

PEDRO II AND GETÚLIO VARGAS: NATIONAL LEADERS, WORDS, AND
SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE IN BRAZIL DURING THE PARAGUAYAN WAR AND
WORLD WAR II

by

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ABSTRACT

NICHOLAS ORTIZ. Pedro II and Getúlio Vargas: National Leaders, Words, and Sociopolitical Change in Brazil during the Paraguayan War and World War II. (Under the direction of DR. OSCAR DE LA TORRE)

The speeches given by Pedro Segundo and Getulio Vargas during wartime reveals their orientation of leadership but in turn provides something else. These discourses give one a unique window into not only how these leaders chose to perceive these challenges but how to address them to the national populace. The rhetoric they used had to transform for purposes of mobilization while adapting to shifting political environments. Among one of the features of this adaptation was the choice of which aspects of the national consciousness to stress at pivotal moments. By examining the public speeches of Pedro Segundo and Getulio Vargas one can see the political orientation of both leaders and thus understand the political climate of both periods and witness how much Brazil had changed in the eighty-one years between the beginning of the Paraguayan War and the end of WWII.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Paraguayan War (1864-1870) and World War II (1937-1945) have played instrumental roles in the history of Brazil. In each war, Brazil was led by leaders who dominated the country's politics with their personality and who used this personality not only to solidify their control but as well as to represent the Brazilian people as a whole. In the cases of Pedro Segundo (1841-1889) and Getulio Vargas (1930-1945, 1951-1954), these two leaders claimed to embody the wills of Brazil and used this authority to mobilize large segments of the Brazilian populace to fight these wars. While it is understandable for a government to expect strong leadership from a head of state during a period of war, it is important to analyze the orientation of the leaders and how they used their leadership and personality in order to galvanize the populace. By examining the public speeches of Pedro Segundo and Getulio Vargas one can see the political orientation of both leaders and thus understand the political climate of both periods and witness how much Brazil had changed in the eighty-one years between the beginning of the Paraguayan War and the end of WWII.

The speeches given by Pedro Segundo and Getulio Vargas during wartime reveals their orientation of leadership but in turn provides something else. These discourses give one a unique window into not only how these leaders chose to

perceive these challenges but how to address them to the national populace. The rhetoric they used had to transform for purposes of mobilization while adapting to shifting political environments. Among one of the features of this adaptation was the choice of which aspects of the national consciousness to stress at pivotal moments. Both leaders were intent on protecting Brazil but while Pedro Segundo, through his words, gave an appearance of a conservative monarch with an intent on promoting change gradually, the rhetoric of Getulio Vargas shows a populist leader that wanted to promote change at a more rapid pace. However, the rhetoric used to enforce the legitimacy of these regimes during these two major wars changed. By understanding how the rhetoric changed one can understand both the evolution and constancy of different aspects of Brazilian politics and leadership during the two wars.

There exists a rich selection of secondary sources where experienced historians give their hypotheses on how Pedro II and Vargas led their countries during the Paraguayan War and World War II respectively. In his book, *Dom Pedro II: Empereur du Brésil*, B. Mossé describes the Brazilian emperor as a talented leader who successfully won the hearts and minds of his people. With his skills at governing, Pedro II was able to use his *poder moderador* or moderating power as emperor to create stable governments between the Liberal and Conservative parties in Brazil. Furthermore, Mossé contends that during Pedro II's reign Brazil's image improved in the eyes of Europe for the benefit of everyone in Brazil. It must be said that Mossé's biography of Pedro II at times

sounds hagiographical due to its biases and abundant praise for the Brazilian emperor. However, his argument of Pedro II's role in the Paraguayan War must be noted. Mossé argues that Pedro II was not a conquerer during the war and that after the war's end he defended Paraguay from being annexed by Brazil or other states and in turn aided the Paraguayans in reconstructing their state. In a way, Mossé's biography can be seen as a glimpse into how Pedro II was viewed by many Europeans and monarchists throughout the nineteenth century.¹

Roderick J. Barman in his biography of Pedro II, *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-1891* collaborates the view that early events of an unstable nature during Pedro II's childhood shaped his personality and affected Brazilian politics as a result. Barman argues that Pedro II's personality had a steady influence on Brazilian politics throughout the nineteenth century. He contends that during the Paraguayan War, Pedro II was so committed to the Brazilian cause that he was willing to abdicate and endanger the imperial regime if it meant the war's end in a Brazilian victory. In conclusion, Barman argues that the emperor's legacy to Brazil is his personal imprint on Brazilian politics.²

The arguments by authors, such as Barman, that Pedro II had a direct role in the course of the Paraguayan War is disputed by authors such as Thomas Whigham. In his extensive book entitled *The Paraguayan War: Volume I: Causes and Early Conflict*, Whigham argues that the outbreak of the Paraguayan War and

¹ B. Mossé, *Dom Pedro II: Empereur du Brésil* (Paris: Librairie de Firmin-Didot, 1889), 12-423.

² Roderick J. Barman, *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-91* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 34-416.

the formation of the Triple Alliance composing of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay against Paraguay under the personal dictatorship of Francisco Solano López awoke a strong sense of patriotism that had been growing across Brazilian society since independence. While Whigham acknowledges the fact that Pedro II was able and very patriotic like many of his Brazilian counterparts, he argues that the emperor did not play a direct role in the affairs of the war. Rather, Whigham contends that led the Brazilian forces indirectly through his personal presence and his generals. This suggests that the emperor's role in the Paraguayan War was not as decisive or essential as past authors have contended.³ The argument by Whigham is collaborated by another author who wrote another extensive history of the Paraguayan War, Francisco Doratioto. In his book, *Maldita Guerra: Nova História da Guerra do Paraguai*, Doratioto contends that the influence of Pedro II during the war was indirect and symbolic.⁴ The assertions of Whigham and Doratioto are taken one step further by Lilia Schwartz in her book *As Barbas do Imperador: D. Pedro II: Um Monarca nos Trópicos*. Her argument is not only similar to those of Whigham and Doratioto in terms of Pedro II's indirect influence during the war but that it asserts that the war both positively and negatively affected the emperor's image afterward. Furthermore, Schwartz argues that the Paraguayan War was the height in respect to the legitimacy of the

³ Thomas Whigham, *The Paraguayan War: Volume I: Causes and Early Conflict* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 39-416.

⁴ Francisco Doratioto, *Maldita Guerra: Nova História da Guerra do Paraguai* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), 69-481.

Brazilian Empire and that a noticeable decline can be seen in the years and decades immediately afterward.⁵ In sum, this research will contribute to the discussion by revealing that Pedro II's role in the Paraguayan War is not as simple as past authors have argued. It shows that his leadership during the war and lies somewhat in the middle between direct and indirect influence.

In the literature surrounding the Vargas Era in Brazil, several authors have stated that personality was an important and obvious factor in how Getúlio Vargas governed Brazil at different moments throughout the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. In his book, *O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas e a Formação dos Blocos, 1930-1942*, Ricardo Silva Seitenfus argues that personality dominated the Vargas regime and was an essential factor from the beginning. He argues that Vargas' personality was inseparable from the regime and that Vargas' personal power was even institutionalized in the Brazilian constitutions of 1934 and 1937.⁶ Alejandro Groppo makes a similar argument in his book *Los Dos Príncipes: Juan D. Perón y Getúlio Vargas: Un Estudio Comparado del Populismo Latinoamericano*. In his comparative study of Vargas and Perón, Groppo not only states similarities between the two leaders but argues that Vargas ruled in a period of major transition in Brazilian history. During this transition, Vargas through his

⁵ Lilia Moritz Schwartz, *As Barbas do Imperador: D. Pedro II, Um Monarca nos Trópicos* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998), 1-527.

⁶ Ricardo Antônio Silva Seitenfus, *O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas e a Formação dos Blocos, 1930-1942: O Processo do Envolvimento Brasileiro na II Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1985), 3-431.

personality acted a mediator between elites and the popular masses.⁷ John W.F Dulles discusses different aspects of the impact of Vargas' personality on Brazilian governmental affairs in his book *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography*. While his biases must be noted, Dulles argues that while Vargas' role as a moderator was important it was his emphasis on law and order as well as his ability as a clever politician that defined the regime. Vargas' focus on the vague themes of law and order helped ease the minds of many Brazilians who felt the country was becoming destabilized. Vargas' portrayed himself as a paternal, populist figure who could calm the storm surrounding Brazilian politics and society by mediating between all sides with a single goal of helping Brazil. His ability as a politicians is seen throughout Vargas' reign as he ensures that in the political sphere that no one side obtained too much power. His careful attention to balance in Brazilian politics played an important role according to Dulles.⁸

Authors, such as Skidmore and Levine, have discussed how Vargas ruled in a time of profound political, social, and economic change and how this change was implemented by new forces such as labor. In his book, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy*, Thomas E. Skidmore argues how new forces affected the policies of the Varguista regime, especially during the Estado Novo. He argues that the Vargas era was a competition between different political

⁷ Alejandro Groppo, *Los Dos Príncipes: Juan D. Perón y Getúlio Vargas: Un Estudio Comparado del Populismo Latinoamericano* (Villa María: Editorial Universitaria Villa María, 2009), 292-428.

⁸ John W.F Dulles, *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), 23-263.

factions forces from both the political Left and Right whether it included new forces such as labor, old conservative factions, or new political parties such as those of the communists and integralistas. His contention is that the interaction of these new and old forces with the Vargas regime influenced the reforms that had such a transformative effect on Brazilian society and that the ties that Vargas made with these forces (especially that of labor) persisted even after the fall of the Estado Novo in 1945.⁹ The argument of how new forces such as labor strengthened Varguista reforms and helped in creating a power base for Vargas himself is elaborated more by Robert M. Levine in his book *Father of the Poor?: Vargas and His Era*. Levine adds to this argument by stating that to Vargas labor was a moral issue in the government had a paternalistic duty to alleviate the suffering of Brazil's lower and working classes. This duty included raises in the minimum wage and relief programs which later translated into political support for Vargas during and after the Estado Novo.¹⁰

There is a lack of literature on certain aspects of the Brazilian Empire and the Estado Novo such as continuity in Brazilian politics during and between the two periods. To date, there exists a dearth of comparisons between the two Brazilian leaders and how their rhetoric indicates continuities and changes in respect to the type of orientation one sees in Brazil at the national level during

⁹ Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 3-120.

¹⁰ Robert M. Levine, *Father of the Poor?: Vargas and His Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 37-96.

wartime crises. This paper seeks to fill in the gaps in the historiography surrounding Brazilian history during the reign of Pedro II in the Paraguayan War and Getúlio Vargas during WWII by comparing the two leaders to discover how the similarities in their rhetoric and orientation indicates these trends and continuities in Brazilian politics. The paper will argue how during the Paraguayan War and World War II Brazil, in a period of wartime crisis and national development, Pedro II and Vargas used similar and different orientations and ideas in their rhetoric in order to lead Brazil during these transformative processes. It is the author's hope that in such ways the paper will add valuable scholarship to the discussion of comparisons between national political leaders in times of crisis in Brazilian history as well as making an addition to the debate surrounding the role of leadership to that of political trends in Latin American history.

The methodology used in this research is based on work done by renowned authors on rhetorical analysis. In their book, *Discourse Analysis*, Gillian Brown and George Yule provide readers with a detailed background into how one can analyze the rhetoric of past leaders. According to them, it is important for researchers analyzing rhetoric discover the purpose of language use, "The analysis of language in use. As such, it cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent of the purpose or functions which these forms are designed to serve in human affairs. While some linguists may concentrate on determining the formal properties of a language, the discourse analyst is

committed to an investigation of what that language is used for.”¹¹ To analyze rhetoric, Brown and Yule list several approaches that include transactional, interactional, reference/inference/ and thematic types.¹² In regards to studying the rhetoric of both Pedro II and Getúlio Vargas the reference/inference and thematic approaches will be utilized since these approaches focus on the relationship between the speaker and the audience and in what context is this relationship taking place. This approach is crucial to understanding why Pedro II and Vargas say what they say and why they choose certain moments to use certain types of rhetoric.

This research references analytical techniques used by past discourse analysts such as Dorsey and Friedenberg. In his book *We are All Americans, Pure and Simple: Theodore Roosevelt and the Myth of Americanism*, Leroy G. Dorsey argues that Theodore Roosevelt in the early twentieth through his rhetoric creates a myth of national identity in order to include various ethnicities into the national dialogue. In his research, Dorsey analyzes the choices the speaker makes in order to convince his audience. He puts historical context into account when he explains how and why Theodore Roosevelt decided to use inclusive or exclusive rhetoric at certain periods during his presidency to expand this national myth.¹³ Further analysis of T.R’s rhetoric is given by Robert V. Friedenberg in his book,

¹¹ Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.

¹² Brown and Yule, 1-143.

¹³ Leroy G. Dorsey, *We are All Americans, Pure and Simple: Theodore Roosevelt and the Myth of Americanism* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2007), 1-13.

Theodore Roosevelt and the Rhetoric of Militant Decency. Fridenberg contends that T.R achieved most of his aims based on the rhetoric he used. By using rhetoric based on ethics and morality, T.R was able to promote values such as civic virtue and character in order to consolidate his regime and gain support for his reforms. Unlike Dorsey, Friedenbergr uses a Neo-Aristotelian approach which means that he focuses on how T.R used concepts of morality in his rhetoric.¹⁴ A similar approach to Dorsey's will be taken when looking at how and why Pedro II and Vargas chose to appeal to certain political groups during a wartime crisis.

