearly running, thus leaving with nothing but hope to find some way to keep the animation ambitions alive.

A Steamboat into a New Golden Age

Oswald was lost, but Walt had no shortage of ideas. The problem was usually in financing those ideas. In early 1928, the Disney brothers and Iwerks decided their new character would be a mouse who was inspired by a small, tame mouse that made his home in Walt's desk during his Laugh-O-Gram Films years.[36] Disney's mouse was originally named Mortimer, but Walt's wife encouraged him to change it to something more friendly-sounding and easier to roll off the tongue, thus Mickey Mouse was born.[37] Mickey had to have a story or an introduction, and Iwerks quickly sketched out Disney's new creation while Walt told him of Mickey's first exploits as an aviator — a story loosely based on Charles Lindburgh, and was later named *Plane Crazy*. The quality was poor, but Disney and Iwerks were working out of Walt's garage at the time since they had no distributors lined up nor money to support a better location.[38]

A few months prior on October 6, 1927, Warner Bros. released *The Jazz Singer* (1927) featuring the first film to include a synchronized soundtrack and lip-synced musical scenes, and a new revolution in sound-synchronized film began.[39] Disney was enamored with the possibilities of adding more sound effects and music to his artistic

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[36] Kathy Merlock Jackson, ed., *Walt Disney: Conversations (Conversations with Comic Artists Series)* (Jackson: The University Press of Mississippi, 2005), 120.
[37] There is no evidence nor official statement given for the origin of the name Mickey for the character, only that Walt believed it was close to the original Mortimer and his wife approved. Obviously, neither Roy nor Ub Iwerks objected.
[38] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 62.
[39] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination*, 62.

creations, but the logistics and equipment to do so were a problem. Despite those setbacks and the continued lack of distributors, Disney pitched a new idea for Mickey's next short *Steamboat Willie*, somewhat inspired by Buster Keaton's feature film *Steamboat Bill, Jr*. (1928). Iwerks and small staff of close friends immediately began working on the project while Disney left for New York in September 1928 to look for a distributor and an inexpensive way to add synchronized sound to film.[40]

Disney's search for sound technology led him to former partner in Universal and current controller of the Cinephone license Pat Powers.[41] The Cinephone was a device that allowed for sound to be recorded and spliced directly into film at specific time intervals, and was an invaluable asset to Disney's future work with sound synchronization. Walt used the Cinephone to record and overlay sound to his *Steamboat Willie* animated short, and exhibited the completed film to Harry Reichenbach, manager of the popular Colony Theater on Broadway.[42] Reichenbach was impressed by Disney's short, and agreed to give it a two week trial in hopes of giving him better chances at reaching a national distributor.[43]

Steamboat Willie opened on November 28, 1928 under the new Walt Disney Studio production name at the Colony Theater preceding the main feature film *Gang Wars* (1928). The audience responded warmly to *Steamboat Willie,* and film critics were fast to positively review Disney's innovative technique in bringing animated characters to life with such sound and realism. Mordaunt Haul of the *The New York Times* called it "an

[40] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 63.
[41] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 63-64.
[42] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 64; The Colony Theater was later renamed the Broadway Theater.
[43] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 64.

ingenious piece of work with a good deal of fun" after an early screening in the November 19, 1928 issue.[44] After a successful run at Colony Theater, which lasted longer than Reichenbach's two week trial period, Disney secured a distribution deal with the prestigious Roxy Theater in West Hollywood where it gained even greater exposure.[45]

Steamboat Willie was not the first cartoon to use sound, but it was the first to feature synchronized sound. Prior to *Steamboat Willie*, cartoons were predominately silent with a musical overlay, but no artist or studio prior to Disney experimented with synchronization for voiceovers. Just as *The Jazz Singer* opened up new possibilities with sound technology and integration into film in 1927, so did Disney's *Steamboat Willie* in 1928. In the span of one year, both the film and animation industries evolved from silent masterpieces to sound-filled wonders, and no studio could hope to remain competitive while audiences clamored for more productions that came to life with synchronized sound. The next feature was only one year later in the 1929 *Silly Symphonies* through a brief contract with Columbia Pictures, again featuring fully synchronized sound. If Warner Bros. can be credited for birthing the Golden Age of Hollywood with its innovative film and sound techniques, then the same distinction is owed to Walt Disney for forever transforming and pioneering a new form of animated entertainment.

Despite the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, the film industry was largely unaffected as the cinema remained a relatively cost-efficient means of escape from the reality of hardships.[46] Some film companies had to make certain concessions due to lower ticket sales by 1933, but these were mostly limited to sliced ticket costs and the

[44] Richard Allen Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up: the Walt Disney Studios during World War II" (PhD diss, University of Michigan, 1976), 7.
[45] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 7.
[46] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 67.

elimination of short film productions that preceded main features.[47] Animation, however, was thriving mostly due to the uplifting nature of the storytelling and the production costs were a fraction of its live-action counterparts.

The 1930s was an important decade for Disney as his fame was attributed to the quality of his work.[48] By 1930, Disney had already reorganized the animation studio from his simple garage to a full production facility on Hyperion Avenue in California, the new home of Walt Disney Productions, complete with individual departments for storyboard creation, sound engineering, and marketing. Disney's *Flowers and Trees* (1932) from the *Silly Symphony* series won the first Academy Award for Best Animated Short film in 1932, and Disney's animated shorts dominated the category every year until 1940.[49]

The true power of animation as art was not fully realized until the release of Disney's first feature-length animated film based on the story of Snow White from the original 1812 *Grimm's Fairy Tales*. Production for the film began in the spring of 1934 when Disney wanted to expand the artistic nature of his work from shorts into feature-length film. He wanted to demonstrate that animation was capable of extensive character development, and creating and emotional attachment with the audience that was previously only known to exist in live-action films. In December 1937, Disney proved that animation could trigger deep human emotions beyond happiness and laughter with the official release of *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs.* With tearful audiences followed by an Academy Honorary Award at the 11th Academy Awards in February 1939, Walt

[47] Arnold, *Animation and the American Imagination,* 67.
[48] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 22.
[49] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 23.

Disney's accomplishments with art and animation not only had the world turning heads, but desperate for more.

US Isolationism and the Nazi Conspiracy

The Golden Age of Hollywood coincided with the rise of the Third Reich in Germany, and much of the news featured in print and newsreels paired movie previews and Hollywood news alongside world news reports from Europe. Clayton D. Laurie's 1996 book entitled *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany* is one of the most thorough academic explorations of how the United States encountered and fought Nazi German propaganda. According to Laurie, the Nazi German propaganda machine was far-reaching and "affirmed by American journalists reporting from Europe," and these reports stoked both fear and concern at home as Americans were constantly besieged by the powerful rhetoric of German statecraft.[50] Myths, facts, and fiction dominated debates on the efficacy of propaganda throughout the decade, and not just in Washington.[51] Businessmen, diplomats, and internationalists were inspired to shake President Franklin D. Roosevelt from his isolationist policies.[52]

The battle against Nazi German propaganda began as early as 1933 with the Nazi Party's rise to power with journalists reporting on Nazi propaganda as a weapon of "psychological warfare" and prelude to conflict; a tactic of political warfare where "the strategic will of a nation can be broken without the direct use of force."[53] Roosevelt was,

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[50] Clayton D. Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 8.
[51] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 9-10.
[52] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 9.
[53] Edmond Taylor, *Awakening from History* (Boston: Gambit, 1969), 246, quoted in Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 8-9, 10. Taylor was an independent journalist-turned-historian who reported prior to and during the war years.

however, not an isolationist — he was an interventionist constrained by an isolationist Congress. Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts beginning in 1935 that severely limited political meddling and trade between the United States and Europe. The Neutrality Act of 1935 was revised in 1936, 1937, and 1939 to further deter interventionism, and included harsher criminal penalties for violations.[54] With an ocean between the United States and Europe, many in Washington believed it was enough to keep the spread of Nazism away from our shores.

The United States was not far enough away from Nazism to quell the general concerns of the public, even if Congress was confident in its ability to keep it confined to Europe. German-Americans referred to as *Reichsdeutschen* formed multiple American organizations in support of their German heritage and fatherland.[55] These organizations, called *Bunds*, were often large, popular in major cities, and played host to regular pro-Nazi rallies. The most infamous was the *Bund der Freunde des Neuen Deutschland* (BFND) or Friends of New Germany, founded in 1933 and operating out of New York City.[56] By this time, there were an estimated twenty-five million Americans who traced their ancestry to Germany, and approximately half a million who emigrated to the United States during the Weimar period.[57] There remains some historical debate on how much

[54] The Neutrality Acts were meant to keep the United States out of conflict in Europe, and also to prevent businesses from profiteering by selling to potentially aggressive nations. The final revision to the Neutrality Act of 1939 on November 5, 1939 established a cash-and-carry policy, effectively ending the Act by allowing the US to trade both military and non-military assets so long as they could pay immediately and in cash. This revision was the predecessor to Roosevelt's Lend-Lease policy on March 11, 1941.
[55] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 21.
[56] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 21-22. Sometimes abbreviated as FONG.
[57] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 21.

control Nazi Germany had over these *bunds*, but journalists and observers were quick to sow the seeds of conspiracies and distrust regarding these German nationals.

The most notable conspiracy to take hold on the American conscience was that of an "omnipresent fifth-column" of Nazi Germans and their loyalists who were "trained as shock troops…disguised as sportsmen, tourists, commercial agents, and cultural representatives."[58] The fifth-column was purportedly engaged in high-level espionage and sabotage missions on US soil in preparation for the eventuality of war.[59] The rise in journalistic coverage of the German-American *bunds* only fueled further tensions between the people and what they perceived as an encroachment of aggressive Nazi propaganda on their peaceful way of life. There were skeptics, of course, but a potential truth behind these conspiracies was revealed in the arrest of Guenther Gustave Rumrich in February 1938.[60]

Rumrich was a German national who served in the US Army, but deserted for unknown reasons in 1935.[61] Sometime in early 1936, Rumrich wrote to a former director of German intelligence during the Great War with an application for employment to serve German interests abroad.[62] In financial desperation and without knowing exactly how to reach him, Rumrich mailed his application to the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the official newspaper of the Nazi Party.[63] The newspaper forwarded his application to the *Abwehr*, a German military intelligence organization, who subsequently contacted and hired him

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[58] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 21.
[59] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 21.
[60] The Rumrich story is surprisingly missing from Laurie's work, especially considering the author's efforts to establish the vast conspiratorial syndicate of the *bunds*.
[61] Hans L. Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1935-1945," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 42 (1955): 86.
[62] Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1935-1945," 86.
[63] Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1935-1945," 86.

that same year.[64] The *Abwehr* put Rumrich in contact with other agents, both domestic and in the German *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD), to gather intelligence on American coastal fortifications, shipping routes, aviation, and other relevant material.[65]

Rumrich was arrested in February 1938 by the New York Police Department after a tip from British intelligence. He was already wanted by the US Army for desertion, but Rumrich made the unfortunate and questionably-intelligent decision to attempt to obtain fifty blank US passports for German operatives by impersonating a "Mr. Weston, Undersecretary of State.[66] Perhaps what gave him away was there had not been a British Under Secretary of State named Weston since the 18th century, nor one with such title in the United States, much less one that would need a large amount of blank American passports.[67] Rumrich divulged all of his domestic contacts to Federal agents over the course of multiple interrogations, eventually leading to the first major international espionage trial in fall of 1938. Rumrich and two others were found guilty of espionage on December 2, 1938, though he was granted leniency and a reduced sentence of two years for his cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.[68]

Though the press coverage of the 1938 espionage attempt and trial was extensive, it was arguably eclipsed by former FBI agent and federal witness Leon G. Turrou. Turrou was assigned to lead a special counterintelligence task force to uncover Nazi espionage,

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[64] New York Times, October 18, 1938, 4, quoted in Hans L. Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1935-1945," 86.
[65] Leon G. Turrou, *Nazi Spies in America* (New York: Random House, 1939), 189-198.
[66] Turrou, *Nazi Spies in America*, 18-19.
[67] It is unclear if Rumrich was impersonating a British undersecretary or if he incorrectly assumed there was a position of the same title in the US Government. On page 86 of Trefousse's article on "The Failure of German Intelligence in the United States," the author asserts it was Rumrich's lack of intelligence that was his ultimate undoing.
[68] Turrou, *Nazi Spies in America*, 226-227.

but was terminated from the Bureau in June 1937 after leaking details of the investigation to press.[69] Turrou leaked multiple interrogation documents to the New York press throughout 1937 and into 1938, eventually publishing the first of his many books, entitled *Nazi Spies in America*, in 1939 containing all of his leaked documents along with personal commentary.

