Access Control Design and Implementation for Direct Memory Access Attack

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Hughes, M. (2021). Access Control Design and Implementation for Direct Memory Access Attack. Unc Charlotte Electronic Theses And Dissertations.
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Abstract

With technology advancements and becoming prevalent in everyday lives, the need for robust and comprehensive security measures is growing. To defend against brute force type of attacks, encryption algorithms have been used to keep user information on hardware safe from outside influences. However, such counter measures are vulnerable to non-invasive side-channel attacks. The direct attacks are used to go after vulnerabilities in algorithm while a side channel attack focuses on analyzing certain physical characteristics of the hardware and using statistical calculations to gain access to private information. In this work, we explore a type of side channel attacks that uses the systems Direct Memory Access (DMA) protocol to compromise the system and later propose a lightweight authentication scheme that identifies the compromised chips and mitigate such attach and makes the system resilient to corrupted hardware without modifications to either the physical hardware or the protocols of the system. The scheme provides protection by generating a unique identifier for trusted hardware and storing the identifiers in a database on the system, allowing only hardware that matches the identifiers to have access to the system and the system's memories.

Details
Author

Hughes, Marcus

Title

Access Control Design and Implementation for Direct Memory Access Attack

Physical Description

1 online resource (41 pages) : PDF

Date

2021

Degree Granting Institution

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Abstract

With technology advancements and becoming prevalent in everyday lives, the need for robust and comprehensive security measures is growing. To defend against brute force type of attacks, encryption algorithms have been used to keep user information on hardware safe from outside influences. However, such counter measures are vulnerable to non-invasive side-channel attacks. The direct attacks are used to go after vulnerabilities in algorithm while a side channel attack focuses on analyzing certain physical characteristics of the hardware and using statistical calculations to gain access to private information. In this work, we explore a type of side channel attacks that uses the systems Direct Memory Access (DMA) protocol to compromise the system and later propose a lightweight authentication scheme that identifies the compromised chips and mitigate such attach and makes the system resilient to corrupted hardware without modifications to either the physical hardware or the protocols of the system. The scheme provides protection by generating a unique identifier for trusted hardware and storing the identifiers in a database on the system, allowing only hardware that matches the identifiers to have access to the system and the system's memories.

Genre

masters theses

Subjects--Topics

Electrical engineering

Degree

M.S.

Keywords

Direct Memory Access
Dma Attack
Hardware
Security

Subject Area

Electrical Engineering

Advisor(s)

Saqib, Fareena

Committee Members

Mukherjee, Arindam
Smith-Weldon, Kathryn

Degree Note

Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2021.

Rights Statement

This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). For additional information, see http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/.

Rights Holder Information

Copyright is held by the author unless otherwise indicated.

Identifier

Hughes_uncc_0694N_12997

Permalink

http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13093/etd:2652