Other authors, such as Anderson and Bruner, have discussed how rhetoric can affect the identity of nation states. Benedict Anderson focuses on how national identities are formed in his book, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. He argues that nations are imagined and are created artificially through the use of a common language, administrative techniques such as a census, religion, the media, and immigration in order to create a nation where there is the sense of a shared identity within a state.¹⁵ In his book *Strategies of Remembrance: The Rhetorical Dimensions of National Identity Construction*, M. Lane. Bruner builds on this concept of the nation being an artificial entity. He argues that the nation state is never fixed at any point and is

¹⁴ Robert V. Friedenbergr, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rhetoric of Militant Decency* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 15-99.

¹⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised Edition* (New York: Verso, 2006), 6-197.

constantly changing. He contends that the nation is constantly shifting through discourse:

“Nations do not have stable or natural identities. Instead, national identity is incessantly negotiated discourse. What the nation is at any given moment for any given individual depends on the narrative accounts and arguments they bring to bear on the subject. These characterizations vary widely from state to state and from political group to political group and have radically unequal effects on cultures, institutions, economic policies, and laws. Tensions prompted by changes in economic conditions, state authority, real or imagined domestic and international threats, and/or significant changes in cultural markers of national belonging continually cause new groups to become alienated from dominant characterizations of collective belonging, preventing the process of national identity construction from ever being completed.”¹⁶

He goes on to say that, “The rhetorical dimensions of national identity construction remain relatively obscure.”¹⁷ and that national identities are “malleable fictions, assembled out of available historical resources and incessantly negotiated between state and public representatives offering competing accounts of national character.”¹⁸ Bruner uses these concepts to explain why leaders in countries such as West Germany, Russia, and Canada have used rhetoric relating to ideas such as democracy and authoritarianism to create competing national narratives.¹⁹ It is important to note that both Pedro II and Vargas presided over moments where Brazil was expanding as a nation and how their choices of rhetoric were based on preexisting ideas at the time. This research will analyze how this rhetoric helped guide this national development during a wartime crisis while keeping the concepts mentioned by Bruner in mind.

¹⁶ M. Lane. Bruner, *Strategies of Remembrance: The Rhetorical Dimensions of National Identity Construction* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 1.

¹⁷ Bruner, 2.

¹⁸ Bruner, 3.

¹⁹ Bruner, 1-98.

This paper will analyze a specific number personal letters, speeches from the throne, and public speeches of Pedro II and Getúlio Vargas in order to advance the argument of how the choice of rhetoric used by these two leaders in wartime crises illustrates the massive change that occurred between the Paraguayan War and World War II. In regards to the analysis of Pedro II's rhetoric during the Paraguayan War, this paper will examine five of the emperor's personal letters and ten of this speeches from the throne (or *falas*) between the years 1859-1870. In these letters and speeches, crucial concepts (such as honor and the public cause) will be analyzed according to audience appeal. The paper will seek to argue as to why Pedro II chose to stress those concepts and to what types of audiences was the intended target whether it be the Brazilian populace as a whole or certain political factions. The emphasis of concepts and their appeal will explain how Pedro II's rhetoric took certain forms during the Paraguayan War not only to solidify support for the war effort but also to appeal to certain groups of his audience. In the analysis of Vargas' rhetoric during World War II a similar approach will be taken with the examination of nine public speeches that were given between the years 1937-1944. Attention will be given to concepts such as international liberalism and pan-americanism in order to argue how and why this rhetoric changed drastically from that used during the Brazilian Empire in a wartime crisis.

CHAPTER 2: PEDRO II AND THE PARAGUAYAN WAR

Before the eruption of the Paraguayan War, the Brazilian Empire was ruled by a constitutional monarchy under the reign of Dom Pedro II. The monarchy was formed after Brazil's independence in 1822 when the crown prince to the Portuguese throne, Pedro Braganza, refused to return to Portugal after being ordered to do so by the Portuguese constituent assembly. Instead of returning to Portugal, Pedro stayed and declared the independence of Brazil with the support of aristocrats, merchants, and reformers. After independence, a constitution was created which gave the emperor of Brazil immense power vis-à-vis the legislative branches of the government such as the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. This power was signified by the emperor's role as the *poder moderador* or moderating power. As the *poder moderador* the emperor could dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, choose members of the Senate, call new elections at will, and could exert his personal influence in a large degree when it came to Brazil's domestic politics and foreign policy. The framers of the constitution, especially Pedro Braganza (now Dom Pedro I) believed that Brazil needed a strong monarch to provide stability and order. This stability and order was important for many Brazilians, especially aristocrats and elites who were determined to protect their interests in the social and economic system inherited from the Portuguese colonial

system which relied on slave labor and an emphasis on agrarian exports. The emperor was charged with preserving the stability of the regime and the state so this status quo could continue and to defend from disturbances such as the many revolts that occurred in regions such as Pernambuco after Brazil's independence.²⁰ It was this same system that Dom Pedro II inherited from his father and protected throughout his reign.

Brazilian Nationalism and the Causes of the Paraguayan War

Throughout the nineteenth century, Brazil endeavored to maintain cordial diplomatic relations with other Latin American countries for the purpose of maintaining stability along the border. The imperial regime under Pedro II was not afraid to fight rivals, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, if they threatened Brazilian national interests and honor. Dom Pedro made this clear in the speech he gave the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies in 1864 concerning the wrongs done by the Uruguayan government towards Brazilian citizens, "And [still] we have not obtained a just reparation that we demanded from the government of the Estado Oriental for the committed offenses towards the rights and legitimate interests of our compatriots."²¹ The defense of Brazil's honor in foreign policy was related to territorial disputes that predated the country's independence. The main contention was related to the ambiguities relating to the Treaty of Tordesillas, the treaty that was mediated by the Papacy and signed by Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century. The treaty divided the world into Spanish and

²⁰ B. Mossé, *Dom Pedro II: Empereur du Brésil* (Paris: Librairie de Firmin-Didot, 1889), 12-38.

²¹ Coligidas na Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados, *Falás do Trono desde o Ano de 1823 até o Ano de 1889* (São Paulo: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1977), 356-357. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

Portuguese spheres of influence. The delineated line mandated by the treaty crossed through South America and helped develop the modern day boundaries between Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina. However, disputes about where the line ended along the Río de la Plata led to territorial disputes between the Spanish and Portuguese since both colonial powers wanted unlimited access to the river for trade purposes. The rivalry survived after the erosion of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism in the early nineteenth century with navigational control of the river and the territory surrounding; it becoming a major foreign policy objective for the new regimes that formed from the ruins of the Kingdom of Brazil and the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata.²² Shortly before independence, the Portuguese invaded and annexed the Banda Oriental when control over the territory was being contested by the government in Buenos Aires and guerrillas under the command of the caudillo José Artigas. Renamed the Cisplatine Province after annexation, the Banda Oriental was a part of Brazil until control over the territory became contested again during the Cisplatine War. During this war, Argentina and political factions advocating for the territory's independence fought against Brazilian forces in the 1820s. The outcome of the war led to the independence of Uruguay. Uruguay, in the diplomatic schemes of both Argentina and Brazil, was seen as a buffer state that prevented both hegemonic powers from taking full control of the Río de la Plata. Brazil's defeat in this war was detrimental to the reign of Dom Pedro I but was not injurious to national pride in the eyes of many Brazilians. This was probably due to

²² Thomas Whigham, *The Paraguayan War: Volume I: Causes and Early Conflict* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 1-77.

the fact that the concept of nationalism was not solidified in Brazil when the country experienced major defeats during the war in 1827.²³

As the idea of Brazil as a nation became widely accepted throughout Brazilian society, rivalries in the Southern Cone and national honor became intertwined as Brazil competed with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay over control of the Río de la Plata, hegemony in the Southern Cone, and influence in Uruguay through its turbulent politics. From Brazil's independence to the 1850s, Brazil retained a policy of neutrality towards Paraguay. Under José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, Paraguay's first dictator, the country was isolated from the rest of Latin America. This policy changed after Francia's death when his successor, Carlos López, began to conduct a foreign policy that involved Paraguay in the rivalry between Brazil and Argentina in the region. López wanted to maintain a friendly relationship with both powers. In July of 1852 and April of 1856 respectively, the López regime signed treaties with Argentina and Brazil that established border and modes of navigation along the Río de la Plata, Paraná, and Paraguay rivers. After independence, the establishment of regulations relating to navigation was important to all three countries since the Río de la Plata flowed through the interior of each of them.²⁴ While these treaties facilitated agreements relating to navigation, they did not do the same when it came to territorial claims. In 1852, when the dictatorial regime of Manuel Rosas fell in Argentina, Uruguay destabilized as the Blanco regime in which Rosas supported began to crumble. The imperial regime under Pedro II saw this as a

²³ Whigham, 49.

²⁴ Whigham, 87-166.

chance to increase Brazil's influence in Uruguay and thus supported the rivals of the Blancos, the Colorados. Paraguay remained an important player in regional politics in the Southern Cone as Brazil solidified its influence in Uruguay through its support for the Colorados and with Argentina embroiled in political struggles between different factions advocating for federalism or centralization.²⁵

The Paraguayan War was the cause of the continuing rivalry between Brazil and Argentina over hegemony in the Southern Cone, the political instability in Uruguay, and the ambitions of Francisco López in making Paraguay a respected regional and military power. In 1864, both Brazil and Argentina continued to find ways to advance their hegemony in the region and pursue more control of the navigational routes that existed along the Uruguay, Paraná, and other rivers that facilitated trade along the Río de la Plata. Both countries maintained positions of neutrality.²⁶ Pedro II framed Brazil's neutrality in protecting the desires of Brazilians in the region and defending the sovereignty of Uruguay, "The Brazilian government continues to remain strictly neutral. It will respect relative international accords towards the independence of the first republic [Uruguay] as well as the rights and legitimate interests of Brazilians in the Estado do Prata."²⁷ However, what these "rights and legitimate interests" were very vague and open to interpretation by imperial officials.²⁸ It proved too tempting for both Brazil and Argentina

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Joaquín Nabuco, *La Guerra del Paraguay*. Versión Castellana de Gonzalo Reparaz (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1977), 21.

²⁷ *Falas do Trono*, 352. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

²⁸ Ibid.

to get involved since it provided both powers with opportunities to advance their interests in the Río de la Plata region in terms of trade and regional power.

The destabilization in Uruguay, that included the Colorados (supported by the Brazilian Empire) and the Blancos (supported by Argentina), created opportunities not only for the two regional powers but also for a government that sought to rival the dominance of the two countries: Paraguay. Ruled by Francisco López since 1863, the dictatorship in Paraguay had built a large military and a government that was heavily dependent in the personal preferences of the leader. Among López's preferences was to establish Paraguay as a regional power that had influence to match that of Argentina and Brazil. This desire for regional power was a result of not only López's immense self-confidence in his abilities but also in his belief in Paraguay's military superiority over that of his rivals.²⁹ Fears of the potential machinations of both Argentina and Brazil haunted the Paraguayan dictator. López did not want either Brazil or Argentina to fulfill their goals in the Río de la Plata, feeling that such a result would threaten Paraguay's security and derail his dreams for Paraguayan hegemony in the region.³⁰ Such fears gave López the view that Paraguay needed to act quickly if Paraguay was to avoid being ruined by its rivals. López's strategy focused on aiding the Blancos in Uruguay and attempting to form an alliance with Argentina against Brazil. The view that Brazil was a larger threat to Paraguay, the Brazilian invasion of Uruguay in 1864, the empire's continuing support for the Colorados, and the perception that imperial forces were

²⁹ James Schofield Saeger, *Francisco Solano López and the Ruination of Paraguay: Honor and Egocentrism* (Lanham: Rown and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 1-102.

³⁰ Lídia Besouchet, *Pedro II e O Século XIX* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1993), 122.

militarily weaker than their counterparts in Paraguay convinced López that Brazil was an easy target for an invasion.³¹ This frame of mind inspired the Paraguayan invasion of Uruguay and Mato Grosso in Brazil in September 1864 and December 1864 respectively along with other acts of aggression against the Brazilian Empire such as the seizure of the Marquês de Olinda in November 1864.

The Paraguayan invasions led the imperial government to declare war on Paraguay with the Mitre government in Argentina remaining neutral. López's frustrations at Argentinian neutrality convinced him that Argentina needed a show of force from Paraguay just as much as Brazil and that this display would convince Argentina to join the war against Brazil. This strategy backfired when Paraguay invaded Corrientes in April 1865 in which the Argentinian government declared war on Paraguay soon after. With a common enemy recognized by the Brazilian Empire, the Argentina Confederation, the Colorados, and the Blancos (who were supported by Brazil and Argentina respectively), the Triple Alliance was formed. The treaty that formed the alliance included the main goal of overthrowing López that included other clauses that sought to resolve competition over navigational routes in the Río de la Plata region.³²

Pedro II and the Triple Alliance

The formation of the Triple Alliance and the outbreak of the Paraguayan War put the Brazilian Empire in a crisis which demanded the attention of the country's emperor, Pedro II. The perception of many Brazilians, including Pedro II himself, that the

³¹ Francisco Doratioto, *Maldita Guerra: Nova História da Guerra do Paraguai* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), 69.

³² Saeger, 108-137.

Brazilian emperor was leader of the Triple Alliance helped not only to justify the scale of the war effort, improve national pride, and give legitimacy to the cause but also broadened the appeal of the Pedro's rhetoric. When Brazil was invaded again by Paraguay in June of 1865, Pedro II was determined to play a direct role in the war effort since he felt that an attack on Brazil signified an attack on his person. His feelings are shown in one of his letters, "The Rio Grande has been invaded. My place is there, and there I will go tomorrow morning at 8. I believe that all will go well and the Paraguayans will have already been repelled from the Rio Grande."³³ After the Triple Alliance was formed in May of the same year, Pedro II was convinced that his personal presence was needed to preserve not only the unity of the alliance but also to improve the effectiveness of the war effort. His conviction is noted by historians such as Whigham, "The emperor had no military experience but did possess considerable presence of mind. Under the terms of the May agreement, he could claim command of all Allied forces in Brazil, and personally might have felt inclined to do exactly that."³⁴ The strength of this personal conviction is seen a year later in a speech he gave on May 3, 1866, "The province of Rio Grande do Sul has been invaded by Paraguayan forces. I have decided that it is my duty to ensure the defense of the integrity of the Empire by traveling there to encourage through my presence and example."³⁵ The Triple Alliance, other than forming to defeat López and resolve ongoing disputes about access to navigational routes in the Río de la

³³ Vianna, 47. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

³⁴ Whigham, 380.