The media uproar on this Nazi spy ring was seemingly made for the movies, and Jack Warner of Warner Bros. was quick to see the potential. During the October 1938 testimonies of Rumrich and Turrou, Warner Bros. assigned screenwriter Milton Krims to observe the proceedings and compile as many of Turrou's leaked interrogations as possible.[70] Jack Warner pitched the idea of a movie based on the real accounts of Rumrich and the Nazi spy ring entitled "Storm Over America" to Krims earlier in summer 1938. Warner's vision was to turn the "courtroom drama into a movie" with his own flair for dramatic showmanship using a documentary style.[71] This was Hollywood's first film on the role of America's vulnerability to Nazi espionage, and Warner Bros. weathered its own storms of political and film code backlash as it was renamed and released as *Confessions of Nazi Spy* on May 6, 1939.

Hollywood Interventionism

Warner Bros. submitted the draft script of "Storm Over America" to Joseph Breen, head of the Production Code Administration (PCA), in December 1938 with a

[69] "A Byte Out of History: Spies Caught, Spies Lost, Lessons Learned," Stories, December 2007, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed February 21, 2017, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2007/december/espionage_120307
[70] Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies* (Berkeley: University of Los Angeles Press, 1987), 27.
[71] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 27-29.

strict appeal to keep the script secret and out of the hands of the German consul or German-American *Bund*.[72] However, news of Warner Bros. spinning the espionage trials into a movie already had spread to the other Hollywood studio giants as early as November 1938. Prior to the script submission to Breen, Luigi Luraschi of Paramount's Censorship Department publicly scolded Warner for producing a film that was "uncomplimentary" to a nation, even if Germany was at the forefront of controversial international politics.[73] Luraschi later added that he believed if Warner's film was "in any way uncomplimentary to Germany…then Warners will have on their hands the blood of a great many Jews in Germany."[74] Paramount, a rival studio to Warner Bros., remained an outspoken opponent of Warner's controversial interests in anti-German film narratives, and declared Paramount would remain "morally superior" in its productions.[75]

Breen's office was heavily divided on the issue of script approval for Warner's film. One faction argued it was a creative story adaptation of current events while the other asserted its inflammatory nature toward Germany was dangerous to the entire industry.[76] The story identified Nazi Germany as a threat to the free world with its uncompromising desire for world domination, thus adding further fuel to the potential danger of the script leading the film industry from "the pleasant and profitable course of entertainment to engage in propaganda."[77] Though the script was technically within bounds of the censorship code, Breen appealed to Warner Bros. to consider the economic

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[72] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 28.
[73] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 28.
[74] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 28.
[75] Luigi Luraschi to Breen, December 10, 1938, PCA Files, Academy Library, quoted in Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 28.
[76] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 28.
[77] K.L. To Breen, December 10, 1938, PCA Files, Academy Library, quoted in Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 29.

ramifications of distributing such a film where both national and international political censorship could be risked, despite the fact that the film's content was produced from trial excerpts.[78]

Warner ignored Breen's concerns, and proceeded to produce the film regardless of any associated censorship risks. The film was renamed *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* and released on May 6, 1939 to a lukewarm response at home and abroad. The chief protagonist is character Edward "Ed" Renard, an FBI agent based on Leon Turrou, who asserts Germany's espionage on American soil places the nation already at war with the United States.[79] In the final scene, the US Attorney Kellogg makes an impassioned lecture to the jury on the dangers of US isolationism, and implies that if the US does not learn from Europe it will be complicit in failing to defend the Constitution of the United States of America and its Bill of Rights.[80] Film critics generally accepted the film as "brilliantly realized" and "purposeful entertainment," but some entertainment review outlets found it to be melodramatic and too aggressively anti-German.[81]

Confessions was a financial success, but by no means an immediate blockbuster release. Breen's concerns over international censorship was realized when Germany, Italy, and Spain predictably banned the film from exhibition upon its release.[82] Holland and Norway followed on August 4, 1939, and London refused to show the film unless an

[78] Breen to Jack Warner, December 30, 1938, PCA Files, Academy Library, quoted in Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 29.
[79] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 29; The character, Renard, states "It's a new kind of war but it's still war."
[80] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 29-30.
[81] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 30.
[82] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 30.

edited version was released omitting any inflammatory references to Hitler.[83] Warner edited some portions of the film to circumvent British censorship, but the uncut version was relegated to exhibition only in North America. Unsurprisingly, British censorship relaxed after the outbreak of war in Europe on September 1, 1939, and the original uncut version of *Confessions* played in Great Britain with no reservations throughout the remainder of the year and into the 1940s.[84]

Following the release of *Confessions* and the onset of the war in Europe, other film studios followed Warner's example by going on the offensive against Nazi Germany. Paramount, once a self-proclaimed beacon of moral film conscience, released what is perhaps the most anti-fascist and satirical film of the era, *The Great Dictator* (1940) starring Charlie Chaplin, on October 31, 1940. Despite Chaplin's own warnings about censorship from United Artists during his summer filming, he proceeded to release it because "Hitler must be laughed at."[85] Breen, who was initially skeptical over censorship of *Confessions*, screened the movie earlier on September 6, 1940 calling it "superb entertainment."[86] With German-occupied markets in Europe banning American films while the overseas conflicts hastened, 1940 marked the year when Hollywood film studios churned out features that blurred the lines between entertainment and interventionist propaganda.

Roosevelt and the Hollywood Propaganda Partnership

[83] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 30.
[84] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 31-32.
[85] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 31; Tino Balio, *United Artists: The Company Built by the Stars* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 164.
[86] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 31.

As previously stated, Roosevelt was an interventionist at the mercy of an isolationist Congress. The espionage trial was one of many factors that emboldened Roosevelt to establish the Office of Government Reports (OGR)[87] under Executive Order 8284 in September 1939 to handle all relevant material requests from the US Government as well as report on public responses to national and government problems.[88] Presidential assistant Lowell Mellett was placed in charge of the OGR, and the agency was slowly filled with other Democrat and Roosevelt-aligned interventionists.[89] The Republican-majority Congress, however, refused to formally acknowledge the agency for almost two years despite its official presence.[90] Another factor leading to the creation of the OGR and its eventual successor was due to nonprofit groups such as the Institute for Propaganda Analysis pressuring Roosevelt to study the effects of "enemy" propaganda, analyze it, and find ways to educate and inform the public about the truth so that they became immune to it.[91] Roosevelt was eager to embrace any opportunity to break the Congressional hold on isolationism.

Congress was not trying to silence interventionists, but they made sweeping attempts to draw legislation to restrict foreign agents between 1938 and 1940 with the goal of making isolationism seem a safer and more secure option.[92] The Foreign Agents

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[87] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 50; The acronym OGR was loosely pronounced like the mythical creature "ogre," and sometimes appeared as OGRE or OGRe in documents produced by both internal and external critics who opposed the agency's meddling in propaganda. It was also a considered an inside joke.
[88] Allan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 21.
[89] Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, 21.
[90] Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, 21.
[91] Clayton D. Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany*, 30.
[92] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 30.

Registration Act of 1938 was passed, and required anyone working for a foreign government to register with the Justice Department.[93] The Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940 required foreigners to report their whereabouts to federal authorities at all times, thus keeping non-nationals in what amounted to a police state.[94] Finally, the Voorhis Act of 1940 forced the registration of all anti-government organizations, and permitted the federal government to investigate them at any time under suspicion of treason or seditious activity.[95] These Acts were drafted and passed in response to growing public awareness of alleged Nazi threats, but they were not enough for Roosevelt. The threat of aggressive war was further realized when Germany conducted air raids on Belgium and Holland on May 10, 1940. With the threat of Nazi German aggression and expansionism dominating world news, Roosevelt had no choice but to take the fight against isolationism directly to Congress.

Roosevelt addressed Congress on May 16, 1940, opening with bold statements regarding the "fifth column," which he called "treacherous" and "an enemy unit of occupation," and need for the appropriation of military assistance to US allies.[96] Roosevelt stated that "the American people must recast their thinking about national protection," and that "impregnable fortifications no longer exist."[97] Furthermore, in light of public concerns over the modernity and effectiveness of Army and Navy assets, Roosevelt requested that Congress approve a sum of $860 million to be divided amongst

[93] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 30.
[94] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 30.
[95] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 30.
[96] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Message to Congress on Appropriations for National Defense," May 16, 1940, accessed April 5, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15954.
[97] Roosevelt, "Message to Congress on Appropriations for National Defense," May 16, 1940.

US defense and military agencies to issue contracts for updating equipment.[98] Roosevelt also stated "loose talking and loose thinking on the part of some may give the false impression that our own American Army and Navy are not first-rate, or that money has been wasted on them"[99]; this appropriations request effectively aimed to correct this misunderstanding. His interventionist intentions were finally made transparent and clear to Congress, and Roosevelt planned to move forward in preparing the US for inevitable conflict.

Congressional approval and budget allocations were only part of conflict preparation — the people needed to be convinced to contribute to national safety. Roosevelt understood that propaganda could be used to educate and inspire patriotic service, but he had little experience or knowledge with it. Equally, the Roosevelt administration was concerned about introducing propaganda that unintentionally overreached and mirrored the same context of material distributed in Nazi Germany.[100] Roosevelt wrestled with the need to produce information for the public while being conscious of the US Government's prior failures with propaganda in the Great War.[101] American propaganda from 1917 was heavily nationalistic, and "prone to hysterical, lurid, and crude exaggeration"[102] — themes predominately found in Nazi German propaganda. His reluctance to establish any executive policy on propaganda often left the burden on Mellett to sort out various inquiries from committees and organizations

[98] Roosevelt, "Message to Congress on Appropriations for National Defense," May 16, 1940.
[99] Roosevelt, "Message to Congress on Appropriations for National Defense," May 16, 1940.
[100] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 46.
[101] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 49.
[102] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 49.

seeking to coordinate with any government propaganda initiatives.[103] Though Mellett was an interventionist, he was staunchly anti-propaganda for fear that "high-powered government propaganda" would be counter-productive to public opinion.[104] Between Roosevelt's indecisiveness and Mellett's somewhat unpopular opposition to the administration's aggressive interventionist intent, the American propaganda machine was slow-moving from 1940 into late 1941.

American filmmakers were already preparing for their foray into interventionism, and Hollywood and the Roosevelt administration crossed an important threshold of cooperation in the summer of 1940. In July 1940, the Hays office established the Motion Picture Committee Cooperating for National Defense, which issued contracts to film companies willing to produce live-action shorts on preparedness and rearmament education.[105] The brothers Warner, avid interventionists as evidenced by their earlier release of *Confessions*, immediately offered to produce many of these live-action morale and education shorts at no cost — an offer the Motion Picture Committee did not expect nor know how to react in such its earliest phase.[106]

Despite Roosevelt's reluctance to engage in state-sponsored propaganda, he wanted to take at least one idea to Hollywood by himself even though he had only one contact, mostly thanks to his son. In August 1940, Roosevelt directly corresponded with

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[103] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 50.
[104] Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors*, 50.
[105] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 33; This committee oversaw the production of film shorts for both public and defense-only distribution, which included subjects such as preparation for surviving air attacks to assembly of equipment. These shorts could be shown to workers or spliced to the beginning of feature films, but restrictions were in place to prevent these subjects from being feature-length to limit cost and criticism from anti-interventionists.
[106] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 33; *Variety*, July 21, 1940.

Nicholas Schenck, filmmaker and president of Loew's (subsidiary company of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer), to convince Schenck to produce a two reel, twenty minute documentary entitled *Eyes of the Navy* (1940) to be released no later than October.[107] Schenck, who considered himself to be a patriot, eagerly agreed as it was decidedly unpatriotic to deny a request directly from the President of the United States. The short film was released on October 28, 1940, and simply documented a handful of young men as they entered Navy flight training on an aircraft carrier. *Eyes of the Navy* was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Short Subject at the 13th Academy Awards on February 27, 1941. It was patriotic, realistic, and exactly what Roosevelt wanted to distribute to the public to inspire service and pride.

Disney Attempts to Enter the War Effort

By late 1940, Walt Disney Productions was facing a financial crisis due to film distribution complications that led Disney to reconsider his earlier reluctance to produce anything for the military or government. Walt Disney's 1940 letter to his stockholders offers insight as to why he reconsidered producing government films. The war in Europe was proving to be bad for business, and Disney was no longer able to safely distribute his films outside of North America. As he stated in the "EFFECT OF THE WAR" section of the letter:

> The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of your Company has been serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined. It has been impossible to effect an orderly release of the Company's pictures in any of the countries at war and in many countries it has been impossible to effect any release whatsoever. In fact, in most of the territories dominated by the Axis Powers, the release of American pictures has been forbidden. In addition, currency restrictions

[107] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 34.