³⁵ *Falas do Trono*, 363. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

Plata, was meant to stand for everything that was the opposite of what the López dictatorship signified to those in the countries of the alliance. Their ideas are represented by Nabuco, “In the war of the Triple Alliance, the major part was that of Paraguay. The cause of the allies was that of justice, liberty, and civilization. López was the incarnation of the imprisonment and oppression of a people by the projects and illusions of a pitiful dictator.”³⁶ With the alliance representing these values, the presence of the emperor to many added legitimacy to the cause, at least in the case of Brazil. This is noted by historian Mary Williams, “Without question, Dom Pedro’s visit to the war zone stimulated allied solidarity as well as Brazilian loyalty in support of the conflict.”³⁷ This sentiment was certainly shared by imperial officials such as Joaquim Nabuco, “The presence of the emperor in Rio Grande do Sul during the invasion and when the allied troops arrived was a an event of great consequences not only for the consolidation of monarchical sentiment for all in Rio Grande but also for the reinforcement of the alliance.”³⁸ Pedro II’s commitment to the alliance and the war effort made many Brazilians feel that their role in defeating López and protecting Brazil was invaluable and necessary. This sentiment is demonstrated by the emperor himself in one of his letters to the Condessa de Barral in 1866, “Your card is Brazilian. My Brazilian national pride [*brasileirismo*] grows with the difficulties and I do not have the slightest doubt that we

³⁶ Nabuco, 241. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

³⁷ Mary Wilhelmine Williams, *Dom Pedro the Magnanimous: Second Emperor of Brazil* (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), 121.

³⁸ Nabuco, 142. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

will emerge from the war with glory for our nation because we were provoked.”³⁹

Nabuco comments on how Pedro affected the feelings of many within and outside of Brazil especially during the Paraguayan invasion of Rio Grande do Sul, “The presence of the emperor in Rio Grande do Sul during the invasion and at the moment when the allied troops arrived was an event that had great consequences not only towards the consolidation of monarchical sentiment, on everyone in Rio Grande, but also towards the reinforcement of the alliance.”⁴⁰ The role of Pedro in the alliance improved his image and gave his rhetoric only a greater impact but also a greater audience for the purpose of preserving unity during the war.

The Paraguayan War (1864-1870) consumed a lot of Brazil’s resources and produced a crisis that, in the opinion of many within Brazil, threatened the nation itself. There were several major battles during the course of the war such as that of Riachuelo, Yatay, Uruguaiana, Tuyuty, Curupaity, and Itá-Ibaté from 1865-1868. These battles led to the triumph of the Triple Alliance which culminated in the capture of Asunción in January 1869 and the demise of López in March 1870.⁴¹ The Brazilian military played a major role in the war with the conflict presenting enormous challenges to imperial officials in terms of mobilizing resources and people to the battlefields. At first it was the expectation of Dom Pedro that the war would not last long. This is seen in a letter he sent to the Condessa de Barral in September of 1865, “The war goes well and I hope that it will not

³⁹ R. Magalhães Júnior, *D. Pedro II e a Condessa de Barral através da Correspondência Íntima do Imperador; Anotada e Comentada* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1956), 90. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁴⁰ Nabuco, 142. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁴¹ Saeger, 137-189.

last long. Internally there is a lot to do, but we are working on it.”⁴² An underestimation of his opponents may have also played a role according to Saeger, “The emperor believed the Paraguayan forces were undertrained, although they were better trained than most of his own forces. Assuming a Paraguayan racial inferiority owing to Guaraní influence, Pedro II judged that their men would be poor soldiers, a grave miscalculation.”⁴³ While proven wrong, the challenges of the war forced the imperial government to change their approach as the war progressed.

When heavy losses and the slow advancement of the war depleted the amount of troops, the imperial government implemented a policy of conscription that included slaves and Brazilian citizens of African descent despite the reservations of many in the aristocracy and elite. This policy enabled Brazil to continue the war but undermined the foundations of the imperial regime after conflict’s end.⁴⁴ The tensions that the war brought to Dom Pedro’s government are noted by historian Francisco Doratioto, “In Brazil the continuation of the war brought despair, becoming a great difficulty with the enlistment of new soldiers. Pacifists were not accepted and the difficulty of enlisting Brazilian citizens for the conflict was partially avoided through the liberation of slaves who could fight in Guaraní country. Despite these many obstacles, the imperial government continued the war.”⁴⁵ The struggles during the war aided in the development of important factors that influenced not only government policy but also the rhetoric used

⁴² Magalhães Júnior, 55. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁴³ Saeger, 144.

⁴⁴ Barman, 230.

⁴⁵ Doratioto, 255. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

by Brazil's emperor during this wartime crisis in Brazilian history. Through his rhetoric, one can gain important perspectives on the leadership orientation and style of the Brazilian emperor and the system he protected during the Paraguayan War.

Pedro II's Background

The events before and after Pedro's ascension to the throne in 1841 shaped the emperor's character and political trends in Brazil decades later. In 1831, after less than a decade on the throne, Dom Pedro I was forced to abdicate after his preoccupation with the Portuguese throne and his personal habits created a rift between many of the aristocratic, mercantile, and reformist groups that had supported him during Brazil's independence in 1822.⁴⁶ After his father's abdication, Pedro was placed under a regency that lasted until his ascension in 1841. During this time, Pedro's character developed. He loved to learn and to study. This focus provided him a sense of security according to Roderick Barman, "By the middle of 1832 the narrow world surrounding Pedro II had become increasingly insecure. The only means available to him for holding that world at bay lay within himself. Learning, and above all books, opened for the child another and more friendly existence."⁴⁷ Despite the change in tutors throughout the decade, Pedro liked to keep a schedule and a focus when it came to his studies and his travels. These practices gave him a sense of discipline according to José Murilo de Carvalho, "D. Pedro incorporated habits of discipline and punctuality that were instilled in him during his childhood. Throughout his life, he always had a habit of establishing rigid schedules for

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Roderick J. Barman, *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-91* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 39.

everything.”⁴⁸ His routine gave him a sense of calm that helped him to deal with the feeling of abandonment and loss when his father left the country after his abdication.⁴⁹ In addition, Pedro developed a purpose with which to use his knowledge. The importance of studying is seen in the emperor’s own words, “I always serve the nation through by studying.”⁵⁰ He decided to use his intelligence in order to advance the welfare of all Brazilians. This sentiment is mentioned by Barman, “The knowledge he had gained and continued to acquire he would apply to the benefit and progress of his country.”⁵¹ Pedro II had considerable influence in how he used his knowledge since before 1864, many classes throughout Brazilian society were dependent on the emperor for the purpose of providing stability for defending their privileges. This is noted by Thomas Whigham, “The Brazil that the elites wished to create explicitly conflated the role of monarch and nation, the better to defend their traditional privileges while moving the country forward economically. They argued that the monarch prevented social breakdown, while the nominal republicanism of the Spanish American states yielded nothing but strife.”⁵² The fact that Pedro II, unlike his father, was born in Brazil, helped solidify the legitimacy of his reign and prevented serious opposition. These factors, along with a political system that gave considerable power to the emperor based on the doctrine of the poder

⁴⁸ José Murilo de Carvalho, *Dom Pedro II* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2007), 27. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁴⁹ Alberto Rangel, *A Educação do Príncipe: Esboço Histórico e Crítico sobre o Ensino de D. Pedro II* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Agir Editôra, 1945), 63

⁵⁰ Max Fleiuss, *Dom Pedro Segundo* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940), 49. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁵¹ Barman, 118.

⁵² Whigham, xvi.

moderador. With the powers given to him as emperor and poder moderador, and his self-made image as an intellectual, Dom Pedro II guided Brazil through the nineteenth century with an emphasis on stability in politics, order in the domestic realm, and gradual reforms. His background, priorities, personality, and the political system in which he surveyed shaped his leadership style orientation that emphasized guiding the country's politics, economy, society, and culture gradually while maintaining the overall structure of the hierarchical and patriarchal system inherited by Brazil from Portugal.

Pedro II and the Use of Honor as a Rhetorical Tool

Throughout the war, the determination and patience held by Pedro II held a significant role in the rhetoric he used to generate support for the war effort. During his reign, Pedro took his role as emperor and poder moderador seriously and focused on using his knowledge to defend the regime and advance the welfare of all Brazilians. He sought to do this not only by stressing education as a means of self-advancement but by defending the traditional values and social structure sustained by the regime he swore to defend when he ascended to the throne in 1841. Among these traditional values was the concept of defending national honor as is seen through Pedro II's words to the Chamber of Deputies before the war in 1863, "It is appropriate for me to manifest my just pride for the honorable way in which all Brazilians have pledged themselves in sustaining our national dignity and sovereignty."⁵³ During the war, honor and sovereignty became one and the same. Defending Brazil's sovereignty required a lot of dedication and patience on the part of the Brazilian emperor as is seen in his personal letters such as the one written

⁵³ *Falas do Trono*, 346. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

to the Condessa de Barral on July 23, 1866, “We are well. Now, unfortunately, I cannot give you good news about the war. Have patience like me.”⁵⁴ Pedro II’s role as a defender is seen in his speech from the throne in May 1866, “The amends to our offended national honor by the president of Paraguay still has not contented us to lay down our arms; it please me then to recognize that you have been the course of all in the pledge of such a sacred duty.”⁵⁵ In this speech, Pedro II portrays the defense of honor as a national duty by all Brazilian citizens; especially aristocrats who valued the concept as a way of protecting their privileges. This orientation gives Pedro II the image of not only as a defender of Brazil’s honor but as a symbol of constancy and confidence in a wartime crisis. In a way, Pedro portrayed himself through his letters and speeches as a father defending the honor of his family and nation from aggressors.

Honor, the public cause, and stability were major themes in Pedro II’s rhetoric during the Paraguayan War. During the war, Pedro II felt that Brazil’s honor was at stake. The emperor believed that López in attacking Brazil had violated the honor and integrity of the nation; an offense that could only be paid with the complete defeat of the enemy. Dom Pedro was convinced that the demand that Brazil’s honor be regained was shared by all Brazilians is seen in a speech he gave on May 9, 1868, “Yet for once it pleases me to recognize that the government and every Brazilian have helped in the defense of national honor, offended by the president of Paraguay. I am certain that this aid will not cease.”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Vianna, Hélio, *Letras Imperiais* (Brasília: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1961), 77. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁵⁵ *Falas do Trono*, 363. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁵⁶ *Falas do Trono*, 379. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

This insistence on honor was so strong that Pedro II did not accept any type of arbitration. His response to offers from countries such as Bolivia and the United States is seen in a speech he gave to the *Camara dos Deputados* or Chamber of Deputies on May 22, 1867, “The allies, grateful for the offers, however could not accept them because they do not have the consent of our national dignity.”⁵⁷ This concern is also stressed in his personal letters in 1867, during one of the most difficult times during the war, “Nevertheless, we would have gone forward and finish the war with honor. It is a question of honor and I will not compromise.”⁵⁸ As the war came to a close honor remained a major theme as is seen in a speech given on May 6, 1870. Here the emperor associates honor with patriotism as if the two were inseparable, “The confidence that I have placed in the fortitude and patriotism of Brazilians was amply justified; and history will attest every time that real veneration was shown, constantly and unshakably, in the unanimous belief in the recovery of Brazil’s honor.”⁵⁹ Honor was used to justify the war effort by the imperial regime but these speeches and revelations from his personal letters demonstrate that honor was a theme that Pedro II took personally and seriously. His stress in his discourses with Brazilians citizens and officials attests to this as he sees honor and patriotism as indivisible in pursuing victory in the Paraguayan War.

⁵⁷ *Falas do Trono*, 373. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁵⁸ Magalhães Júnior, 105. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁵⁹ *Falas do Trono*, 392. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

Pedro II and the “Public Cause”

The public cause functioned as an idea and a concern under the reign of Pedro II before and during the Paraguayan War. In the years before the outbreak of the war Pedro II uses the concept “causa pública” or public cause to justify the endeavors and program of the imperial regime. This is seen in his speech to Brazilian legislators in May 1859, “Brazil counts on your dedication to vanquish the difficulties of the present, always walking towards the great future that Providence has destined for us; because the progress and glory of our nation are your only aim, as well as a precious reward, that God’s blessing can concede to my conscientious devotions to the *public cause* [italics mine].”⁶⁰ Before the war, Pedro II used the public cause to create a feeling of service and dedication to one’s country and honesty among the legislators and other officials within the Brazilian government. During the war he used this concept to focus these ideals towards the war effort as is seen in a speech given on May 6, 1865 shortly before the formation of the Triple Alliance, “The government hopes that from your lights and dedication to the public cause that you will occupy, quickly, the expected offices due to the gravity of the circumstances.”⁶¹ Other than creating a sense of dedication among officials and many Brazilians in general, the concept of the public cause in Dom Pedro’s rhetoric served to reinforce his authority as *poder moderador*. The role of the *poder moderador* was to maintain the integrity of the empire as well as to moderate Brazilian politics away from the partisan conflicts and factionalism that many Brazilian elites

⁶⁰ *Falas do Trono*, 323. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁶¹ *Falas do Trono*, 359. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

claimed plagued the republics formed across Latin America in the nineteenth century. The emphasis on dedication to the public cause was also used to reassure Brazilian citizens during wartime that the country was protected by a leader that placed ideals above politics. This demonstrates how the use of abstract ideals, such as the public cause, influenced Dom Pedro's choice of rhetoric.

Dom Pedro's Rhetorical Use of Stability

The theme of stability played a significant role in the wartime rhetoric of Pedro II. It must be noted that stability was a constant and pressing theme for Pedro II and the Brazilian Empire before and during the war. After Brazil's independence and Pedro I's abdication in 1822 and 1831 respectively, the state was challenged by political strife and rebellions that sought to break away from the central authority of Rio de Janeiro. These rebellions created a fear among many in Brazil's elite and aristocracy of instability and the association of republican movements with disorder. These concerns aided in the early end of the regency in 1841 when influential elites in the imperial regime facilitated the rise of the Pedro II to the throne even though he was only fourteen. They thought that the establishment of a Brazilian emperor was the only way that Brazil could stabilize and progress as a nation. How their concerns affected the emperor's orientation is noted by Lídia Besouchet, "The legend of his persona was already delineated. His life plan [Pedro II's] appeared clear: preserve, from large, useless disturbances, faith in the regime; defend the people in their essential freedoms; and liberate them through education. Doing this would help the country progress."⁶² Stability, in addition, was a personal concern for the

⁶² Besouchet, 76. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

emperor himself since, due to his feelings of abandonment by his parents after 1831, he viewed any type of serious conflict to the regime as a threat to his worldview and person. As a result, both Pedro II and many supporters of the imperial regime throughout Brazilian society were convinced that the social system that was a legacy of Portuguese colonialism should be maintained in the Brazilian Empire since it provided stability and that any deviation from this course would produce chaos. Historians, such as Richard Graham, have noted how the importance of stability was linked to class, “Political institutions had as one principal purpose the maintenance of order, and that concern derived from the imperatives of class rule.”⁶³ With stability implying the protection of elitist privileges, Pedro used the support for this value in his rhetoric as he sought to continue this consensus and use it to moderate the politics of the imperial regime for the purpose of gradual change and progress. Graham further relates as to how Pedro II’s use of this value to his advantage was related to how the concept of hierarchy was prized by these elites, “The Emperor’s role as a supreme arbiter whose decisions could be accepted without loss of face or status is consistent with a hierarchical view of society: however much one person might struggle for superiority over another, both contenders acknowledged that above them another still held higher rank.”⁶⁴ Many elites, including Pedro, did not see the social structure of the empire as being inimical to progress itself since they believed progress could be pursued and preserved within the structure itself.⁶⁵

⁶³ Richard Graham, *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 39.

⁶⁴ Graham, 56.

⁶⁵ Emilia Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 1-185.

The Growth of Brazilian Patriotism and Its Effect on Pedro II's Rhetoric

The expansion of Brazilian patriotism was a factor of particular significance for Pedro II and his rhetoric. The Paraguayan invasions of Mato Grosso and Rio Grande do Sul in 1864 and 1865 respectively ignited the patriotism of many in Brazil and convinced many within the nation itself was under threat from a foreign enemy. This patriotism had been growing since the abdication of Pedro I in 1831 and became more of a fact as the regions of Brazil became more and more politically, socially, culturally, and economically integrated. By the time the war erupted, it was possible for the imperial regime to surpass the limits of regionalism and mobilize national resources for the war effort and to depend on the support of the Brazilian citizens throughout the country. Whigham comments on this phenomenon, "This openhanded reaction stood in sharp contrast to the indifference displayed forty years earlier at the time of the Cisplatine War. It suggests that some sort of national feelings had sunk roots in Brazil."⁶⁶ This unity is mentioned by Mossé, "In this era, the small provincial rivalries disappeared. The inhabitants of the Amazon, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul were equally proud of being Brazilian and considered nothing else but the glory of the common nation."⁶⁷ The conditions were more favorable for Pedro II in 1864 than for his father Pedro I in 1825 during the Cisplatine War. In the Cisplatine War, Brazil had only recently become independent and was too embroiled in political conflicts to truly launch a national war effort to safeguard its

⁶⁶ Whigham, 218.

⁶⁷ Mossé, 152. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

control over Uruguay.⁶⁸ Pedro II was more fortunate since the regions throughout Brazil were connected to the imperial regime to such an extent that Pedro II could truly claim to protect not only the interests of regional elites but also the interests of all Brazilians in wartime.

In 1864, the image of Pedro II as a protector of Brazil that was shared by many worked to the emperor's advantage and augmented the impact of his rhetoric as is seen in the speech given in the middle of war in 1867, "I am certain that through the influence of your council, you concur with maintaining the enthusiasm of all Brazilians in the defense of the just cause that we sustain. They [all Brazilians] do not lack aid in bringing about the prompt and honorable end of the war."⁶⁹ The support for Pedro II's "just cause" is shown as Brazilian patriotism manifested in ways such as in the number of volunteers who elected to fight at the beginning of the war. Although, the imperial government had no choice but to enforce conscription policies as casualties mounted, the participation and patriotism of these volunteers was recognized by imperial officials and Pedro II himself as is seen in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on May 6, 1865, "The justice of the cause, national patriotism, and the valor of our soldiers further assures us of complete triumph."⁷⁰ In the eyes of many Brazilians, Pedro II inspired patriotism and was a symbol of the Brazilian nation based on his dedication to the war effort and his open concern for the welfare of the country he defended. Mossé remarks on the favorable view many

⁶⁸ Luiz Werneck da Silva and Williams Gonçalves, *Relações Exteriores do Brasil I (1808-1930): A Política Externa do Sistema Agroexportador* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 2009), 44-47.

⁶⁹ *Falas do Trono*, 378. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁷⁰ *Falas do Trono*, 359. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

Brazilians had for the emperor during this period, “The Brazilian nation was proud of this patriotic emperor. It [his dedication] was an admirable display of patriotism.”⁷¹ The relevance and importance of patriotism during the conflict not only solidified support for the empire but added more purpose to Pedro II’s rhetoric and increased its effect to sustain the war effort and to portray the emperor as the defender of Brazil during the war. One sees why the Brazilian emperor chose to stress honor, the public cause, and stability before and during the Paraguayan War but what do these choices of rhetorical discourse suggest about the leadership orientation of Dom Pedro? Furthermore, what do they reveal about potential trends in Brazilian history and politics during this period?

The Leadership Orientation of Dom Pedro During the War

The rhetorical choices and expression by Pedro II in his speeches and letters attest to his leadership orientation during the Paraguayan War. This orientation focuses on the imagery of the head of state as placing the wellbeing of the people and nation before all else while negotiating between various factions in order to preserve the stability of the state. What differentiates this type from populist leadership is that the leader does not necessarily have to embody the nation but simply is required to serve it or hold it in high regard. In his rhetoric, Pedro II does not assume to embody the nation but states that he is its protector. Herein, he obtains support at a national level for the war effort by appealing to abstract concepts that represent national values.⁷² Through his words and the mediation of political blocs (in this case the traditional, middle class, and republican, Pedro II

⁷¹ Mossé, 151. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁷² *Falas do Trono*, 369.

stressed unity through the promotion of honor, the public cause, and stability. The structure of power left behind after the end of Portuguese colonial domination concentrated on the privileges of an agrarian aristocracy along with other elites in Brazilian society. To them these concepts were interconnected. In their eyes a leader that embodied the concept of the *poder moderador*, such as Pedro II, was the only one who could uphold these values from external and internal pressure; especially in wartime. Pedro II recognized their concern and embraced the defense of these values in the belief that their maintenance included Brazil's survival as a nation from external threats such as Paraguay.⁷³ Pedro II's faith in these values gave Brazilian elites and important reassurance. This reassurance was important since it touched on a concern many Brazilian elites had after independence. Many within Brazil's political elite, economic elite, aristocracy, middle class, and other sectors were concerned that Brazil, being newly independent, was at risk of being torn apart by regional rivalries, political factionalism, and potential foreign interference. As a result an expectation developed among these sectors that the best type of leader was one who could *moderate* between the various groups that were competing for power after Brazil's independence and give the state the chance to consolidate and stabilize. Each sector had their reasons for why they needed this specific type of leadership, whether it be for protecting their privileges or the pursuit of progressive reform, but most agreed that this was the only type of leadership was acceptable for Brazil since it was the expectation that it would protect the structure of power by promoting ideals such as honor, the public cause, and stability. It was due to

⁷³ *Falas do Trono*, 383.

these factors and his personality that Pedro II was able to meet the demands of the political factions that supported him.

Conclusion

The crisis of the Paraguayan War reveals several things about Brazilian national leadership and politics during this important time period in the country's history. The Paraguayan War was a test not only for the emperor but for the nation as a whole. As a result the Brazilian triumph in the Paraguayan War convinced many that the war effort was just and that many facets of Brazilian politics and society were legitimate. Lilia Schwartz notes how the war enhanced the image of the Brazilian emperor and his regime, "The years of the Paraguayan War left profound marks on the representation of Dom Pedro II that somehow was a result, at least, of the exhausting prolongation of the conflict."⁷⁴ Pedro II's confidence of this fact is demonstrated when he commented on the dedication of Brazilians when the war was still raging, "[It is] otherwise obvious of the profound love the people have towards the institutions that govern us."⁷⁵ One can say that the Paraguayan War marks the pinnacle of Pedro II's reign and that his defense of Brazil in a wartime crisis is one of his greatest achievements. When the war ended in 1870, many Brazilians felt that Brazil was triumphant in its defense of national identity and honor. This feeling is conveyed by the Brazilian emperor himself, "Possessed of the most vibrant joy which I believe resonates throughout the national representation, I render thanks to the Almighty and congratulate you all for the joyous and glorious end of the

⁷⁴ Lilia Mortiz Schwartz, *As Barbas do Imperador: D. Pedro II, Um Monarca nos Trópicos* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998), 319. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁷⁵ *Falas do Trono*, 379. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

war that we sustained for five years.”⁷⁶ It was the opinion of contemporaries at the time, such as Joaquim Nabuco, that the war marked a decisive turning point in Brazilian history, “The Paraguayan War had such a decisive importance on our destinies and on those of the whole region of the Río de la Plata that we can consider it as a dividing line between two periods of our contemporary history.”⁷⁷ This joy was translated into hope for future reforms as is seen through the sovereign’s own words to representatives in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, “If your dedication and patriotism will work with the government that managed the extraordinary amount of resources that the war demanded, your lights and love of the nation will have given a vigorous impulse to all internal reforms that promise us a new era of peace.”⁷⁸ While the implementation of important reforms, such as the Free Womb Law in 1871 and the abolition of slavery in 1888, helped Brazil in its period of peace, it led to the downfall of the Brazilian Empire.

The demise of the empire was a long term consequence of these reforms, nonetheless it must be said that the imperial regime could not have sustained the war for such a long period of time and laid the foundations for a new stage in Brazilian nationalism without Pedro II. This observation is shared by other historians of this period such as Barman,

“Difficulties, setbacks, and war weariness had no effect on his quiet resolve. The mounting total of dead and wounded deterred him not at all. His cause, which was the cause of Brazil, was just, and to the triumph of that cause he was willing to sacrifice everything, even his throne. Finding some eighty thousand troops needed to fight the war had seriously undermined the imperial regime. The financial costs came very high, although the war certainly stimulated the economy and promoted development. Without the emperor Brazil would not have persevered

⁷⁶ *Falas do Trono*, 392. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁷⁷ Nabuco, 57. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁷⁸ *Falas do Trono*, 393. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

and secured the elimination of López. Brazilians, whose sense of national identity had been enhanced by this long and bloody struggle, acknowledged this fact.”⁷⁹

Other historians, such as Schwartz, have noted that the war was both the height and the beginning of the end for the Brazilian Empire, “If the Paraguayan War represents the zenith of Dom Pedro’s empire, the moment of great maturity, it signifies the same as well in the opposite sense, the beginning of the fall.”⁸⁰ It is important to note the factors that made the Paraguayan War such a major event for Brazil and how the war was sustained in order to make it so.

During the war, while protecting the nation, Pedro II built upon and consolidated the nation through the use of values that existed both before Brazil became independent. In a way, Pedro II, through the promulgation of the war effort, facilitated the progress of the nation through the promotion of old ideals. This fits into the thesis of Eugene Weber who argues how the Third Republic followed a similar path in nineteenth and early twentieth century France, “For the old structure did not in fact break; it stretched; it twisted new turns into the old shapes, incorporating the new-fangled and the up-to-date into familiar patterns.”⁸¹ The determination of Pedro II and his use of national values such as honor, the public cause, and stability generated a growing sense of patriotism that evolved as the war progressed; producing in turn the support the imperial regime needed to sustain the war effort in a critical time in Brazil’s national development. Other factors

⁷⁹ Barman, 230.

⁸⁰ Schwartz, 295. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁸¹ Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 231.

included the regime's conservative orientation and its heavy reliance on the personal moderation of the emperor. The rhetoric used during the Paraguayan War not only shows how the war shaped Brazil as a nation but how it was used as a stimulus for the consolidation of certain values (such as honor, the public cause, and stability) and leadership that already existed in Brazilian society before the war.

CHAPTER 3: VARGAS AND WORLD WAR II: CHANGES AND TRENDS IN NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

After the fall of the Brazilian Empire, the political, social, and cultural environment of Brazil changed dramatically, especially after the demise of the República Velha in 1930. These changes demanded a new orientation of national leadership that differed from the one that had been so prominent under the reign of Pedro II during the Paraguayan War. This orientation focused on promoting international liberalism, populism, nationalism, and reformism in order to gain public support for the Brazilian war effort during World War II under the Estado Novo (1937-1945). Getúlio Vargas was the main practitioner of this orientation. Due to circumstances of the environment and his preference, used a populist orientation to appeal to political groups and the Brazilian populace as a whole. His leadership during WWII was not only meant to solidify support behind the war effort through the use of rhetoric to both inspire the population and to mediate between the political blocs that could be used as bases of support. Through the analysis of Vargas' rhetoric one can see the changes and constants in Brazil's national leadership changed between 1864 and 1942.