> and regulations, as well as fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, have served to reduce further the Company's income from such pictures as were already released in foreign countries.[108]

The overall market for animated feature films was already narrow given how new the concept was in the industry, but the war put further inescapable constraints on distribution and potential profits.[109] Disney's *Pinocchio* (1940) was their only feature-length animated film released prior to the end of the 1940 fiscal year on September 28, and it "was planned and production started prior to the outbreak of the European war."[110] Profits from film barely surpassed half of the production budget, and Walt Disney Productions had to make a $1,000,000 charge to temporarily recoup part of the $2,595,379.66 film's cost.[111] The significant profit loss was exacerbated due to basing the film's profit predictions upon the international distribution and success of his first animated feature film *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs* (1937).[112]

Walt Disney Productions was also facing another financial complication beginning in late 1940 to early 1941, but this one was much closer to home as Disney animators threatened to unionize under the Animators Guild, claiming unequal and unfair pay. Walt was always quite vocal about his opposition to labor unions. After the war, he

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[108] Walt Disney, "Letter to the Stockholders for the 1940 Walt Disney Productions Annual Report," in "Accountability and Rhetoric During a Crisis: Walt Disney's 1940 Letter to Stockholders," by Joel H. Amernic and Russel J. Craig, *The Accounting Historians Journal* 27 (2000): 78.
[109] Joel H. Amernic and Russel J. Craig, "Accountability and Rhetoric During a Crisis: Walt Disney's 1940 Letter to Stockholders*," The Accounting Historians Journal* 27 (2000): 55.
[110] Walt Disney, "Letter to the Stockholders for the 1940 Walt Disney Productions Annual Report," 79.
[111] Walt Disney, "Letter to the Stockholders for the 1940 Walt Disney Productions Annual Report," 79.
[112] Walt Disney, "Letter to the Stockholders for the 1940 Walt Disney Productions Annual Report," 79.

declared them part of a communist conspiracy in the 1947 congressional hearings on un-American activities.[113] Disney was considered to have been an extraordinary leader by most who worked for him in this era, though he ruled his business with a near-autocratic iron fist. Walt believed the success of his business was due to his work, alone, and the profits were his to distribute amongst his employees as he saw fit.[114] While Disney threw lavish barbecues and cookouts at his home for his artists, he paid some of the lowest wages in the entire industry.[115] With the exception of a few top animators, most Disney artists made less than house painters at only $16 to $18 dollars per week, and most worked second jobs to pay their bills.[116] Ken O'Connor, one of Disney's top layout artists, said that the women in cell painting often had it even worse, and he "didn't know how they stayed decent" with such paltry salaries.[117] Disney animators knew their salaries were always arbitrary and often inconsistent depending on production profits, and the war in Europe further threatened their meager earnings.

Disney's sudden interest in entertaining government contracts allowed him an opportunity to keep his artists paid, if not partially distracted from union activities, thus the decision was as practical as it was patriotic.[118] Facing the potential of financial disaster, Walt instructed Robert "Bob" Carr, a writer and director for Walt Disney

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[113] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Un-American Activities, *Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry—Testimony of Walter Elias* Disney, 80th Congress, 1st sess., 1947, in *Walt Disney Conversations,* Kathy M. Jackson, ed. (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2005), 34-41.
[114] Tom Sito, *Drawing the Line: The Untold Story of the Animation Unions from Bosko to Bart Simpson* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 110.
[115] Tom Sito, *Drawing the Line,* 108.
[116] Tom Sito, *Drawing the Line,* 108.
[117] Ken O'Connor, interview by Don Peri, *Working With Walt: Interviews with Disney Artists* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2008), 103.
[118] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 43-44.

Productions, to negotiate potential government contracts to subsidize his losses with overseas distribution and union struggles. In early February 1941, Carr reached out to his good friend Leo Rosten who also happened to be the chief of the Motion Picture Division of the OGR. What should have been an easy transition, especially considering US Government interest in Hollywood as early as summer 1940 as well as Disney's prior decade of unparalleled success, resulted in a tense year of government distrust and financial uncertainty.

CHAPTER 2: FROM FIRST CONTACT TO FIRST CONTRACT: SKEPTICISM, RESISTANCE, AND THE CANADIAN QUESTION

Following the unbridled success of Walt Disney's reimagining of animation as a theatrical art form during the Golden Age of Animation, one might be inclined to believe Walt Disney's name carried a substantial air of authority and reliability with United States defense industries upon first contact in March 1941. Unfortunately, this could not be further from the truth. The first correspondence between Walt Disney Productions and Chief Lowell Mellett, Director of the Office of Government Reports (OGR)[119], was initially met with blatant skepticism. Questions arose pertaining to the overall effectiveness and sensitivity of delivering education and morale films utilizing animation and/or animated characters, possible creative differences, and expenses with regard to this new medium. Though Mellett's skepticism was quickly resolved, the same could not be said for others representing various defense programs and contracts who continued questioning Disney's pedagogical prowess. Disney's first contract did not come from the United States, but from Canada — a nation already at war. While the Canadians eagerly embraced Walt Disney's ideas for wartime propaganda and education films, the United States demonstrated far less enthusiasm in the potential risks associated with using a new, animated medium. Though Walt Disney Productions made first contact with the U.S. Government in February 1941, it was not until the day after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor that Disney received his American contract.

The reservations and skepticism expressed by U.S. Government officials cannot be understated, and is never addressed in its entirety in prior academic works. Richard

[119] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War,* 50.

Shale's 1976 dissertation *Donald Duck Joins Up: The Walt Disney Studio during World War II* is the only detailed study that explores the minutia of memorandums exchanged between Walt Disney Productions and the U.S. Government. However, his research is mostly limited to internal documents and memorandums from Walt Disney Productions, but almost nothing is explored between government agencies. The omission of these government memorandums and the discourse within elucidates a narrative of greater skepticism and conflict in 1941 that Shale's study does not explore. The Disney Archives along with the internal Walt Disney Productions documents are now closed to the public, including academics, and Shale's work is the only true academic exploration of internal Walt Disney Productions sources remaining. Shale's limitations, however, left an important gap in this historical narrative as to why it took until December 8, 1941, the day after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, for Disney to officially receive his first U.S. Government contract. This narrative from first contact to first contract can only be completed by exploring memorandums and documents in the Records of the Office of War Information instead of using or revisiting internal sources from the now-closed Disney Archives. One cannot appreciate Disney's wartime role without first exploring the many facets of uncertainty and government resistance his studios confronted in 1941.

First Contact

Walt Disney was no stranger to creating educational short films, as he produced numerous short titles throughout the late 1920s and 1930s. His first was as early as 1922 when he was commissioned to make a black and white silent short film *Tommy Tucker's Tooth* by Dr. Thomas McCrum of the Deener Dental Institute in Missouri.[120] This short

[120] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 29-30.

film featured both live action and animation — a unique and difficult production technique which Disney later perfected, thus setting him part from other artists. Disney was forever an innovator, and he always pushed both himself and his artists to find new ways to present animation as an art form rather than the singular medium of cartoon production.[121]

When Walt Disney Productions officially moved their studios from Hyperion to the newly-constructed 51 acre Burbank location in early 1940, their proximity to prominent military contractor Lockheed led to a friendly but constant bombardment of requests for Disney to produce training films. The most common request was for instructional films on flush riveting, a complex method of riveting metal to aircraft framework whereby the rivet heads were fixed as to not protrude above the surface. Lockheed's interest in this subject may have been inspired by the 1940 Disney animated short *The Riveter* starring Donald Duck.[122] Walt remained reluctant to entertain these offers due to focusing his resources on animated feature films and the upcoming releases of *Pinnochio* and *Fantasia* scheduled for later that year.[123]

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[121] Wilfred Jackson, interview by Don Peri, *Working With Walt: Interviews with Disney Artists* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2008), 64; Wilfred Jackson was one of Disney's premier directors from 1928 throughout the 1930s, and well-respected for his work on over 30 shorts as well as feature films such as *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937), Pinnochio (1940),* and *Dumbo (1941).*

[122] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 30; In this same passage, Shale briefly mentions that Walt Disney approached Lockheed first after moving the studio to Burbank, and bases this on a March 12, 1941 memorandum from Walt Disney to S.A. Pedersen, Educational Director at Lockheed. The memorandum only mentions that Walt Disney Productions would be willing to produce the animated short for Lockheed and use it as an example of animation being used for educational purposes. Shale's assertion that Walt Disney approached Lockheed first is not verifiable in that document and contradictory to Bob Carr's contact with Leo Rosten, thus leading me to conclude Shale is in error.

[123] Leo C. Rosten, "MEMORANDUM: Walt Disney Studio," February 17, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records

By February 1941, Disney's reluctance to entertain these requests evolved to unexpected enthusiasm. The first memorandum to Washington expressing Walt Disney's interest in producing government films did not originate from Walt Disney Productions, but from the Chief of the Motion Picture Division of OGR, Leo C. Rosten. Rosten, a well-known author and humorist, had steady contact with Robert "Bob" Carr of Walt Disney Productions since 1939, and there was a shared admiration and respect for their creative authority. Bob Carr contacted Rosten in early February 1941, surprising him by requesting information on the procedure for contacting the defense industries with Disney's interest in producing technical training and morale films.[124] Rosten could not have been more excited to get this information circulated in preparation for an official statement from Walt Disney Productions, and quickly drafted a memorandum entitled "Walt Disney Studio" on February 17, 1941 to be sent to Washington. This memorandum also referenced initial discussions of production on cost-plus[125] contracts and the use of iconic characters as well as brief mention of seemingly rogue union activity within the Disney family of artists.

Rosten's memorandum reached the desk of OGR Director Lowell Mellett, and his response was one of guarded interest. Mellett recognized Disney's talent for reaching the

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of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD); also briefly mentioned in Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 30.

[124] Leo C. Rosten, "MEMORANDUM: Walt Disney Studio," February 17, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[125] The use of "cost-plus" here refers to "cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts." Cost-plus utilizes an incentive formula for calculating profit in addition to the reimbursement of fees associated with the production and labor.; "Subpart 16.4—Incentive Contracts, 16.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts," *Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)*, accessed October 6th, 2016, https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/Subpart%2016_4.html

masses, but he had reservations about immediately pursuing the offer. Mellett's letter back to Leo Rosten, dated February 22, 1941, detailed initial, if not slightly informal, stipulations on government cooperation with Walt Disney, and requested these be brought to their attention. Mellett insisted revising the idea of cost-plus production by asserting the U.S. Government would not approve of assuring profit to any entity under a production contract.[126] Also, Mellett insisted that Disney be made aware that there would be two authors in this venture: "the government and Disney, and it is not at all likely that they would see so much eye to eye that a sure success would result."[127] Though not implicitly stated, it is worth noting that placing government before Disney implies the intended hierarchy in this cooperative venture, should it be pursued, and Mellett was clear that he was concerned Disney's artistic desire for creative freedom would supersede government necessity. In a later response from Leo Rosten dated March 3, 1941, both Mellett and Rosten were in agreement with regards to potential communication and cooperative production issues.[128]

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[126] Lowell Mellett to Leo C. Rosten, February 22, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[127] Lowell Mellett to Leo C. Rosten, February 22, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[128] Rosten understood Mellett's reservations, but mentioned Disney would be proceeding with negotiations. Rosten requested that Washington act as a "shepherd" in this matter to help steer Disney's collaboration and efforts into "it's most effective and serviceable use."; Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, March 3, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

On March 12, 1941, Walt Disney Productions addressed two memorandums to Washington expressing interest in making part of their Burbank studio available for creating and producing educational and technical films for the defense industries. The first was directed to "Those Responsible for Training Labor in the Defense Industries" which briefly outlined the benefits of including animation in training films to "present clearly many operations and processes which ordinary photography cannot portray, nor personal instruction convey."[129] The second was directed to "Personnel Managers in the Defense Industries" which presented animated shorts, specifically featuring iconic Disney characters like Donald Duck, as a unique medium to effectively address and handle "certain aspects of morale and discipline problems" and "lessons on touchy points" where live action might not be as well-received by the public.[130] Copies of these memorandums were also delivered to Mellett directly from Carr, along with a small personal message to say that he might find these of interest especially after his follow-up conversation with Leo Rosten.[131]

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[129] Robert Spencer Carr, "A MEMORANDUM. ON: Use of Animated Cartoon Medium for Technical Training Films in Defense Industries; TO: Those Responsible for Training Labor in the Defense Industries," March 12, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[130] Robert Spencer Carr, "A MEMORANDUM. ON: Use of Walt Disney Cartoon Characters in Morale Films; TO: Personnel Managers in the Defense Industries," March 12, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[131] Robert Carr sent copies of these memorandums directly to Lowell Mellett with a short cover letter indicating that these were the product of "a series of conferences with Dr. Leo C. Rosten," which likely took place shortly after previous correspondence between Rosten and Mellett; Robert Carr to Lowell Mellett, March 12, 1941, Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of

Mellett's response to Carr on March 19, 1941 was far less pessimistic, but he remained reasonably skeptical with respect to the use of animation in morale films. Mellett expressed reservations to "undertaking morale films using cartoon characters" for fear of inadvertently ridiculing the actors being represented.[132] His reservations were reasonable enough seeing as how almost all cartoons included slapstick and satire, and only recently that a single artist dared transcend that stereotype. Mellett concluded that his feelings were not meant to be misconstrued as direct opposition, but rather he had misgivings about the medium since "cartoons…hit awfully hard" and "time-toughened politicians" may be the only ones desensitized to it.[133] In closing, as if to reassure Carr of his interest in continuing the discussion, Mellett added "I write, in part, as one who has been a devoted admirer of Disney's productions since the first three times I saw King Neptune."[134] Mellett's letter remained unanswered for almost four weeks while Walt Disney Productions prepared to host a luncheon and conference at his Burbank studios on April 3, 1941.[135]

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the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[132] Lowell Mellett to Robert Carr, March 19, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[133] Lowell Mellett to Robert Carr, March 19, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[134] Lowell Mellett to Robert Carr, March 19, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[135] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK, GUEST LIST," April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War

Dining with Defense

The luncheon and conference on April 3, 1941 was organized on behalf of Walt Disney Productions to demonstrate how animation techniques could be used for educational purposes in the defense industries, and for open discussion on the topic from those present.[136] Five films[137] were shown to elucidate specific aspects and themes: animation segments featuring the cartoon medium in combination with live action from *Servant's Entrance* (1934) and "The Sorcerer's Apprentice" from *Fantasia* (1940); a slide film segment specifically created for this presentation entitled "The Wind in the Willows," adapted the children's novel written by Kenneth Grahame demonstrating how effective and emotional stories can be crafted with only still images, dialogue, and sound; "Baby Weems," a segment from Disney's scheduled June release of their animated feature film *The Reluctant Dragon* (1941) exploring a unique method of storytelling using a narrator, minimally-animated characters sketched on a storyboard, and camera techniques to simulate animation; and an experimental draft version of "Four Methods of Flush Riveting" produced for Lockheed as a penultimate example of Disney's proposal. Walt's ultimate goal was to cement his dedication by stating "we have the plant, the

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Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD); The guest list consisted of nineteen people with fifteen of those representing various defense contractors and government agencies.