The Rise of the Estado Novo

In the 1930s and early 1940s, Brazil was undergoing a massive amount of political, economic, and social change which included the rise of Getúlio Vargas and the Estado Novo in 1937. In October 24, 1930, the *República Velha* or Old Republic came to

an end after a military coup toppled the last president Washington Luís Pereira de Sousa. In the 1930 presidential election a series of parties across Brazil came together to form the *Aliança Liberal* or Liberal Alliance with the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Getúlio Vargas, as their candidate to face the candidate chosen by the oligarchy of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, Antônio Carlos. Despite the amount of popular support for Vargas, the election was manipulated in favor of Carlos. Recognizing that fraud had played a role in the election, dissident elements within the political, social, and military establishments within Brazil rebelled against the oligarchy for various reasons such as the demand for social reform, economic reform, more political participation, a new constitution, and an insistence on justice after the knowledge of abuses of political power regarding assassinations of politicians such as João Pessoa.⁸²

After the oligarchy was overthrown, a provisional government was formed under the leadership of Vargas. Vargas began to implement political, social, and economic reforms which included a new constitution in 1934. During this period, Vargas focused on guiding Brazil as a reformer who was adept at mediating between different political factions whether they be elitist, tenente, communist, socialist, integralista, or fascist in origin.⁸³ Vargas' ability to manage between different political factions was important since it helped him to build a political coalition that eventually gave him enough support for later political developments such as the Estado Novo. Vargas' main strength as a

⁸² John W.F Dulles, *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), 17-171.

⁸³ Alejandro Groppo, *Los Dos Principes: Juan D. Perón y Getúlio Vargas: Un Estudio Comparado del Populismo Latinoamericano* (Villa María: Editorial Universitaria Villa María, 2009), 305. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

leader was that he seemed to have a concrete political program that suited various elements in Brazil's political spectrum.⁸⁴ Vargas' abilities as a mediator and leader helped him implement reforms during the provisional government and create a diverse coalition but these skills were not a panacea for political stability. Failed rebellions and coups by Paulista and communist factions in 1931 and 1935 respectively along with continued unrest caused by political factions from both the Left and Right led many within the Varguista regime to demand a more authoritarian form of government in order to facilitate political, social, and economic reforms.

The decision to implement a new political order came on November 10, 1937 when Vargas, with the support of tenentes and other military and conservative factions, dissolved the assembly, canceled the presidential elections, and declared the creation of the Estado Novo. Vargas justified this *autogolpe* or self-coup by arguing that this regime was to restore national authority and to protect the country from elements that sought to disturb public peace and lead the country into civil war, "We will restore the nation in its authority and liberty of action—its authority gives you the instruments of real and effective power with which [the nation] should be able to overcome destabilizing elements, internal or external; in its freedom, opening the national tribunal to the ends and means of the government, and allowing it to construct freely its history and destiny."⁸⁵ With the arrival of the Estado Novo came press censorship, an increased

⁸⁴ Francisco Iglésias, "Aspectos Políticos e econômicas do Estado Novo," In *Getúlio Vargas e a Economia Contemporânea*, ed. Támas Szmezsányi and Rui G. Granziera (Campinas: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 1986), 77. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁸⁵ Getúlio Vargas, *A Nação: Proclamação ao Povo Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1937), 20. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

authority for the national government, and various forms of political repression. The new regime created a form of political stability that many sectors of Brazilian society appreciated. However, this did not imply that the country was completely free of intrigue and political unrest. A failed assassination attempt by integralistas in 1938 and the continued influence of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy through the use of propaganda indicated a measure of political dissent but not instability.⁸⁶ From 1937-1945, the Estado Novo provided Brazilians with political stability albeit a fragile one.

Brazil and World War II

Brazil joined the Allies in WWII based on how the war could help Brazil's economy and improve the country's influence regionally and internationally. In the 1930s, Brazil's economy was changing arguably just as fast as its politics. Brazil since the nineteenth century had been a country that specialized in exporting coffee with an large agrarian base. This began to change after 1929 when Brazil faced the consequences of remaining an agrarian based country that focused on exporting a limited number of crops. The Great Depression affected Brazil with unemployment and economic distress. In this period of turmoil, Brazil's economy was shifting according to Eli Diníz, "In my opinion, the principal change was the passage from a society that focused on agrarian exports to society with a urban-industrial base."⁸⁷ After taking power in 1930, Vargas and his regime began to implement reforms that facilitated industrialization and

⁸⁶ Neil Lochery, *Brazil: The Fortunes of War: World War II and the Making of Modern Brazil* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 3-192.

⁸⁷ Eli Diníz, "A Progressiva Subordinação das Oligarquias Regionais ao Governo Central," In *Getúlio Vargas e a Economia Contemporânea*, ed. Tamas Szmrecsányi and Rui G. Granziera (Campinas: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 1986),42. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

modernization across Brazil. These reforms coincided with statist and nationalistic policies that involved heavy state involvement in the economy. This is demonstrated by the nationalization of major Brazilian industries such as coffee and oil during the Estado Novo.

While these policies helped the Brazilian economy in the short term the regime knew it had to find countries that could invest in Brazil in the long term. It is for these reasons that Brazil sought new economic relationships with countries such as the United States, Germany, and Italy. Between 1930-1939, Brazil made a series of trade agreements with Germany regarding the export of cotton. Italy traded with Brazil for similar exports but the combination of trade between these two fascist countries and Brazil did not compare to the growing amount of U.S investment in Brazil during this same time period.⁸⁸ Due to its foreign policy of reducing economic and political influence from fascist countries such as Nazi Germany during the 1930s and 1940s, the U.S began to invest heavily in Brazilian industries. A trade agreement was made in 1935 between Brazil and the U.S that increased commerce between the two countries while continued negotiations continued throughout the decade regarding favorable exchange rates and tariffs for U.S businesses.⁸⁹ While Vargas at first wanted to use the economic rivalry between the United States, Germany, and Italy to Brazil's advantage, as U.S influence became more pronounced throughout the 1930s and 1940s, this policy became more and

⁸⁸ Gerson Moura, *Autonomia na Dependência: A Política Externa Brasileira de 1935 a 1942* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1980), 117-121.

⁸⁹ United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers*, (Washington, D.C: 1933), 87.

more untenable. Brazil had this phenomenon in common in regards to the growth of U.S influence when it economic concerns according to historian Roberto Gambini, “Under the influence of this [U.S] economic/financial scheme, the Good Neighbor policy came to be concretely implanted in the Continent.”⁹⁰ The policy of balancing the rivalries of different powers to Brazil’s benefit became one that focused solely on enhancing U.S investment in Brazil that helped fund the Varguista regime’s modernization and industrialization policies. As war became more and more likely between the U.S and the Axis powers, Varguista officials realized that if Brazil remained neutral in such a conflict the effect might adversely affect Brazil’s economic development in the long run. Despite Vargas’ fears about political instability if Brazil entered the war, economic considerations outweighed any reservations as the country entered WWII on the side of the Allies in 1941.⁹¹

The desire of the Estado Novo to improve Brazil’s influence and image regionally and internationally played a role in Brazil’s decision to renounce its neutrality in favor of joining the Allies after 1941. Brazil’s rivalry with Argentina over dominance in the Southern Cone was just as much a reality in the twentieth century as it was in the nineteenth. Brazil wanted to maintain either a military parity or a position of military superiority over Argentina. Officials of the Estado Novo saw U.S support as key to gaining an advantage over Argentina. They wanted U.S support in the form of not only economic investment but as well as military supplies in training. While at first this

⁹⁰ Roberto Gambini, *O Duplo Jogo de Getúlio Vargas: Influência Americana e Alemã no Estado Novo* (São Paulo: Edições Símbolo, 1977), 42. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁹¹ Lochery, 3-192.

military support started out as military missions, Vargas and his officials knew that further U.S support was needed to ensure Brazil's dominance over Argentina.⁹² In the 1930s and after the outbreak of WWII in 1939, Argentina retained a position of neutrality that annoyed prominent U.S officials. Vargas had a similar policy since he equated neutrality with freedom of action; the same freedom of action that served as one of the reasons Vargas used to justify the creation of the Estado Novo in 1937.⁹³ However, for Brazil to become the primary hegemonic power in the Southern Cone, the government had to abandon its position of neutrality and adopt a policy opposite that of Argentina in order to use U.S support to increase the country's power.

Throughout the course of WWII, Brazil made contributions to the Allied war effort in regards to military units and raw materials. In August 1942, Brazil declared war on the Axis after two Brazilian ships were sunk by enemy submarines. Vargas viewed this as a declaration of war and as a perfect opportunity to increase the amount of U.S support for his economic projects by declaring war on the Axis. Other than allowing limited U.S access to bases in the country, Brazil was expected to supply some type of a military force to help the Allies. In addition, the Estado Novo felt that Brazil had to fight in the war in some way.

Varguista officials were convinced that to secure Brazilian hegemony in the Southern Cone, to gain a voice for Brazil in international affairs, and to solidify U.S

⁹² United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers*, (Washington, D.C: 1938), 312-377

⁹³ Gary Frank, *Struggle for Hegemony in South America: Argentina, Brazil, and the United States during the Second World War* (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami, 1979), 3-88.

financial support for the regime's modernization and industrialization projects, they needed to send a Brazilian military force to help the Allies in the war. These concerns led to the creation of the *Força Expedicionária Brasileira* (FEB) in 1943. This military force of 25,334 soldiers was important to the Allied cause in the Italian campaign. Brazilian soldiers in the FEB were crucial in major battles such as Monte Castello and Barga.⁹⁴ The FEB was also important to Allied forces in conflicts that transpired in cities such as Piacenza, Alessandria, Turim, and Susa.⁹⁵ It is fair to say that without the participation of the FEB, Allied progress in the Italian campaign would have been different since its support was important in several conflicts that were crucial to the success of the Allies in Italy.

The Failure of Brazilian Neutrality

Vargas' choice of rhetoric during WWII reveals changes and constants in the orientation of Brazilian national leadership during a wartime crisis. The language used by Vargas proved decisive in not only whether or not the Brazilian populace supported the war effort but whether they saw the Estado Novo as having enough legitimacy to lead Brazil in wartime. Before the war, Vargas emphasized a policy of neutrality in respect to the relations Brazil had with the United States, Italy, and other European powers, "Neutrality does not mean passivity. The true neutral attitude is translates as vigilance and exemption of heart in the face of situations that we do not agree to create nor wish to

⁹⁴ Andrea Giannasi, *Il Brasile in Guerra: La Força Expedicionária Brasileira in Italia (1944-1945)* (Roma: Carrocci Editore, 2014), 25-143.

⁹⁵ Ricardo Bonalume Neto, *A Nossa Segunda Guerra: Os Brasileiros em Combate, 1942-1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Expressão e Cultura, 1995), 170-177.

intervene.”⁹⁶ This policy was a part of the Estado Novo’s policy of reciprocity which involved a nationalist orientation by portraying Brazil as an equal in the international arena and ensuring that the country had some autonomy in its foreign policy. This policy was important for many within and outside the Vargas government since Brazil, since its independence, had a history of its foreign policy being manipulated by European powers, such as Great Britain, through its economic ties.⁹⁷

This policy of neutrality became untenable as the United States government under Roosevelt became more and more interested in ensuring that Brazil’s economy and politics did not become corrupted by Axis powers. Between 1930 and 1941 Brazil was a center of a rivalry between the U.S and Axis powers such as Italy and Germany according to Perazzo, “It defined itself [Brazil] by none of the hegemonic powers of the age, maintaining political and economic relations with different centers that disputed the Latin American market; perceiving that Brazil represented a camp of hegemonic disputes between the two systems of power—Germany and the United States.”⁹⁸ However, according to other authors such as Silva Seitenfus, this policy of neutrality was unsustainable due to its inability to maintain an independent foreign policy, “Of all the preceding observations and from the collection of research a fundamental constancy presents itself. Brazil did not have an independent and autonomous foreign policy during

⁹⁶ Getúlio Vargas, *As Diretrizes da Nova Política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1942), 275. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

⁹⁷ Luiz Werneck da Silva, “O Prata e a Autonomia da Diplomacia Imperial,” In *Relações Exteriores do Brasil (1808-1930): A Política Externa do Sistema Agroexportador*, ed. Luiz Werneck da Silva and José Williams Gonçalves (Petropolis: Editora Vozes, 2009), 77-98.

⁹⁸ Priscila Ferreira Perazzo, *O Perigo Alemão e a Repressão Policial no Estado Novo* (São Paulo: Arquivo do Estado, 1999), 37. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

the period 1930-1942.”⁹⁹ not only to the flaws of maintaining a balance between two antagonistic systems of power (i.e the Allies and the Axis) but also due to the proximity and growing interest of the U.S in Brazilian affairs and the perceived benefits of this cooperation by Varguista officials. This was seen as early as 1933 as is seen through the words of the U.S ambassador Hugh Gibson as he talks to the U.S secretary of state of the pro-U.S orientation of Oscar Aranha, the premier diplomat in Vargas’ regime, “Aranha said that he was honestly desirous of meeting any reasonable views on our part, that this statement could be taken at par because it was based on his conviction that real Brazilian prosperity was dependent on developing the best possible relations with the United States.”¹⁰⁰ Due to these circumstances, Vargas’ policy of neutrality could not be sustained despite the perceived threats Brazilian participation in the war could have on his regime. Regardless, during the course of the war, Vargas would portray the war as Brazil’s choice and moral duty to other countries instead of admitting that Brazil was pushed by U.S influence and Axis aggression. It is through this portrayal that more aspects of Vargas’ leadership orientation are revealed.