[136] Despite meticulous archival research and returning to Shale's sources, there are no documents specifying how the how the guest list for this luncheon and conference was formed. Since Leo Rosten was the introductory speaker at the luncheon, it is likely he played a significant role in forming the list.

[137] Both Rosten and Walt Disney mentioned they were going to show four films in their introductory statements at the luncheon, but five were transcribed.

equipment, and the personnel, and we're willing to do anything we can to help in any way."[138] He was determined to make the potential for contracts a reality.

Though five films were presented, only two animation techniques were demonstrated: traditional and slide film, both with sound. Traditional animation is the most commonly recognized technique featuring two-dimensional, cell drawn segments where backgrounds and characters display as full range of motion. Slide film, however, was far more simplistic. 16mm slide films were designed to be used more technically than its standard 35mm Hollywood cousins, and it had unique advantages in instructional presentations. Slide films could be produced significantly cheaper, faster, display basic animation at varying speeds, and could be effectively paused during the middle of a presentation "to elaborate on a point."[139] Walt Disney provided a cost comparison estimating the traditionally-animated "The Sorcerer's Apprentice" segment was approximately $150,000 after months of work and storyboard edits, but the slide film "Four Methods of Flush Riveting" was around $2,000 with only six hours of storyboard work and just five feet of Technicolor film.[140]

Ultimately, the more inexpensive slide film drew the most immediate interest during the open discussion. One key aspect of slide film that proved most popular was the

[138] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 3.
[139] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 4.
[140] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 3-4.

projector. Slide films, which could be produced on 16mm reels, did not need the complex and hulking machinery used to show theatrical releases. When Disney was probed further about the equipment, he noted that the projector was purchased commercially just prior to the conference, and there were already "a lot of [companies] that turn them out."[141] Disney also mentioned the potential for slide film to transition to all educational institutions after its successful implementation in defense, arguably indulging the interests of guest Dr. Hardy Steeholm from the Office of Education by stating "It would be a marvelous way to tell the kids stories or to demonstrate anything; we're developing the method right in line with our production work, and I believe it has a great future."[142]

Despite the aforementioned interest, the reception was mixed. Director W.K. Hopkins from the National Defense Advisory Commission was not sold on Disney's offer nor perspective on the medium's future. The following is an excerpt from the transcript of their exchange:

> MR. HOPKINS: Mr. Disney, the adoption of this method of education is probably going to be subject to the options of the educational people. We have a national problem in this connection. How do you intend to determine the reaction of the thousands of organizations throughout the country who might be interested in this type of presentation, in order that you might be justified in going ahead with the program – if it's any of my business?
>
> WALT DISNEY: We're simply making ourselves available.

[141] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 4.
[142] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 4.

> MR. HOPKINS: This is the first group you've had together, and now you're trying to find out the reaction of this group to this type of presentation?
>
> WALT DISNEY: We're trying to find out if it could be used in any way. I'm not close to the needs of the aviation industry, and I don't know its needs. I can only say that we can do anything you would want done, and that we'd be very happy to do it.[143]

Hopkins' comment was arguably ill-placed considering Steeholm, a representative from the Office of Education, was also in attendance. Rosten quickly attempted to diffuse the exchange by thanking Hopkins for his question and asked Steeholm to speak since he represented that agency.[144] Steeholm countered Hopkins with unwavering support for Disney's vision:

> I presume that this idea was born in Mr. Disney's mind, but it's been in our minds for years. We've been interested in visual education for some time. We have constantly asked instructors at the training stations what they were using for visual methods – "Where are your charts, your graphs, your slides, your projectors, to make this work easier?" I have said that sometime or other we're going to have to use the Seven Dwarfs; we're going to have to use the cartoons, and I have wished that we could get Walt Disney to cooperate with us. It never occurred to me that it was possible for it to happen. When I first saw it in the newspaper, I was jubilant. I think it is going to be a great contribution; I am sure that the educators of the entire country will accept the project with enthusiasm.[145]

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[143] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 4.
[144] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 6.
[145] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 6.

Steeholm's statement prompted a conciliatory if not humbled response from Hopkins as he declared those working in the Commission's Training Within Industries Section, of whom he was director, would be happy to entertain a further presentation and "it would be our pleasure to cooperate with him."[146]

At the beginning of the open discussion, Disney mentioned it would be most cost-effective to settle on one technique since reel cost decreased with volume, and their studio could "turn them out as fast as you could cook them up."[147] However, traditional animation returned to the discussion when Dr. Arthur Kline from CIT and Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. expressed concern that slide film did not appear to present enough of an opportunity through animation to teach complex subjects such as aerodynamics.[148] While slide film was effective for flush riveting, Kline argued that "people can't see air" and aeronautics was only one aspect of engineering and physics where "graphic production…is very important," thus it might be one of many subjects given disservice with simplistic depiction.[149] Thomas Reid, also from Douglas Aircraft, echoed Kline's concerns and added that Douglas "would make good use" of all the techniques outlined,

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[146] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 6.
[147] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 4.
[148] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 8.
[149] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 8.

but various organizations might have different needs, thus complicating mass production.[150] One such example Reid offered was Douglas Aircraft's likelihood of requesting that the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences advise and educate Disney so that structural engineering and aerodynamics was observed with proper appreciation, and that "would be a forward step for the 'go' from here."[151]

Douglas Aircraft was not the only one with a "go" contingent upon meeting certain conditions—the other agencies expressed their own toward the conclusion of the luncheon. Steeholm also saw the value using traditional animation in some film subjects, but the newness of the medium and potential for budget concerns prevented him from speaking with authority on behalf of the Office of Education without further consultation.[152] Homer Fetty, also from the Office of Education and representing their National Defense Training division, stated the deal would likely be dependent upon convincing the agency to approve school purchasing of the equipment and films.[153] Both Victor J. Hydar, from Lockheed and T.C. Coleman from Northrop Aircraft Co. stated

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[150] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 8.
[151] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 8.
[152] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 9.
[153] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 9.

they would appreciate morale films on such subjects as job safety and supervision in addition to instructional material.[154]

The luncheon and conference concluded shortly after Disney stated that he was "not venturing out into this field with a specific plan in mind, we're just throwing our plant and facilities here open to the use of any industry."[155] Rosten appointed Reid and Svend Pedersen, Educational Director at Lockheed who could not be present at the conference, as co-chairmen of a new Aviation Film Committee consisting of all attendees before amicably inviting everyone to a tour of the studios.[156] Arguably, there was little accomplished at the conclusion of the conference beyond educating those present on what to disseminate to their respective agencies and companies. Disney had no discernible and central plan for production other than generalizations with respect to studio commitment. Every agency and company, of which only a few voiced any opinions and/or questions, had varied needs and agendas while J.H. Waterbury from Consolidated Aircraft Corp. still couldn't understand what animation could do that still pictures could not.[157] Disney's

[154] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 13-14.
[155] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 14.
[156] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 15.
[157] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 12.

venture into defense films was clearly going to be more complex than he initially realized.

Reiterating Interest and Commitment

One week passed with no further communication regarding the luncheon and conference until Rosten recommended that Disney reiterate his statement of intent in a letter to the new Aviation Film Committee on April 10, 1941.[158] In this memorandum, Disney restated his desire to make "part of our studio facilities for the production of a limited number of national defense training films and personnel films," and to do "at cost, and without profit."[159] Disney also included an addendum to his statement at the luncheon, insisting "that these training films would, upon completion, be turned over to the Aviation Film Committee or to the contracting aircraft company or companies, as their own property," thus ensuring Walt Disney Productions would claim no ownership over them.[160] His desperation and immediate desire to move forward was elucidated in his closing statement: "I trust that this letter establishes a satisfactory basis upon which we can get to work at once."[161]

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[158] This is mentioned in Rosten's followup letter to Mellet on April 11, 1941; Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, April 11, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD)

[159] Walt Disney to Aviation Film Committee, April 10, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD)

[160] Walt Disney to Aviation Film Committee, April 10, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[161] Walt Disney to Aviation Film Committee, April 10, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of

After receiving Disney's memorandum, Rosten wrote to Mellett the day after on April 11, 1941 to update him on the previous developments, specifically the luncheon. Rosten stated that the lack of further interest was likely due to the attendees distrusting "any Hollywood offer," and that they feared there would be some "secret catch" that would undermine any say in their future with the product.[162] They generally misunderstood Disney's offer "to make [defense] films for them at cost, at no profit to his organization, and without including overhead and administrative costs."[163] Furthermore, Rosten stated that the aircraft companies "were not sure if these films qualified as legitimate cost items under their contract with the government," and reassuring them would mitigate one of the obstacles to proceeding with the contract.[164] Rosten attempted to assure Mellett "that Disney's offer opens an invaluable field for personnel and training techniques," and he hoped "that the [aircraft companies] will take advantage of an opportunity which, six months ago, would have seemed impossible."[165]

Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[162] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, April 11, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[163] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, April 11, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[164] Companies with defense contracts were given a budget for workplace education, but only live-action educational films were being produced for this purpose. There were no official statements clarifying that animated films and/or slide films equally qualified.

[165] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, April 11, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

On April 16, 1941, Robert Carr finally responded to Mellett's letter from March 19, 1941 to address concerns over the sensitivity and nature of animation in morale films. Attempting to ease Mellett's reservations, Carr stated the following on Disney's behalf:

> You may be sure that any motion pictures which Mr. Disney might be called upon to make would always put their message across in positive, rather than negative, terms, and would have the same good humor and good taste which have at all times characterized this studio's work.
>
> We feel that you will agree that it is the humanness and gentleness of Walt Disney's humor which has always distinguished his creations; and that these qualities would pervade any program he might be asked to undertake.[166]

Carr also mentioned a recent encounter with Waterbury, the representative from Consolidated Aircraft who initially voiced his dissenting opinion on the value of animation in education at the conference. Waterbury made another visit to Disney's studios and later wrote to Carr expressing how Disney motion pictures were being shown at Consolidated "for the benefit of the night shift," and he stated that their "three to four thousand employees" were uplifted by Disney's talent and imagination.[167] Waterbury saw how Disney's films positively affected the morale of his workforce, and he wrote to Carr inquiring how Disney could create and promote morale films to be circulated by the management of every large industry from coast to coast.[168]

Finally convincing Waterbury was arguably a significant accomplishment, but there are no records of Mellett ever responding to Carr's April 16, 1941 letter.

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[166] R.S. Carr to Lowell Mellett, April 16, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).
[167] R.S. Carr to Lowell Mellett, April 16, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).
[168] R.S. Carr to Lowell Mellett, April 16, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

Unfortunately, one can only assume Mellett either contacted the Aviation Film Committee addressing concerns over contractual spending with no success, or any documented response was simply lost. There is, also, the possibility that Mellett never responded at all. However, that will be further explored later. The lack of further archival evidence from late April to June 1941 from the OGR, Walt Disney Productions, and the aviation/defense industries leads one to arguably conclude that no deals were reached, no American contracts were negotiated, and interest was relegated to only a select few rather than the whole.

Disney's interest in contributing to what he often referred to as the "present emergency," however, did not go entirely unnoticed. There was one attendee at the luncheon and conference who had very little to say, but who had the approval and authority to expedite contractual negotiations for educational and morale films. Enter John Grierson, Commissioner of the National Film Board of Canada (NFB) — Canada's premier propaganda agency.