The Use of Rhetorical Populism and Reformism

During the war, Vargas portrays the conflict as a noble cause that Brazil chose to strengthen its national character, identity, and independence. In his speeches to galvanize support Vargas speaks of the conflict as a benefit to the Brazilian nation even though

⁹⁹ Ricardo Antônio Silva Seitenfus, *O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas e a Formação dos Blocos, 1930-1942: O Processo do Envolvimento Brasileiro na II Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1985), 431. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹⁰⁰ U.S Foreign Policy Papers, 1933, 87.

reality shows that the war itself was contradictory to many Varguista policies of neutrality and demonstrated that Brazil was not as completely autonomous as the dictator and his officials would have liked, “We cherish, for the time being, what is essential and urgent: to win the war and to prepare the country by fortifying its political independence and completing its economic independence. The internal problems of the definitive structure of the State, traits of the institutional order, will be resolved in due time through the broad pronouncement of all social forces.”¹⁰¹ In this speech, Vargas assures his audience that his regime is continuing its policies of strengthening Brazilian nationalism by implementing social and political reforms. In a wartime crisis it was important for Vargas to stress what was constant in order to reaffirm the government’s legitimacy for the purposes of the war effort. Vargas once again uses rhetoric that contains broad meanings in order to appeal to a wide audience. While this rhetoric may appear vague to some, this choice of words on Vargas’ part reflects the time in which he was living. He describes that the internal problems of the country will be resolved by the “social forces” of the country. Even though he does not define what these forces are rhetoric is representative of a change in how the Brazilian government interacted with the Brazilian populace. It demonstrates a willingness and an acceptance of allowing more popular participation in the political process. This is a significant change compared to the political system in the Brazilian Empire which mainly emphasized the interests of those who were considered to be Brazilian citizens which included those of the aristocracy, middle class, and those of a European background while giving vague references to the rest of the population. In the

¹⁰¹ Getúlio Vargas, *Brazil en Armas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Mundo Atlantico, 1944), 185. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

twentieth century, popular forces had to be recognized by leaders such as Vargas, populist or not, in order to form a government since Brazil had changed much politically and economically since the nineteenth century. The populist orientation of Vargas in this speech is indicative of the reformist spirit of the Estado Novo and how Brazil's political system was evolving with the nation at this crucial juncture.¹⁰²

The orientation of political leadership at the national level had to change and Vargas was the leader who consolidated this adjustment. At this time, the concept of the Brazilian nation and what it meant to be a Brazilian citizen was changing and these phenomena had to be acknowledged or appreciated by officials in order to create a stable regime. One of the major reasons why the República Velha disintegrated was many officials in that regime refused to recognize the aforementioned forces and continued to adhere to an antiquated leadership orientation that resembled that practiced by imperial officials in the nineteenth century with their emphasis on regionalism, advancement through education, and an exclusionary definition of Brazilian citizenship that rested on race and class.¹⁰³ Vargas clearly mentions these new forces in Brazilian society at least by name and accepts their influence in theory.

In some of his rhetoric, Vargas mixed domestic concerns with the war effort in order to argue that victory in the war was connected to the success of political, social, and economic reform. This is seen in a speech he gave soon after Brazil entered the war, "The consequences of the fight in the which we find ourselves bound to will decide the

¹⁰² Richard Graham, *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth Century Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 11-200.

¹⁰³ Graham, 11-145.

destinies of the world. They cannot inspire in us apprehensions. The privileges of caste, racial prejudices, inequalities of fortune, class oppressions, malicious hatreds, every value that is apparently irreconcilable to contemporary civilization will have been erased in this inferno of such vast proportions. In a holocaust lies the dawn of a new era.”¹⁰⁴ Vargas is using a strategy used by other populists in Latin American during the early twentieth century whereby he uses the possibility class inequality and racial prejudice as a reason to redefine the nation and build popular support for a regime; in this case the authoritarian Estado Novo. In contrast, to other populists such as Juan Perón in Argentina, Vargas uses this mix to generate support for the Brazilian war effort.

Vargas spoke at a time when Brazil as a nation was still being formulated. Vargas simply used developing concepts, such as “social forces” in his speeches not only to give his regime a populist face but also to defend a structure of power that was ironically anachronistic to the reforms the Estado Novo was implementing. The Estado Novo presided over a period in Brazilian history where new forces (such as feminist groups, workers, and political factions of the political Left and Right) were participating in politics at new levels. Vargas’ regime during the 1930s and 1940s sought to alleviate the concerns of these different groups.¹⁰⁵ His use of broad concepts served not only to appease these divergent interests but also to make the listener feel that she was invested in a broad cause such as the reconstruction of what it meant to be Brazilian in a Brazilian nation. Vargas’ use of a national leadership orientation that centered on a leader with a

¹⁰⁴ Vargas, *Brazil en Armas*, 150. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹⁰⁵ Robert M. Levine, *Father of the Poor?: Vargas and His Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 37-96.

scholarly, charismatic persona not only symbolizes the changes Brazil was undergoing in the 1940s but illustrates a parallel with his predecessor Pedro II whose own style possessed similar traits.

The Use of International Liberalism in Vargas' Rhetoric

During the war, Vargas used rhetoric that suggested that since Brazil was a country of toleration, liberty, and justice it had a duty to defend the rights of weaker states from Axis aggression and domination, "If it rests upon ourselves to fight, it will not be to avoid defeat but to obtain a complete victory with the intention of restructuring the world on more humane and just bases, with respect towards the sovereignty of all nations, big or small, militarily weak or strong. Each people will be able to organize themselves according to their own will, expressed through the means of their historical tradition and the imperatives of their autonomous existence."¹⁰⁶ Vargas' choice of rhetoric reminds one of international liberalism. There have been different types of liberalism that have become ascendant at within different centuries. There exists a liberalism that stressed a economic freedom and a political process that centered on representative government based on a republican model. This ideology was popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in the United States and countries in Latin America such as Colombia and Chile. However, this is not the type Vargas is describing. The liberalism he is promoting is that of the twentieth century variety; international liberalism. This strand stresses norms that it assumes are universal in scope such as those relating to the autonomy of the nation state, international institutions to mediate problems, the promotion of common interests such as

¹⁰⁶ Getúlio Vargas, *Discursos* (Rio de Janeiro: Coleção Brasil, 1944), 19. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

justice and liberty, and the acceptance of, in theory, popular mobilization and voices in the governmental apparatus. This was the exact type of liberalism promoted by the U.S under presidents Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) and Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933-1945). Vargas' reference to the ideals of this ideology not only demonstrates its appeal to many in Brazil but also its use as a symbol of Brazilian-U.S support during the war effort. This type, along with claims of Brazil's moral superiority, was used by Vargas to justify the war effort.¹⁰⁷

While the combination of these elements may inspire patriotism in some, appeals with elements of international liberalism to the Brazilian masses is questionable. While many agreed that the Axis had to be defeated, the majority of Brazilians felt as if the war was a distraction so that the Estado Novo could avoid focusing on the pressing political and social issues at the time.¹⁰⁸ At a time when many Brazilians were concerned about political change, social reform, and economic prosperity, why would the most prominent political figure in the early twentieth century Brazil focus on a war based on international liberalism whose concepts many Brazilians did not identify with? This gives an indication as to which parts of Vargas' audience were the focus of these types of speeches. In speeches, it is very important to know not only why a speech is given but who is the target audience.¹⁰⁹ Vargas' target audience in this case were primarily elites and government officials in the United States and Brazil. He believed that these groups were

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 33-120.

¹⁰⁹ Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-270.

essential to sustaining the war effort and the Estado Novo. The use of liberal ideals in the war effort by Vargas illustrates that a political faction that included officials, elites, and members of Brazil's middle class took these ideas seriously and composed a major bloc of support for the Estado Novo. Vargas could not ignore this bloc since he needed to consolidate the regime during the war, even if the promotion of these ideas would lead to the demise of the Estado Novo later. According to historians, such as John W.F Dulles, Brazil's participation in WWII undermined the Estado Novo, "Brazil's entry into the fight on the side of the Allies gave opponents of the regime further opportunity to manifest support for anti-dictatorial concepts."¹¹⁰ However, he does not go deeper as to why this is. Based on his rhetoric, the use of international liberalism to justify the war combined with the open authoritarianism and repression of the Estado Novo to lead to the political demise of Vargas after the war. Here an authoritarian regime using liberalist ideas to promote a war effort is an obvious contradiction. However, this indicates a curious trait of the Estado Novo. This is indicative of the origins of the Estado Novo itself and its policies that date back to the Aliança Liberal in the 1930 election. Vargas believed that using ideas from liberalism, such as liberty and justice, would appeal to the key power blocs of his regime and rally the populace regardless of the long term political ramifications on his regime.

Vargas and the "Espírito Americanista"

Vargas through his rhetoric encourages cooperation between different American countries by claiming the existence of a "espírito americanista" or American spirit. In

¹¹⁰ Dulles, 251.

addition, he displays this sentiment in pursuit of causes that resemble liberalism as is seen in this passage, “The *espírito americanista* [italics mine] that presides over our determinations is based on that of the restoration of human values, liberty, and justice.”¹¹¹ He never portrays Brazil as an Allied nation but merely says that Brazil is an enemy of the Axis and a supporter of the Allied cause. Due to the fact that the Estado Novo was firmly nationalist, to say that Brazil was an ally of the United States would have given a portrayal of the former as a subordinate of the latter. This effect would have diminished the prestige of the Vargasista regime at a time when the state was trying to maintain popular support for the war effort. At the same time, Vargas could not ignore the United States due to the political and economic benefits that the country provided to Brazil. Vargas, in his rhetoric, talks of the two countries as equals in defending their continent from aggression, “Our continent, in this tormented hour of the world, must concentrate all of its energies towards a work of american cooperation.”¹¹² His use of the word “cooperation” is vague but it is deliberate. It is a vague nod to the concept of pan-americanism that was promoted by the Franklin Roosevelt regime at the time to extend U.S influence in order to defend the Americas from Axis threats as is noted by historians such as David Haglund, “It is my contention that a necessary condition for American intervention in World War II was the uncertainty that the Latin American republics could or would resist the combined political, economic, and military threats and blandishments

¹¹¹ Vargas, *Discursos*, 55. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹¹² Vargas, *As Novas Diretrizes da Nova Política*, 89. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

of a Germany that, by the middle of 1940, looked to be the conquerer of all Europe.”¹¹³ By using this word this way, he acknowledges the importance of pan-americanism to both Brazil and the United States, promotes Brazil is an equal to the United States and other countries throughout the Americas, and at the same time does not mention either of the countries by name. Brazil cooperated with the United States by sending troops and war materials to Europe while allowing U.S troops to use Brazilian bases in the cause of hemispheric security. Vargas mentions very little about these facts in public due to the potential political fallout.¹¹⁴ Instead, he exhorts the Brazilian populace to focus on the war effort by focusing on higher causes that transcend politics, race, and class such as american cooperation. His word provided solidarity to many and allowed Vargas’ audience to vividly imagine the Brazilian nation according to their desires due to the fluidity in the words’ interpretation. In this way, through the use of Vargas’ personality and rhetoric, we can see similarities to the reign of Pedro II. Pedro II uses similar rhetoric of cooperation during the Paraguayan War in order to generate popular support not only for the Brazilian war effort but also for the war efforts of Argentina and Uruguay, the two other countries that formed the Triple Alliance against Paraguay. However, he phrases this cooperation in the framework of defending national sovereignty and honor.¹¹⁵

The Use of Rhetorical Nationalism

¹¹³ David G. Haglund, *Latin America and the Transformation of U.S Strategic Thought, 1936-1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 34.

¹¹⁴ Jacob Gorander, “A Participação do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial e suas Conseqüências,” In *Getúlio Vargas e a Economia Contemporânea*, ed. Tamas Szmrecsányi and Rui G. Granziera (Campinas: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 1986), 87-100

¹¹⁵ Coligidas na Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados, *Falás do Trono desde o Ano de 1823 até o Ano de 1889* (São Paulo: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1977), 373.

Nationalism was almost a constant theme for Vargas in his rhetoric during WWII. In his speech to Brazil's armed forces he speaks of dedicating oneself completely to the defense of the *pátria* or nation, "It was this vocation in which you have dedicated your life. To live to serve the *pátria* [italics mine] at every instant; to study and work continually towards your perfections, each time more, and you will become more efficient in this high and noble profession, worthy of your labors."¹¹⁶ In a time where the concept of the Brazilian nation was being vigorously debated, it must be said that this idea had been discussed since Brazil's independence and had reached a high point in its development by Vargas' rise in the 1930s and 40s. Through his words, he used a political orientation that focused on nationalism, populism, and concepts that suggested that the Brazilian populace as a whole had common interests. Vargas called upon these ideas during the war in order to defend the nation from attack but this builds upon a past trend from the Brazilian Empire: the concept of honor. During the Paraguayan War, Pedro II stressed that Brazil needed to continue the war with Paraguay in order to defend the country's honor. This emphasis on honor evolved over time and helped influence the concept of the Brazilian nation but the time of Vargas. When Nazi submarines attacked Brazilian ships in 1941, a similar concept was present in the Estado Novo and helped justify Brazil's entry into WWII. Except it was spoken in different terms whereas honor had changed to liberty and justice as is seen in Vargas' own words to Brazilian soldiers, "The armed forces, as always, in acute periods of national crisis, nobly, selflessly, have

¹¹⁶ Vargas, *Discursos*, 47. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

placed themselves beside the people in the defense of liberty and justice.”¹¹⁷ This blend of nationalism appealed to tenente factions loyal to his government. These factions composed a power bloc of his regime and he could not ignore them. Historians, such as Shawn Smallman, have commented on their rise in Brazilian politics during this period, “In Brazil most powerful military factions have had an ideological basis. As the military professionalized during the twentieth century, military factions became increasingly powerful, in part because they tended to increasingly defined in ideological terms.”¹¹⁸ Liberty and justice may have replaced honor and public tranquility between the Brazilian Empire and the Estado Novo but both Pedro II and Vargas are practitioners of a trend where the leader uses broad rhetoric in order to facilitate the cooperation of political factions and attract the imagination of Brazil’s populace in wartime crises.