The Canadian Question

Canada had been officially at war for almost two years by the time of Disney's luncheon and conference. Grierson was already an accomplished documentarian and filmmaker who held Disney in high esteem for his artistic talent and innovation.[169] Grierson fully realized and appreciated the potential of positively influencing the Canadian war effort by including Disney's imagination and motivation to contribute his resources during this time of conflict. He was a fan and admirer, but also the strategic genius behind Canada's propaganda machine.

[169] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 31.

There is no archival evidence indicating how Grierson landed on the guest list for the April 3, 1941 conference, but filmmakers were often well-connected, even internationally. Grierson spoke only once toward the latter half of the luncheon when Rosten finally introduced him following the influx of opinions and agendas expressed by the others in attendance. He introduced himself as being "on a visit of inquiry like everyone else here…[whose] job I've got in Canada is to see to the maximum use of film in connection with the whole war effort."[170] According to Grierson's estimation, there is one branch of their War Office that had "something like three hundred million dollars of equipment involved…and we have not got a proper education system working for the maintenance of this property"[171]; referring to "tanks…motorcycles…trucks and so on."[172] Grierson's following statement did not appear to resonate further with the attendees, but it clarified his mission:

> I do want to add this word – that if the aircraft industry or any other war industry has the enormous blessing of having the superb technique of Disney, and the superb lucidity of Disney, geared to their educational problems, they are very lucky indeed. To all of us who have operated with pedagogical films, it is a great problem to secure lucidity in the ordinary documentary way. But dealing with purely technical problems, or personnel problems, animation seems to have a capacity for simplifying the presentation of pedagogical problems, as documentary films have not. And I am speaking as a documentarian. I think you

[170] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 11.
[171] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 11.
[172] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 11.

> will be very fortunate indeed if the simplicity and brilliance of this medium are geared to educational problems.[173]

Grierson's powerful words were not addressed further nor acknowledged by any other person in attendance, but he was only there to represent Canadian interests.

Shortly after the conference, the NFB was restructured and reorganized by merging with the redundant and obsolete Canadian Government Motion Picture Bureau, and the budget was frozen until the assimilation was completed. The NFB namesake was retained, but the merger was not finalized until June 11, 1941, and Grierson extended the first olive branch of government contracts to Disney in late July.[174] There is no archival evidence containing the exact date that Disney signed the government contracts with the NFB, but it is implied to have been on July 27, 1941 based on a letter from Rosten to Mellett dated July 28, 1941.[175] The NFB immediately purchased the rights to "The Four Methods of Flush Riveting"; negotiated a short educational film on the Boys anti-tank rifle for Canadian, British, and Australian anti-armor infantry; and commissioned four traditionally-animated short films at $20,000 apiece promoting war bonds and savings certificates.[176] The most important asset in these contracts, however, was Disney's blessing and enthusiasm to include his beloved, iconic characters from his cartoon shorts

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[173] Transcript, "LUNCHEON AND CONFERENCE, WALT DISNEY STUDIO, BURBANK" April 3, 1941, Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD), 11.
[174] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 32.
[175] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, July 23, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD); Rosten states "I think you would be interested to know that John Grierson flew in yesterday morning and has concluded a deal with Walt Disney."
[176] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 32-33.

and feature films.[177] From Donald Duck to the Seven Dwarfs, the NFB won a serious victory in Canadian domestic propaganda, thus keeping Disney's Defense Films Division producing exclusively for Canada until December 8, 1941.

After a rather long dry spell of contact since the post-luncheon letter on April 11, 1941, Rosten wrote to Mellett on July 23, 1941 with general updates on cooperation between the Aviation Film Committee and the Screen Actors Guild. The crux of his letter, however, was the inclusion of his passive-aggressive opinion on the U.S. Government's loss of Disney to the Canadian NFB:

> You will be interested to know that John Grierson of the National Film Board, Canada, wired me and asked whether the Disney offer to make animated or semi-animated films at cost would be open to the Canadian government. I called the Disney people, who told me they would be delighted to make the films for Canada on the same terms tha they have offered to do so for our own federal agencies. Disney wired Grierson to this effect and Grierson replied that he would get in touch with them shortly "regarding the production of a first film which deals with Army training. It combines comedy animation with stretches of straight instruction." I think there will be a moral in the fact that the Canadians jumped at Disney's offer long before we did and will probably turn out a [fine] series.[178]

Rosten was well known and respected for his positive attitude and cheery disposition, but this letter displayed his underlying displeasure for the U.S. Government's lack of action. Mellett drafted a short letter that same day in response containing a brief acknowledgement of Rosten's other points of interest, and asked one relevant question that potentially elucidates the conclusion of Mellett's negotiations with the U.S.

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[177] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 33-35.

[178] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, July 23, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

Government: “If the Canadians do work out a program with Disney, the situation will furnish something approximating irony, won’t it?”[179]

Mellett’s earlier negotiations likely fell upon deaf ears in Washington, thus defense contractors never resumed talks with Walt Disney Productions. Rosten maintained steady contact with Grierson, who was more than willing to share information if not casually bask in the NFB’s claim over Disney, and this relationship reinvigorated a Disney discourse between Rosten and Mellett. Grierson was neither openly rude nor crass towards Rosten and the U.S. Government, but Rosten acknowledged his enthusiasm in a response to Mellett on July 28, 1941.[180] In this letter, Rosten informed Mellett that the Canadians had secured rights to use iconic Disney characters in their film shorts, and he anticipated that Disney’s NFB contract would “break the ice in many directions and…[hoped] that some of our government agencies will have either the money or initiative to follow suit quickly.”[181]

Rosten was later invited by Grierson to fly up to Canada to tour the work from the NFB Film Unit, and he received official confirmation with further details on the

[179] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, July 23, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).
[180] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, July 28, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).
[181] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, July 28, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

Canadian program with Disney.[182] Rosten even mentioned that Grierson invited him to "fly to England with him in a bomber to survey the use of films in war time," but he opted for a week's vacation instead[183]; undoubtedly the safer choice. When Rosten returned from vacation, he wrote to Mellett on August 17th, 1941 with two newspaper clippings from August 5, 1941 issues of *The Film Daily* from the United States and *The Evening Citizen* from Ottawa, Ontario.[184] These articles were brief and only acknowledged the Disney-Canada partnership with the aforementioned film projects. Rosten promised he would "send longer report soon,"[185] though the articles spoke for themselves; Canada earned international recognition for acquiring Walt Disney contracts. Despite additional documents[186] circulated within the U.S. Government pertaining to Disney's NFB films and internal tensions increasing over the loss of Disney to Canada,

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[182] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, August 5, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[183] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, August 5, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[184] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, August 17, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[185] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, August 17, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

[186] Robert S. Carr to Dr. Leo C. Rosten, Walt Disney Productions Inter-Office Communication, August 15, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD); These archived documents dated August 15, 1941 are from Carr to Rosten exploring the stories and themes of their animated films in detail for the NFB. Most of these have already been alluded to or exhaustively covered in Shale's work.

no American agency expressed any interest in pursuing contracts for morale and education films with Walt Disney Productions, nor any other studio, until December 8, 1941 — the day after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.

What Went Wrong?

How did someone as successful and American as Walt Disney fail to secure even a single U.S. Government contract until the day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor? There are a few potential answers, none of which are concrete, revealing a spectrum of problems in the latter half of 1941 that provide some context for the government's failure to commit prior to Pearl Harbor.

Carr wrote to Rosten on October 8, 1941 regarding the continued lack of American interest in Disney's offer to produce education and morale films. After spending an afternoon with a government representative whose name was redacted to "- - - -", Carr asserted that he made aware of the "log jam" that stifled the whole operation.[187] According to Carr's source, the "bottleneck" was John C. Beswick, Director of National Defense Training in the State Department of Education.[188] Carr asserted that "Mr. Beswick is the custodian of the many millions which Washington has poured into Southern California for emergency training of defense workers," and that multiple members of the Aviation Film Committee including both co-chairmen and Homer Fetty

[187] Robert S. Carr to Leo Rosten, October 8, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).
[188] Robert S. Carr to Leo Rosten, October 8, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

urged Beswick to act after the luncheon to no success.[189] Carr also quotes an alleged statement from Beswick elucidating his policy on training films: "All kinds of film companies are after me. If I buy from one, I'll have to buy from all of them. So I won't buy anything from any of them."[190] Furthermore, Carr declares Beswick to be a "kingpin" because of a law that grants him almost authoritarian control over all educational properties related to training programs, thus causing this "ridiculous stalemate."[191]

The validity of Carr's assertions and reliability of his source, who remains anonymous due to censorship/redaction, is questionable at best. There are no archived records from John Beswick proving his alleged policy on training films, nor any policy for that matter. However, there might have been some credibility to Carr's argument since Rosten enclosed copies of the letter to Mellett on October 13, 1941. In Rosten's letter to Mellett, he stated the "subject matter is…remote from my own responsibilities," but he thought "someone in Washington would be interested."[192] No further correspondence on the matter is archived, if it exists at all, but the claim upon Beswick's

[189] Robert S. Carr to Leo Rosten, October 8, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).
[190] Robert S. Carr to Leo Rosten, October 8, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).
[191] Robert S. Carr to Leo Rosten, October 8, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).
[192] Leo C. Rosten to Lowell Mellett, October 13, 1941, Folder: Leo Rosten, 1940-1942, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 888, Records of the Office of Government Reports, 1932-1947, Record Group 44 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD).

policy regarding educational films shows potential resistance that obstructed Disney's negotiations with the U.S. Government.

Hollywood was also at the forefront of a Congressional investigation into "war-mongering," which Carr briefly mentioned in his October 8, 1941 letter. Prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States retained its non-interventionist policy with respect to the war in Europe, but Hollywood was indulging interventionist sentiments by depicting the inevitability of American entry into the war.[193] Warner Bros.' *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* (1939), though popular, drew the earliest criticism from Washington for implying that Nazi Germany was a direct enemy to American security.[194] On September 1, 1941, Senators Gerald P. Nye (R-North Dakota) and Bennett C. Clark (D-Missouri) introduced a resolution to Congress authorizing "an investigation of war propaganda disseminated by the motion picture industry and of any monopoly in the production, distribution, or exhibition of motion pictures."[195] A subcommittee was formed to investigate Hollywood as a singular entity that potentially violated federal non-interventionist law as ordered by President Roosevelt.[196]

Though Wendell Willkie, Hollywood's high profile attorney and 1940 presidential nominee, successfully defended their interests as solely entertainment and protected by the First Amendment, the investigations further aggravated those in Washington who were decidedly against the film giants and their meddling in war

[193] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 52-53.
[194] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 52-53.
[195] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, *Hearings on Propaganda in Motion Pictures*, 77th Congress, 1st sess., 1941.
[196] John E. Moser, "Gigantic Engines of Propaganda: The 1941 Investigation of Hollywood," *The Historian* 63 (2001): 741.

affairs.[197] The congressional hearings concluded on September 26, 1941, but the congressional investigations were not resolved until December 8th, 1941. Senators Nye and Clark, who were at the forefront of the investigations, along with the rest of Congress dismissed any potential case against Hollywood now that combating non-interventionist propaganda was no longer feasible.[198]

Conclusion

Disney's first contract to produce these films for the U.S. war effort was negotiated and finalized over a phone call at 6 o'clock in the evening on December 8, 1941.[199] Lieutenant Cottle from the U.S. Navy Bureau of Supplies and Accounts called Disney to immediately negotiate the production of twenty films on aircraft and warship identification.[200] According to Shale, this phone call resulted from a prior inquiry letter sent by Lieutenant Junior Grade J.C. Hutchison of the U.S. Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics to Bob Carr on November 28, 1941.[201] Hutchison, who was familiar with Disney's work with flush riveting, requested information about depicting warship identification with animation, and Carr responded on December 4, 1941 with "a carefully worded reply outlining point by point the advantages of using Disney Studio facilities."[202] The phone call on December 8, 1941 resulted in the aforementioned films negotiated at $4,500 a piece with production to begin as soon as possible. Cottle ended

[197] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 44-45.
[198] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 45.
[199] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 48.
[200] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 48.
[201] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 48.
[202] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 48; This is the only information Shale gives about Carr's response to Hutchison, and archival searches for copies of these letters were unsuccessful.

the call by saying "Now, this constitutes a contract, Mr. Disney, and we have recorded the conversation for the purposes of making a contract."[203]

While no evidence exists indicating the length of the phone call between Cottle and Disney, the fact that the contract was negotiated over a phone call reflects the urgency and immediacy of the time. Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war effort, and this phone call marked the first of multiple contracts negotiated into early 1942 as Walt Disney Productions was drafted into the American war effort. Shale's failure to adequately explore the severity of government pushback to Disney's proposals in 1941 does not permit one to fully appreciate his later accomplishments in producing educational and morale films between 1942 and 1945. One of Shale's few mentions of these hardships was relegated to a seemingly dismissive notion, at best: "Though the Canadian government was the first to recognize and apply to national interests the talents of Walt Disney and his artists, the United States government was not far behind in tapping these resources."[204]

While Canada's NFB contracts certainly reinvigorated domestic discourse with respect to Disney as an untapped American asset, the U.S. Government's own contractual interests proved to be far less condensed and superficial. Almost seven months of misunderstandings, passive-aggressive silence, and controversy passed between Disney's luncheon and conference and his first American contract. Shale's omission of the exploration of government resistance to Disney's defense films production oversimplifies the narrative, thus the context might lead one to believe that these contracts were a natural progression and welcome admission to U.S. Government defense spending in

[203] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 49.
[204] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 43.

1941. Regardless of whether Shale's omission of this narrative was due to choice or archival availability, reframing Walt Disney's 1941 journey from first contact to first contract to include government skepticism and resistance is key to fully appreciating Disney's later accomplishments as a Second World War animated film producer.

CHAPTER 3: THE NEW SPIRIT OF SERVICE: DISNEY MOBILIZES AND CONGRESS SEETHES

Walt Disney Productions' first contract for a morale film came on December 18, 1941 from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John L. Sullivan on behalf of Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, to produce an animated short encouraging Americans to pay their income taxes in a timely manner.[205] Morgenthau stressed that expediting the production of this animated short was of key importance since income tax payments were due on March 15, 1942.[206] Walt Disney offered his character Donald Duck to the film as it was "the Disney Studio's biggest attraction" at the time, and asserted the loaning of that character was equivalent to "MGM loaning out Clark Gable."[207] *The New Spirit* starring Donald Duck was completed in only four weeks, and was released on January 23, 1942. Walt Disney considered this short film, at a run time of approximately seven minutes and twenty-one seconds, to be the "fasted time ever made on any cartoon production and the fastest service Technicolor has ever given."[208]

The bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 may have opened doors to Walt Disney that were not previously afforded to him, despite his best efforts, but his first government contract was equally underscored with controversy and political backlash. The Department of the Treasury paid Walt Disney for *The New Spirit* with money that was not properly appropriated in its budget, and Congress proved difficult to persuade on the merits of entertainment mediums being used to bolster American patriotism. This

[205] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 59.
[206] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 60.
[207] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 60.
[208] Telegram from Walt Disney to George Buffington, January 20, 1942, quoted in Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 63.

chapter briefly explores *The New Spirit* scene-by-scene, and describes the imagery and messages within the animated short to better provide context for the later controversy on the floors of the House and Senate with respect to Disney and Morgenthau.

The New Spirit **(1942)**

The New Spirit opens with a theme song titled "Yankee Doodle Spirit" written by Cliff Edwards and Oliver Wallace, and sampled the melody from the famous Revolutionary War era folk song "Yankee Doodle." Edwards was a well-established figure at Walt Disney Productions as, both, a personal friend of Walt's and the voice of Jiminy Cricket from Disney's second feature-length animated film *Pinocchio* (1940). The lyrics were meant to evoke the fighting spirit present in every American, and demonstrate that to the world by fighting for freedom:

> *There's a Yankee Doodle spirit in the heart of everyone,*
> *It's the Yankee Doodle spirit now that's shouldering a gun,*
> *For freedom and liberty!*
> *Your freedom, your liberty,*
> *This is our fighting song!*
>
> *For these are right and we will fight,*
> *And never will we cease,*
> *Until we meet our victory and ever lasting peace!*
>
> *So, light up that new Yankee Doodle spirit and forever let it shine,*
> *And show the world that this Yankee Doodle spirit is ours,*
> *It's yours,*
> *It's mine!*[209]

The "Yankee Doodle spirit" is conveyed as the soul of patriotism at the heart of every American citizen, and the melody invokes America's Revolutionary War past as a lyrical foundation for promoting every American's duty to answer the call to arms now that the

[209] Cliff Edwards and Oliver Wallace, "Yankee Doodle Spirit," in *The New Spirit*, Produced by Walt Disney Productions for the United States Department of the Treasury, 1942.

country was at war. The lyrics also assert that this Yankee Doodle spirit must be manifested to the entire world until the entirety of this war is over and peace prevails, thus America will lead the world to victory.

The first scene opens with Donald Duck happily dancing to "Yankee Doodle Spirit" in front of a full-length, four-way mirror as it is played through his living room radio. The four-way mirror provides the visual effect of four Donald Duck characters marching in unison to the beat of the song, and three march away left and off-screen as the song concludes leaving only one character in frame. Donald Duck's saluting silhouette approaches the radio just as the theme ends, and is followed by a close up of his large, white eyes with colorful American flags blowing in the wind in place of his pupils.

Donald Duck's enthrallment with the theme's lyrics reflecting America's patriotism and duty through service is further roused by the radio narrator's commentary on "the spirit of a free people united again in a common cause to stamp tyranny from the earth." The narrator asks about the listeners' patriotic duty to serve their country, and informs them "there's something important you can do." Much to Donald Duck's dismay, the narrator deflates his eagerness to serve his country by informing him of the need to pay his income tax. Donald Duck collapses to the floor and mumbles disgruntled and incoherently about such a seemingly mundane avenue of service to one's country, and his mood is briefly assuaged once the narrator stresses its importance as it being "your duty…your privilege to help your government by paying your tax, and paying it promptly."

Still not understanding the gravity of paying one's income tax promptly, Donald Duck says "what's the big hurry?" as he slumps back down to the floor in frustration and disappointment. The narrator answers: "Your country is at war! Your country needs taxes for guns, taxes for ships, taxes for democracy — taxes to beat the Axis!" Donald Duck leaps up from the floor and hops about excitedly, striking a fighting pose with his fists in the air and responds: "Oh, boy! Taxes to beat the Axis!" With his patriotic and fighting spirit reinvigorated, Donald Duck dashes clumsily into an adjacent room, and presents himself back in front of the radio a few seconds later holding an exaggerated mountain of math books, an adding machine, and a large bottle of aspirin in preparation to begin the complicated task of preparing his taxes.

Despite Donald Duck's preparation for the worst in filing his taxes, *The New Spirit* was created with the specific purpose: to convey the ease of filing one's taxes. According to varying sources loosely quoting Morgenthau, there would be millions of new taxpayers who had no experience filing their income taxes, and taxpayer education was a substantial priority in preparing them.[210] Donald Duck was the perfect educational tool to reach these new taxpayers, including rejuvenating the existing base, with his quick wit and sense of humor. According to the narrator, Donald Duck could use the "simplified form" for filing his income tax since he made less than $3,000 last year. This salary demographic made up the majority of new and existing taxpayers. The narrator stresses the process is "streamlined" and "simple" by instructing Donald Duck on how to fill out the new two-page FORM 1040 A INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 1941.

[210] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 59.

Donald Duck was instructed to list his occupation, "actor," immediately followed by recording his three dependents: his adopted nephews Huey, Dewey, and Louey. Next, the narrator stressed the importance of accurately reporting his total income from the previous year which came to $2,501.00, and subtract his $800 credit for his three dependents with the total coming to $1,701.00. Donald Duck confirmed that he was single with three dependents, and the narrator instructed him to find his income tax total using Column B on the second page of the form. His total income tax came to $13, which he paid using a check while the narrator further informed him of the importance of "mailing it in early" in order to "really help." Donald Duck, being the enthusiastic patriot, rushed out of his house and passed the mailbox entirely in favor of comically rushing the check on-foot directly to Washington, D.C.

The final three minutes consist of an animated montage of factories producing assets of war from the money acquired through "your taxes, my taxes, our taxes that run the factories." Work whistles painted with the stars and stripes of the American flag blow to indicate the beginning of work, and steel molds for ammunition are filled and dumped on conveyer belts that carry them off screen. The next scene features a searing hot forge producing oblong blocks of red hot steel along another conveyer belt while the narrator drones about "factories making guns, machine guns, anti-tank guns, long-range guns — guns, guns, all kinds of guns." A silhouetted Japanese naval destroyer painted with the red and white emblem of the rising sun is then sunk by an explosive shot, sending it to the depths while the narrator advocates to "blast the aggressors from the seas."[211] The

[211] This scene is important as it is the first in the animated short depicting an attack on America's enemies. In this case, the first of America's enemies are the Japanese for

patriotic work whistles blow again to send more factories to work against the Nazis with a montage of US fighter planes, naval ships, and submarines working together to send the Nazi war machines into a mountain of crumpled parts. Throughout the montage, the narrator continues with the message of "taxes to keep them fighting, taxes to keep them rolling, taxes to keep them coming, taxes to beat to earth the evil destroy of freedom and peace." The montage ends with an animated scene zooming out on a sunrise with hints of the American flag fading in from the top, American bombers continuously flying up from the left and right of the picture, and a constant roll of silhouetted tanks rolling along the bottom. While the American folk song "Let Freedom Ring" plays in the background, the narrator closes by stating "taxes will keep democracy on the march!"

The House of Representatives Fights the Film

While Walt Disney's tumultuous negotiations with the US Government in 1941 appeared resolved the day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, there was one final, unexpected complication following the release of *The New Spirit*. Morgenthau approved an $80,000 payment to Walt Disney Productions to cover both the work and print costs, but he did not have Congressional approval. Morgenthau submitted a budget request to Congress to cover the cost of the *The New Spirit*, which was subsequently addressed with significant furor on February 6, 1942 while debates regarding defense appropriations bill H.R. 6548 ensued.

H.R. 6548 was a defense spending bill making appropriations to supply deficiencies in certain appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1942, and for prior fiscal years, to provide supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June

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having attacked Pearl Harbor. This was likely necessary to convey to the viewers that America's entry into the war was first and foremost the result of Japanese aggression.

30, 1942, and for other purposes. Representative John Taber from New York, a Republican who was one month shy of twenty years of service in the House of Representatives and on the Appropriations Committee, was a chief opponent of this bill in its current form due to taxpayer dollars being spent on films, and insisted the budget be made solely "for defense and cut out the frills and nonsense."[212] Morgenthau's request to Congress was Taber's primary issue with the bill because he did not see film production, or any form of song-and-dance entertainment, as essential to civilian defense programs. Instead, he referred to them as "leeches on the United States Treasury."[213]

During the debate, Representative Charles Eaton, a fellow Republican from New Jersey, called upon Taber to present "his Scripture support for his position, namely, where the carcass is, there the birds gather together."[214] Taber took the floor with this passionate response:

> Mr. TABER. And I say to the gentleman that unless Congress begins to operate pretty soon, the meat will all be taken off the carcass by these leeches and parasites, and there will not be any left with which to buy bombers and guns and ammunition to support our boys in the field.
>
> The Treasury Department and the Bureau of Internal Revenue have gone ahead and hired Walt Disney, a great artist, and I am not criticizing Mr. Disney, but I think the gentlemen in the Treasury Department ought to know better than this. They have hired him to make a moving picture that is going to cost $80,000 to persuade the people to pay their income taxes. My God! Can you think of anything that would come nearer to making people hate to pay their income tax than the knowledge that $80,000, that should go for a bomber, is to be spent for a moving picture to entertain people?[215]

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[212] Representative John Taber, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1096.
[213] Representative Charles Eaton, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1096.
[214] Representative John Taber, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1095.
[215] Representative John Taber, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1095.

Representative Andrew May, a Democrat from Kentucky, then requested Taber yield to shift the discourse away from the tirade to the topic of Orson Wells being promoted to Goodwill Ambassador to South America, and remarked that Wells was also producing films for defense and education.[216] This prompted Taber to continue his ardent accosting of the Treasury Department:

> Mr. TABER. Perhaps there is no limit to how far some people will go in making a travesty out of some of this national defense activity. I made some remarks upon some of this situation in the hearings, on page 207, and I am going to repeat that statement:
>
> Now, there has got to be some sense to this operation, or we are going to be in a terrible shape. And to put on a moving picture and a hurdy-gurdy, people will want to know where the monkey is and who is going to turn the crank of the hurdy-gurdy.
>
> Mr. O'Neal. The monkey is the taxpayer.
>
> Mr. Taber. The taxpayer is going to be a monkey, anyway, when you get through with that operation. It is about time that we got rid of some of these expenses that have no relation to defense and which cannot do anything except make the people more unwilling to pay their taxes.
>
> The Treasury Department is getting out songs on income tax and distributing them around the country.[217]

May interrupted Taber's continued rant about the Treasury Department, this time inciting an equally-passionate exchange regarding the Appropriations Committee between the two:

> Mr. MAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
>
> Mr. TABER. I yield.
>
> Mr. MAY. If the Appropriations Committee has had evidence of these things before it, and I am sure it has, does not that committee have the power to limit the appropriations by providing that none of the funds appropriated shall be used for certain purposes?
>
> Mr. TABER. Yes.

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[216] Representative Andrew May, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1095.

[217] Representative John Taber, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1095.