Vargas’ Rhetoric and Its Appeal Towards the Brazilian Populace and Conservative, Liberal Civilian, and Tenente Factions During WWII

One can gain glimpses into this system through the speeches of Vargas and the political factions they appealed to. This speech gives an indication into the types of audiences Vargas was addressing: the remnant of the old elitist bloc that survived both the fall of the Brazilian Empire and the República Velha, a new bloc of elitists that were more liberal, nationalist, and populist in orientation that rose during this period, a generation of *tenentes*, or military commanders that justified their intervention in politics on the basis of nationalism and reforms of a political, social, and economic nature, and the Brazilian

¹¹⁷ Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil*, 154. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹¹⁸ Shawn C. Smallman, *Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army & Society, 1889-1954* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 43.

populace as a whole that is referred to only generally by Vargas in his speeches. Vargas' orientation is similar to Alejandro Groppo's argument that both Perón and Vargas used populism as a way for them to mediate between different political groups at key moments in Argentinian and Brazilian national development.¹¹⁹ These four groups made up the majority of his audience in a large number of his speeches.

What can be observed is that in this speech Vargas is once again appealing to both popular forces and political factions by using words that appealed to the concerns and imaginations of the listener, liberal ideas due to their malleability depending on the situation, and the mix of domestic and international affairs into one cause. With these rhetorical strategies he could appear to be partial to the concerns of everyone they are crafted in a way to cater to the opinions and views of the political blocs that were deemed to be the most relevant at the moment while at the same time at least recognizing popular sovereignty in theory but not in practice. The composition of the political blocs changed from the rise of Vargas in 1930 to the establishment of the Estado Novo in 1937. In 1930, after the fall of the República Velha, the power blocs competing for power in the new regime, according to Thomas Skidmore, included groups such as liberal constitutionalists, junior military officers with political affiliations to ideologies such as nationalism, communism, and fascism otherwise known as tenentes, the higher ranks of the military that wanted more attention to military spending and equipment, agriculturalists in the coffee export sector, and civilian elites in the middle class.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Groppo, 291-381.

¹²⁰ Skidmore, pg. 9-12.

Skidmore is specific in regards to these middle class elites. He argues that these elites were “middle class in economic position, although frequently not in attitude.”¹²¹ This means that politically these elites either sided with factions dominated by elites from the upper class in the government or with other factions that rested either on the left or right of the political spectrum. Skidmore contends that this division of the middle class helped Vargas establish the Estado Novo in 1937 and aided him in implementing his reforms.¹²²

The factions that came to prominence after the coup in 1930 soon after began to compete with each other for influence. It was during this process that Vargas proved that he was not a representative of every political group. Groppo illustrates this fact when he comments on the diverse political coalition of the Vargasista regime in 1935, “We want to show that after five years in power Vargas still was constructing a dynamic equilibrium between two antagonistic poles [Left and Right].”¹²³ This is demonstrated by Vargas’ repressive policies towards the revolt in São Paulo by liberal constitutionalists in 1932, the failed communist rebellion in 1935, and the attempted coup by fascist elements in 1938 respectively.¹²⁴ These were not only challenges to the regime’s authority but also were opportunities for Vargas and other political blocs to extend their own power. Vargas’ skill was illustrated by his ability to maintain a fragile national unity by mediating between the political factions that remained loyal to the regime while suppressing

¹²¹ Skidmore, 12.

¹²² Skidmore, 29.

¹²³ Groppo, 381. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹²⁴ Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 42-143.

dissident elements in a way that did not create a civil war. However, by the time of the Estado Novo, Vargas had allowed rightist factions to obtain more political influence according to Seitenfus, “The new Varguista cabinet remained clear in its sympathies towards authoritarian regimes. Incontestably, the common denominator that can be gathered from the governmental team is the clear predominance of considered elements from the Right.”¹²⁵ By 1937, the political factions coalesced into the liberal civilian, tenente, and conservative blocs that formed the basis of support for the Estado Novo. aforementioned above that relied on the unequal structure of power for support. Vargas’ attention had to be focused on these blocs in a system that accepted or tolerated popular participation but still limited it in several ways. These blocs, as those in the Brazilian Empire, were not monolithic with each having their own divisions. Nonetheless, it was Vargas’ role, as was Pedro II’s before him, to negotiate between these groups regardless of internal divisions with national stability as one of the main goals. His role was to mediate between the three political blocs that included conservative, liberal civilian, tenente elements respectively since these factions were the victors in the period of political conflict that affected predated Brazil’s entry into WWII in 1941.

While there are obvious differences between the two periods, Vargas’ position is both similar and different to that of Pedro II who also had to mediate between three main political blocs (aristocratic, civilian, and republican) during the Paraguayan War with the military element being unexpected at the end of his reign.¹²⁶ Both were mediators during

¹²⁵ Seitenfus, 154.

¹²⁶ Roderick J. Barman, *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-91* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 194-231.

key episodes in Brazilian national development with the level of popular participation were radically different. However, the inclusivity of popular elements was decisive in the change in leadership orientation by the time of the Estado Novo. This phenomena can be seen in another one of Vargas' wartime speeches where the political interests of his audience, as well as his own, take precedence over the many domestic concerns that were important to many Brazilians at the time. In this speech, he stresses important themes in the eyes of the prominent groups in which he was a mediator, "Brazil is a people of Christian civilization, whose fundamentals are based in the cardinal virtues of tolerance, respect, and magnanimity; free of prejudices, appreciating in men according to their social value without nourishing hatreds nor cultivating resentment."¹²⁷ The ideals in this speech are focused on ideas found in liberalism and traditionalism in Brazilian politics; one a rising current with the other being an older element. Liberalism in a political and international sense was being reinvigorated during the Estado Novo by a new political bloc composed mainly of new elites and civilians who wanted to really implement ideas (such as racial tolerance and the support of policies that respected Brazilians of all social classes) into practice since past leaders had merely used them as rhetorical prose. They were reformers who sympathized with Vargas and desired Brazil to change ideologically and politically in response to the times. Vargas uses these liberal ideas to appeal to this political bloc, even more so during WWII when the Estado Novo's participation in the war revealed the many contradictions of the regime itself.

¹²⁷ Vargas, *Brazil en Armas*, 187. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

The notions of Brazil being “a people of Christian civilization” was Vargas’ attempt to appeal to the old elitist bloc that survived the fall of both the Brazilian Empire and the República Velha.¹²⁸ The members of this bloc were believers of the values that Pedro II promoted during the Paraguayan War that focused on traditional concepts of honor, class status, and stability in the political and social sense. Even though this bloc diminished in influence after 1930, it still remained relevant since many members of this bloc still maintained political power in several sectors of Brazilian society. Vargas could not ignore this group since the support of the new liberal civilian bloc alone was not enough in his opinion to prevent political unrest. While the conservative bloc was not nearly as powerful as under Pedro II, it served as a counterweight to forces that Vargas felt bound to control relating to movements and machinations by opposition tenentes factions, communists, fascists, and foreign political organizations. Vargas’ appeal to traditional values based on Christianity in his speech was designed for this purpose.

The context of this speech is a model for several others that Vargas gives where liberal, traditional, and nationalistic ideals are emphasized to solidify Vargas’ position as mediator between the three political blocs of conservative, liberal civilian, and military orientations while acknowledging and idealizing domestic concerns in order to capture the imagination of popular forces for the purposes of support for the regime and war effort. This is seen in the following passage, “The imperative of national union continues being our order. In this difficult moment of our times, there is no place for individual salvation nor for the privileges of some, nor for the advantages of groups or factions. The

¹²⁸ Ibid.

interests of the collective are placed above personal interests.”¹²⁹ In this approach, Vargas promotes the goals of the “collective” without defining the word itself. This technique was used to make the popular elements of Vargas’ audience feel they were personally invested in the Estado Novo and were politically relevant. By speaking in such a manner Vargas could appear to be a leader above politics and as a father who could stabilize and lead the Brazilian nation to maturity. Pedro II had a similar image in the latter respect in regards to his status as an arbiter in the Brazilian Empire. During the Paraguayan War, Pedro II in his speeches from the throne discussed the representatives in the Chamber of Deputies as possessing “dedication to the public cause” and having “love for the public welfare”¹³⁰ During this time, the emperor probably believed that the deputies really did represent the Brazilians at large and were dedicated to the country’s advancement. What is noticeable from Vargas’ rhetoric (from the perspective of audience appeal) is the dictator’s goal of appealing to the aforementioned groups due to the fact that their collusion simultaneously solidified his grip on power in the short term, undermined his authority in the long term, and maintained the Brazilian war effort.

Conclusion

In 1945, the *União Democrática Nacional* or National Democratic Union (UDN) formed to oppose the Estado Novo and populist factions. The organization was mainly composed by elites and intellectuals in several areas of Brazilian society who felt it was time for Brazil to return to being a republic with liberal values, such as freedom of speech

¹²⁹ Vargas, *Brazil en Armas*, 55. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹³⁰ Coligidas na Secretaria da Câmara dos Deputados. *Falas do Trono desde o Ano de 1823 até o Ano de 1889* (São Paulo: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1977), 359.

and press, being restored. Several were originally supporters of Vargas, such as Francisco Campos, who supported him in the 1930s but felt alienated as his regime became more dictatorial and repressive in nature. Political dissent by the UDN and others compelled Vargas to make a declaration in April 1944 that promised elections as soon as the war was over. However, when the war in Europe ended in May 1945, Vargas was not willing to give up power so quickly due to reasons regarding Brazil's position in the international arena after the war. Dulles explains further, "Vargas himself was anxious to hold on to power at least until peace negotiations had been concluded. He felt that Brazil's contribution to the United Nations and his own friendship with Roosevelt would give Brazil an important voice in postwar affairs. But in the meantime he wanted the world to know that he respected democracy and freedom as well as law and order."¹³¹ This worry on the part of Vargas did not assuage fears by many in the political and military establishments that the dictator would relinquish power even if elections were held. It is for this reason that in October 1945, after making the mistake of appointing his brother as chief of police, Vargas was deposed by a military coup which brought an end to the Estado Novo. However, this was not the end of Vargas' political influence in Brazil as the former dictator remained dominant in Brazilian politics until his death in 1954.¹³²

What we see from Vargas' rhetoric in a wartime crisis is a change and continuation in the orientation of Brazilian national leadership in wartime between the end of the Paraguayan War in 1870 and the beginning of WWII in 1942. The main

¹³¹ Dulles, 254.

¹³² Lochery, 192-291.

difference between these two eras was the environment in which Pedro II and Vargas reigned. The environment which oversaw the rise of Vargas was one where the Brazilian nation was being redefined and where different political forces were ascending due to the insistence by the majority of Brazilians of more participation and rights when it came to national governance.¹³³ This in turn led to a greater sense of national pride and citizenship that was not seen in previous regimes. In fact, the incapability of the República Velha to adapt to these changes led to its downfall since it relied too heavily on narrow regional and political bases of support which mainly came from the elitist/conservative bloc located in the São Paulo and Minas Gerais. This left a power vacuum when Vargas came to power in 1930. Vargas cast himself as a populist who could negotiate with elites in power as well with the Brazilian people as a whole, hence the choice of orientation in response to the environment.

With the use of his personality, Vargas attempted to place himself above politics so as to be seen as open to all points of political persuasion. This approach in his rhetoric served to attract the imagination of his audience in the Brazilian populace and to create a sense of common purpose among Brazilians in order to stabilize and redefine the nation along new lines and to solidify his position among the prominent political factions (i.e the liberal civilian, conservative, and tenente blocs) that needed to be assuaged to enforce stability. These groups changed from the time of Pedro II (with the exception of the conservative bloc) in that they were either more liberal or militaristic in orientation. Vargas' rhetoric was shaped by the participation of these factions along with the inclusion

¹³³ Levine, 1-45.

of more popular elements in the political process and Brazil's alliance with the U.S during WWII. This affected Vargas' use of liberal, traditional, populist, and other forms of rhetoric to appeal to the different groups that were essential to preserving his regime and sustaining the war effort. Furthermore, according to Skidmore, this interaction affected the internal makeup of the Estado Novo itself, "It is important to understand that, unlike his European mentors in fascism, Vargas did not organize any political movement on which to base his authoritarian regime. There was no Vargas party, no Estado Nôvo movement, no government cadres in Brazilian society."¹³⁴ It can be deduced that the Estado Novo was composed to not be dominated by a single party but to appear to be above parties through the personality of Vargas. This orientation was facilitated in order to mediate between the main factions wherein lied support for the war effort and the regime itself. Furthermore, the immediate crisis of the war and the maintenance of this coalition outweighed long term political calculations which is seen in Vargas' use of international liberalism to justify the war effort. These ideals helped secure liberal civilian support for the Estado Novo during the war but led to the regime's downfall almost immediately afterward due to the apparent contradictions.

An intriguing example of the dynamic behind Vargas' approach can be seen in his speech on November 10, 1937 when Vargas attempts to justify the Estado Novo, "The exigencies of the historical moment and the solicitations of the collective interest demand, sometimes imperiously, the adoption of measures that affect the presumptions and common practices of the regime, their own institutional departments, and the

¹³⁴ Skidmore, 31.

processes and methods of Government.”¹³⁵ What exactly is the “collective interest”? The word “collective interest” can easily appeal to the mentalities of many Brazilians at the time who were nationalist or populist in orientation but can also appeal to the dominant political blocs that supported the Estado Novo for the “collective interest” could be seen by members of these blocs as their interest. From this lens, it made sense of for these blocs to support the creation of the Estado Novo since the previous reformist regime seemed too unstable based on its vulnerability to popular pressure and change rather than its weakness to subversion from communist, fascist, and foreign entities (although they often used the latter to justify the *autogolpe* of Vargas publicly).