> Mr. MAY. Well, why have you not done it?
>
> Mr. TABER. I did offer that amendment in the committee and I intend to offer it on the floor. I intend to make a motion to recommit if the amendment fails and I intend to ask for a roll call upon that motion, because I do not believe that that kind of travesty should be permitted to go on.
>
> Personally I have gone away out on a limb before this war started, much farther than many were ready to go, in advocating appropriations which, to my mind, were needed for national defense, or might be needed. Now, it seems to me we ought to have a spirit of realization that we cannot have promotion of fan dancing and such things to entertain the people at a time when we need the funds for national defense.
>
> I realize that we are treading on toes high up, but those toes high up must come around to the point where they are ready to support the national defense program and make sacrifices like the rest of us.
>
> Now, I have listed a lot of these parasites—[218]

Taber further poured salt into the wound when he labeled these so-called "fan dancers" as "highfalutin parasites" subsidized by the Office of Civilian Defense, arguably implying that Walt Disney was among them.[219]

Representative Leland M. Ford, Republican from California, proposed an amendment to the budget shortly after Taber prior statements that eliminated Morgenthau's request for repayment of the $80,000 — along with other similar expenditures — and served to further strike attempts to appropriate any budget toward such future endeavors:

> Mr. LELAND M. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment because I think it is a little more specific in that it will insure that none of the funds herein appropriated will be used as they were used before. I offer as evidence as to the use of these funds, page 272, the volunteer participation. We find people in there volunteering, for several pages, for jobs of $8,000, $6,000 a year, $22 a day, which corresponds to about $8,000 a year. That includes singers, dancers, and a lot of functions that I do not think are necessary. These are wartimes and I do not think that this country has to be sold by song and dance on the necessities of a

[218] Representatives Andrew May and John Taber, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1095.
[219] Representative John Taber, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1095.

> need program. I do not think there is any question about the necessities of the war program. But if a competent person — and when I say "competent" I mean a competent person — will go out among our people, he can sell these ideas and organize these districts and get them going.
>
> Now, we find that we have nothing for material. We have no arm bands. We have no gas masks. Then what did they do with the money? They spent it in this other direction. I do not think that is a proper expenditure of the money. I think it is a political and social pay-off. I do not think there is any question about that. It is not a program that would inspire confidence.[220]

Ford's point regarding confidence was related to a *Washington Post* article from earlier that same day insisting that a new war department be created with positions such as "the director or directress of hobby culture" and "director of quiz programs."[221] This article, obviously critical of defense spending, was a primary catalyst for Ford's amendment and criticism of Civilian Defense not being taken seriously by the public.

Representative Frank E. Hook, Democrat from Michigan, rose from his seat and declared his formal opposition to the amendment:

> …Mr. Chairman, we are actually in a war. Evidently there are some who do not realize it yet, some who still have the complacency that existed before Pearl Harbor: some who can pick out of any program, I do not care what it is, things that they can ridicule. The program of the administration before Pearl Harbor was ridiculed, ridiculed in the same way that the program of the Office of Civilian Defense has been ridiculed here today. Some day you will get a shock, the same as you got on December 7, at Pearl Harbor, unless that ridiculing is stopped once and for all. Yes, you can talk about dancers in this program, and you can talk about all the others, actors or anybody else, but you must remember that the ridicule which the Washington Post or any other newspaper or any other person brings out is taken up by the Axis agents.
>
> There is a definite move throughout this Nation today by the Axis to place ammunition in the hands of unsuspecting people with which they will break down the civilian morale so that the men at the front lines will not be supported by the folks back home. The real thing we need back of the war program in this country is confidence in the Nation's legislative body, confidence in those who administer the program; and it is about time that some of those who are continuously

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[220] Representative Leland M. Ford, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1116-1117.
[221] Representative Leland M. Ford, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1116-1117.

> ridiculing, continuously referring to fan dancers, should realize that they, before Pearl Harbor, were continuously ridiculing the President of the United States. The President of the United States has proven that he was absolutely right. The President of the United States has administered the war program to the point where he has the confidence of the people of the United States of America, and it is about time that Members of Congress and others quit ridiculing this program so we may have the confidence of the people of the United States.[222]

Hook's opposition served as a direct confrontation to House Republicans who were using both the $80,000 Treasury payment to Walt Disney and negative media sentiments to argue against the effectiveness Roosevelt administration. Part of the Republican pushback was fiscal conservatism while the other was partisan politics, of which the latter stemmed from as far back as when Roosevelt first advocated against isolationism.

Shortly after Hook's statement, Ford's amendment was passed with a vote of 75 in favor and 68 against. Representative Richard B. Wigglesworth, Republican from Massachusetts, then proposed an amendment to further clarify and cut the appropriation of the Treasury Deparment's consolidated emergency fund of $350,000. According to Wigglesworth, this money risked being used for unnecessary personnel growth in the Treasury Department, and the $80,000 payment for *The New Spirit* could be inappropriately taken from that fund:

> …It would also wipe out $80,000 requested for the Walt Disney moving-picture film already referred to.
>
> I think the film is unjustified as a matter of policy and I think it is particularly unjustified in view of the fact that the Department went ahead with the production of the picture without any authority in advance from the Congress.[223]

[222] Representative Frank E. Hook, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1117.
[223] Representative Richard B. Wigglesworth, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1117.

Representative Clarence Cannon, Democrat from Missouri, took the floor to challenge Wigglesworth's amendment:

> Mr. CANNON of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts is a businessman of acumen and experience, yet he violates two of the fundamental principles of business-first, by proposing to eliminate advertising; and, second, by objecting to contracting for that advertising at less than the established rate.
>
> Mr. Chairman, every big business to-day considers advertising as essential and indispensable. Motion-picture publicity is the most effective form of advertising, and we secure it here at vastly less than its actual cost.
>
> The cost of making this picture would, at normal rates, be $150,000. Mr. Disney, acknowledged to be the foremost man in his profession, has donated his services free of charge. There is no expense here except the expense of making the film. The making of the picture, which would normally cost $150,000, we get for $80,000.
>
> In addition, the firms which distribute the pictures are also donating their services. Beyond that, 12,000 theaters in the United States exhibit the pictures gratis. At normal rates the cost would amount to $500.000. Between 65,000,000 and 80,000,000 people visit the picture shows every week. In other words, Mr. Chairman, every week more than half the men, women, and children in the United States visit the picture shows and will see these pictures, and come under the influence of the lesson they carry.
>
> Those who have seen the picture with-out exception pronounce it one of the finest agencies for its purpose that could be used. It relates to the filing of income-tax returns. It is estimated that 7,000,000 new income taxpayers will file returns this year who have· never filed returns before, and this picture will exercise a very salutary influence upon them especially.[224]

Representative Joe Starnes, Democrat from Alabama, then requested Cannon yield to ask a question regarding the potential reach of the film medium that sparked a final exchange between Cannon and Taber on the matter.

> Mr. STARNES of Alabama. Is it not a fact that through this medium we will reach more taxpayers than we could reach through the press or the radio, which are also giving time for this program?
>
> Mr. CANNON of Missouri. Yes; and at the same time reach them through the medium which is acknowledged to be the most effective medium that can be brought to bear on public opinion.
>
> Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

[224] Representative Clarence Cannon, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1118.

> Mr. CANNON of Missouri. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
> Mr. TABER. Is it not a fact that the spending of $80,000 of the taxpayers' money that ought to go for bombers will make the taxpayers hate to pay their income tax?
> Mr. CANNON of Missouri. Quite the contrary. No one can see this picture without approving it, and I regret that the gentleman refused to accompany the committee to pass upon it. Could it have been that he was afraid he would be convinced? "What is truth? asked jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer."
>
> [Here the gavel fell.][225]

Discussion on Wigglesworth's amendment was brought to a close with a final vote of 78 for and 63 against. The Treasury Department's consolidated emergency funds were appropriated, and Morgenthau's $80,000 request to pay back the funds for *The New Spirit* was denied.

However, the matter was brought back up at the next meeting of the House of Representatives on February 9, 1942, albeit only briefly, when the House was convened to revisit the prior amendment to H.R. 6548 regarding the Treasury Department. Representative John William Ditter, Republican from Pennsylvania, offered his opening perspective on "artificial patriotism" and Disney:

> The point I make is that with the incentive that comes from the patriotism, the great devotion, the loyalty of the American people I question very much whether we need the artificial means on the scale that are presently being resorted to.
> My challenge to the leadership is that they put ·on a program which will take out the Walt Disney appeals, take out the Donald Ducks, and create in the hearts of the American people a real confidence. I believe the promotional program can be carried on as it was carried on during the first World War. I believe there will be volunteers who will surge forward and do the work. I believe the campaign for the bonds that must be sold for the financing of the war can be carried on more successfully without an overdose of artificial stimulation.
> All of us are eager that the Government needs — the needs to win the war — shall be provided for by the whole-souled support of our people. I repeat what I

[225] Representative Joe Starnes, Clarence Cannon, and John Taber speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 6, 1942): H 1118.

> have said on other occasions, every dollar that is necessary to prosecute speedily and successfully the war in which we are engaged should be appropriated by the Congress. I believe that is the spirit of the American people.[226]

Representative William T. Pheiffer, Republican from New York, responded in favor of the amendment following a brief deviation in debate over House bills:

> Mr. WILLIAM T. PHEIFFER. Mr. Chairman, the debate of last Friday and again today on this appropriation bill, is made important not so much from the standpoint of the amount of money that we are trying to take out of this over-padded bill for the building up of so-called morale, but because it is symptomatic of a great evil. One of the greatest evils of the present day, if you please, and I measure my words when I say it, is the impression that has gotten abroad among the people of the United States that the bureaus of the Government are spending money like drunken sailors for all sorts of frills and furbelows imaginable, and that the Congress of the United States is being blindly submissive to such shameful extravagance.
>
> … The tendency of spending the taxpayers' hard-earned money on useless, and sometimes absurd, projects is increasing all along the line. [227]

The same sentiment was echoed by Representative Charles L. Gifford, Republican from Massachusetts, in a final statement:

> …I hope they will not defeat the amendment which the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. WIGGLESWORTH] offered. The moving picture by Walt Disney may be satisfactory, but we must not use these methods. They ordered that picture without authority and now ask permit to make payment.
>
> …Other departments of our Government have greatly overdone the moving-picture racket. It has been used, in my opinion, to greatly deceive the public by greatly overdrawn results of some Government activities. I have no time to refer to many of them as I would like to, but we should curtail this method of misleading the· public as is done in many cases.[228]

The House remained unwilling to further debate the amendment to H.R. 6548, and it

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[226] Representative William Ditter, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 9, 1942): H 1140.
[227] Representative William T. Pheiffer, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 9, 1942): H 1146.
[228] Representative Charles L. Gifford, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 9, 1942): H 1146.

remained unchallenged due to unwavering Republican support and swing votes from the narrow Democratic majority.

The Senate Receives the Spirit for Debate

The Senate also convened on February 9, 1942 for its usual order of business, but Democratic Senator Sheridan Downey of California made a motion to allow comments regarding the amendments made to H.R. 6548 from the House's February 6, 1942 meeting. The motion was passed with no objections, and Downey rose to speak on behalf of the Treasury Department, volunteer artists, and Walt Disney:

> The Arts Council of the O.C.D. is confronted with this situation: Thousands of artists in every known medium have volunteered their services to this agency — writers, radio stars, vaudeville troupers, singers, dancers, cartoonists — representatives of every branch of the entertainment profession. They want to help; they do not know just how, but they want to do what they can for national defense.
>
> …Motion pictures-good ones-can provide a legitimate escape from the pressure of the day's duties. Modern war, at the front or behind it, has been defined as one-tenth danger and nine-tenths drudgery. In the camps where tired soldiers gather to enjoy the fantasy of the screen, in the towns where hard-worked men and women flock to theaters to forget the hardships of factory or home, hospital or office-there the motion-picture industry can and will play its crucial role in sustaining the morale of a people, sending them back to their several tasks refreshed, un-wound, invigorated.
>
> The Treasury Department was thinking of the morale, not of our soldiers and sailors but of the taxpayers, when it sought the influence of Donald Duck to stimulate and encourage tax payments. Poor Donald, too, is now in the dog-house, placed there by a slim majority in the House of Representatives. He had blithely and happily donated his services in the interest of national defense. So, too, had his talented master and creator, Mr. Disney. For only a portion of the out-of-pocket money a film of incalculable propaganda value was given our Government. Publicity experts say that advertising of equal worth could not be secured by the Treasury for many times the $80,000 it cost. I hope Mr. Disney and his associates will not believe that the Government of the United States and the people of this Nation are as ungrateful and as unappreciative as the vote in the House of Representatives would seem to indicate.[229]

[229] Senator Sheridan Downey, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 9, 1942): S 1126-1128.

Despite Downey's passionate commentary on the H.R. 6548 amendment, of which the above is only a small excerpt, no further discussion was allowed on the Senate floor for the remainder of this meeting.