Through Vargas’ rhetoric during WWII we can see how the dictator and Pedro II had the same responsibilities even though the situations of their time demanded different orientations with, in the case of Vargas, a populist one. Both were responsible for maintaining an orientation of national leadership that included on a scholarly, charismatic persona charged with appealing to the values held dear by the main political factions and populace at the time. Despite the transformative changes on sees between the Paraguayan War and WWII, through Vargas’ reign one can identify the changes in the strategies and orientations used in wartime crises between these wars in order to defend Brazil in a wartime crisis.

¹³⁵ Vargas, *A Nação*, 3. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

The struggles the Brazilian nation went through in the Paraguayan War and World War II under Pedro II and Getúlio Vargas advanced the cultural, political, economic, and social development of the country. This can be seen in the rhetoric and orientations of the two leaders despite the massive changes that occurred between the two periods. The Brazil during the Paraguayan War and the Brazil during WWII could almost be described as two different societies. In the Brazilian Empire, Pedro II presided over a system that defended slavery in Brazil, preserved a paternalistic political regime that was dominated by political blocs composed from the aristocracy, republican politicians, and a divided but growing middle class, a society where the majority of Brazilians were disenfranchised, and reigned at a time where Brazil as a country was still being defined. Brazil under the Estado Novo in that there was more of a demand for popular participation, different political blocs with traditional, liberal, and militaristic orientations, and where the country as nation was being consolidated as the central government grew in strength under Vargas. Given the backgrounds between these two periods there are stark differences and similarities relating to the common values that each leader used to galvanize the Brazilian populace during wartime crises at critical moments in Brazil's national development.

Defense of the nation during the Paraguayan War focused around the leadership of Pedro II who used values such as honor, the public cause, public tranquility, and

stability to moderate between aristocratic, republican, and middle class power blocs in order to facilitate popular support for the war effort. These ideas were important since they resonated with the political groups in which the emperor relied upon for support. Honor was essential to this effort as implied especially to aristocratic factions that the regime was intent on defending their privileges from internal and external threat. Pedro II's fusion of honor and national defense is seen during the war as he frames the war as a battle to regain Brazil's damaged honor, "The amends to our offended national honor by the president of Paraguay still has not contented us to lay down our arms; it please me then to recognize that you have been the course of all in the pledge of such a sacred duty."¹³⁶ The concept of the public cause was used to create a sense of shared commitment and sense of responsibility on the part of imperial officials towards the defense of all Brazilians through public service and dedication to the war effort. By portraying the Brazilian public as a faceless entity that transcended politics, Dom Pedro was able to appeal to nationalism whereas Brazilian citizens were encouraged to protect other citizens as is seen in a speech he gave in 1865, "The government hopes that from your lights and dedication to the public cause that you will occupy, quickly, the expected offices due to the gravity of the circumstances."¹³⁷ Stability was another major theme that appealed to the political blocs that Pedro II interacted with. Honor could imply the maintenance of privileges and political power but stability implied something different to the groups in power at the time. It implied mainly that of internal stability which signified

¹³⁶ *Falas do Trono*, 363. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹³⁷ *Falas do Trono*, 359. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

environment where elitists within Brazil could exercise their privileges without fear of dissent or rebellion. It was important for Pedro II to stress this during the war so as to reassure his supporters that the regime was protecting their lifestyle while at the same time guiding the war effort. The combination of these themes allowed Pedro II to harness and increase the growing swell of patriotism as the war progressed. This patriotism became especially pronounced in 1867 as is seen through the emperor himself, “I am certain that through the influence of your council, you concur with maintaining the enthusiasm of all Brazilians in the defense of the just cause that we sustain. They [all Brazilians] do not lack aid in bringing about the prompt and honorable end of the war.”¹³⁸ The use of these themes and the evolving sense of patriotism allowed Pedro II to not only defend the imperial regime from external threat but enabled at the same time the further development of Brazil as a nation state.

The management of the Brazilian war effort during WWII by Vargas indicates the use of different ideals to stimulate patriotism and support in another period where Brazil was involved simultaneously in a wartime crisis and a critical point of national development. Unlike the Brazilian Empire in 1864 where much had remained unchanged since the colonial era in regards to its society, hierarchy, and preservation of slavery, Brazil in 1942 was a different that was undergoing large transformations. New political actors and factions were competing for political power after the fall of República Velha in 1930 and new ideologies such as populism, communism, socialism, and fascism were competing with others such as liberalism to determine Brazil’s future. During this period,

¹³⁸ *Falas do Trono*, 378. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

Vargas under the Estado Novo had to galvanize support for the Brazilian war effort while at the same time ensuring that the regime had enough of a coalition to maintain this participation. To do this, Vargas had to use ideas and values that were the most resonant with the Brazilian populace and political factions at the time. These values were mixed between ideologies of populism, reformism, international liberalism, pan-americanism, and nationalism.

Vargas uses a blend of populism and reformism in his rhetoric during WWII in order to identify the war effort with the reformative policies the Estado Novo was promoting during the war. Vargas portrayed the war as a just cause that would strengthen Brazil's independence as a nation. He associated this independence with the ability of the Brazilian government to reform Brazilian society for the benefit of all Brazilians. In order to galvanize support for the war, Vargas uses populism and reformism in his rhetoric to establish a connection between the public and the war effort, "The consequences of the fight in the which we find ourselves bound to will decide the destinies of the world. They cannot inspire in us apprehensions. The privileges of caste, racial prejudices, inequalities of fortune, class oppressions, malicious hatreds, every value that is apparently irreconcilable to contemporary civilization will have been erased in this inferno of such vast proportions. In a holocaust lies the dawn of a new era."¹³⁹ To Vargas, appeals to the Brazilian populace was not enough to defend the Estado Novo and Brazil during wartime. He had to at least appear to advance the goals of the major political factions that formed

¹³⁹ Vargas, *Brazil en Armas*, 150. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

the basis of the Estado Novo itself regarding the liberal civilian, tenente, and conservative blocs.

During WWII, Vargas used concepts of international liberalism in his rhetoric in order to maintain the allegiance of many Brazilian elites in the government and middle class. The use of this rhetoric came at a great cost to the Estado Novo as became an overt contradiction to the values Vargas was promoting due to the regime's authoritarian characteristics. This contradiction can be seen in Vargas' speech, "If it rests upon ourselves to fight, it will not be to avoid defeat but to obtain a complete victory with the intention of restructuring the world on more humane and just bases, with respect towards the sovereignty of all nations, big or small, militarily weak or strong. Each people will be able to organize themselves according to their own will, expressed through the means of their historical tradition and the imperatives of their autonomous existence."¹⁴⁰ He expresses the intention of defending sovereignty and self-determination overseas when the Estado Novo was either lacking it or suppressing the same things within Brazil itself. However, Vargas used this type of rhetoric to secure the support of a liberal civilian political bloc who valued these ideals. Whether it was freely his choice or not is irrelevant since the Estado Novo could not sustain the Brazilian war effort without the support of this bloc with its members across Brazil's middle and professional classes.

In the war effort, Vargas had to appeal to U.S support through vague references to pan-americanism in his wartime speeches. This pan-americanism manifested in the idea of the "espírito americanista" as is seen in Vargas' address in 1944, "The *espírito*

¹⁴⁰ Getúlio Vargas, *Discursos* (Rio de Janeiro: Coleção Brasil, 1944), 19. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

americanista [italics mine] that presides over our determinations is based on that of the restoration of human values, liberty, and justice.”¹⁴¹ Furthermore, this concept was compared with the idea of cooperation with the United States even though it was phrased in a different as can be seen in Vargas’ own words, “Our continent, in this tormented hour of the world, must concentrate all of its energies towards a work of american cooperation.”¹⁴² This “american cooperation” was phrased in this way to portray Brazil and other countries in the Americas (especially the United States) that they were equals in a just cause without explaining the reality that Brazil’s sovereignty was weaker than it appeared. This misdirection was necessary in the opinion of Varguista officials in order to prevent any political embarrassment for the Estado Novo during WWII for the purposes of maintaining a diverse coalition of factions for the war effort. At the same time, Vargas was ensuring U.S support for the war effort by affirming that the Roosevelt regime could depend on the Estado Novo for resources and support whether it be in the delivery of raw materials or in the use of Brazilian bases. The reaffirmation of this support was crucial for Brazil during the war not only because the U.S gave the Estado Novo lots of military and financial aid through the Lend-Lease Act but because U.S support was important for the political reforms and economic modernization policies of the regime.

Nationalism was used in a specific way during WWII in order for Vargas to enforce a shared sense of Brazilian patriotism during WWII. This patriotism was expanding during this period as Vargas appealed to the self-sacrifice and duty of Brazilian

¹⁴¹ Vargas, *Discursos*, 55. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹⁴² Vargas, *As Novas Diretrizes da Nova Política*, 89. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

citizens as can be seen in his own words, “It was this vocation in which you have dedicated your life. To live to serve the *pátria* [italics mine] at every instant; to study and work continually towards your perfections, each time more, and you will become more efficient in this high and noble profession, worthy of your labors.”¹⁴³ This appeal was also directed to the tenente factions that supported the Estado Novo since 1937 and helped in its consolidation in the 1940s. These tenente factions, mainly of a rightist orientation, favored concepts such as corporatism, authoritarianism, and, above all, nationalism. Vargas’ rhetoric used this concept of nationalism during WWII in order to preserve the support of this tenente political bloc. In addition, Vargas was not afraid to mix this nationalism with traditionalism to appeal to the weakened but still influential conservative bloc in the Estado Novo, “Brazil is a people of Christian civilization, whose fundamentals are based in the cardinal virtues of tolerance, respect, and magnanimity; free of prejudices, appreciating in men according to their social value without nourishing hatreds nor cultivating resentment.”¹⁴⁴ As can be seen here, this bloc shared traits with the same bloc that supported Pedro II during the Paraguayan War who valued the same concepts such as hierarchy (as can be seen with Vargas’ use of social value). However, it is also tinged with liberalism in its focus on tolerance and respect. It was the combination of these types of rhetorical techniques that allowed Vargas to sustain the Brazilian war effort and the support of major political blocs at a time where Brazilian patriotism was

¹⁴³ Vargas, *Discursos*, 47. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

¹⁴⁴ Vargas, *Brazil en Armas*, 187. Translated by Nick Ortiz.

evolving but where there was still political fluctuations; fluctuations that would continue after the fall of the Estado Novo in 1945.

From the rhetoric of both Pedro II and Vargas, one can see the changes and constants in two major periods of where Brazil experienced a large degree of national development during a wartime crisis. In both periods, both Dom Pedro and Vargas portrayed themselves as above politics in order to both promote an image of themselves as defenders of the nation and to mediate effectively between the major political blocs at the time in order to sustain a war effort. These constants rest side by side with the notable changes that swept Brazil between these periods of time. These changes can best be seen through the rhetoric of these two national leaders and how the use of ideas changed in order to galvanize support at different periods of time. Both wars took place during periods of national development for Brazil and helped stimulate this development. This process was aided by both Pedro II and Vargas through their rhetoric which not only galvanized segments of Brazil's population but framed these periods of expansion based on ideas that were valued at the time. The ideas promoted in 1864 were very different from those in 1942 given the fact that Brazil had transformed dramatically in this span of seventy-eight years. Under Pedro II, concepts such as honor, the public cause, and stability were used to appeal to mainly elitist, aristocratic factions that made up the main base of support for the Brazilian Empire with the expansion of patriotism these values engendered being used by the emperor to gain support from Brazil's middle class and republican political factions. These values were important to many Brazilian officials at a time where slavery and paternalism greatly limited popular participation in the political

process. However, by 1942, political participation was a reality and had to be accepted by politicians and leaders, such as Vargas, at least in theory if a regime was to prosper.

Therefore, Vargas could not use the same values as Pedro II due to the fact that there were more political actors in the 1940s than there were in the 1840s. Here we see this change where Vargas uses a more diverse set of rhetoric that derive from ideologies such as populism, reformism, international liberalism, pan-americanism, and nationalism to appeal to the Brazilian populace as a whole, give reassurances of support to allies such as the United States, and the major political blocs that included liberal civilian, tenente, and conservative elements. In order for the Estado Novo to sustain itself and galvanize segments of Brazilian society for the war effort during WWII, Vargas had to be flexible and varying with his rhetoric, even if the use of the rhetoric expedited the demise of his regime (as with the use of international liberalism).

The analyses presented in this paper can be used in comparisons with other Latin American countries during a wartime crisis. Comparisons between the rhetoric used by Pedro II during the Paraguayan War can be made between countries such as Bolivia and Chile during the nineteenth century. Similar comparisons between the rhetoric used by Vargas during WWII can be made between other countries such as Colombia and Mexico during the same period who also declared war on the Axis and identified with the Allied cause. These comparisons can focus on how the rhetoric used is similar or different to that used by the Brazilian emperor or the dictator of the Estado Novo in a wartime crisis and how these similarities or differences are due to the environment and audience in which the words are being used. The main contribution of this paper is its core argument

that during periods of wartime crisis, one can see how expansions in Brazilian national development and patriotism were stimulated by the rhetoric used by Pedro II and Vargas who used ideas that appealed to a wide array of the populace at the time not only to consolidate a political orientation that would not only to solidify support for their respective regimes but demonstrates how the evolution and constancy of different aspects of Brazilian politics and leadership during these two wars can be seen through the rhetoric of these two national leaders.

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