The Senate convened again on February 17, 1942 where discussion was, once again, permitted on the earlier H.R. 6548 amendment as one of the last orders of business. Downey opened the discussion with another passionate statement praising Morgenthau and the Treasury Department for their decision to employ Disney:

> Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. President, I will detain the Senate but very briefly on a matter concerning which, to some extent, I have already expressed myself-a matter which concerns one of our great national characters, Donald Duck. As the Senate knows, the House of Representatives struck out of the pending measure the item of $80,000 which was to enable the Treasury to cover the expense of producing and distributing this film.
>
> Mr. President, I wish to say that I have not always been in agreement with Mr. Morgenthau upon his economic and financial theories, but I think it is generally believed that Mr. Morgenthau has handled the collection of income taxes, as well as the sale and distribution of defense bonds and stamps, in a most able and efficient manner. Even though the Congress frowns upon the action of the Treasury Department in calling in the services of Walt Disney to help advertise income taxes, the American people know that Mr. Morgenthau performed a most wise and valuable public service in what he did, because, as a matter of cold business, the $80,000 expended by the Treasury Department in the production of this film will pay for itself hundreds of times over. Doubt it not!
>
> Mr. President, I have seen the Donald Duck film; I have heard members of the audience discussing it after viewing it. It is a film not only popular with Americans but one that has caused them to accept more heartily the income-tax law; it has brought to their realization the fact that income taxes have to be paid, and has, undoubtedly, expedited their payment. Consequently, Mr. President, I want to go on record very positively in declaring my belief that the Treasury Department was entirely justified in arranging for the production of this film; that it was money well spent, and that the hysteria generated here in Congress against the Treasury Department because of this film is most un-fortunate.
>
> While the newspapers of America do not appear to be very popular with the Senate and with the other House of Congress today because of their treatment of the retirement proposal, I want to say that almost every newspaper in the United States has reviewed the Donald Duck film and has applauded it.[230]

[230] Senator Sheridan Downey, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 17, 1942): S 1344.

Downey supplemented his statement with evidence of six articles from six different national media publications, and a note from "the most noted national advertising firms of America" that praised *The New Spirit* and the Department of the Treasury for contracting Walt Disney.[231] Downey concluded his opening statement by condemning the House for singling Disney out in this one line item of budget:

> Yes, Mr. President; Walt Disney, in his Donald Duck film, produced probably the cleverest and most ingenious piece of propaganda the American people have ever had. He volunteered his services, working day and night to meet his deadline, with no profit or compensation to himself. And he gave us a film, which from a straight money standpoint, is worth 10 times its cost. Yet the House of Representatives had to single out that particular item of disbursement by the Treasury Department, castigate and condemn it, and strike it from the pending appropriation bill.[232]

Democratic Senator Pat McCarran from Nevada was still skeptical of Downey's supportive assertions, claiming that "however it may be twisted around, it makes no difference; it cost the Treasury of the United States $80,000. There is no use in getting away from that fact."[233]

Downey quickly responded to McCarran in closing:

> Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. President, I have no wish to get away from that fact. The Treasury of the United States, for $80,000 — which did not include any profit or compensation to Mr. Disney personally, but merely covered the cost of the film and out-of-pocket money in its production — got for that $80,000 publicity for

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[231] Senator Sheridan Downey, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 17, 1942): S 1344-1345; The articles were published between February 1, 1942 to February 9, 1942 from *The New York Times*, *The New York Herald Tribune*, *Chicago Tribune*, *The New Yorker*, *The New York Post*, *Time Magazine*, and the advertising firm of *Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne*. All of these articles are transcribed in the Senate Congressional Records during Downey's statement.
[232] Senator Sheridan Downey, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 17, 1942): S 1345.
[233] Senator Pat McCarran, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 17, 1942): S 1345.

> our income-tax program that could not have been purchased through newspaper advertising columns or by speeches of Congressmen or otherwise for $800,000. Yes; it did cost the Treasury of the United States $80,000 to reach in a very persuasive way 85,000,000 of our citizens. But advertising experts and newspapers and the American people generally are, I think, almost a unit in declaring that it was one of the soundest investments the Government has yet made.
>
> Mr. President, my only reason for occupying the time of the Senate on this particular matter is that this fight against the Treasury Department on the Donald Duck film and on Walt Disney's contribution to our defense effort was initiated largely by representatives of the State of California; and I rise here merely to assert that I know the people of our State believe Mr. Morgenthau and the Treasury Department are to be complimented, not reviled, for obtaining this Donald Duck film. Californians are grateful to Mr. Disney for having lent his great genius to the production of this film in the interests of our national defense.[234]

Discussion was closed on the amendment for the remainder of the meeting, and Downey relinquished the floor for other legislative discussions. For all of Downey's fervor and sincerity, he never once called for a vote on the Senate floor to strike the amendment to H.R. 6548 to restore the $80,000 to the Treasury Department as requested by Morgenthau. Downey was a relative newcomer to the Senate, and it is unclear why he never proposed the motion as there is no evidence supporting his inability or forgetfulness to do so.

Conclusion

H.R. 6548 was sent to the President on February 20, 1942, and was signed into law even with the budget cut to the Treasury Department. Despite a month of congressional pushbacks related to a misunderstanding on payment for this animated short, the Department of the Treasury reported that "*The New Spirit* had been seen by

[234] Senator Sheridan Downey, speaking on H.R. 6548, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, Part 1 (February 17, 1942): S 1345.

32,647,000 people in 11,800 theaters" by March 17, 1942.[235] An undated 1942 memorandum circulated through the office of Lowell Mellett indicated that public reception of the short was "overwhelmingly favorable," and that a Gallup poll showed that 37% of viewers "stated that the picture had a direct on their willingness to pay taxes."[236]

Unfortunately, no future bills or amendments were brought before Congress to appropriate the Treasury Department's $80,000 payment to Walt Disney Productions, and Morgenthau was forced to fund the deficit through other unconfirmed sources. One can only speculate that the Treasury Department's report on the short film's success and Gallup poll results eased budget tensions and political rhetoric, and no further heated debates on such appropriations were present on the floors of the House or Senate. *The New Spirit* remains one of the most controversial and successful of Disney's wartime propaganda short films, even though the $80,000 payment still forced Walt Disney Productions to write off a four to six thousand dollar loss in its production.[237]

Disney's foray into producing propaganda shorts was far from over, even after the heated debates in Congress. Claude Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, delivered a national radio address on September 8, 1941 where he announced agricultural production goals for 1942. In this speech, he famously coined the phrase "food will win the war and

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[235] Arthur Mayer to George Buffington, March 17, 1942, quoted in Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 70.
[236] "WALT DISNEY DEFENSE FILMS," Folder: Disney, Walt – Productions; Carr, General Records of Chief Lowell Mellett, Box No. 1433, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208 (National Archives at College Park: College Park, MD); also referenced in Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 70.
[237] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 69-70.

write the peace."[238] In late March of 1942, the Agricultural Department and the Donovan Committee contacted Walt Disney to produce a short film on the subject.[239] The production contract was signed on the first week in April, and endured a series of storyboard revisions before it was renamed *Food Will Win the War* with a runtime of approximately five minutes. The short film was completed almost a week ahead of its July 25, 1942 deadline, and at a cost of $20,000.[240] Production costs were significantly cheaper than those for *The New Spirit* since it featured mostly pan-and-zoom shots of colored still images, and minimal frames of animation. William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information and head of the Office of Strategic Services, paid Disney the full $20,000 without using the appropriated budget from the Agricultural Department.[241]

President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9182 creating the Office of War Information on June 13, 1942 with one if its duties to "view, clear, and approve all proposed radio and motion picture programs sponsored by Federal departments and agencies; and serve as the central point of clearance and contact for the radio broadcasting and motion picture industries, respectively, in their relationships with

[238] Claude Wickard, "Agricultural Production Goals for 1942—Food Will Win the War and Write the Peace," Radio Address, Transcript, September 8, 1941, accessed July 23, 2019, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/1941-09-08a.html; Shale's mentioning of this address on page 71 is brief, but incorrectly implies the speech was given sometime in the spring of 1942. This is likely an oversight.
[239] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 71.
[240] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 72.
[241] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 73; Shale implies that Donovan fronted the cost of the film, himself, in order to avoid a second incident of Congressional budget debates. Donovan's personal records and files from the FDR Library and NACP are unclear on the matter, but it may have been paid for after Executive Order 9182 created the Office of War Information on June 13, 1942.

Federal departments and agencies concerning such Government programs."[242] Regardless of the February furor over defense appropriations, one can only imagine Morgenthau must have felt some sense of vindication regarding his decision to fund *The New Spirit* now that Congress had to fund the OWI's propaganda endeavors. Unfortunately, Morgenthau never communicated such feelings publically or on paper, but the creation of the OWI effectively allowed Hollywood — in all its forms and mediums — to officially mobilize on behalf of the Federal government for the war.

[242] "Executive Order 9182 of June 3, 1942, Consolidating Certain War Information Functions into an Office of War Information," June 3, 1942: 2, accessed August 1, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/Executive_Order_9182_13_Jun_1942.pdf

EPILOGUE

Richard Polenberg said it best in his 1980 book *War and Society*: "Just as the twenties had ended with the stock market crash in October 1929, so the thirties came to a close on December 7, 1941."[243] The attack on Pearl Harbor brought about a sense of national unity, and isolationism gave way to unwavering support of the president. One of the few points of contention, however, remained how best to spend the taxpayers' money for the greatest effect on the American war effort.

As early as March 1942, commercial factories were already mobilizing for war production. Americans were lining up for jobs, but there was a risk of inflation due to an inefficient amount of currency in circulation to support them, coupled with anticipated decreased commercial spending during wartime. Rationing and wage limits were established to curb the potential for an economic crash, and Morgenthau recommended both a sales tax and a reduction in income tax exemptions to stave off a disastrous national debt.[244] When the Revenue Act of 1942 failed to pass in Congress that fall, lower-income families felt the pressure of increased taxes and cost of perishables as wartime job prospects moved away from the farms and into the factories.[245]

By the end of 1942 and into 1943, Morgenthau further introduced the prospect of encouraged citizens to decreased spending and purchase war bonds to reduce the risk of inflation, and contracted various Hollywood personalities to sell the idea to average

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[243] Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 4.
[244] Polenberg, *War and Society*, 24-25.
[245] John Morton Blum, *V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II* (San Diego: Harcourt, 1977), 230-231.

citizens through short films.[246] He believed it make the country more mindful of contributing to the war effort, and stoke the fires of patriotism and service.[247] Walt Disney's *The Spirit of '43*, released January 7, 1943, was one of the newly contracted shorts by Morgenthau that encouraged decreased personal spending while paying income taxes in a timely manner. Prior to its production in September 1942, Morgenthau properly requested the money from Congress to prevent a repeat of the February fiasco, and later attributed the short as one of the better Disney films that addressed frugality.[248]

Though Walt Disney and others produced numerous propaganda films for the war effort featuring iconic characters, we may never know exactly how successful they were due to lack of records with quantitative data from either the OWI or the film companies. These companies, not just Walt Disney Studios, maintain such unforgiving legal control over their intellectual property that producing accurate historical narratives is an arduous task, at best. Many of these shorts contained controversial imagery, such as swastikas and racial caricatures, which most companies want buried. They restrict access to them through comprehensive distribution control and sometimes-oppressive litigiousness, thus historical explorations are often limited to what little information is available in government archives.

This study leaves us with an important question: Why are live-action Hollywood war era films given a social pass, while animated shorts are treated as if are taboo? This is a question that deserves to be answered by historians as well as the film companies. Now that digitization is making more historic productions available, especially in the public

[246] Polenberg, *War and Society*, 29.
[247] Polenberg, *War and Society*, 30.
[248] Shale, "Donald Duck Joins Up," 75-77.

domain, historians deserve to tell these stories of wartime contributions with impunity and in their entirety because it belongs in a greater narrative of world history.

Koppes and Black state in their conclusion of *Hollywood Goes to War* that Hollywood propaganda defined the stakes of war on a global scale, that there were promises of "internal and international harmony," and that "wartime propaganda helped prepare America for the Cold War."[249] Now, as my thesis concludes over thirty years from when their book was published, their reflection is still relevant and largely unexplored in modern historiography, especially on animation. It is my hope that this study broadly contributes to a greater exploration of the proliferation and impact of propaganda, internationally, and that my work may serve to help influence certain companies to release their iron grip on their contributions to our history.

With respect to Walt Disney, he was a man who existed prior to his theme parks. He struggled creatively and financially, had regular disputes with his artists, and rarely accepted compromise. The history of the man and his legacy is made richer when the narrative includes how his personality and business sense evolved over time, and adapted his company to function during the financial hardships of war. These stories, now locked away in private archives, could make the memory of Walt Disney and his contribution to American history only more treasured. Equally, these stories could provide a greater depth of knowledge in 20th century propaganda studies where neither Shale nor I could explore in any greater detail.

[249] Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 326.

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